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This is a 33-minute preview of our vintage 1 hr, 46-minute episode.
Discussing parts of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1740) and Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
Where do we get our moral ideas? Hume and Smith both thought that we get them by reflecting on our own moral judgments and on how we and others (including imaginary, hypothesized others) in turn judge those judgments. Mark, Wes, Seth, and guest Getty Lustila, a phil grad student at Georgia State University, hash through the Scottish stoicism to lay out the differences between these two gents and whether their views constitute an actual moral theory or just a descriptive enterprise.
We read the sections from the Treatise and from Smith in D.D. Raphael’s collection British Moralists: 1650-1800 (Volumes 2): Volume II: Hume – Bentham, and Index Read more about the topic and selections.
End song: “Honest Judge” by New People from the 2010 album “Impossible Things,” written and sung by Nate Pinney.
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Transcript
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0:42 Mark: You're listening to the Partially Examined Life, a philosophy podcast by some guys who were at one point set on doing philosophy for a living, but then thought better of it. Our question for episode 45 is can ethics be founded on human moral sentiments as opposed to alien moral sentiments? I don't know. And we read selections from David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature from 1740 and Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments from 1759. Our selections from these came from the anthology British Moralists 1650-1800, Volume 2, compiled by D.D. raphael. If you look on partiallyexaminedlife.com we'll spell out exactly which selections we read and link to online versions of the original texts. My name is Mark Linsenmayer, positively evaluating my own approval of my actions in Madison, Wisconsin.
1:27 Seth: This is Seth Paskin experiencing both gratitude and resentment in Austin, Texas.
1:32 Wes: This is Wes Alwan in Boston, Massachusetts.
1:34 Getty: This is Getty Lustala performing the Awful Virtue of Self command in Atlanta, Georgia. Awful.
1:42 Mark: All right, Getty, who are you? Why are you here?
1:44 Getty: I'm a graduate student in philosophy at Georgia State University. My main area of interest is in modern philosophy, and I'm writing my thesis currently on Hume and his conception of freedom.
1:56 Seth: Welcome, Geddy.
1:58 Getty: Thanks.
1:58 Wes: Yeah, welcome.
1:59 Mark: Yeah, so I don't know. I never had to read Adam Smith, certainly not his ethical works in graduate school or anywhere else. So stumbling across somebody who'd actually studied that recently was a find.
2:11 Getty: Yeah, I took a seminar on it last fall, actually. One of the professors here, Eric Wilson, taught a class on Kant and Smith. It was really interesting and it wasn't a book that I had expected on really getting that much out of, but it's actually quite a joy to read.
2:26 Mark: And the other impetus to doing this besides our march forward, we wanted to get to Karl Marx and to the wealth of nations and some other more modern political stuff, but was on our recent Patricia Churchland episode, she had referred to Hume quite a bit such that we actually officially read some Hume for that episode, but that was really just a taste and made me want to do some more. So Hume and Smith give us some early alternatives for something like a naturalist ethics. Right. An ethics that is in line is compatible with modern science, if you want
2:57 Wes: to say, just to kind of narrow that down. Most philosophers who hear the phrase moral naturalism will think of it's a brand of moral realism that says moral judgments have truth values, they correspond to objective moral facts and that those facts are based in natural facts, whether they're identical or reducible. So I think Hume's project, while it's naturalist in a broader sense, that he thinks of himself as examining human nature, let's say it's not necessarily in line with the project of moral naturalism because Hume, right, his whole derivation of moral sentiment is compatible with being what's called a non cognitivist or compatible with thinking that moral judgments don't have truth values and that they don't really express anything but emotions, which if you believe that then there's nothing to naturalize.
Naturalizing is trying to save a form of moral realism. And it's unclear whether Hume is even a moral realist.
3:56 Seth: Right.
3:56 Mark: And though Smith is usually put in the same category with him, they were friends, they had the same influencers. Francis Hutcheson was a guy that was maybe invented this moral sentimentalism kind of stuff or at least was the popularizer right before him who was actually Smith's teacher and read the draft of the third book of the treatise by Hume that was on morals, although apparently Hutcheson didn't like it.
4:17 Getty: So I don't. No, I didn't.
4:19 Mark: In any case there's a commonality there. But actually reading Smith, he seems to maybe have a more straightforward view of that yes, morality is real and we know about it, but still he's in common with Hume that we kind of know about it by reflecting on our sentiments about things.
4:32 Getty: Right?
4:33 Wes: Yeah.
4:33 Mark: As opposed to the rationalists which we talked about Kant in another episode. Kant is later than Hume, of course, later than both these guys. But the idea that we figure out morality straight from reason, somehow both of these guys are instead saying let's look at your feelings. And that has to somehow maybe in a very circuitous way, but provide the foundations for morality.
4:52 Getty: You could interpret Hume as a sort of non cognitiveist but I think that would be not to be in line with his project because I think to even submit him to that kind of framework of cognitivism and non cognitivism assumes that there's something else to morality except the sentiments I Think he's pretty clear. And I think you guys for the church and episode, you read some of the second inquiry and he's pretty clear in the introduction about the sort of realness of morality in terms of the way that it shapes our lives through the sentiment. So I think that that's not really even a question for Hume, whether it exists or not.
5:31 Wes: Hume wouldn't phrase it in those terms, but the secondary literature is filled with arguments on whether or not to interpret Hume as a cognitivist or non cognitivist or how to interpret it. And I think the important thing here is that you could take a Humean position on moral sentiments and you could go either way. You could say, yes, there are such things, that moral judgments do have truth value. Or you can say that no they don't. And then if you do accept the idea that they have truth values, then you could conceivably be a non naturalist Humean and say that those must be based in non natural properties. Or you could be a naturalist Humean. I think. Getty, would you agree in a sense that Hume's position here is compatible with a whole range of meta ethical positions?
6:12 Getty: Yeah, no, I agree with that. Yeah, definitely.
6:14 Mark: And here's where Seth jumps in and tells us we're getting hit.
6:17 Seth: I was like, wow, you guys are really jumping the gun. So how about we lay a little groundwork before you start talking about how Hume can or can't be interpreted in meta ethical systems?
6:31 Wes: Well, the point is, if we're going to start calling Hume a moral naturalist, then we need to say what that is.
6:36 Seth: Well, we didn't, Mark did.
6:38 Wes: Because that's a contemporary sort of thing.
6:40 Mark: Something that is not overtly anti science. How about that?
6:45 Wes: Yeah, well, I think framing it in terms of his opposition to the rationalism came before is if we're looking at
6:51 Mark: the contemporary moral landscape, and I'm not talking about among philosophers, I'm talking about among our listening population, probably there's still the you can only have morality if you have God telling you what to do. And then you have everybody else who is. No, maybe we don't need that. In fact, if you read Plato's Euthyphro, you could even think that it's incoherent, that God's commands with themselves dictate right or wrong, that instead he is commanding in accordance with right or wrong.
7:18 Wes: Right.
7:18 Mark: This is a very old position. But you might say we don't need necessarily to refer to religion to figure out what is right and wrong. Okay, then what else could it be founded on. It's founded on something in human experience. The question then becomes, how do we figure out, you know, is it because we all have this innate faculty of reason that in the same way we could figure out basic mathematical truths, we could just look and see what moral goodness is? That's the rationalist position. Or is it some things just really piss me off and they piss you off, too. And when we sit back and reflect on our being pissed off, you know, we can see patterns in how we're pissed off. And somehow out of that, we build morality. Both of the latter two options there, I think are compatible with science. Putting aside the term moral naturalism.
8:01 Wes: Yeah. I mean, I think the compatible with science part you're getting at the idea that you can say, look at the structure of the mind, what Hume was doing, even though he's sort of introspecting, he's thinking of it as an empirical project. Right. The idea is that whether you're introspecting and looking at the structure of the mind or whether you're looking at brain structure is that you can found moral behavior in human nature in some way or human physiology. But that project today, that's sort of uncontroversial across any ethical system. The idea that you can say, well, yes, there's a certain human nature, there are certain faculties that we possess that ground our ability to make moral judgments, that's sort of an uncontroversial thing that's taken for granted across any ethical system.
8:46 Mark: So the other purpose of this though then is since we're following up on the Churchland episode, is since Wes and Seth were not on there, now they get to say the things they would have liked to have said there and be as nasty as they want in a very oblique way, as Wesley.
9:00 Wes: No, I mean, touching upon that. It's just, you know, we've been talking a lot on the blog about the is-ought distinction and Sam Harris and all that stuff. I think some people are confused. They think that establishing facts about human nature and saying that we can derive moral behavior from those facts gets at bridging the odd is distinction. That has nothing to do with the odd is distinction. Unless you get into a far more sophisticated constructivist, neo pragmatist or neo Kantian position, the facts at issue are the moral judgments themselves. The question is whether or not you can get from descriptive empirical facts to moral facts via deduction or possibly via induction. I think that's where I thought I saw some confusion in Churchland. She was kind of Vague enough that it was hard to tell.
9:45 Getty: I think you're right, Wes. I think what the problem is with the churchland, for example, is that the only way that you can point at human nature and the sort of structure of what Butler would call the inner frame of the person and draw sort of normative conclusions from that is if you have built into how the human being was structured some conception of God. So that's the only way to really bridge that by looking at how humans actually are. So I think that's right.
10:14 Seth: Hey, Mark.
10:15 Mark: Yes.
10:16 Seth: It occurs to me that we haven't laid the ground rules.
10:19 Mark: That is exactly what I was going to suggest because he mentioned Bishop Butler there, which clearly was a dropping of something. So here's your quiz, Geddy. I think you should know we quiz the guests. Can you name any of our discussion ground rules?
10:32 Getty: Well, the one should be no name dropp.
10:38 Mark: Good job. Good, good. Right. Just make your point. Don't say you would understand me if only you had read Schleiermacher and the
10:44 Getty: Art of Pistol Whipping.
10:45 Mark: I've had that one on my page here for about four months. I have not done one of those jokes in a little while. Any others that you can call.
10:54 Getty: There's one about being accurate unless. Unless not doing so will be more fun.
11:04 Mark: And the other one is it's more general than the name dropping, but it's the same principle.
11:09 Getty: Try to assume that our audience doesn't know anything about any of this.
11:13 Mark: Three for three, man.
11:14 Wes: I think maybe we should change the name dropping to arguments from authority because the idea isn't that you can't bring up anyone else. And then, you know, often, Mark, you're reading more of the text than we are. So you're bringing things into. It's not that you can't bring things into it that others haven't read. You just have to be willing to explain it.
11:33 Mark: And we were having an email dispute about that. So Seth was saying I should probably not do that.
11:38 Wes: Right.
11:38 Seth: I was just saying that I was not going to read all the stuff that you said you were going to read. In addition, it's hard enough for me to keep up. This was a lot of reading for an episode. It really was going for like the secondary sources and all that stuff was just too much for me.
11:52 Mark: Let me just say where this particular conflict over this one is coming from. So, yes, of course, we could just say, let's try to do what we normally do with a text and read this chunk of Hume's treatise or Hume's Later Inquiry on Morals where he sort of restates the things in the Treatise or the Smith or try to cram both texts in there like we normally do. They're both very long. Right? Both the Hume and the Smith, especially the Smith theory. Moral Sentiments in original form. It's a hugely long book to try to pick a selection from it. I mean, first, yes, I got getty involved to try to just make him do that.
But then his suggestion, actually it struck a chord for me. So this British Moralists book, which is actually two volumes by DD Raphael here, British moral 1650-1800. I mean the two volumes is really is just one volume divided into two books because it would be too massive. But I own this from a course that I took in grad school called I think Moral Intuitionism or something. And what I really found cool about this, not only that, it. So it has your big names, it has your Hobbes and your Hume and it ends with Bentham. So in fact a lot of these guys are prefiguring utilitarianism.
If you want to go back and listen to that episode by us. And it's giving, it's a dialogue. So it's giving short selections not only from these big guys, but also from guys like Bishop Butler that you mentioned or John Balguy is a guy that I wouldn't mind bringing up or many others that are sort of just giving you. It's not like Hume is just this genius talking out of nowhere. All these ideas that he was throwing around were floating around like the determinism and things that's in him and the way he talks about ideas leading to other ideas and motivation is all from Hobbes.
And just to talk about moral sentiments and first place, right was Hutcheson. Or there's another guy, the Earl of Shaftesbury. He's actually known by Shaftesbury instead of his actual name. But anyway, that course was kind of fun for me is reading some of these selections by lesser known guys as well as more known guys to just get at what are the arguments back and forth. Don't get lost in Hume himself because as soon as you descend into Hume, if you really want to get at evaluating his particular views, you have to understand his epistemology, you have to understand his overall philosophy.
It's just difficult. If we want to get sort of what is the modern upshot of this. Let's try to state in one or two sentences what the. Oh, okay. It's based on moral sentiments. Well, what does that exactly mean? And then looking at what A couple different people have to say about this and what other people had to say against that, that was interesting to me. So that even though I did toward the end of this, just immerse myself and like read as much as the Smith as I could read, even beyond the selections that were in here, my initial approach was this was I want to skim these British moralists books.
Read a little bit from a lot of the authors again, to get a flavor of what was going on at the time and where these ideas came from and why we should care about them now. But I will not try to convey the bulk of what I took in in that through here. However, I did write down some questions that we can bring up in evaluating these guys from the rationalist John Balguy who is very near to Hume and Smith chronologically. All right, so Seth, give the other side. You did the more immersive thing, right. What was your overall impression of these guys?
Had you read any of them, Smith in particular before or no?
14:56 Wes: No.
14:57 Seth: In fact, I think I've been the one who's been advocating to read Smith Hume. I've read before, although it's been a long time. In fact, I was thinking back, do you remember there are those canonical versions of the Hume. One was green and one was kind of like a red or burgundy.
15:12 Wes: Yeah, the burgundy.
15:13 Seth: Yeah, the thick little paperbacks. I'm the one who listens to EconTalk and has been getting all excited about reading Smith and getting into the econom and kind of getting into that direction. Originally I was the one who advocated to do wealth of Nations. And then I said, oh, well, you know, we need to get into Theory of Moral Sentiments. I gotta say, I had to slog through it a little bit. Now. Maybe that's just a function of me trying to read on the Kindle. This is the first massive work that I've tried to read on the Kindle, which was not easy, Mark, you know, thinking about the difference between being normative and descriptive.
And I kept coming back as I was reading this to is he cataloging something or is this really a theory of Moral sentiments? While I appreciated it, I'm anxious to see the outcome of this discussion because I'm hoping to gain a little bit more insight than I have. Hume, as always, is an absolute delight. And I think the older I get and the more I read, the more I become a Humean.
16:07 Mark: Other folks, impressions, obviously. Getty, you're excited about this, you're writing about it. How does this sort of, this overall moral sentiment theory affects you think this is still right on. This is not just of historical interest. This is super relevant now or in some sense.
16:21 Getty: I work more on his stuff on freedom, so I'm less tied to the debates in his moral philosophy. But I do find him and Smith's brand of sentimentalism, at least at the face, convincing. And I think Smith personally, I find him a joy to read. I think some of the passages are just absolutely beautiful. I think as far as the best candidates for a theory of moral philosophy, they're definitely there.
16:46 Mark: Yeah, I agree, because they're reflecting our experiences and reporting so much on. This is what we disapprove of, this is what we approve of as opposed to a top down theory. You know, it makes them seem much more initially plausible than say Kant, who you tried to apply his abstract theory to actual cases and it's really difficult. Or utilitarianism where it's just really maximizing the benefit for the greatest possible people is always going to be the best action. So if I need to kill you to make a thousand people a little happy, that's okay.
You know, just things jump out, these obvious exceptions to these rules. But if you don't start with rules and you're just cataloging, then there's less to initially attack. Unless you just think. And I got this impression that a lot of what Smith is saying is a result of his own. Well, it's Scottish, but basically the English Stoic sensibility, sense of propriety, etc.
17:37 Getty: I think that's right. There's definitely some passages where that comes through. I know there's one particular one when he's talking about utility and how that plays out as beauty in everyday life. And he gives the example of his butler putting things in the wrong places and how that's just irritating. I remember when we read that in class, it was like, oh, it's kind of a little hard to identify with that these days.
18:04 Mark: But just the whole thing about what is proper is not to express too much emotion more than observers would be able to sympathize with you.
18:11 Seth: Well, that's the thing. It's all a function of what the independent observer would consider to be the appropriate amount of emotion to show. Right.
18:18 Wes: Should we back up and say what this theory of Moral Sentiments is?
18:22 Mark: Please do.
18:25 Getty: Wes, do you want to do the introduction to the Theory of Moral Sentiments?
18:29 Wes: Why don't you do that if you have.
18:30 Mark: Yes.
18:31 Getty: Slave beef? You want me to say some stuff about Smith too?
18:35 Wes: Or just maybe let's start with Hume?
18:37 Mark: Because with Hume we can get More at the meta ethical issues. Smith is more rich as to the act content.
18:44 Wes: I think Smith is going to elaborate on the whole what the moral sentiment is and have a more sophisticated theory of that. But as far as getting at what is Hume responding to in the rationalists and what is his argument about why rationalism doesn't work, and so on and so forth.
19:02 Getty: Okay. One of the main people that Hume is responding to in all of his texts is a philosopher named Samuel Clarke. Clarke, who was a English theologian who was kind of seen as the sort of the height of like moral rationalism. So he thought that performing moral actions was just like doing math equations. And there's a lot of talk of fittedness in Clarke. So it's the idea that these moral truths are sort of written into the universe in some way and that what you have to do is sort of get at how everything is connected. It's a sort of conceptual way of looking at morality.
19:40 Mark: And it's always the same example. Right. It's gratitude and beneficence that those concepts just fit together. If somebody does something nice for you, it just fits with that to do something nice back there.
19:51 Getty: And the example of mathematics is used all the time. So like you can see in Hume, even though he doesn't reference Clarke, he'll talk about fitting or fittedness when he's talking about rationalism. So he's going after Clarke in those examples. Do we want to talk about the specific arguments that Hume gives?
20:09 Mark: Yeah, I mean, just that you can sort of see out of his epistemology why this would not be okay with him. Because seeing this fittedness or really any other truth that you would get at through reason. Right. Through what you would do to figure out math problems is not going to be something that according to Hume could be a motivator.
20:28 Getty: Right.
20:28 Mark: Because everything we experience for Hume is either an impression or an idea.
20:33 Wes: Where an idea is like a copy of an impression.
20:35 Mark: Yeah. It's like a fainter version.
20:37 Wes: Yeah.
20:38 Mark: And ideas are what reason deals with. That's the manipulation. But it doesn't deal with sort of the raw stuff, the impressions that come straight from the senses. And in fact, I think Hume, definitely Hutchinson, I, forgetting where I read this, wanted to say specifically, you don't want to confuse impressions with the specific five sense organs. Like there are plenty of impressions that we have that we can't identify as this is a smell or this is a color that is given to us. So you could have an impression of the moral value of something and it's just a Certain kind of special feeling that you get.
And we might not even be able to put into other words exactly what that feeling is or how it differs from other feelings, though we could talk about patterns of what kind of stuff in general causes us to have that feeling. But the quality of the feeling itself, the feeling is somehow elemental.
21:24 Getty: Some impressions are going to feel more or less. The will, for example, is the example that Hume uses the will as the most potent impression that we have.
21:34 Mark: And then part of his psychological theory, right, is that people act. And I think this is mostly from Hobbes smashed in with Hume's epistemology. But people act in response to, well, motives. But motives, then are a certain kind of impression, right? It can't be something feeble, A little idea sitting back there is not going to actually motivate us to do something. Now, we could figure out a matter of fact, an idea, and that would trigger some impression, some motive that is already there. So I might logically deduce that my wife is cheating on me or something, but that in itself would not make me do anything.
It's only because I have this antecedent desire for that not to happen. So desires and the will, all these things are impressions, and those are the things that actually push us and move us. And so no verdict of reason could be a motivator. So therefore morality can't be a verdict of reason.
22:28 Wes: Right.
22:29 Seth: And I think that's one of the compelling points. Hume makes the point that reason can never compel you to action, that there's always something else you have to add to an idea or to something arrived at via reason in order to get action. And to me, that's a very insightful comment. It says a lot about the rationalist enterprise when you look at rationalist systems, not just for ethics, but also the enterprise of philosophy, insofar as it's an exercise in reason. And a lot of times you end up saying, and so what? What am I supposed to do? Why is this interesting?
Right? And the fact of the matter is, is that what we find interesting, what it is that motivates us to talk about things, why we get passionate about things, why ideas matter, has nothing to do with reason. It has to do with something else. Which in turn makes the question interesting of why is that particular thing of interest to you, and why are you passionate about it, and why do you care?
23:21 Wes: Yeah, I think that's a good way of putting it. And another way of saying it is that you always have to make reference to the desire of the agent. If you're talking about motivation. Morality has to be motivating. And you could take some fact of the matter like there's a big juicy apple on the table, any descriptive fact like that. But to get to the motivating element, you always have to refer back to the desire of the agent. And so you'll never derive the motivating and therefore moral element just out of the descriptive fact. And the other angle for Hume, reason, judges of facts or relations of ideas, which is like saying the a posteriori empirical and the a priori relations of ideas.
Like, for instance, mathematics is a matter of relations of ideas. You know, I think many of the rationalists went the route of talking about morality is akin to mathematics. And for Hume, that fails as well, because any relations that you can talk about, they apply just as much to animals or inanimate objects as they would to human beings. So, for instance, the acorn falling. The idea is, you could take, say, a simpler example of one animal killing another animal, and that relation in of itself can't be described as moral. It's not the relation itself that gives you the moral quality.
We wouldn't talk about one animal killing another as being a moral issue, even though we would with human beings. So it must be something more than the simple state of affairs there that gives rise to the moral element. And that will come down to sympathy and approbation and those sorts of concepts.
24:58 Mark: Well, let's chase that down for a second because I think that's good to have that example on the table. So. Right. Hume's response to that or Smith's response to that is it's not the relation of objects that we're witnessing that we're talking about one animal killing another animal. It's the fact that this inspires in us seeing this murder, a special feeling. And the feeling is different when it's two animals or when it's a person doing something. Okay, but the obvious response to that is it's not just the feeling. The feeling is based on something.
It is based on an apprehension that in the case of a person killing, that that person has certain intentions and has a sort of a required level of reflection and reason to be a member of the moral community. Whatever, you know, it's not just the killing or the desire to kill. Maybe you want to say animals have desires to kill, but it's the freedom or whatever we want to say is going into making it a moral choice. Why is Hume's interpretation better than that? More sort of common sense interpretation of the difference?
25:53 Getty: The common sense Interpretation being being that
25:56 Mark: it's because of the agency of the person, that is the difference. It's not our reaction to it. It still has to do with the event that you are witnessing.
26:04 Wes: This is one of the objections he brings up where you could say, well, why not appeal to free will of the agent?
26:09 Mark: Hume says we have to bring in the spectator for it to be immoral action. Right. If you just had somebody alone on an island, going around, and then another person somehow is there, and the first person kills the second person, well, would that be immoral in itself? If there's no third person, it seems like you haven't developed the moral. I'm not sure exactly what to say. Hume would have to say, that is not murder, because there's no spectator, there's no community to judge it. But yet maybe this person. I don't know.
26:35 Wes: That's.
26:35 Mark: It's a problematic example, because how would the person alone on the island, who's never seen another person, understand that this is a rational being that he's killing or something? So it's problematic to try to pull the spectator out of the situation. But I guess the question is, does the source of the value lie in the spectator's reaction? Yes, the spectator is reacting to what he imagines the motives of the actor are. That is part of it. But is it really? Do we have to talk about the spectator at all in saying that it's moral, or can we just refer to the motives?
27:05 Wes: Well, I'm looking at page 16.
27:07 Getty: What section?
27:08 Mark: Treatise book three, part one, section one, a little bit into it.
27:12 Wes: This is where I think he brings up the free will objection and then responds to it. Right.
27:16 Mark: So he brings up that example we say, killing your father is bad. Okay, but think about a tree drops an acorn, and the acorn grows into a tree that completely smothers out the its parent tree. So that's the same relation as parricide. But of course, that's not moral evil. So he says, it is not sufficient to reply that a choice or will is wanting. For in the case of parricide, a will does not give rise to any different relations, but is only the cause from which the action is derived and consequently produces the same relations that in the oak or elm arise from some other principles.
It is a will or choice that determines a man to kill his parent, and they are the laws of matter and motion that determine a sapling to destroy the oak from which it is sprung. Here, then, the same relations have different causes, but still the relations are the same. And as their Discovery is not, in both cases, attended with the notion of immorality. It follows that the notion does not arise from such a discovery. Now, I don't know if that response relies on his peculiar account of free will.
28:12 Getty: It does.
28:13 Mark: Yes.
28:14 Getty: So, because physical and moral necessity are the same thing for him. So when he's talking about the will causing things, it causes things just like gravity causes a rock to fall. But the only difference is, in the case with the agents or human beings, is that it's a particular kind of cause, namely, one that flows from some agent's motive or desire to do something. So that is what makes the two cases different, is that in one case, it's the type of cause that flows from some person's motive, even though it's equally as necessary as the other one.
28:50 Wes: Yeah, that makes sense.
28:51 Mark: So if we get rid of that, I'm tempted to bring in Kant just because he's the person we talked about the most on this podcast, but let's not use him as one of the rationalists would say, you know, God gives us free will, and you, Hume, your Hobbesian account of mental determinism is just messed up. And so I don't know if he has a response to that other than go read my epistemology for the reason why I hold this psychological view.
29:16 Getty: I think that's right. There's just kind of an impasse at this point.
29:21 Mark: Maybe Smith can save us here. Right, Because Smith does not have that same view. And in fact, what I read in this online introduction to the Smith book was, yeah, Smith doesn't deal with this rationalism versus moral sentiment thing because sort of by his time, which of course is only 20 years after Hume was writing his, it was already in his mind, at least a done deal. But then I found in the Smith book here, somewhere far into the Smith book, beyond where we read, I have a quote where he says something. The effect of whatever we believe about the basis of moral faculties, either certain work by reason, a basic instinct called the moral sense, or some other source in our nature.
It can't be doubted that these faculties were given to us for the direction of our conduct in life. They bring with them the most obvious badges of this authority, signifying that they were set up within us to be the supreme deciders of all our actions, to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites, and to judge how far each of them should be indulged or restrained. In other words, he's saying, I don't even care. Like, maybe we do get these things from reason. And he certainly says in that same chapter, this is a chapter on sort of the relation of morality to religion.
It's clear that he says throughout the rest of this that we know about morality because of something like the moral sense. Right? Because we reflect on the fact that we approve of this, which is right. The same thing the Hume is saying. We look at the acorn in the tree and we don't have any reaction like that. And that's ultimately how we build up these general moral rules. But Smith, Smith beyond that says, yeah, once we build these moral rules, we can see through the light of reason that they were correct and in fact that these are given to us by the Creator to make us awesome.
So for Smith, he really has this over determined, even though 90% of what he says sounds very much like Hume, at least in that chapter he's saying, yeah, you could get this from reason too, who cares? And he doesn't seem to be committed.
31:04 Wes: That might just be political necessity though, to have to say something like that.
31:08 Mark: Well, it's a long chapter and it seems like he's just not committed to this sort of determinism. He just doesn't talk about the epistemology and the metaphysics in the way that Hume does throughout this whole work. It's all about, fine, wherever these sentiments come from, wherever these thoughts that we have, like, here's the content of them and here's what we think about them, when we think harder about them, etc. So let's bring Smith then into this question. Smith also thinks that you have to have the spectator there. We all have these reactions to things and then the question is, do we then when we reflect on our own reactions to them, do we approve of those reactions? And if so, then it was a moral action.
31:45 Wes: You're talking about the disinterested spectator thing where you.
31:49 Seth: Yes.
31:50 Wes: Is that reason or is that the point of empathy is that you're putting yourself into a similar position, not necessarily into the shoes of the particular person, but you're imagining what it would be like. And not even just for you to be in that situation, but for any given human being to be in that situation. So it's still an empathetic exercise. It's just a more generalized version. It doesn't make it reasoning in the sense that Hume wants to think about.
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I haven’t listen yet because I’ve decided to listen to all the episodes in order. I just wanted to give a shout-out to Georgia State University. I’m thinking of applying to their program after I get my MLIS and I can’t find a job.
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish next? It’s soooo good!
You’ve come back from the dead to hype your own book?
Heh heh. Second breakfast.
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” Isn’t that Hume’s main idea? It’s about the priority of “sentiments’ over rational thought, especially Rationalist thought. This is a general epistemology and not just a moral theory, no?
Have you heard about Frans De Wall’s work on primate morality? It’s all about empathy and a basic sense of fairness within the group. It’s not hard to make a case that our own evolutionary development would have included the same basic capacity for empathy and reciprocity. And so it seems that morality is more basic than rationality. I mean, to prioritize the passions is not to say they are better or higher but rather that it’s older, more basic and more primary. This supports Hume’s basic contention, I think, and it suggest a reasonably scientific and empirical approach by which to examine morality. It seems quite reasonable to suppose that morality has evolved, that it’s rooted in biology but also been profoundly shaped by cultural evolution.
One doesn’t have to be a Freudian to believe that most of what we call morality is a set of rules that restrain the biological appetites for sex and violence. Primates are a lot less neurotic, but we can have knives at the dinner table and we smell better. This kind of morality is what motivates vice cops and family values conservatives. It’s the kind of buttoned-up, well starched Victorian morality that Freud lived with. But there’s more to it than that. There are more than just these two layers of moral evolution. Isn’t the philosophical examination of morality a moral thing to do in it’s own way? We expect all kind of moral things from a person who wants to do that; they ought to committed and qualified. We expect such examiners to be honest and open to criticism, which entails submission to the facts and some humility about your conclusions. We could just about define philosophy as a critical examination of one’s own culture, as a willingness to scrutinize inherited moral values. Where the vice cops keep biological instincts in check, philosophers keep social demands in check. This social level morality it what civilized us and it’s “higher” than the laws of the jungle and but it has it’s limits. Vice cops are supposed to protect us from rape and murder, not from new ideas. Comedians and philosophers are supposed to be subversive and there’s a certain morality to the challenge posed by intellectual criticism. Questioning a culture’s values is just not at all like robbing banks or stealing bananas.
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.’-Yes, but it can’t really be justified as such if you par that with Hume’s induction problem and Hume’s is/ought distinction. In other words, it’s also equilivant to the stance of the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus.
” It’s not hard to make a case that our own evolutionary development would have included the same basic capacity for empathy and reciprocity. ”
It hard to take that from a descriptive case from a normative case though.
seems small and unmathematical, but true, that each of us, all things, are of ourselves to begin with. right, Seth; our selfs contain direction toward survival and respect other entities and our selves the exact same way. We function toward surviving, at first. We adapt. and find that we don’t want what we don’t want. -like physical pain, even more than we want what we want. why, this far along, are there still such things as enemies? heck, why are there morals? so we can have law? please understand that no person ever felt sympathy for a dead person. It ain’ possible.
Hey Mark. I think you can feel sympathy for a dead person – sympathy is just the mechanism where you identify and empathize with another person’s situation. Since the action is entirely internal, you can feel sympathy for a dead person by imagining yourself in their place. If that brings a shudder to your spine, it’s working.
I like the approach of not namedropping. After all we can learn a lot through riffing on a topic that has taken on a life of its own, and we don’t have to do the history of literature every step of the way. And simply telling someone to go read something doesn’t help since we should be able to talk about the concepts all on our own, even if the topic was inspired by historically famous thinkers. But I would like to add another caveat (along with the couple added in the discussion) to the rule to not namedrop.
*When Person A is perusing the comment section of a post relating to a topic Person A has a keen interest in, and
*sees Person B being very dismissive of what Person A believes is actually a pretty subtle issue,
*then Person A spends way too much time painstakingly explaining, pleading even, with Person B in an attempt to illuminate the issue,
*all while Person A’s efforts are frustrated by Person B’s determined pat denials,
Then,
*Person A is allowed to tell Person B they simply need to go read some stuff on the particular topic (naming particular articles even) before Person B continues to spout off.
This is all hypothetical, of course.
Since I’ve been reading and thinking over Hume I thought I’d listen to the Episode 17: Hume’s Empiricism: What Can We Know? and Episode 45: Moral Sense Theory: Hume and Smith podcasts again.
I’ve listened to them twice and I have really enjoyed them yet again.
I think bringing in others of his time like Smith really illustrates the conversations going on then, but it also blurs Hume himself.
I mean to get a better understanding of the conversation from Hume’s perspective I think you have to include his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals because he clarifies or appends many of his positions/arguments.
In 45 guest Getty Lustila mentioned the theologian Bishop Butler that the way to bridge the is-ought gap is an idea of God which Hume’s first “is” that can not be used to base morality on is God.
“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, …. establishes the being of a God,”
The second which was mentioned is the reason of the Rationalists with the subjective Cartesian cogito who thought that knowledge could be derived from reason independently of the senses or others who just make up s#!* in their heads – non-empirically.
For Hume and the Empiricists morals are based in human sense experience and for Hume who clarifies later he is not really a non-cognitivist as he ways into the debate of are morals from reason or sentiment he says both
“…that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions.” 137
There were many interesting thoughts about the third person observer but the most obvious one not mentioned since we’re talking about Empiricists and the scientific method. The “observer” is that morals are objective.
(although not in the sense that moral propositions refer to objective facts independent of human experience such as propositions in physics)
Hume “… reject every system of ethics, … which is not founded on fact and observation.” 138
“As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances. ” 138
“Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone.” 133
from Hume’s Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals
Section I ‘The Principles of Morals’ – seven pages long
David Hume very much thought of his project as scientific “The science of man (or the science of human nature) is a topic in David Hume’s 18th century experimental philosophy A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). The science of man expanded the understanding of facets of human nature, including senses, impressions, ideas, imagination, passions, morality, justice, and society.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_of_man
Which was taken up by Charles Darwin and others that were and are influential in the development of the sciences of psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, etc. today.
To name only a few
‘The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals’ is a book by Charles Darwin, published in 1872
Darwin’s ideas were followed up in William James’ ‘What Is An Emotion?’
Freud’s early publications acknowledged debts to Darwin’s work on emotional expression.
Dr. Paul Ekman research on the specific biological correlates of specific emotions, demonstrating the universality and discreteness of emotions in a Darwinian approach.
Dacher Keltner current research in his Berkeley Social Interaction Laboratory focuses on prosocial behavior, compassion, moral reasoning, and collective emotions
et alia
David Hume
“In full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation.” 138
Interesting qapla:
I have been following your inquiry into morality via Hume and Darwin, and am impressed by your continued affirmation and engagement with these original pioneers in their time. Of course, what we do not learn from history, of philosophy, science, etc., we are doomed to repeat and we can avoid that by walking in previous footsteps, like those of Hume and Darwin.
I also recognize that your concern regarding morality is to keep it natural and scientific as Darwin and Hume propose, which certainly makes sense. Very cool how you include Darwin’s focus on emotions and their relationship to Freud and James, with a focus on fact and observation.
I guess coming from you, as with many others here at PEL, for whom I have a great amount of respect for even when we disagree, I thank you.
I personally prefer the term “physicalism” or really “embodiment” to “naturalism”.
I’m probably a bit influenced by my interest in the ancinet Greeks. And think philosophy and the scineces can get back to something like the ancinet Greeks – eudamonia – that philosophy was meaningful and important and practical like John Dewey philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer among others.
Much of philosophy while interesting is often untethered from reality. And many philosophers while brilliant do not embody their philosophy as the ancient Greeks or the Buddhists or Taoists do/did.
With Hume I think we are very much aware of his huge influences in philosophy on Immanuel Kant, Schopenhauer, A. J. Ayer, Karl Popper, and in science like on Albert Einstein among others.
But an important and often over looked influence was on psychology, psychiatry, and the neurosciences.
I’m very much influenced the philosophy of embodiment and phenomenology of Merleau Ponty who engaged extensively with the sciences and especially with descriptive psychology. Many phenomenologists like Francisco Varela used the results of psychology and cognitive neuroscience.
examples Varela
Naturalizing Phenomenology: Contemporary Issues in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
The View from Within: First-Person Methodologies in the Study of Consciousness
Ethical Know-How: Action, Wisdom and Cognition
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
etc.
Hume’s influence and work continues with Paul Ekaman, Keltner, Daniel Goleman, Dan Siegel, and many others too numerous to mention
where we’re at
Dan Siegel
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gr4Od7kqDT8
in schools and education
The Hawn Foundation – The MindUp Program
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAo_ZSmjLJ4
An Introduction to Social and Emotional Learning
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfyC0o88zfM
TEDxBlue – Daniel J. Siegel, M.D.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nu7wEr8AnHw
much respect Wayne
I know this is a response to a podcast done like years ago, 2011!, but I would just like it marked that this podcast has proven incredibly useful for my current university course on Jane Austen, who was directly influenced by both Hume and Smith in moral sentiment and the development of sympathy/empathy for others through the activity of reading. Thank you!
I had never heard this about Austen, and I am suddenly much more interested in exploring her work. Are there any secondary sources you would recommend regarding her philosophical thought?
Hi,
Listened to this episode recently during a cross-country plane ride. There was some discussion within it about the intellectual environment Hume was reacting to and influenced by. Coincidentally, I was (and am) in the midst of reading James A. Harris’ “Hume: An Intellectual Biography” and wanted to make note of it here as a wonderful source to explore Hume’s context.
http://www.amazon.com/Hume-Intellectual-Biography-James-Harris/dp/0521837251
From his early experimentation with Stoicism (he abandoned it), the importance of Bernard Mandeville’s “The Fable of the Bees,” the role of Shaftesbury, Bayle, and Hutcheson — this is a very thorough account of the influences.
Just wanted to jot this down here for folks who are interested to consider.
The citizens link is broken – as of 2 May 2016, it points to Episode 17 instead of Episode 45.