You'll likely remember Tom from our Hegel podcasts and his several posts on this blog. His blog has switched names now to Owl of Minerva.org, and one of his interests is how the conception of reason by Hegel and the phenomenologists differs from the one prevalent in our culture, i.e. thinking clearly in the context of scientific naturalism (that's my formulation, not Tom's). This latter conception of reason is what leads directly to the sentiment that anyone religious is being irrational.
In his post on Intelligent Design theory, he gives a brief defense of "transcendental reason," which he defines as "deciphering the ultimate purpose behind the patterns of things we observe." In Aristotle's terminology, this means looking for final causes. Using a slightly different but I think equally secular tack as Thomas Nagel (as discussed at the outset of our quantum physics epsiode), Tom suggests that since naturalism is ultimately unsatisfying--incomplete (Nagel's rationale for this is clearer in light of his take on philosophy of mind), there's a future for this transcendental conception of reason. I quote:
But natural science does not give us and cannot give us an empirical explanation of itself, of its own character as a rational social institution, appearing over time, historically. It cannot explain its own rationality as a result of natural mechanisms.
I grant that the transcendental conception of reason with which the cruder proponents of Intelligent Design theory operate may be more flawed and less plausible today than naturalistic instrumentalism at explaining human life, but neither is the instrumental sense of reason adequate to this task. Naturalistic thinkers would be foolish to assume that Intelligent Design theory is simply Biblical Creationism in disguise, denying the possibility that it could draw wider public support among intelligent persons. It can do this by appealing to many such persons across the political spectrum who are frustrated with the dominance of instrumental reason in science, business, and technology, with its reductive understanding of culture, humanistic knowledge, and public institutions.
Read Tom's post at owlofminerva.org.
-Mark Linsenmayer
Evan Guiney says
November 23, 2011 at 2:12 pmMark,
I read Tom’s post and I’m just baffled. I’m a working scientist with a deep love of philosophy; I consider myself a naturalist, and I just don’t see his characterization of naturalism as on target at all! His post seems, honestly, to be mostly confused.
Set aside the fact that modern intelligent design *actually is* biblical creationism in disguise (remember the Dover trial and Of Pandas And People, and the failed search and replace switching “creationists” with “design proponents” that resulted in one instance of “cdesign proponentsists”), or that its prime examples of irreducible complexity, the eye and the flagella, are both perfectly reducible, as exemplified by simple eyes or type III secretion systems, respectively.
What most bothers me is the claim that scientists have a “reductive understanding of culture etc”. I don’t know what that means. As a scientist, I’m just really curious as to how things work! I love culture, and I love digging into its nitty gritty, and good heavens, I would never want to explain it in terms of neurons, let alone quarks. I study cells, and I don’t dream of explaining them in terms of quarks either; it wouldn’t be explanatory at all! I agree that reason is not merely instrumental; I think its right on that reason is a light on how language works. This all seems to me to be proper, naturalistic curiosity with how the world works!
Basically, I think you guys bring up the specter of “scientism” a lot, but have never given it a real treatment. Right now, its some vague bugaboo and I think a bit of a straw man. I’d love for you to put something on that topic in the podcast pipeline (though I don’t know who’d be a good primary source to use for your reading).
Dylan Casey says
December 2, 2011 at 2:25 pmEvan,
I don’t get through all the posts and comments on the blog (I probably should), but I wanted to simply underline what you’ve said, particularly the third and fourth paragraphs.
For myself, the charge that science has a “reductive understanding of culture” has always rang hollow to me for just the reasons you say — that the one over-riding characteristic of scientists is wanting to know how the world works. It is often the case that this pursuit is voiced with declarative claims like “the atom is the smallest piece of matter” and ” nothing goes faster than the speed of light” (forgive the physics examples — that’s my scientific background). But it is equally true that every scientist holds onto the possibility that every one of those declarations may need significant revision as we learn more. That revision may, in fact, result in wholesale modification of our understanding of the very entities themselves. Quantum mechanics, germ theory, astrophysics are just a few of examples. This possibility of revision in the face of new evidence — deep-down revision — is what marks science apart.
Frankly, I’m not entirely certain what “scientism” is or means. I suspect that the notion has less to do with science itself and more to do with the nature of authority and how science gets used in making judgments. This is how I take Tom’s claim that ID would “appeal to persons across the political spectrum who are frustrated with the dominance of instrumental reason in science, business, and technology, with its reductive understanding of culture, humanistic knowledge, and public institutions.” This question of authority is also how I understand Tom’s reply to you regarding “normative pressures that demand one conform to the philosophical principle of methodological naturalism.”
I expect that some of this will continue to come up in future episodes.
Anonny says
December 3, 2011 at 10:16 am” the one over-riding characteristic of scientists is wanting to know how the world works.”
This is what philosophy is supposed to be about, as well. However, most agree that science has done a far better job of it in only three centuries compared to the fundamental unanswered philosophical questions of three millennia.
Maybe its a matter of method< Grand metaphysical philosophically speculative models (Aquinas, Spinoza, Whitehead) attempt to establish a universal truth, while scientists rope off a small chunck of the whole and determine causal relationships involved in this abstraction only.
In the end, the speculative metaphysician and the scientist who makes inductive predictions from his/her abstracted deductive work are both alike in postulating a hunch about the whole of nature which will always exceed their mental capacity.
It seems pragmatic to bunk with the scientific mindset that offers natural findings that prove quite accurate rather than holding to the opinions offered on metaphysics by any individual philosopher/philosophy.
Jay Jeffers says
December 3, 2011 at 12:02 pmI agree. It’s pragmatic to bunk with the scientific mindset. I would add, though, that this applies only to matters within science. Granted, the line gets blurry sometimes, and in such cases, both scientists and philosophers should be consulted, whereas with epistemological and/or metaphysical issues that would underlie any scientific worldview whatsoever, we must form a philosophical view or be instrumentalists. Thoughts?
Anonny says
December 3, 2011 at 1:48 pm“Granted, the line gets blurry sometimes, and in such cases, both scientists and philosophers should be consulted, whereas with epistemological and/or metaphysical issues that would underlie any scientific worldview whatsoever, we must form a philosophical view or be instrumentalists. Thoughts”
Just listened to Dan Dennett on Alan Saunders’ ‘Philosophy Zone.’ I think I get him, now, and if he is being a scientistphilosopher in the matter of epistemology, then I think his is a practical approach. It seems to me that he is a philosopher now converted to the scientific approach, using his old phil expertise merely to sharpen his cognitive investigations.
Tom McDonald says
November 23, 2011 at 7:30 pmEvan,
It would be great if you could refute my actual argument which is premised on points about the very nature of reason. My argument is in the vein of Kant’s well established argument about the transcendental-dialectical character of reason which attempts either to affirm or refute non-empirical claims about its own ultimate origin. Thus, IIntelligent Design will remain plausible and ‘reasonable’ to anyone outside a situation where strong normative pressures demand one conform to the philosophical principal of methodologicalreason naturalism. Instead youof appeal to buggaboos about empirical cases of scaryreason creationists. That ispasses avoiding the challenge. You reallycould have tosome show why methodological naturalism is not a philosophical choice to foreclose philosophical reasoning, ie it has no empirical basis. Thus your preference for naturalism is not based in science but in beliefs about practical social consequences, but scientists tend not to realize or admit this. And im not even’for’ ID I am just recognizing the philosophical weakness of its opposition.
Joan Brown says
January 28, 2012 at 7:54 amHow can/do you quantify a ‘weakness of opposition’?
ID has no foundation on empirical data. End of story.
If a person chooses ( and I do mean chooses; it is a preference) to believe that the universe/world/humanity was created by a superior entity, with this belief supporting the superiority of the human species, i believe they do it because of a need for meaning for the self, for their existence.
When I see a child with a disability such as cerebral palsy, encephalitis, autism, down’s syndrome, I do not see ‘god’s will’. I see genetic disfunction. And then deal with the reality of this.
ID proponents would seek blame/reason/rationale. There is no rationale…
It just is.
Ernest Prabhakar says
November 25, 2011 at 2:38 pmMark, thanks for the link to Tom’s website, I’m really enjoying it (of course, I like to think of myself as a rational theologian, so I may be both self-deceived and biased :-). I would love to see your definition of “scientific naturalism”, including a discussion of whether (or how) it relates to your personal worldview. Thanks!
Anonny says
December 3, 2011 at 6:46 pmJay
Also, with metaphysics and physics, both do inductive speculating, but that is ALL there is to metaphysics. The physicist has made inroads in figuring things out.
Jay Jeffers says
December 3, 2011 at 7:02 pmAnonny,
Perhaps it’s that I don’t get the competitive analysis. I mean, we probably don’t have time to get into it if we don’t already agree, but at least for the sake of pinpointing our (potential) disagreement, I see philosophy and science as being a lot more in harmony than in competition. True enough there are skirmishes, but when/if we make good sense of physics, for example (as opposed to getting better at predicting and controlling our environment) then it will be a philosophical endeavor, and as such, we will consult philosophers (more particularly, metaphysicians).
When it comes to hands-on science, any philosopher who makes a habit of quibbling with scientists should stop, but when it comes to broader claims about, say, what a theory means, or broad claims about what we’re justified in believing and why, then scientists aren’t generally in a better position than philosophers to provide good counsel, and my strong leaning is that they’re in a worse position.
It’s almost as if we’re choosing whether we should “bunk” with judges or law professors. If I were asked which one I bunk with, I would probably hesitate but then eventually say, “it depends.” What it would depend on is the type of work we were discussing.