Has science destroyed the dream of philosophy? Was Stephen Hawking correct in claiming,“Philosophy is Dead?” These and a few more questions were raised, or more so alluded to in a recent debate by Paul Horwich and Michael P. Lynch in the Stone in March. The two philosophy professors debated the current state of philosophy using Wittgenstein as a platform.
Horwich went first, focusing on the pessimistic state of Wittgenstein’s later days and his growing disinterest with the potential of philosophy.
Thus, even Bertrand Russell, his early teacher and enthusiastic supporter, was eventually led to complain peevishly that Wittgenstein seems to have “grown tired of serious thinking and invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary.”
Horwich outlines four claims that he thinks constitute this 'doctrine': philosophy is scientistic, the non-empirical nature of philosophy is in tension with former, philosophy is pervaded by oversimplification and a decent approach to philosophy must be 'therapeutic' rather than constructive. He reads Wittgenstein as the "logical" philosopher, one who understands the problems with theoretical philosophy. What Horwich is describing as Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy is Wittgenstein's problems with the way dialogical philosophy is conducted and how he believes it should be done instead. Wittgenstein criticized philosophy "purely descriptive," unable to attain foundation explanatory answers.
On the other hand, Lynch’s rebuttal gives the reader another interpretation. Instead of simply overturning Horwich’s reading of Wittgenstein, Lynch accuses Wittgenstein of being prone to overgeneralization. Lynch’s article urges the philosopher to realize the error of science, the error that comes, perhaps, when one tries to oversimplify an argument in search of a 'grounding' answer. For example, Lynch argues that Horwich's Wittgenstein, as he calls it, was mistaken in his attempt to find a unitary nature of truth. He contests that the option to define truth is singular and posits that it is much more rhizomatic (to use Deleuzian terminology) but that this does not leave the philosopher with anything less than a much more detailed way to explore the very definition of truth. Lynch sees Philosophy's strength in searching, producing the effect of a new way of thinking, instead of simply trying to find the end result. He draws a hard line between science and philosophy, claiming each to have their place in the world.
Compelled by the recent PEL episode and these articles, I, too, have been contemplating the purpose of philosophy. Now, philosophy is regarded by some as the precursor to science, and some may believe that science has dismissed the need for philosophic debate and dreaming, but I tend to lean towards the side of Lynch’s argument. Having a strong bias towards Postructuralist Philosophy, I appreciate the inspiration to think differently. I understand the frustration of Heidegger in his inability to explicate the radical notions he tried to raise in Being and Time. I don’t know if we’ll ever be ready to develop the skills necessary to completely disconnect and reconnect our lens caps, to reveal a new take of the world. But this does not give us an excuse to fail to attempt articulation of these ideas. It only strengthens the value of philosophy and true philosophical debate. It allows the modern day philosopher to understand where we have fallen short, and justifies an even more intrinsic study into the art of philosophy, Socratic debate, and the need for a fresh take on how one participates in the discursive process.
Rian Mitch
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Thanks Rian for another great post.
What is truth? How do we know? What is knowing? How could knowing what we do not know be the most fundamental approach to Philosophy?
From Deleuze: History and Science:
“Deleuze would argue that his ontological commitments place him in the same tradition
that, from Aristotle to Kant, have subordinated problems to the
possibility of solving them, or what amounts to the same thing,
have traced problems from the propositions that express cases of
solutions. It does not really matter how the solutions are
expressed, linguistically or non-linguistically, whether as
“logical opinions, geometrical theorems, algebraic equations,
physical hypotheses, or transcendental judgments.” What
matters is the subordination of problems to solutions, a
subordination that threatens to negate the gains from the
Copernican revolution by focusing the efforts of scientists and
philosophers of science on final products (physical, chemical,
biological solutions) instead of on the processes that produce
these products as virtual problems become progressively better
specified. ” (p. 157)
So if we approach all that we know in the world as provisional answers to bigger problems, perhaps we can learn the most from understanding the problems yet unsolved, from what we do not yet know, and how it is that our knowledge is profoundly limited and less profound than what we do not yet know.
“Lynch argues that Horwich’s Wittgenstein, as he calls it, was mistaken in his attempt to find a unitary nature of truth”
I don’t see were Wittgenstein did try to find a unitary nature of truth, and i also fail to see were Horwich’s Wittgenstein attempt to do this.
Infact Wittgensteins idea of family resemblence and his ideas of language seems to lead up to something of a Tarskian notion of truth (as do Horwich’s Wittgenstein in the Horwich article). How such a notion is unitary I fail to understand.
This notion of truth on the other hand resembles very much what Lynch thinks of as a possible good notion in the article:
“Perhaps some statements, like those we make about the physical world, are true because they correspond to a reality, while others, like those we make about political rights or mathematics, are true because they fit into an overall theory that coheres with the rest of what we know. That is, maybe truth doesn’t have just one nature, or none, but more than one.”
Which sounds alot like the views of the real Wittgenstein according to:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/
1.” Wittgenstein answers this question, in part, by asserting that the only genuine propositions that we can use to make assertions about reality are contingent (‘empirical’) propositions, which are true if they agree with reality and false otherwise ”
2. “Wittgenstein maintains that “mathematical propositions” are not real propositions and that “mathematical truth” is essentially non-referential and purely syntactical in nature. “
First, I haven’t listened to the Why Do Philosophy and What Is It episode yet, so I might be regurgitating here – apologies in advance. Also, I’m not going to have a fancy rebuttal-rebuttal to the putative Late Wittgenstein on the topic – I understand that Philosophical Investigations is very different in tone from the Tractus… that’s about all I’ll say with any certainty regarding Wittgenstein.
I am a fan of Richard Rorty for his anti-philosophy philosophy. At least, that is how some critics (and supporters) have labeled Rorty. (Oddly, even anti-philosophers are still philosophers – take that Law of Noncontradiction.) His admiration of Wittgenstein – and of William James – leads him to the interesting conclusion that philosophy should be edifying rather than systemizing. I think this is one of the most general yet useful ways to support Lynch’s sentiment that there are normative aspects in philosophy that can justify practicing the discipline.
Would it be reasonable to expect that philosophy function like science in its tangible applications? No. And that seems to be the real issue – at least from my perspective. Science is this new toy made of plastic and lasers, and philosophy is the old and worn wooden block set (yet another meaningless analogy, I’m sure). Do we ever think we *need* to master the wooden block set for life to continue? Surely not (Socrates). But, in one fell swoop, we only need to look to Camus’ version of existence to find out that all potential college majors are useless (absurd). We live. We consume and (to) copulate. We die. Giving science (and yes, even modern medicine) a spot on the pedestal as the pinnacle of human achievement is a purely anthropomorphic appreciation of whatever we arbitrarily define as progress. My point: there probably is no justification for any human behavior. I don’t mean to peddle post-modern relativism; I am offering the worst-case scenario for philosophers: if our endeavors are not as useful and relevant as those of science, we can at least take solace in knowing they are just as useless.
A less cynical take – one I try to maintain – is the view of philosophy as the vanguard against stupidity. I remember reading Sam Harris’ Free Will and wanting to get out a red pen and mark all the claims lacking rigor. Maybe there is nothing but confusion in even thinking about the idea of free will at all, but it surely doesn’t need to be trampled on by a neuroscientist with a sensationalist agenda. Even more straightforward and less biased artifacts like biology textbooks have implicit metaphysical claims that signal reductionist ontologies without regard for the fact that those of us still reconfiguring the wooden blocks have not agreed upon those “facts”.
On the one hand, philosophers have seemed to tackle problems in geological time – much like Tolkien’s ents – and we would live in a very different world if we had to solve all of the philosophical issues before moving on to do whatever it is we think we are doing in science (and other realms). On the other hand, philosophers have not forgotten that this newfangled toy is just that – a fad – and I (at least) do not flinch when I see physicalistic reductionism run rampant as the only way to do intellectual business. Some Christmas morning, that plastic toy with the lasers will be tossed in the chest with the wooden blocks. I don’t say that because I think science is useless; one look at our short history shows that we are young and dumb if we are going to be around for at least another 10,000 years, so science is just another stepping stone to the future of human culture. I believe in (near) unlimited growth of human potential – and philosophy will always have a role in that growth because it blatantly asks some unanswerable yet fundamentally important questions. It is job security for the curious. The most relevant questions philosophy currently asks need not always be the perennial ones. A very simple “Are you sure you thought this through all the way?” is what empowers the philosopher over any other discipline. We are not beholden to results (which is most likely why humanities budgets suffer in a time when everyone demands results).
Publish or perish might seem like a way to offer results, but I often wonder why academic philosophers don’t break free from their cloister more often to engage the general public. General interest feeds funding and student interest drives teaching demand. Ethics and law (and any other applied phil) can draw some interest, but why is the gap between peer-reviewed journals and Saturday morning cartoons so large? If we are genuine in claiming that philosophy has value outside of philosophy – and that its questions should inherently be important to everyone, why is it so hard to fuse with pop culture?
Anyway, my comment probably wandered off topic a ways back and surely didn’t have enough water to survive in preachy desert I just inadvertently exiled it to. One last observation: there are still active metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology faculties out there – philosophy does police its self as well as well all the other disciplines it mothers.