In the Nietzsche episode, I made a point relating Nietzsche’s “bright side” of slave morality with Hegel’s account of the master-slave encounter.
To refresh: Nietzsche’s story in the Genealogy of Morals involves the oppressed turning in on themselves for satisfaction, because they can’t get satisfaction in the usual brutish, masterful way. Nietzsche is often taken in telling this story to be advocating the master morality, and certainly he does explicitly rail against the content of this slave morality (Christianity), but in the Genealogy, he really is trying to give a “scientific,” i.e. historical, account, and in the Gay Science and elsewhere, he stresses that the turn inward made us interesting, gave us the self-reflective capacity that now makes philosophy possible.
Hegel was likewise trying to give something like a historical/psychological account, in that instead of a social contract starting off society, we get one person enslaving another. While Hegel doesn’t say much more about the master, the slave in this equation is the one who works directly with the real world, and who also gains a view of himself, i.e. in how the master sees him (the master doesn’t give a crap about how the slave sees him on this account; the slave is just a tool to the master). In both of these ways, the slave “gains a self.” Now, someone else will have to fill me in re. the degree to which Hegel spells out the steps by which this self-consciousness then becomes a dominant part of the social zeitgeist (if it ever does at all); my memory of Hegel if fuzzy on this point.
My point here, though, is that both of these points, and many of Nietzsche’s other comments in Gay Science, seem to make suffering and subjugation not only a necessary, historical evil for human development but a positive boon on the individual level. My immediate reaction is to push on both of these thinkers my own view that, no, of course not; none of this should deter our efforts to eliminate suffering. True, were we to actually achieve a state of no suffering on a social level, then we would have to contend with becoming the “last man” in Nietzsche’s sense, which I think of as equivalent to the people lying around on couches in Wall-E. But since there’s no real danger of succeeding in the effort to eliminate suffering, the goal of reducing suffering remains pressing and obvious.
This dynamic is comparable to the one engendered by contemplating Heraclitus’s picture of the world as conflict: that the tension of opposing forces is what gives society and even the physical world a definite character and sustained form. Both this and Nietzsche’s exhortation that suffering breeds character might lead one, as a political and/or ethical matter, to posit that we’re better off leaving people’s fates to their own struggles and the winds of fate (i.e. chance) rather than to a social plan designed to mitigate suffering.
Whatever your meta-ethical views (i.e. whether you think ethical principles are pure human inventions or have an objective status or both or neither), the prima facie desirability of reducing suffering is a basic ethical principle. Without pretending that this intuition amounts to a fully detailed principle (Should we always act to reduce suffering? Whose job is it to reduce suffering for whom? How do we balance reduction of suffering vs. other goods?), I think we can safely say that it’s part of a default ethical framework for beings like us, meaning that you don’t overturn it unless you’ve got a damned good reason. On the Buddhism and naturalism episode we asked “why would belief in no-self lead to compassion?” A simple answer is that compassion is the default and that no-self is not sufficient to overturn it, while no-self is sufficient to overturn avarice and pride and other things that would ordinarily interfere with compassion.
Nietzsche’s “ethics” is, as we’ve discussed, a matter of “I will,” not “thou shalt.” Because he also thinks we’re pretty ignorant of ourselves, there’s no reason that he couldn’t give you some advice about your life if he knew you well, but he seems fairly unconcerned with the project of translating this kind of ethical deliberation into legislation. Given the complexities of his ethical view, i.e. the differences between people in what they need at a given time, I’d guess that he’d see legislation as necessarily divorced from this complex personal calculus, relying instead on more crude principles: pragmatism, or perhaps utilitarianism, or maybe something else. One could argue for a variety of legislative systems as compatible with Nietzsche’s insights, but surely we’d need some form of freedom to be central to it: freedom without which individuals would have no hope of self-actualizing.
This conception of freedom might be libertarian–“everyone has the freedom to pursue happiness”–or it might be the kind Frithjof in New Work deliberations ties explicitly to Nietzsche, where positive steps are taken (surely by government, but not only by government) to liberate us in a real way from drudgery. But on no account would Nietzsche’s view support positive oppression on the grounds that being oppressed would make one stronger, or more interesting, or better suited to philosophy. Nature (including our own psychology) gives us many unavoidable challenges, and if we need more than that, then we can think up challenges for ourselves. As an expression of “I will,” I might choose to pursue a challenging, even dangerous path and be all the better for it, but Nietzsche is in no position to recommend that we actively try to put others at a disadvantage for their own good. Feeling good about being oppressed (a “slave party,” if you will) is clearly a post hoc rationalization, a form of amor fati, where you accept what has come to you as yours like a good existentialist.
-Mark Linsenmayer
You are absolutely right to point out that no one should read Nietzsche as supporting systematic oppression. However, I think your claim that we should (on his view) never “support positive oppression on the grounds that being oppressed would make one stronger, or more interesting, or better suited to philosophy.” Is a bit over broad.
An obvious counter example is the raising of children. Surely Warren Buffet had the capacity to raise his children in much greater luxury and with much greater power than he chose to at no cost to himself. In a sense, this is a cruelty: he made other people physically worse off just for the sake of it. However, he chose to raise his children much more modestly, giving them small inheritances and typical child responsibilities. This was done with the goal of making them better people, and I think he was in the right.
When I was writing the post, I started to type that we can give challenges to ourselves but not to others, but for exactly the reason you point out modified that.
Whether or not a given act of “tough love” passes the smell test depends, I think, on the details. Does it involve giving your love conditionally instead of unconditionally so that your kid will have to earn your approval with good grades and ambition? Did Buffet lock his kids out of structured opportunities (science club, gymnastics, dance, music lessons, or whatever) that would maybe have given them a chance to stretch out and try things? Like if I had heaps of cash, and my kid expressed an interest in science, I think I’d go to one of the scientific foundations I fund and make them let him hang around them and show him what doing science actually means… or better yet, there are science camps and many things like that actually designed to be interesting to kids.
A more down-to-earth example might be bullying. If your kid complains about being bullied, you can just say “kids are kids; he has to learn to deal with it,” or you can call in the cavalry. I think the first choice is based on a screwed up sense of child psychology/sociology.
Of course, these choices are all about “what constitutes love?” whereas most political uses of Nietzsche or Heraclitus to excuse callousness are nothing of the sort.
Fair enough. But it seems clear to me that a virtue ethicist (and especially Nietzsche) would more readily endorse the kind of ‘tough love’ we are discussing than a utilitarian.
Mark:
You state “prima facie [the] desirability of reducing suffering is a basic ethical principle,” (not that this is not important), however, Nietzsche is foundationally addressing the nature of ethics and morality at the core, beyond suffering alone.
“He’d see legislation as necessarily divorced from this complex personal calculus, relying instead on more crude principles: pragmatism, or perhaps utilitarianism, or maybe something else. One
could argue for a variety of legislative systems as compatible with Nietzsche’s insights, but surely we’d need some form of freedom to be central to it.” Yes, “legislation,” or even justice or freedom itself would fall under question with Nietzsche, not unlike with Derrida.
We have a new PEL citizen, Dan, who is interested in the philosophy of law according to Judge Posner, a pragmatist, and someone who has pragmatic validity, but in the bigger picture, is justice possible? (Derrida says not, so I like Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, because he comes from a hermeneutical position of the need to update the law for today, and not just impose previous history.) Any legislation may well not translate into proper justice, so what are we to do?
I think I agree that “on no account would Nietzsche’s view support positive oppression,” unless that fits his view of positive opposition.
I want to get your concluding comments clear: “Nietzsche is in no position to recommend that we actively try to put others at a disadvantage for their own good. Feeling good about being oppressed (a ‘slave party,’ if you will) is clearly a post hoc rationalization, a form of amor fati, where you accept what has come to you as yours like a good existentialist.”
So I will hope you agree that in fact, Nietzsche is not recommending “that we actively try to put others at a disadvantage for their own good, ” as that would be Master morality, nor that he is recommending that we feel “good about being oppressed (a ‘slave party,’ if you will), the Slave morality.
Perhaps the basic question of ethics is not “What must I do?” (the question of morality), but “What am I capable of doing?” (the question of ethics regardless of morality). How can I maximize my creative potential–and all of us–but not in the “herd” mentality?
I am in the process of trying to present a more clear representation of Nietzsche’s immanent ethics as separate from the “morality”/moralizing which he attacks in “Geneology of Morals,” and hope to post a blog on this soon.
Hegel comes later.
Mark:
Regarding Amor Fati, (no good existentialist would qualify as “good,” since existence preceeds essence), Nietzsche regards four aspects of reality as leading to his primary goal,
1) to affirm existence–just say “Yes” to reality:
2) Eternal Return and
3) Amor Fati. “My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary . . . but love it.” (NCW, Epilogue.1). Finally,
4) the Dionysian: “a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception or selection . . . The highest state a philosopher can attain: tp stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence–my formula for this is amor fati.”
In Will to Power (p. 293), Nietzsche states “In all correlations of Yes and No, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that is expressed is a perspective, an interest of certain types of life: in itself, everything that is says Yes.”
But even so, how could amor fati not just be another slave morality–this is crucial to understanding Nietzsche–more to come.
Wayne,
I’ve generally taken Nietzsche as making a claim fundamentally about meta-ethics: delving into why we might have values, why we need them, what grounds them and so what justifies a change in them.
This account has implications, of course, for ethics proper (what in particular should we value), but the two inquiries are to some degree separable, which is why I have no problem, e.g. having the Mill vs. Kant debate about our ethical intuitions despite the fact that I don’t share the meta-ethical commitments of those guys.
Back in our Camus discussion, one of the primary discussion points was how Camus could strongly deny the ontological basis of ethics while still evidently expressing values: to be a “good existentialist” (my term) would to him be honestly encountering the absurd. For Sartre, you get the same deal: avoid bad faith. I’m interpreting amor fati as a version of that: you make your rock (whatever shit you have instead of Sisyphus’s rock) “your thing,” you (per Nietzsche’s directive) artistically work with the self you’ve got.
I’d interpret Nietzsche’s “intellectual conscience” as a positive moral commandment that works on us motivationally much like Kant’s Categorical Imperative is supposed to work according to Kant: here’s an intuition you already have, that you can’t avoid, and violating it violates your own integrity, your own internal coherence, so I don’t have to argue with you that you should follow this directive; I just have to point out to you that you already have it. (Incidentally, I think this is the only way ANY moral commandment gets any traction: I have to convince the person that they already believe in this rule I want them to follow, that either they WANT to follow it or that even if they don’t–if they want the “bad”–they also have a second-order desire against this first desire that they can recognize is supposed to trump the bad impulse.)
Mark:
Thanks for the clarification.
–Only the comment on Kant would make Nietzsche roll over in his grave I think. The Categorical Imperative is best implemented in the absence of any human sentiment, so that the greatest objectivity, or duty can rule. Following passions or emotions disqualify for Kant’s Categorical Imperative, we need virtue, not happiness. The keystone for his epistemology is transcendental idealism (pure reason) leading to his moral philosophy of the autonomy of practical reason. It is against this rationalistic approach that Nietzsche establishes his alternative epistemology.
“On the Buddhism and naturalism episode we asked “why would belief in no-self lead to compassion?” A simple answer is that compassion is the default and that no-self is not sufficient to overturn it, while no-self is sufficient to overturn avarice and pride and other things that would ordinarily interfere with compassion.”
From what I understand in Buddhism compassion comes about by experientially or existentially grokking pratitya samutpada or co-dependent arising or co-dependent origination. This is in a way much like Heraclitus two wrestlers co-creating and like Taoist yin and yang in dynamic creative tension.
This is an understanding of the co-dependent arising of the self or anatman or no-self.
In Buddhism atman =self/soul is a negation. So in Buddhism says an=no/not + atman self/soul.
In Buddhism there is no separate self. No thing-in-itself “self”. The “self” arises co-dependntly with the arising of other selves and the world/universe. Co-creating interdependently. Not One and Not Two.
I’ll use Christian terms to illustrate this which would have appalled Nietzsche because such terms lead us astray. For Nietzsche as for Heraclitus as for Buddhism as well as Heidegger’s “Being” is not a personal thing-in-it-itself “God”.
For example some want union with God or the universe but the very notion of a separate self is what impedes such a union.
Christianity (or some forms I should say) are “the One (God) or the Many (Humans)” NOT “One” but zen says “and Not Two”.
Heraclitus and from there Nietzsche and Heidegger and Deleuze (Sameness or repetition (One) an difference(Many)) as well as Buddhism is/are “the One AND the Many”.
So for Buddhism an=no/not + atman=self/soul is NO “or” no negation.
We see that our prosperity, security, and well-being is intimately interconnected with that of others.
Even our house prices are interconnected with that of our neighbors houses.
This ties into New Work which is not capitalism nor is it socialism as both are zero sum.
Both are the exploitation of the work of others and resources and money has to come or be taken from some one or some where.
“A human being is a part of the whole called by us universe, a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feeling as something separated from the rest, a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty.”
― Albert Einstein
“But on no account would Nietzsche’s view support positive oppression on the grounds that being oppressed would make one stronger, or more interesting, or better suited to philosophy. ”
It seems to me to be a very Heraclitian idea of strife, adversity, and hardship.
“Episode 6: Nietzsche on Hardship – British philosopher Alain De Botton explores Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) dictum that any worthwhile achievements in life come from the experience of overcoming hardship. For him, any existence that is too comfortable is worthless, as are the twin refugees of drink or religion.”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=280Ev9h_C3c
much respect
A bit of an additional thought that ties Nietzsche’s eternal return with zen in particular.
In some forms of Buddhism “samsara” is the endless cycle of of suffering of re-birth, old, age, sickness, and death. (Some buddhologist see this as the re-Hinduization of Buddhism)
Such forms of Buddhism seek to escape samsara the rejection of life, a “no” to life, but zen says “samsara IS nirvana” amor fati the ultimate affirmation of life, a “yes” to life.
The Heat Sutra chanted by Zen Buddhists
“Far beyond all such delusion, nirvana is already here.”
much respect
gassho
“Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?”
except that FN seems to be working against all ascetic fantasies of Nirvana/Peace, also not emptiness but overabundance is his driving interest, maybe more of a drunken monk poetry guy?
“except that FN seems to be working against all ascetic fantasies of Nirvana/Peace, also not emptiness but overabundance is his driving interest, maybe more of a drunken monk poetry guy?”
I agree. Nietzsche was against asceticism that is in some forms of Buddhism.
Japanese zen monks are not celibate. Zen here takes much from Taoism.
Ikkyū (1394–1481) (self-named: “Crazy Cloud”) was an eccentric, iconoclastic Japanese Zen Buddhist monk and poet. He had a great impact on the infusion of Japanese art and literature with Zen attitudes and ideals.
Ikkyū is one of the most significant (and eccentric) figures in Zen history. To Japanese children, he is a folk hero, mischievous and always out-smarting his teachers and the shogun. In addition to passed down oral stories, this is due to the very popular animated TV series “Ikkyū-san”. In Rinzai Zen tradition, he is both heretic and saint. Ikkyū was among the few Zen priests who argued that his enlightenment was deepened by consorting with pavilion girls. He entered brothels wearing his black robes, since for him sexual intercourse was a religious rite. At the same time he warned Zen against its own bureaucratic politicising. Usually he is referred to as one of the main influences on the Fuke sect of Rinzai zen, as he is one of the most famous flute player mendicants of the medieval times of Japan. The piece “Murasaki Reibo” is attributed to him. He is credited as one of the great influences on the Japanese tea ceremony, and renowned as one of medieval Japan’s greatest calligraphers and sumi-e artists (copy paste)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ikky%C5%AB
A sex-loving monk, you object!
Hot-blooded and passionate, totally aroused.
Remember, though, that lust can consume all passion,
Transmuting base metal into pure gold.
Ten days in this temple and my mind is reeling!
Between my legs the red thread stretches and stretches.
If you come some other day and ask for me,
Better look in a fish stall, a sake shop, or a brothel.
Follow the rule of celibacy blindly, and you are no more than an ass;
Break it and you are only human.
The spirit of Zen is manifest in ways countless as the
sands of the Ganges.
Every newborn is the fruit of the conjugal bond.
For how many aeons have secret blossoms been
budding and fading?
With a young beauty, sporting in deep love play;
We sit in the pavilion, a pleasure girl and this Zen monk.
Enraptured by hugs and kisses,
I certainly don’t feel as if I am burning in hell.
A Woman’s Sex
It has the original mouth but remains wordless;
It is surrounded by a magnificent mound of hair.
Sentient beings can get completely lost in it
But it is also the birthplace of all the Buddhas of the
ten thousand worlds.
The Dharma Master of Love
My life has been devoted to love play;
I’ve no regrets about being tangled in red thread from
head to foot,
Nor am I ashamed to have spent my days as a
Crazy Cloud—
But I sure don’t like this long, long bitter autumn of
no good sex!
http://www.tricycle.com/special-section/the-riddle-desire?page=0,7
“except that FN seems to be working against all ascetic fantasies of Nirvana/Peace, also not emptiness but overabundance is his driving interest, maybe more of a drunken monk poetry guy?”
A thought. In zen there are no ascetics fantasies. The point is to over come such fantasies.
http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/nord.htm
Additionally “emptiness” is NOT “emptiness” or a void or nothingness it is the exact opposite. “Shunyata” is everythingness. The dharma kaya the “flesh” of the world to translate with a Merleau Ponty terms.
Whatever is dependently co-arisen (pratitya samutpada)
That is explained to be emptiness. (shunyata)
That, being a dependent designation
Is itself the middle way. (madyamika)
Something that is not dependently arisen,
Such a thing does not exist. (anatman)
Therefore a non-empty thing ( a dualistic thing-in-itself)
Does not exist.
Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamikakariki (24:18 and 24: 19)
the emptiness of emptiness emerges directly from 24:18.
Whatever is dependently co-arisen (pratitya samutpada)
That is explained to be emptiness. (shunyata)
That, being a dependent designation
Is itself the middle way. (madyamika)
This is an explication of “anatman” there isn’t any separate unchanging thing-in-itself essence that stands outside of the changing phenomenological co-dependently arising mutually co-creating world/universe.
“The Prasangika-Madhyamika Buddhists,’ like Sextus, refer to their oppo-
nents as “dogmatists.” They identify, for each philosophical problem subject
to skeptical treatment, a reificationist and a nihilistic version of dogmatism”
Epoche and Śūnyatā: Skepticism East and West
Author(s): Jay L. Garfield
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Jul., 1990), pp. 285-307
Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness:
Why did Nagarjuana start with causation?
Jay L. Garfield
Professor of Philosophy in the School of Communications and Cognitive Science at Hampshire College
Philosophy East & West, Apr94, Vol. 44 Issue 2, p219, 32p
http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Dependent_Arising.htm
Epoche and Śūnyatā: Skepticism East and West
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/comparativephilosophy/s1/Epoche%20and%20Skepticism%20East%20and%20West%20by%20J.%20Garfield.pdf
I don’t know if you have spent any time with zen monastics but as a rule they are quite strict/orderly and so folks like Ikkyu are notable exceptions (and really mostly function as object lessons) and tranquility is really the goal, whereas FN (in his theory) wanted to feed his desires and be as driven as possible.
As close as I can imagine for a kind of buddhist parallel would be something like:
http://www.janushead.org/3-2/lingis.cfm
http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft3779n8sd&brand=ucpress
Lingis’ Abuses
I have spent some time doing zen retreats and yes they are quite structured and disciplined. As well as martial arts.
A large influence on Japanese Zen practice some of it’s discipline is from the samurai.
“Zen” developed differently in different countries or at least the practices and garments etc..
The core philosophical points are much the same.
I’m not trying to say that zen and Nietzsche are exactly the same.
For one it’s hard to say Nietzsche had a goal or even a system.
I think perhaps that was on purpose though.
It seems his point was an active engagement with life. With real life.
I was bringing up some commonalities and intersections of Nietzsche and Heidegger and Heraclitus and zen above as Mark started out the blog post making connections.
I agree Nietzsche is much more Heraclitus strife, adversity, and hardship.
But I can’t help think that that requires a zen or samurai like discipline. In zen this is jishu zammai = self mastery. That is one of a number of reasons zen has such a connection with the martial arts unlike other forms of Buddhism. The Shaolin chan/zen warrior scholar monks.
Chod is much more a melding of Tibetan Buddhism which is almost indistinguishable from Hinduism with the pre-Buddhist native shamanic “Bon” religion. And so there are some supernatural and dualistic elements that would not be Nietzsche or even zen.
I would for the above separate philosophical zen or Buddhism from “religious” zen and Buddhism. And from forms of Buddhism that are meldings of native religions.
I personally I find it fascinating and by no accident that there are great connections between Heraclitus, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze and zen and Buddhism and Nagarjuna with shunyata and the epoche of the skeptics like Sextus Empiricus and phenomenology.
You can put Nagajuna and Sextus Empiricus side by side.
And even the early gnostic Chrisitans.
The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies
By Thomas McEvilley
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4553155406381622401&hl=en#
Greek Buddhism Pt. 1 thru 4
Burke Lecture: Buddhism in a Global Age of Technology
Greco-Buddhism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Buddhism
Greco-Buddhist art
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Buddhist_Art
Buddhism and Christianity
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_and_Christianity
Buddhism and the Roman world
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_and_the_Roman_world
Buddhism and Gnosticism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_and_Gnosticism
much respect
q says “But I can’t help think that that requires a zen or samurai like discipline. In zen this is jishu zammai = self mastery”
FN says” Even under the influence of the narcotic draught, of which songs of all primitive men and peoples speak, or with the potent coming of spring that penetrates all nature with joy, these Dionysian emotions awake, and as they grow in intensity everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness. In the German Middle Ages, too, singing and dancing crowds, ever increasing in number, whirled themselves from place to place under this same Dionysian impulse. […] There are some who, from obtuseness or lack of experience, turn away from such phenomena as from “folk-diseases,” with contempt or pity born of consciousness of their own “healthy-mindedness.” But of course such poor wretches have no idea how corpselike and ghostly their so-called “healthy-mindedness” looks when the glowing life of the Dionysian revelers roars past them.”
Awesome! Live life fully.
“We should consider every day lost on which we have not danced at least once.”
― Friedrich Nietzsche
… we find ourselves in the midst of a rude fetishism when we call to mind the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language-which is to say, of reason. It is this which sees everywhere deed and doer; this which believes in will as cause in general; this which believes in the ‘ego’, in the ego as being, in the ego and substance, and which projects its belief in the ego-substance on to all things-only thus does it create the concept ‘thing’…. ‘Reason’ in language: oh what a deceitful old woman! I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar…. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
[W]e do not only designate things with them [words and concepts], we think originally that through them we grasp the true in things. Through words and concepts we are still continually misled into imagining things as being simpler than they are, separate from one another, indivisible, each existing in and for itself. A philosophical mythology lies concealed in language which breaks out again every moment, however careful one may be otherwise. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Wanderer and his Shadow
Language against its own mystifications: Deconstruction in Nagarjuna and Dogen
http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/DogenStudies/LanguageAgainst.htm