I took Michael Sandel in our recent interview with him to be commenting about philosophical mistakes in our political discourse. One of these had to do with how we talk about rights. (And note that the following is not a formulation that he gives.) "Natural rights" are ontologically suspect. What could such a thing be? Is there any non-theological story that could really make sense of them? Kant and Rawls each try to give us a such a story, having to do with our nature as rational and willing beings. For Sandel, as with Hume and others, the matter is more complex: we simply can't analyze the facts about our desires and their relationship to our will and to other people and come up with absolute restrictions, i.e. rights that could never be legitimately contravened.
For someone like Anscombe, this position is intolerable: unless there are some absolutes, then we will rationalize bad behavior by torturous chains of utilitarian logic and end up bombing cities of innocent people. This move in ethics is tantamount to the move in founding the American government to make the system immune to corruption by individual officials.
Now, we know that merely dividing power does not make a system fool-proof; if all the different centers of power are still corrupt or blind or otherwise wrong about something, there will still be problems. The Bill of Rights presents us with the illusion of an absolute limit on power, but laws still need to be interpreted, and if the Supreme Court and the other branches agree to interpret a listed right in such a way that it won't protect some particular action, they can and have done that. Despite our efforts to the contrary, we remain a nation of people using laws as tools, not a nation of laws lording over people.
Likewise, morally, we can agree heartily that, for example, everyone has the right to life, but then achieve a broad consensus that, e.g. killing in self-defense or in a just war (i.e. in self-defense interpreted on a wider scale) or whatnot is still permitted. We may pretend to believe in absolute moral laws, but when faced with a wholly counterintuitive consequence of the letter of such a law, we reinterpret it: we refine it to actually make sense (and when we don't do this, we should).
It is a long-running beef of this podcast against theists and other moral absolutists that it's simply not true that unless there are moral laws somehow beyond human psychology or sociology, written into the fabric of the universe, then morality simply collapses, being replaced by individual desires and whatever arbitrary customs societies have developed. Sandel discusses this in terms of morality having to have the appropriate distance from us: If it's too close, i.e. if what is right is defined as what we already prefer or what we will (as individuals or societies), then the matter judged gets confused with the judging apparatus; there would be no standpoint from which we could criticize a moral practice. On the other hand, if moral commandments are too far away from us--if they aren't somehow rooted in ways that people actually behave--then they couldn't actually even apply to us (see our discussion about the Euthyphro; it's also a basic tenet of existentialism and follows from the is-ought distinction: even if God wrote right and wrong into the universe, if it were just a commandment floating in air that wasn't also somehow written into human nature, that then we as individuals wouldn't be obligated to make these objective values our values).
So the goal of a modern, mature ethics is to use our social and intellectual nature to be able to make judgments on moral matters, not primarily as individuals but as members of groups, using reflective equilibrium. There is no absolute standpoint (e.g. the Law of God or the will of the founding fathers) from which we can make apodictic moral judgments, but neither are we tied to judge according to (individual or social) whims. We can reflect using moral principles (as defeasible rules of thumb, not as absolute restrictions), long traditions (which we must analyze teleologically and critically so that we don't blindly follow the past), and gut reactions to individual alleged cases of injustice (which, while powerful guides, are themselves subject to criticism and possible revision).
So, while the concept of natural rights don't make sense, morally grounded legal rights as constructs to be argued for are an essential part of governing. Yes, we could all be corrupt or blind in the way that Anscombe feared in some particular debate and make mistakes, but we can't prevent that by pretending that some moral law or right is beyond human the human sphere of value creation. Instead, we need to further bring debate above-board, to further open the open society, to increase the honesty and integrity of our political debates.
And this, my friends, is what I am very very pessimistic about. Sandel gives the example that in deciding about the permissibility of abortion, we need to be above board in stating simply that we (as representatives in a Republic; this may not actually reflect the majority view) regard the Catholic claims that zygotes are persons as simply incorrect and not try to pussy-foot around such philosophical, scientific, and moral issues in issuing decisions. But this is of course exactly how law-making does not work. If we required consensus on philosophical issues before legislation could take place, nothing would get done. Instead, we make practical arguments: in the case of abortion, we can argue that whatever the ontological status of the zygote or fetus, people should have the right to choose what to do with their bodies. We can argue that outlawing abortions just leads to an unsafe black market in them. We tend to pass laws that seek to mitigate bad things that are happening, not to order society in any ideal way.
Reducing hypocrisy and encouraging rigor in public discourse is great, but the effect that doing so would have on actual legislation is difficult to predict. I think this kind of thinking works better in deciding what kind of society to promote instead of deciding what actions to outlaw. I brought up Robert Skidelsky on the good life, which of course relates to my ongoing interest in New Work. Skidelsky and Bergmann argue that working full time in a traditional job is not part of our human good. Put in terms of human dignity, it is beneath our dignity to sell off so much of our time. So what's the solution? If you think of outlawing certain actions as the only tool that government has in its toolbox, then it's hard to imagine how to address this. What, are we going to outlaw full-time work, disrupting all these free exchanges and leave people much worse off, with employers not able to get things done and (now part time) employees much much poorer? Sounds crazy.
But if instead of simply outlawing, the idea is to promote community values (and yes, the goal of talking about New Work is to change this community value and put this recognition that jobs generally suck into a politically efficacious spot), then there are tons of things that government can do, from using incentives (tax breaks and payouts) to facilitate livable New Work life arrangements to creating infrastructure (Obamacare, for one, and libraries, free public transportation, good public schools, and much more is needed if we're really going to lessen the role of money in day-to-day life as Sandel would like). So the political upshot of Sandel's position is a progressive government that discusses at a deep and far-seeing level what human good amounts to (insofar as it can be generalized across people; this will still be a thin theory, but not nearly as thin as Rawls would have us believe for a population in a particular historical time and place) and what can be done to help the population at large approximate that good.
The assumption here is that honest philosophical debate about the good will not end in us promoting Sharia law or any other reactionary, "morality"-based set of restrictions. One could argue, for instance, that an ideal person does not curse: that cursing comes from anger and disrespect, and so we should outlaw cursing. But this would get psychology backwards. If it's true that the ideal person doesn't curse (and let's just say for the sake of argument that it is), then instead of outlawing cursing, we should be trying to put people in a situation where they don't need to curse. If people in a veritable garden of Eden would still curse (because, say, the pomegranate juice squirts them in the eye), that would be a demonstration that cursing is actually not a vice, that it's a normal and healthy human reaction.
So the way that a good-acknowledging society (and not one that pretends to be neutral about the good a la classical Liberalism) avoids the kind of objectionable actions that Wes so often referred to in our discussions (promoting the good according to some particular religion) is by recognizing how difficult it is to be precise about the good, and in cases of significant doubt, to remain neutral. It seems to Sandel that selling your body (for sex or for surrogacy or advertising space) is inherently degrading. Well, if that's so, he'd need to argue for that, and such an argument--once you confine yourself to comments about inherent dignity and not about how such transactions are effectively coercive given the poverty or lack of other opportunities for the seller--is difficult to make, given that a Sam-Harris-type "science of morality" is fundamentally confused.
...Difficult, but not impossible, because we're not trying to establish an objective fact, not a full-fledged theory of human nature and human good, but merely enough to achieve a consensus for action. Hasn't human experience told us that, in general, some situations are simply not good for us? If you want to argue that prostitution, even if completely free of tacit coercion, is OK, then you have to argue something about sexuality: that just as we don't think it's particularly demeaning for someone to dance or play a sport (wrestling!) for money, adding the sexual element doesn't add anything that would change that intuition. To bring back in New Work, haven't we had enough people punching the clock for enough years to know that at least some work situations (ones which involve actual clock-punching, for sure, but many others besides) are simply not in tune with our well-being? Less controversially, we have enough experience as a culture with long-term relationships to know that same-sex ones aren't significantly more screwed up than opposite-sex ones, so there should be no objections to gay marriage on those grounds. Want to outlaw a drug? I could see a good case to be made that any substance (alcohol) that makes us think less clearly is demeaning to our humanity, but there's also plenty of documented experience that drinking enhances life.
And of course, even if we come to a consensus on the fact about the good life, there are still practical considerations that would determine whether or not to make a law out of it. If it's not worth the resources to enforce, or if enforcing it would involve nasty by-products (e.g. dents in privacy), then forget it: maybe this is something we have public service announcements about but don't actually prohibit. Incentives may be more than we want to pay for; desirable infrastructure may be more complex than we want to build. Every legislative situation is unique. Unfortunately, the good faith argumentation required to evaluate such situations, give a nuanced analysis of both the philosophical and practical issues, and propose sensible laws is something that elected legislators, at least, seem to me largely incapable of, for fear of angering their constituents and/or financial backers. Perhaps committees such as the one on stem cell research that Sandel mentioned serving on can serve some of this deliberative purpose, if Congress and state legislatures are not up for the job.
-Mark Linsenmayer
Hard to beat Deidre McCloskey on Sandel
http://www.deirdremccloskey.com/editorials/sandel.php
Interesting article. McCloskey is right about the lack of philosophical depth in the book: I think without having read Sandel’s earlier text, we would have been pretty unsituated with this one. But even as I understand why an apparent libertarian like McCloskey would find her concerns unengaged the text, I don’t find the particular alternate points she puts forward in the article particularly persuasive.
For example, she points out that markets have a civilizing effect in that a black man’s money becomes just as good as a white man’s money. This is what I meant in referring in our interview to something essentially egalitarian about market thinking… Sandel and some of the other guys corrected me: surely I must mean freedom, not egalitarianism, but McCloskey makes the point.
So fair enough, but per my blog post here, the alternative to purely market thinking is not supposed to be whatever bullshit prejudices people had already, i.e. the idea of the good as promoted by some tradition or religion (though we don’t simply dismiss such traditions either), but sensible thinking on a case-by-case basis, which given our history (of civil rights struggles, etc.), would rule out racism. Note that I’m not saying that science or reason itself shows us the error of racism, but these things in combination with hard-learned historical lessons.
So McCloskey is giving us a strawman; Sandel is in no way committed to a position that leaves open the door for racist or other overtly stupid decision-making procedures. Goods are not, as McCloskey fears, “allocated by race or gender or Party membership.”
The rest of the article makes it clear how difficult this “sensible, cooperative analysis of history” is given people’s ideological biases. McCloskey gives standard pro-capitalist allegedly historical arguments: Allowing inequality ends up lifting all boats; any attempt to limit markets ends up with worse poverty. I don’t find this convincing, but I agree that Sandel should go into more detail about what actual policy solutions he’s suggesting and what effects he thinks these would have. Typically issues of fairness (justice) are supposed to trump issues of effectiveness, e.g. even if it would pump the economy further to commit X and Y crimes, we’re simply not going to do that, so Sandel is content to point out that the commodification he’s pointing out is “corrosive of democracy.” I can see why this would be unconvincing to someone of McCloskey’s political bent.
Good review.
You say,
>If we required consensus on philosophical issues before legislation could take place, nothing would get done.
And then proceed to list many philosophical issues we’ve achieved enough consensus on to use (eg. people should have the right to choose what to do with their bodies). You imply these are much less prone to “ethical qualification” but even bodily soverignty is dispensed with for issues of mental health and we do not allow people to sell their organs.
> I think this kind of thinking works better in deciding what kind of society to promote instead of deciding what actions to outlaw.
“Deciding what actions to outlaw” *is* the promotion of a societal vision!
> If you think of outlawing certain actions as the only tool that government has in its toolbox
This is a straw man. Outlawing actions is the promotion of a social vision, but many other things are too: and you list them! Government investement, (“incentives”)…
You’re concern then is an abitary dislike of goverment’s outlawing behaviour. (“You can do everything to promote a social vision except…”). This assumes that you can outlaw without promoting a social vision. You cannot.
The background assumption to all this argumentation is that there are a possible set of laws that do not imply a social vision (or a restricted set). That “outlawing” if it is to exist at all can be neutral or not in service of a vision.
I’m not sure what these laws are (nor even that theyre possible), an example would be useful…
Perhaps you think negative freedom is the highest priority and we should restrict ourselves only to societies which is consistent with this prioritization. OK – but this is an extremely restricted subset (an most definitly a vision): for example its not clear how past injustice could be redressed in such a society so it’s likely that this prioritization would create generational injustice.. etc.
Hi, Michael,
Re. “…And then proceed to list many philosophical issues we’ve achieved enough consensus on to use (eg. people should have the right to choose what to do with their bodies).”:
Perhaps I should have said “metaphysical” rather than “philosophical.” And I would not overestimate the philosophical content of a given piece of legislation. So say a legislature bans genetic manipulation of humans. Is that because they have actually done a philosophical analysis of issues of individual and species identity? No, it’s likely because they consider the practice straightforwardly abominable, like imagining half human, half dogs and the “playing God” involved in creating such a thing. Assuming the legislators are uniformly revolted by such a prospect, you might say they’ve taken a philosophical stand in that they’ve invoked an ethical intuition and generalized from it, but they certainly haven’t treated the metaphysical issues involved in anything like a satisfactory way… nor do they need to in order to achieve consensus.
Re. ““Deciding what actions to outlaw” *is* the promotion of a societal vision!” and your subsequent Zizekian comments: I disagree that this is necessary. Again, banning something out of disgust with a practice, or more likely because it has caused deaths or other harm, does not amount by itself to having a picture of the society you’re trying to create… other than specifying the detail that you don’t want it to include that practice. It’s like the difference between negative ethics (Thou shalt not) and virtue ethics (here’s an ideal to follow). A particularly stark example of outlawing without a comprehensive vision behind it is when certain models of firearm are prohibited but other, substantially similar ones are allowed.
Perhaps in the UK there’s not such a strong libertarian strain, which is both what Sandel was reacting to in his Moral Limits of Markets book and what I was reacting to here. It is a myth pervasive in US political speech that negative freedom is the only kind of freedom there is, and this explains, as you mention, why we have not even the slightest tool to deal with rectification of past injustices, e.g. reparations for slavery. Such proposals would be taken as purely jocular if raised in the context of US legislation. I’m sure the US government does have some laws and programs dedicated to this (e.g. preservation of Native American communities), but I’d guess that none of these were initiated within the last 20 years. I often think that if there weren’t already public schools well established in the US, there’s no way that public education would get established here.
> , but they certainly haven’t treated the metaphysical issues involved in anything like a satisfactory way… nor do they need to in order to achieve consensus.
But “warm feelings” / “disgust” etc. will often be “metaphysically mistaken”… and our reply to the promotion or restriction of behaviours based on warmth and disgust will be to correct these mistakes. You may use “rights” as a kind of underhanded liberal weapon to exclude certain social visions, and so side step the discussion – but that’s merelely endorsing a “metaphysical” heuristic (ie. that metaphysics inconsistent with rights are likely to be wrong) .
> Zizekian
That’s fast becoming a dog-whistle around here (“this guy’s crazy”).
> It’s like the difference between negative ethics (Thou shalt not) and virtue ethics (here’s an ideal to follow).
If only this line existed as you assumed. Saying “no” to X is saying yes to every vision not containing X. Saying “no” to abortion-restrictions is saying “yes” to abortion. There’s no way around it. Everyone has their vision in mind: “rights-constrained pluralism” (to be generous) *is a vision* and it excludes others.
Michael, I understand the point you are making in order to not give license to unbridled or invalid ideological tenets, but it seems you are making very finely tuned points which are missing the proper context of Mark’s claims: to provide a non-ideological basis (not moralistic) for arriving at a well considered social perspective by which to maximize social and individual well-being. His approach on the issues you raise come from a pragmatic perspective in an attempt to avoid the types of concerns you note (unacknowledged ideological bias), and I think he both covers your concerns and provides a nicely integrated approach to a very complex set of problems.
Just to clarify: By Zizekian I’m just using a shorthand for Marxist or Lacanian aspersions of secret motives hidden in collective actions. I barely know what I’m talking about here, and it certainly needs an episode (or several!) to explore, but what I’m objecting to in this case is the idea that a law, which is a public thing, not like an artwork created by one individual such that you could talk fruitfully not just about the work but about the artist’s intentions or unconscious impulses, is invariably the token of some ideology.
To me, this imputes to the law too much rationality. Laws are typically compromises, with numerous provisions that few of those that signed it have even read. Certainly there were intentions in forming the law, and reasons that individuals had in supporting it, but it’s not a given that these contents of multiple minds as it were sum up to a shared vision or ideology. So if we pass a ban on smoking in certain kinds of establishments, is the “vision” a smoke-free country? Are we saying smoking and smokers are low-class or filthy? The relevant visions of those individuals involved far surpass the actual content of the law, and the law likely contains numerous individual provisions that are not particularly relevant to any given individual’s vision.
So what I’m imputing, perhaps incorrectly, to Zizek is the practice of reading ideology into social phenomena in the way that a literary analyst would read themes into a book, and I’m claiming that society and literature are dissimilar enough that such a practice is illuminating a la art but of dubious value as knowledge. If it can be done briefly, please help me understand how I’m misunderstanding Zizek and/or your comments here. Thanks.
Mark, (until Michael responds) the points he is making, which are not just Zizekian, Lacanian or Marxist, but merely seeking philosophical consistency are:
1) It would be good to get consensus on philosophical issues before legistlation takes place.
2) Your position on focusing not on what kind of society to promote, but on what to outlaw (negative freedom) does not guarantee a more objective justice (we have more governmental tools than outlawing). This seems to imply no basis to redress previous injustices.
3) You seem to be using “rights” as a means to exclude the value of social visions. That is a heuristic implying that metaphysics inconsistent with rights are likely to be wrong.
4) Your idea of “rights-constrained pluralism” is a vision which excludes others.
“1) It would be good to get consensus on philosophical issues before legislation takes place.”
I think this is Sandel’s position. I think the political arena (i.e. actual legislators debating as laws are contemplating) is a terribly ineffective forum for philosophical discussion. Consensus typically has to be achieved in society at large before this is (hopefully) reflected in legislative action, though it’s not unheard of for representatives to get ahead of their ignorant constituents. Sandel is right on in trying to preach to the wider society, but who hears him? Certainly not a conservative like the one Prax. linked to, and certainly few not in the intellectual elite. I have no real theory about how consensus in a wider society is built, but I don’t think this is enough. Ditto with New Work: telling philosophers about it is fine, but only functional installations of “regular” people (i.e. not communities of self-identified radical leftists) are going to really spread the idea.
#2-4 are not my position, but related to a description of how I think things typically work in the current establishment. Michael was claiming that by outlawing something, society does express a world-vision, and I’m arguing that this is not inherent in the act of outlawing itself, even though sure, many times governments do pursue comprehensive visions that involve outlawing certain things (the war on drugs, the war on terror, New York City’s generally successful attempt to a couple of decades back to crack down on crime; I’m sure there are more positive-sounding examples too!).
I’m actually with Sandel in complaining about this impoverished view of government as restriction-based/negative freedom only; while this view (Nozickian) isn’t quite the dominant view in the U.S., it’s pervasive enough (most of the right wing) that our political process unfortunately uses that as a default starting point, so that any little positive government action needs to be fought for, with cries of “tyranny!” coming from the right. Thus my point #1: no substantial philosophical progress can be made in political discourse with such a skewed public dialogue. (And of course, since libertarians would prefer that “progress” be made by private individuals, i.e. corporations bringing good things to the masses, a paralyzed public apparatus is just fine with them.)
Hello, Mark:
I really enjoyed the essay, and I thought I’d make a few comments on it.
You wrote that “the political upshot of Sandel’s position is a progressive government that discusses at a deep and far-seeing level what human good amounts to (insofar as it can be generalized across people; this will still be a thin theory, but not nearly as thin as Rawls would have us believe for a population in a particular historical time and place) and what can be done to help the population at large approximate that good.”
I think this is correct, and I might state further that what Sandel calls for, although he never explicitly says it, is to have a more participatory democracy. In order for an open dialogue about what counts as a theory of good or to come to a consensus about what ends institutions serve and what honors people ought to receive, we would have to have a political structure where the debates about such issues would make a difference, and this could only occur if we had either a more participatory democracy or if the people who have the most influence in the society are willing to make public policy on the basis of majority or supermajority consensus.
You also wrote, “The Bill of Rights presents us with the illusion of an absolute limit on power, but laws still need to be interpreted, and if the Supreme Court and the other branches agree to interpret a listed right in such a way that it won’t protect some particular action, they can and have done that. Despite our efforts to the contrary, we remain a nation of people using laws as tools, not a nation of laws lording over people.”
And not only do the laws need to be interpreted appropriatley but also the only reason that any of the limits on power exist in actuality is because people are at least comfortable enough with certain aspects of political power so as not to revolt against them. Some of this could be from a reasoned position, some of it could be from inertia, but it seems that any words on parchment only hold to the extent that the citizens of the country are willing to accept them as binding.
The public policy issue about abortion really gets to the heart of the matter of what Sandel thinks about how we ought to go about deciding legislative issues on moral grounds. You wrote, “Sandel gives the example that in deciding about the permissibility of abortion, we need to be above board in stating simply that we (as representatives in a Republic; this may not actually reflect the majority view) regard the Catholic claims that zygotes are persons as simply incorrect and not try to pussy-foot around such philosophical, scientific, and moral issues in issuing decisions. But this is of course exactly how law-making does not work. If we required consensus on philosophical issues before legislation could take place, nothing would get done. Instead, we make practical arguments: in the case of abortion, we can argue that whatever the ontological status of the zygote or fetus, people should have the right to choose what to do with their bodies. We can argue that outlawing abortions just leads to an unsafe black market in them. We tend to pass laws that seek to mitigate bad things that are happening, not to order society in any ideal way.”
Here is a point where I agree with Sandel. In large, nation-wide decisions like the abortion debate, or health care, or progressive taxation, or what have you, there is an implied moral judgment in these public policies issues, and it might do us some good to tease out the moral arguments we’re using to arrive at these decisions. And that would even mean teasing out some of the metaphysical assumptions from which we’re operating. If we really think that any of these public policy issues help move toward a better quality of life, one way or the other, then we ought to move in that direction, and legislation ultimatley has to enshrine one position over the other as being correct. It seems to me that the issue about abortion really is not only about when life begins but also about which is a higher good: the capacities and restraints a woman may have on terminating a fetus or the importance for human development of carrying every child to full-term.
One more comment, about natural rights. I agree that on one interpretation of ‘natural rights’ that they are “ontologically suspect,” as you said. Another way to take natural rights, though, and the way I take it that the American founders took them in general is a collection of capabilities or capacities we’re choosing to preserve as founding principles, without which not much of the framework will make sense, or without which it would be difficult to proceed. They’re like House Rules, but House Rules we think are worth preserving because they say something about the quality of life we want to ensure.
who is capable of “good faith argumentation”, who could set aside their own interests (who be be something other than a kluged together outcome of their interests/habits), their own all-too-human manipulative/instrumentalist critterly natures in order to do so?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases
building on the earlier guest prof of rhetoric folks may wish to check out:
Olson, Gary A. Justifying Belief: Stanley Fish and the Work of Rhetoric
One of the problems behind any effort to propose a theory of justice, especially from the philosophical position, is the allure of providing a comprehensive solution which is rational, both socially and individually. Society not a rationally instituted, but the development of history, the outcome of ongoing habits of groups of people. The a posteriori (historical precedence) always preceeds the a priori (theoretical). Societies do not just sit down, pull Rawls, Kant or Sanders off the shelf and study how to construct a society.
So philosophy always comes late to the party, and can only offer ideas which are always limited by on going social forces which thereby take priority. It is unrealistic to think that a theory of justice should be implemented because it fits a theoretically derived system. So good solutions to political conditions are always going to be a work in progress, and should be acknowledged as such, without false hopes in finally getting it right.
The take away I got from Sandel was his point about how we’ve gone from a market economy to a market society. But here I don’t think his critique goes far enough.
From the very beginnings of “civilization” i.e. Egypt, Sumeria, Greece, Rome, etc. is itself based not only on the domestication of plants and animals but especially the domestication and enslavement of humans.
It’s a factory farm of people and human labor and taxation.
“Civilization” is people living in large numbers in an area that cannot sustain them so food and resources must come from outside
Usually by conquest and colonialism often with forced tribute and taxation because the other people don’t want to give up their food and daughters.
The government/king/pharoah must take care of his/its’ domesticated mass of capital (capit = head = heads of human cattle) so food/water/goods/slaves/money/taxes/tribute must be taken from others and given to its’ human cattle.
But here capitalism and socialism are the same things. Which is why I’m interested in New Work and how that develops.
domestication
http://www.bulletproofexec.com/rewild-yourself-with-daniel-vitalis-podcast-141/
Domesticated homo sapiens, & How Civilization Became a Feed Lot
http://fatburningman.com/daniel-vitalis-rewilding-domesticated-homosapians-civilization/
Domesticating Humans
http://undergroundwellness.com/podcasts/279-domesticating-humans/
much respect
You wrote that “the political upshot of Sandel’s position is a progressive government that discusses at a deep and far-seeing level what human good amounts to (insofar as it can be generalized across people; this will still be a thin theory, but not nearly as thin as Rawls would have us believe for a population in a particular historical time and place) and what can be done to help the population at large approximate that good.”
That’s a perfect description of Sam Harris’s science of morality. That’s exactly how it functions, informed by the best available empirical data spanning the whole range of human knowledge (sociology, economics, political science, psychology, neuroscience… anything and everything which contributes to the well-being/suffering of conscious creatures).
Sandel stressed something in the podcast that this discussion appears to be missing or avoiding: that choosing to be neutral is in fact a moral position, and that we can see this clearly when opposing our neutrality to one of the poles of a moral position. To use Sandel’s example, if Christianity values the zygote as a full-fledged human being, then someone who argues from the neutral position is opposed to this value and is taking a different value, the ‘neutral value’. The neutral value is in conflict with the Christian value, and the Christian may take offense to this alleged neutrality and say “How can you be morally neutral about the sanctity of life!” (not my position). The neutral value does not side-step the issue of value altogether, nor does it stand above it as an objectively unbiased position that allows pragmatism to begin
I think Mark and Wayne are confusing the epistemological position of neutrality with that of a ‘neutral’ moral position. One can be epistemologically neutral—abstaining from committing to a belief, or admitting that you are uncertain about a belief—where this neutral position does not come in conflict with or contradict any definite epistemic belief, but for the moral positions—the zygote has value, no value, or neutral value—the neutral value is not a quantum superposition of possible values, but another type of definite value.
In other words, if you are uncertain about the moral value of something, then you automatically value that thing differently than someone who claims to value that thing in a definite way. For instance, if, from a distance, I am unsure that a particular child is my daughter, then I will value that child differently than I value my daughter. Once I decide she is my daughter, my love and value for her settle in in a way that differs from my previous state; or if I decide she is not my daughter, I will begin to value her how I value any child I am unacquainted with. When I am in an epistemologically uncertain state about an object, I still value that uncertain object in a particular way; I don’t abstain from valuing it altogether.
I guess I am saying that possibly ontologic/epistemic states carry definite value judgments, and we don’t get around morality by claiming epistemological neutrality or uncertainty. So when Mark says: “ in the case of abortion, we can argue that whatever the ontological status of the zygote or fetus, people should have the right to choose what to do with their bodies.” , he makes value judgments. He is uncertain about the ontological status of zygotes, and values this uncertain ontologic object (I confuse epistemic and ontologic myself) in a very particular way. Mark is still valorizing zygotes, he just values them differently than fully-fledged human beings.
Mark’s entire essay knowingly values practicality and problem solving in society above all else, or at least takes problem solving in society to be very important, but not everybody will value solving problems above, for instance, living the good life, or being a righteous person, and so forth. I don’t think Sandel expects everyone to come to a consensus about value issues prior to doing anything practical, but he is, at least in this podcast, encouraging us to lay our moral cards down on the table. And I think he sees this alleged neutral moral position as a dangerous, if not simply illusory, construct in society. Most people don’t realize that when they are being neutral or practical that they are taking a definite moral position. They are not above all the petty moral bickering; they are simply taking a different position that usually isn’t a target of attack because the other two sides are too busy beating each other up.
Great work guys. Cheers.
Marc:
Ontological or epistemic neutrality. Never considerd that concept as a possiblity before. There is a considerable difference between moral value as good (true) versus bad (false) and epistemic value of valid/real (true) and invalid/not real (false). These differences often get conflated and thus confused (which is not to speak of neutrality in either case).
Not speaking for Mark, it is possible he is making a value judgment about zygotes, although I think the primary point is to address any possible moral value that individuals would make, and make those judgments subservient to the issue of what is a good way to approach social justice in the spirit of Rawls, while considering Sandel–the summary of positions represented in both PEL podcasts, not easy to summarize, but bear with me. Yes, practicality (pragmatism), problem solving in society (but not to necessarily exclude either living the good life as represented by Frithjof Bergmann, or “being a righteous person” as represented by virture ethics and Alasdair MacIntyre). You heard Mark express an interest in the nature of human subjectivity to help clarify some of these issues.
Sandel is indeed calling us to express our moral values, although he wisely does not do so in making his case. He is not therefore imposing his moral values while calling for us to dialogue morally since he understands that moralizing is not a wise philosophical position. I for one, do not view my position on the dangers of morality as a neutral or merely practical position, but one of great value to me as previously elaborated by Nietzsche: let’s get beyond moralizing good or bad, even beyond what is epistemically true or false to what is of ontological value to all of us–Wayne.
Thanks Mark for the interesting post! I’ve enjoyed the discussions around Sandel’s critique of liberalism and neoliberalism.
I hope I’m not beating a dead horse by stating again that one of the central questions is whether liberalism is culturally embedded, and if so, as I’d claim it certainly must be, to what extent can we universalize it and in what ways is it ideologically biased (similar argument against the critique of identity politics is that it hides another tacit identity politics). This problem was at the centre of the disagreement between Geertz and Rorty, and illuminates why people like Viveiros de Castro have called Rorty anti-anthropological for being so comfortable in his “ethnocentric” liberalism.
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/common_knowledge/v017/17.1.de-castro.pdf
For another take on liberalism and such critiques see
http://www.amazon.com/Liberals-Cannibals-The-Implications-Diversity/dp/1859845959
Joel Robbins has made an interesting argument concerning the politically conscious turn in anthropology since the 80s, brought about by feminism, post-colonial theory, and critiques of representation, and which focused on the “suffering subject.” The moral demand to address suffering brought with it a certain universalism that reinforced suspicions of depicting cultural otherness. I see a certain analogy between the universalising effect on concentrating on suffering and how to alleviate it (e.g. rights) and the universalizing effect of liberalism. Robbins proposes that anthropologists should get back to looking at cultural differences through “anthropology of the good”, that comparative work on values and morality could offer powerful critical tools for reflecting on and assessing our own notions of the good life. This is largely where I see the best hope of anthropology contributing to this discussion.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9655.12044/abstract
On another note, you should do further stuff on ideology. The term gets used in multiple ways and the commonplace connotations of Marxist “false consciousness” do not necessarily always imply. I’d argue that there is nothing individually or collectively constructed that is free of ideology, not necessarily in the sense of a political outlook, but purely by being connected to a cultural ontology. To express meaning is to express an ideology.
where in Rorty do you find him denying that “liberalism is culturally embedded” ?
I didn’t say Rorty claimed such a thing, it is the implication of the embeddedness that’s at issue: Rorty embraced his ethnocentrism, trusting in liberalism’s ability to accommodate diversity (but not too much), while Geertz was more troubled by it. The general thrust of the anthropological project has usually been to reach beyond its starting point (liberal or otherwise). I’m sure you can say the same thing about Rorty, but in this context he becomes an apologist or defender of certain form of ethnocentrism. If there’s another reading of the debate I’d be interested to hear it.
http://nansi.abaetenet.net/abaetextos/the-nazis-or-the-amazonians-but-then-again-zeno
“Geertz likens Rorty’s ethnocentrism to certain positions assumed by Lévi-Strauss in “Race and Culture.” It seems to me that Geertz misses a crucial difference. Rorty is extolling the virtues of ethnocentrism from the vantage point of a civilization that imagines itself as increasingly dominant: “. . . the gradual expansion of the imagination of those in power, and their gradual willingness to use the term ‘we’ to include more and more different sorts of people” Lévi-Strauss, on the other hand, sees in a certain amount of ethnocentrism a society’s protective reflex against its absorption by hegemonic projects like those for which Rorty elected himself spokesperson.”
Viveiros de Castro (2011) Zeno and the Art of Anthropology: Of Lies, Beliefs, Paradoxes,
and Other Truths (p.130 n. 7)
“In his provoctive paper on “The Uses of Diversity,” Professor Geertz asserts that ethnocentrism relegates gaps and asymmetries between individuals or groups to “a realm of repressible or ignorable difference, mere unlikeness.” This is a good description of how we treat people whom we think not worth understanding: those whom we regard as irredeemably crazy, stupid, base, or sinful. Such people are not viewed as possible conversational partners, but, at most, as means to ends. We think we have nothing to learn from such people, for we would rather die than share the beliefs which we assume are central to their self-identities. Some people think of Jews and atheists in these terms. Others think this way about Nazis and religious fundamentalists.
When we bourgeois liberals find ourselves thinking of people in this way – when, for example, we find ourselves reacting to the Nazis and the fundamentalists with indignation and contempt – we have to think twice. For we are exemplifying the attitude we claim to despise. We would rather die than be ethnocentric, but ethnocentrism is precisely the conviction that one would rather die than share certain beliefs. We then find ourselves wondering whether our own bourgeois liberalism is not just one more example of cultural bias
This bemusement makes us susceptible to the suggestion that the culture of Western liberal democracy is somehow “on a par” with that of the Vandals and the Ik.”
-Rorty
…which can lead us to be so “open-minded that our brains have fallen out.” I’m not sure what you are implying with that quote or if its supposed to contradict what I said.
I guess you could say that Rorty’s liberalism is enlightened cosmopolitan liberalism on its toes, an ethnocentrism embraced by those distrustful of ethnocentrism and attempting to extend solidarity as far as possible. It is an acceptance of a certain ethnocentric premise nonetheless: “We Western liberal intellectuals should accept the fact that we have to start from where we are, and that this means that there are lots of visions which we simply cannot take seriously.” Whether this makes him anti-anthropological or whether Viveiros de Castro is fair in describing his perspective as “relativism of the rich and pragmatism of the powerful” or calling him out for pairing Nazism and Amazonian cultures as twin topoi of incomprehensible alienness everyone can decide for themselves.
If Rorty is as open to get from where “we” are to somewhere else through the reevaluation of our fundamental cultural premises (the “accepted” starting point) I no longer see where the disagreement lies. As Michael Krauz put it bluntly:
“Geertz’s self-characterization as white, male, bourgeois, liberal, intellectual, and so on, resembles Rorty’s self-characterization. But such a self-characterization for Geertz is initial, while for Rorty it is final in the sense that Rorty seems to see no need for self-development through confrontation with alternative cultures. Put otherwise, Geert’s ethnocentrism encourages a development in inquirers, while Rorty’s does not.”
But I’m sure your take on Rorty is more subtle than mine.
One could of course contradict Krauz by pointing to Rorty’s insistence that liberalism is constantly expanding our moral imagination. So will liberalism “doing what its always doing” lead to self-transformation? If so shouldn’t Rorty be listening to Geertz (as a specialist of particularity and an agent of love)?
so first just wanted to get a bit of what Rorty actually said on the table, no more no less, but yes if you read Rorty (and I’m not asking you to do so) you would be hard pressed to say that he doesn’t encourage engagement with people of differing opinions/experiences (in fact he explicitly recommends that people read anthropologists) that said he, Barbara Hernstein Smith, Stanley Fish, Paul Rabinow and others had some fundamental technical differences with Geertz & Co.over what one might properly (at least to my mind) characterize as philosophical/epistemological issues and without getting into the weeds it isn’t helpful (in my experience/reading) to reduce these matters to caricatures. My only real plea in the spirit of PEL would be a bit of wrestling with the primary texts, thanks
http://pages.uoregon.edu/koopman/courses_readings/rorty/rorty_CIS_full.pdf
DMF:
Sorry if I caricatured Rorty, it wasn’t my intention. I have certainly read the original articles and my views are based on them despite quoting Viveiros de Castro and Krausz in order to show a particular take on the debate. I’m also well aware that Rorty advocated anthropology as a way to expand our moral horizon (as I indicated above). If my “wrestling” isn’t to your liking, goes against the spirit of PEL, or is at the level of an undergrad paper I cannot but apologize.
sorry HS wasn’t pointing to any personal shortcoming of yours in particular just worried about how commenting/blogging seems to fall into these kinds of exchanges, doesn’t seem in the spirit of the podcasts somehow but obviously there are restrictions on time/space in these formats, don’t think that anyone has got it down yet so we are all making it up as we go, new formats call for new forms of exchange I think, does this make some sense?
Yes, sorry if I was defensive, I admit to being a philosophical tourist here. I still maintain that my take is not particularly unreasonable (however wrong it may be) and that it was well on topic (limits of liberalism).
I guess the actually helpful thing to do would be to get into the weeds and show how the epistemological differences contribute to the differing views on ethnocentrism and liberalism.
yes thanks that makes sense, the fellows have asked for new contributions/formats to build on what is already happening hereabouts and maybe this is the beginning of such an endeavor by those of us in the peanut-gallery to dig into the texts a bit, my sense is the more examples/quotes the better so there is some context since we are all working from such different places, oh and public-access texts as most of us are outside the paywall.
My critique of “Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” is available here: http://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2015/10/21/the-incoherence-of-michael-sandels-critique-of-liberalism/