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On "The Meaning of Meaning" (1975).
So if per Kripke (we're following the thread from #126), meaning is NOT a matter of having a description in your head, then what is it? Hilary Putnam reformulates Kripke's insight in terms of Twin Earths: If Earth-water is H2O, and on Twin Earth, they have something that looks just like water but is a different compound, then we wouldn't call that water, right? Putnam says part of what makes up the meaning of a word is an implicit pointing to the stuff around us, so it's relative to the speaker: The Twin Earthers saying "water" are referring to the stuff around them, not H2O. So even though we and the Twin Earthers both have the same mental contents, our reference points at different stuff.
Mark, Wes, and Dylan are rejoined by Matt Teichman for this gripping discussion, which in addition to covering that main essay also touched on Putnam's articles "It Ain't Necessarily So" (1962) and "Is Semantics Possible" (1970). Learn more about the topic and get the readings.
End song: "In the Boatyard" by Mark Lint & the Madison Lint Ensemble. Instruments recorded 2004, vocals (and Daniel Gustafsson's organ) added just now.
Putnam image by Corey Mohler.
http://vuh-la-risprt.herts.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/words-as-deeds-wittgensteins-spontaneous-utterances-and-the-dissolution-of-the-explanatory-gap%285aa06840-f1c9-4d3a-b15f-21b6ddd000b4%29.html
Chomsky discussing the Putnam paper: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CHS1NraVsAc
It beings at 3:40
David, thank you for the link; interesting interview. Chomsky gives Putnam the kungfu death blow in about 50 words or so. If the logical problems with Putnam’s paper weren’t enough, Chomsky feels these analytical philosophers are simple making up technical definitions that are unconnected to theory or practice. In contrast, when physicists define energy technically, it is not so much the definition that matters, but how the concept is used in calculations, theory, and practice. An technical defining of linguistic meaning is a made up entity, and if it is not connected to anything else, then who cares.
Sorry guys, but during the first 30 minutes of this one or so, I just kept thinking to myself “To the pain.” I have a passing interest in analytic philosophy of language, but the beginning and set up of this podcast was brutal and did not pick up until the main event of Twin Earth. If you are going to do analytic philosophy in the future, the technical terms need to be gradually introduced, set up, and given history. Wes tried to give the background, but he got derailed right out of Boston. Anyway, I was encouraged (forced) to read the paper to get my bearings…if that was the point.
When I got to page 160, I found that Putnam pretty much contradicted his whole Twin Earth argument with one of his thoughtful, pragmatic asides:
Putnam says: “Coming back to the Twin Earth example, for a moment, if H20 and XYZ had both been plentiful on Earth…it would have been correct to say that there were two kinds of “water.” And instead of saying that “the stuff on Twin Earth turned out not to really be water,” we would have to say “it turned out to be the XYZ kind of water”.”
So Putnam is saying above, that if both H20 and XYZ exist on earth, then the extension of the word “water” would include both all H20 and XYZ molecules, and rather than saying that XYZ is not water, we would say that XYZ is a kind of water—in other words, XYZ is water. Yet, in considering the original example, where H20 is only on earth, and XYZ is only on Twin Earth, he argues that the ‘meaning’ of water to earthlings is entirely different than the meaning of water to twin earthers, because the extensions differ. So what if we transport XYZ to Earth? Surely, after a generation or two (or sooner), everybody will call both XYZ and H20 water on Earth, and we will call them 2 kinds of water. Of course, there will be water Nazis, saying—that XYZ is not real water.
Again, considering the original Twin Earth problem, why not just say that for both the Earthings and Twin Earthers, they have the same extension for the term “water.” This extension includes all molecules of H20 and XYZ. It just so happens that earthlings did not know about XYZ water, and mistakenly held a narrow view of water. Putman makes nearly an identical argument when talking about the nature of gold (except the view of gold was overly broad for the ancients). When Putman says that there can be different kinds of water, he is prioritizing the functional properties and ‘superficial’ characteristics of water above the molecular properties—which to me seems completely reasonable at times, and we already sort of do this with the different versions of water on Earth (Heavy water, heavy oxygen water, etc). The molecular properties of these waters differ, but we still call them water. But this move invalidates his entire Twin Earth argument. If we broaden the extension of water, the Earthlings and Twin Earthers have both the same intension of water, and the same extension (they simply had a narrow view of water that needed expanding). This puts meaning back in the head—or at least the idea that intension determines extension.
But the bigger problem with this: you can argue it either way, which is the case for all analytical philosophy. And Putnam relies upon a ‘completed’ view science to make most of his arguments. As if knowing that water is composed of H20 molecules completes the work of science with regard to water? Scientists do not even fully understand the liquidity of water to this date. Knowledge of molecules is helpful, but these are not necessarily the end of the scientific line (think quarks, strings, quantum loops, who knows)–and how all these things interact still hold significant mystery. Putnam argues from a position in 1975 that assumes he grasps a partially completed scientific essentiallism in comparison to the ancient greeks and pre-atomic theory knuckleheads several hundred years ago. Is is not possible that the science of 1000 years from now will make our atomic theory look trite as well? In fairness, his pragmatism does seep into the article–as above–leading to interesting contradictions, which perhaps makes this piece such a classic.
” When Putman [sic] says that there can be different kinds of water, he is prioritizing the functional properties and ‘superficial’ characteristics of water above the molecular properties—which to me seems completely reasonable at times, and we already sort of do this with the different versions of water on Earth (Heavy water, heavy oxygen water, etc). The molecular properties of these waters differ, but we still call them water.”
Nailed it. In fact, you can drive this stake even deeper into the heart:
Putnam and the Real Essentialists imagine they can maintain a distinction between phenomenal properties and what something “really is”. The slight of hand comes in making you forget that the “real” deep molecular properties themselves can only be cashed out in terms of long chains of inferences from whatever the appropriate phenomenal properties of the relevant scientific instruments are.
Was it Wes who kept bringing up 1750 in the episode? This is exactly why that’s such a good point. Twin Earth STIPULATES equal epistemic access with Prime Earth. Putnam therefore either has to SMUGGLE IN phenomenal data (e.g. about the results of electrolysis experiments) about that Twin-Water “really is”, thereby breaking the symmetry; or he has to concede that his description of Twin Earth FAILS TO GIVE A SPECIFICATION sufficient to distinguish two possible worlds.
(And just in case someone might be inclined to say “but if they had done these experiments, they would have seen…” stop and consider that “if/then” is itself a modal claim. Counterfactuals where X happened describe a SEPARATE POSSIBLE WORLD from all the ones where X did not happen — you cannot locate a counterfactual IN a single world where the counterfactual didn’t happen!)
It is unfortunate how “Platonism” on language is associated with something like mathematical forms. The Cratylus and Euthydemus (295a-e) can be summarized to say that, for Socrates, words do not have meaning in themselves. Meaning is in the soul of the speaker and the hearer. Words are instruments to use and utterances cannot be detached from the speaker. You cannot misuse language. But you can use language in an unhelpful way.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-cratylus/