Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Part Two)

0:00 Wes: So I want to turn us back to the fitting part of his argument. We got to the point in the argument where he talks about what he calls conceptual scheme, empirical content dualism. And that dualism is important because when people want to talk about different conceptual schemes, they have to be able to sort of appeal to some outside frame to say that these schemes are different. Right? We can't talk about those difference unless there's this sort of neutral ground that's outside the schemes that we can use to adjudicate the difference. And that neutral ground he talks about as either.

We could call it experience or evidence or nature or something like that. And then we could think about the relation that determines whether translation is possible as involving either organizing, which we talked about, or predicting fitting. And so my gloss on the fitting argument is basically that when we get to the point where we're talking about fitting, we're talking about predictive sentences. And the sentences that predict are just the sentences that are true. And then truth, it turns out, inherently involves the concept of translatability.

So if we're thinking about conceptual schemes as doing this fitting, and if truth cannot be untangled from translatability, then we can't make sense of conceptual schemes that cannot be translated into other conceptual schemes.

1:22 Mark: Right.

1:23 Dusty: To briefly fill out a little bit why truth essentially involves translatability on Davidson's story, the idea is that to understand what truth is we have to have what Davidson calls a theory of truth. And our best clue, and this itself is not a definition of truth, but a kind of, he thinks, an intuition that we can all agree on about truth, is that however truth is to be defined, it must be such that we can say that if the sentence say this desk is black is true, just in case this desk is black, and we need to be able to construct statements like that for any sentence that is true.

But ultimately, if the sentence that we're checking the truth of is a sentence, say in French, right, we're going to say this French sentence is true, just in case, and then we're going to give a translation of that sentence into English. That understanding what it would mean for a sentence in another language to be true just is translating it into English, or it involves it, essentially, if you're an English speaker or if you're formulating your theory of truth in English. This is controversial by its own lights. There are people who reject this, but Davidson took it to be a sturdy piece of puzzle.

2:34 Wes: Intuitively, we can see that it's kind of strange if we think of two different conceptual schemes, both involving sentences that predict phenomena in the world or fit them, and yet they're not translatable. The intuition here is, well, if they're fitting the same world, how could they possibly not be translatable between each other?

2:50 Dusty: Right. And that of any sentence in that conceptual scheme that is alien to mine. In supposing any sentence in that language to be true, I cannot formulate what it is true because of in my own language, I can't say what makes

3:04 Wes: it true, even if it's like a radically different perception of things, you know, if it's that sonar or whatever.

3:10 Dylan: But isn't part of the translatability question having to do with whether or not there's overlap in the thing that you call the world? Even admitting that there's one world or

3:24 Wes: conceding, I think he says there is at most one world in here. Or is that carnap?

3:28 Dylan: No, he says it.

3:30 Wes: Yeah, that's great. And that really sums up the paper. There's at most one world, so there's at most one conceptual scheme.

3:36 Dylan: So even if there is just one world, let's just say that's the case. Part of the issue with conceptual schemes and fittingness is going to be what part of that world is fitted. Just because the examples we were giving, there's a lot of overlap.

3:50 Wes: Right.

3:50 Dylan: But it may be that there are things that you're describing that one way of speaking about it doesn't overlap completely with another way of speaking about it. And a perfect example is one we were using earlier, Newtonian physics versus quantum mechanical physics. And we were giving other examples as well, the sensory experience of being blind versus seeing or being deaf versus hearing, that either the phenomena being described or the reach, that they don't necessarily overlap with one another. So even if they're speaking about the same world, they're touching different parts of the elephant.

Right. And it may be that they're not translatable in the same way, you have to fill in the parts of the world that your conceptual scheme. He's denying that they exist. Your language, you're filling in the world that your language doesn't, let's call it naturally describe and hold into it. You're extrapolating. You're filling in the other pieces that aren't part of your direct experience or that are directly in the language of your own language. And it's not so you can translate to it.

4:55 Wes: We have to imagine that some parts of the world are radically different than others. And yet we, I think Davidson would argue they have to be translatable in the sense that if a visitor from that radically different part of the world, or just say another planet, let's say part of the universe comes to see us and where they're from is radically different from Earth. I think the idea is that there has to be translatability in the sense they'd have to be able to explain it to us. A radically different conceptual scheme would mean that they couldn't even explain their world to us. They couldn't explain what it's like.

5:25 Mark: Yeah, I'm trying to think about the, you know, just in terms of the many examples that we've already given. And one of the things that what Dylan was just saying was making me think of is, you know, sort of like the seeing auras example I gave before. But imagine I can see pheromones. I'm very sensitive to pheromones and so I'm able to predict sexual behavior because I'm so sensitive to pheromones. And you can't predict that. In fact, I'm rather autistic about regular social cues, so I can't understand sarcasm or something. So you're very good at predicting the sarcasm. That seems like it's a non overlapping in fitting the world, obviously you could be focusing on different parts that you're fitting to. But I think Dylan, just the image you gave of parts of the elephant. Well, there's still one elephant. And so those are translatable. We can explain, as Wes was just

6:09 Wes: saying, there's some systematic interrelation between the parts.

6:12 Dylan: And I guess I'm agreeing that they're translatable. What I find Davidson seems to be saying that because they're translatable, that the experience is the same and that there aren't distinctions that are being made in the ways that people think about the world that are distinctions that have any difference in them. That if they did, that distinctions that had real difference would be something like real conceptual schemes and you would end up with truth values about things that were different about the same thing. And then absent of that, then there aren't any differences. That's the part that seems kind of strange.

6:46 Mark: Can you focus in on the truth value? I can imagine what I think you mean there, but can you give us an example there?

6:51 Dylan: Well, I take Davidson to mean that one sign of there being genuine conceptual schemes would be that you had different truth values about the same thing for two different entities.

7:04 Mark: Is France octagonal? The example we used in from J.L. austin that in one conceptual scheme of the map maker, France is not octagonal. In the conceptual scheme of the general who just wants to march his troops across there and needs to know the approximate shape, sure, it's just about octagonal. So the same sentence is true and false because the word octagonal really has a different meaning given the context.

7:29 Dusty: I think the closing argument will speak to these things because ultimately Davidson is just going to want to understand these kinds of differences as differences within. He won't even want to say a common scheme. But these kinds of differences don't amount to differences in scheme. There are differences of opinion, effectively, yeah, you could even frame it as differences of perspective. But for the many criticisms that might be raised against this, I don't think he's trying to eliminate all texture from human experience. What he's attacking here is a kind of extreme and I think on the face of it, incoherent conclusion that could be drawn after noticing the kind of great variety of human experiences. You could see it as him criticizing one wrong way of accommodating the variety of human experiences, but not ruling out that there is a correct way to accommodate it.

8:13 Wes: All right, shall we move on to the wrap up then? Which is the failure of partial translation. Just to recap the argument so far, very basically, I think the idea is that, look, if you're going to say there are different conceptual schemes, you got to have to be able to distinguish them. And that means you have to be able to appeal to this neutral ground in order to make the distinction that neutral ground turns out to be the world. And if it's the same world, that undermines the idea that the conceptual schemes themselves can be incommensurable. That's that basic argument with the partial translation argument, the failure of partial translation. The idea here is that we can't really interpret speech without thinking that the other person. We have to be able to attribute a whole range of beliefs to the other person.

9:01 Dusty: Davidson says that the theory of belief and the theory of meaning are both closely tied up with interpreting someone's speech. So we have to take their words to mean something in particular, and we have to take them to have particular beliefs about what they mean and about what they're intending to do by communicating, etc. Etc. He gives an example of a case of malapropism.

9:23 Wes: Before you say that, the most fundamental thing we do is we attribute to them the belief of accepting as true the assertion that they're making. So even if they utter something, we have no idea what it means. At the very least, we make this minimal attribution to them of asserting the truth of what they're asserting.

9:39 Dusty: Right. He takes this to be a kind of less committal assumption that we can then ground our understanding of belief and meaning on this basic attitude of taking true. He gives an example of someone who says, look at that yawl kind of boat when looking at a ketch. I don't know anything about boats. And you know, this is someone who is looking at a boat under clear conditions. When you hear that, you immediately attribute to them the attitude of taking true that there is a yawl. However you see that in fact it is a ketch. And then you're kind of confronted with a choice that either you have to take it that they mistook a ketch for a yawl, that there's something wrong with the conditions of observation.

Or alternatively, you take it that they use the word yawl differently than you, that perhaps they've adopted an incorrect use of the term. And he thinks that in many cases this is an instance of malapropism. We very automatically and kind of instinctually recognize what they actually mean, and we attribute to them the correct belief. You know, when someone says, look at that yawl while looking at a ketch, we attribute to them the belief that there is a ketch.

10:47 Wes: So in other words, they just don't know their vocabulary. They know what they're seeing, they know that there's a sort of category for it, but they've inverted the words. So when they make that confusion, it's not that they are somehow applying the wrong concept. It's just that conceptually everything is the same. It's just that they're using different words because it's a vocabulary error.

11:07 Dusty: And then that this is involved in all understanding. So it's involved in the interpretation of behavior more broadly. If you see someone chasing after an ice cream truck with money in their hand, there are a theoretically infinite number of beliefs that you assume that person has in order to make sense of their behavior. For instance, they assume that money can buy ice cream.

11:30 Unknown speaker: Right.

11:31 Dusty: But they also assume that whatever, we live in a spatiotemporal world with perduring objects. And they assume that running gets you closer to things rather than further away.

11:40 Wes: They like you like ice cream and not just giving their money away to people.

11:45 Dusty: Right, right. But we do this in speech as well. When any, anytime, even someone speaking in the same language, we make all kinds of assumptions about what they believe in order to understand what they're saying to us.

11:54 Wes: And to do that, we essentially assume that what they believe is true. Our guidepost for all those assumptions about what they believe is just what we think we believe accurately about the world. We assume that they, to a large extent, have this set of true beliefs that match ours or a set of beliefs that match ours by virtue of the fact that they largely fit the world.

12:19 Dusty: Yeah, it seems right to me. Yeah. And so then, just to tie it back in, Davidson thinks that even in cases where there is something like partial failure of translatability between conceptual schemes, in order to make sense of someone as speaking at all or using language at all, we have to do this. We have to assume that the majority of their beliefs are true. And in so doing, we adopt what Davidson calls the charity as an approach. We represent them as responsive to the same world that we are responsive to. And this is a precondition for having any theory of meaning on Davidson's story. So adopting this charitable attitude isn't an act of charity, so to speak. We're not being nice. This is just the only way that one can understand another person as saying things that have meaning.

13:15 Wes: Yeah. And it turns out that meaningful disagreement really depends on this foundation in agreement. Right. If we thought there were no agreement on anything, if we, as you've pointed out, didn't make all these assumptions about the very large number of beliefs and the assumption that those beliefs are true, in the end, it wouldn't be possible to disagree at all, because there wouldn't be a single Frame of meaning. And so if you think of an example, if I'm having an argument with someone about some political issue and they just say, well, based on my identity, I have a different conceptual scheme than yours, our positions are relative to that conceptual scheme, then essentially what they're saying is that we don't even disagree because our different positions really don't meet to do battle on the same terrain.

14:02 Dylan: Yeah. And that's actually a powerful way to formulate the problem.

14:06 Unknown speaker: Right.

14:07 Dylan: Pointing out that it's not just having radically different schemes means not only do

14:12 Wes: you disagree, it makes disagreement impossible.

14:15 Dylan: It makes disagreement impossible, which seems to be a stronger claim than saying it makes agreement impossible.

14:22 Dusty: So this claim ultimately amounts to. Even in cases of partial failure of translatability, Davidson says we're never forced to interpret this as a difference in conceptual schemes. Note that it is interesting though that he doesn't say that we cannot. His line is that there's always a way to interpret their behavior that doesn't require positing that there is a difference in conceptual schemes. But the possibility is open. So this argument is in an interesting way, it seems to me weaker than the argument against total failure of translatability.

14:58 Wes: Say why?

14:59 Dusty: Just because in the case of total failure of translatability, he at least takes himself to have shown that the notion itself is incoherent and that translatability between schemes is always presupposed. His conclusion is that we are never forced to interpret someone as having a difference in conceptual schemes.

15:20 Wes: Yeah, we could never actually be in a position to judge that others have radically different conceptual schemes. There's no standpoint from which we could make that assessment. There's no intelligible basis, he says, to say that schemes are different. The one thing he says at the very end is that we have to give up on this idea of this relation between concept and then uninterpreted reality, which is reminiscent of Wilfred Sellars. So it's that distinction which gets us into this trouble. This idea that we have this uninterpreted world and then we have these concepts and that we can do this conceptual scheme thing with that relation.

15:58 Dylan: What about an example like Marx from Arrival? It seems intelligible to talk about conceptual schemes that were non translatable, even if demonstrating is a kind of. It's like trying to prove non existence.

16:16 Mark: Yeah.

16:16 Wes: He's basically saying there would be no way to tell except for the fact

16:20 Dylan: that you can't do it.

16:22 Wes: Right.

16:22 Dylan: Except the mere unintelligibility. So the only evidence is this unintelligibility

16:28 Wes: you wouldn't think of it as unintelligible. You wouldn't think of it as a expression of speech in the first place, at the point where you think that the aliens are speaking to you even though you don't understand them. I think for Davidson, the idea of translatability is posited. No. So for it to be completely unintelligible in the sense, I think the aliens would look like rocks that have just fallen from space and are sitting there, and they may be are trying to communicate and have such a radically different conceptual apparatus that their communications don't look like anything to us. Or something like that.

17:02 Dylan: Yeah, but right there. So what you're saying is that the moment that you say they're trying to communicate with me, that's a point where you have enough intelligibility to say, now it's a problem of figuring out what they're saying. And therefore the conceptual schemes can't be completely non overlapping because at the very least there's an overlapping in some kind of signaling that corresponds to communication in both cases.

17:33 Dusty: Well, you're now attributing to them some beliefs, attitudes, the kind of things that are constitutive of being engaging in speech, behavior and communication, on Davidson's view.

17:45 Dylan: Yeah, but the only thing I'm positing right now is just something that is so thin as to be hidden behind just that they are trying to communicate with us.

17:54 Wes: But once we know they're communicating, we assume that they have beliefs, that they think those beliefs are true, and that in large part those beliefs are true. And if that's the case, that's an argument for translatability.

18:06 Dylan: Yep.

18:06 Dusty: So I just, very briefly just wanted to come back just to give some sense to the thing I said a minute ago. I found the passage. So the sense in which I think that Davidson's argument against partial or failure of translation as an argument for conceptual scheme relativism is weaker hinges on this passage. Concluding his talk about interpretation, he says, we make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. This includes room, as we said, for explicable error, for instance, differences of opinion.

Where does this leave the case for conceptual relativism? The answer is, I think that we must say much the same thing about differences in conceptual scheme as we say about differences in belief. We improve the clarity and bite of declarations of difference, whether of scheme or opinion, by enlarging the basis of shared translatable language or of shared opinion. Indeed, no clear line between the cases can be made out. If we choose to translate some alien sentence rejected by its speakers by a sentence to which we are strongly attached on a community basis, we may be tempted to call this a difference in schemes.

If we decide to accommodate the evidence in other ways, it may be more natural to speak of a difference of opinion. But when others think differently from us, no general principle or appeal to evidence can force us to decide that the difference lies in our beliefs rather than our concepts. So it's just weaker in the sense that he. He's claiming that nothing can ever force us to interpret someone's speech behavior as embodying a difference in conceptual scheme. We can always interpret it as a difference in opinion. But he doesn't rule out in the same way that he does with.

He says that total conceptual scheme incommensurability is incoherent. He doesn't quite say that in the case of partial incommensurability, right?

19:49 Mark: Which is seemingly all that we would need for different conceptual schemes. None of his opponents, no matter how disreputable, claimed anything like total untranslatability. That there is no term in language A that matches to a term in language B at all. Is that just. He thinks that that would have to be just like his statement about that I interpreted as being about Kant at the beginning, that once you say that we use concepts to interpret the world, so there is the uninterpreted world, and then there is the filter, the distorting filter of concepts that has to leave room for the possibility of totally different concepts and hence complete untranslatability. So this is really just a totally abstract argument against that picture, which, if you, like Sellars, you already don't believe of the uninterpreted world versus filtering through concepts to reach our minds.

20:48 Dusty: Right. This article is important, though, because it's oftentimes the kind of. For people who reject even these more modest stories about conceptual schemes that don't make that extreme claim about incommensurability, people will often point to this article as a kind of a quick rejection of those approaches, but it doesn't seem to speak as decisively against them as sometimes supposed.

21:13 Mark: Well, how about we get our Carnap article on the table as. And consider it how he might be responding to Davidson, even though we've already admitted that Carnap is 23 years earlier and is definitely not responding to Davidson. But some of what Dylan was struggling to articulate in terms of the different schemes touching different parts of the elephant and actually Considering concrete problems in science and the different languages that are used. Well, that's exactly what Carnap is doing here. Right. Empiricism, semantics and ontology. Let's kind of go around. What was your big takeaway to this? Did this seem totally un. Fairly thoroughly unconnected, or. There's at least been a number of times during this conversation where I'm like, oh, well, Carnap answered that. Exactly.

22:01 Wes: He's rejecting the objection to abstract entities, sort of the accusations of Platonism when people use terms like number, for instance. Right. Even though I think in the end he turns out to be sort of a nominalist himself. And these sort of objections seem to come from nominalists. But there's this idea of a language which is a system set up to describe the world and then talk about that system itself as a whole, which is not the same thing as talking about the world and empirical entities. So he says to be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system. Hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. So our discussions about the reality of predicates or abstractions like number are misplaced.

22:55 Dylan: He calls them pseudo questions. In the section on linguistic frameworks, he categorizes two kinds of questions, internal and external questions. And all those internal questions are up for grabs and able to be answered.

23:08 Wes: Is the cat on the mat or not?

23:11 Dylan: Yeah. Questions within the framework are called internal questions. And then about the entities that are whole are external questions. And those questions, from his perspective, end up being pseudo questions.

23:24 Wes: So questions about the empirical world essentially are internal, and then questions about the system, the language concept system that we use to describe the empirical world. Those questions themselves are not those external questions, once they get into the ontology area, become. Yeah, right.

23:46 Dylan: I mean, importantly, they're pseudo in that you can't answer them in the same way as you were answering the internal questions. You end up having kind of a pragmatic solution to the external questions. You adjust things and there's a sort of rough and readiness to it. Right. And you have certain kinds of fittingness questions, but you're not going to resolve them in the terms that you resolve the internal questions, because the items, the entities, the concepts, don't have that relation to one another.

24:17 Dusty: Right. So the question is, what does it mean to accept the framework of numbers, say. Right. To talk about numbers. Traditionally, realists about abstract entities have thought that if you talk about numbers, then you're accepting that numbers exist. Carnap is kind of trying to kind of diffuse this debate throughout his whole career he does these kinds of things, basically saying that there's no real issue here, that what is it to accept the framework of numbers? Well, it's just to accept a system of linguistic rules that tell you how to use the word number and the word one and the word to, etc.

And you incorporate those rules into your total set of rules that constitute your language. And then we can ask what he calls internal questions about our set of rules for language. Namely, like, are there such things as numbers? Well, yeah, there are, because we have rules for talking about them. But that's, that's a kind of trivial truth. In fact, on his story, it's an analytic truth. Whereas the external question that he kind of box at would be the metaphysical one. But like, but are there really numbers? Right? Are we right in accepting the framework of numbers?

And he says that that question just has no content, just doesn't mean anything. And so instead of asking that question, we should reframe it as the practical question. Is it useful to talk about numbers? Should we talk about numbers?

25:43 Dylan: When you talk about all kinds of phenomena, you know, physics or chemistry or other kinds of science, you'll say, well, what is force? Or what is an atom? And he would say that all that stuff is useful up until a point, but none of it really corresponds to what is being talked about, except for the specific mathematical relations that are there. And so you in fact would probably be better off to not even be worrying about what mass really is. It's an M in that equation. That's what it is.

26:18 Wes: All that can accurately be said about atoms or the field is implicitly contained in the physical laws of the theories in question.

26:25 Dylan: This reminds me if you guys ever heard of Freeman Dyson. So he's one of the guys who clarified quantum electrodynamics. He didn't get the Nobel Prize for it, but he is the one who showed that Schwinger and Feynman and Tomonaga that that work was equivalent. He sort of famously spent a whole bunch of time with Feynman trying. Richard Feynman, who was one of the guys who invented quantum electrodynamics, but had a completely. Had a very different way of formulating it than another famous physicist. Schwinger and Dyson figured out what the translation was and showed that they were speaking about the same thing.

I had the chance to meet him many years later. He doesn't do that kind of physics. He was at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton and I got him to come to the college to Give a talk. He and I spent a bunch of time together and one of the things that St. John's students, of course, loved to talk about, it's like, well, you know, what is quantum mechanics? What is a wave function? What are we talking about here? And he straight up just said, the wave function is what it says in the equation. So he was deeply ungratifying for all of the students because he just.

He didn't find any of the questions that they wanted to ask about what uncertainty was in the uncertainty relation, what a wave in a particle duality was. He didn't think any of that was of any interest at all because it's just. It's just. It doesn't mean anything other than what you can say in the equation. And if you're. And that's what you have to figure out, that's what the answer is.

28:01 Mark: So you think he was giving a carnap answer or he was giving a nominalist answer.

28:06 Dylan: If I really understood what nominalism went, maybe I would. But he's given a carnapian answer, as far as I can tell.

28:13 Mark: There are two ways of taking this article. The one that I was fishing for was how does this respond to the conceptual scheme paper? As if it was responding. So we can talk later here about the difference between linguistic frameworks and conceptual schemes as Davidson was talking about them. But the straightforward way of taking this paper is as a response to Quine's on what there is is his essay. And I just re listened to our discussion on that. I'm not sure how if we got the essay right in discussing it, but assuming that we were more or less accurate, then Quine was warning in that that we should be careful about our ontological commitments, because whenever we use any terms in a scientific theory, I think he thought that we were at least prima facie making an ontological commitment to those existing, to those being part of our ontology.

But Quine is also known as a nominalist. He even talks about physical objects as being like mythological entities.

29:11 Unknown speaker: Right.

29:11 Mark: It's just the physical object talk of there being chairs and tables is really a recreation, is a way of organizing a pretty complicated set of experiences and social practices so that I know what you're talking about and you know what I'm talking about when we're talking about tables and chairs. But that doesn't really mean that we think in our ultimate ontology that those are there. So I think Quine is both recognizing the prima facie you are, whenever you use any of these things, adding something to your ontology, but also very much admitting that we should be sort of take that with a grain of salt that we should ultimately be nominalist about these things and say, well, these are.

Ontologies are things of convenience. They're not like we're spelling out the metaphysics that is going to be the signature of God or something. You know, the reason why old time metaphysicians did metaphysics. It's just. It's a different way of thinking about ontology.

30:05 Dusty: Right. So ultimately the feature of Quine's account, which will still fall prey to Davidson's critique, is the part where our theory as a whole has to meet the tribunal of experience. Right. Where at least on Davidson's understanding of Quine's story, there's still this picture of the theory as a whole coming up against content. We have the scheme content distinction. And that seems, at least on a charitable reading of this article by Carnap, to be less present because he wants to frame the question of the suitability of adopting a particular way of speaking or a particular framework, not in terms of its squaring well with how the world is in itself or with the sense data at this point in his career, but rather in terms of this practical criterion.

30:57 Mark: And was specifically responding to Quine's seeming concern with ontology in the way that Dylan was just describing Freeman. Dyson is saying like it's a meaningless question. And ontological questions are either obvious. Yeah, of course there are numbers. We're using the number language. So yes, there are numbers in the number language. Duh. Or meaningless. Are there numbers really? No, that's just. And when Carnap, you know, the first time we introduced Carnap was in the context of logical positivism, verificationism. Unless there's some evidence pro or conversation, then it's not a legitimate thing to argue about. So what evidence can you give that numbers should be on your ontology or not in your ontology? There is no evidence. So forget about it. It's not even a real question.

31:43 Wes: Yeah, so the nominalists who worry that when we accept these systems, these ways of speaking, that there are implied ontological commitments are subject, as he says, to the same old metaphysical confusion. In a way, it's correct to be a nominalist, but not if you have these sorts of worries, which I think

32:03 Mark: he was saying that Quine did have those sorts of worries, but it's not really clear. Maybe Quine was more sophisticated than that, even just trying to re. Spell out what he meant in his paper. I was kind of getting caught in myself, I think the way we discussed it was, yes, straight up. Quine thought that all of these scientific statements in these different linguistic frameworks do have ontological commitments, which Carnap is straight up denying.

32:30 Wes: So what's the connection here to the Davidson paper?

32:34 Dusty: So, ultimately, Davidson's critique of conceptual framework or conceptual scheme talk, as I said, involves that critique of the scheme content dualism. Now, there are passages here in Carnap, so he thinks that our decision whether to accept a particular framework of entities as scientifically real, just meaning, as useful to incorporate into our language, is a practical decision. Now, his notion of practical decision is not spelled out in much detail.

33:07 Wes: Exactly. It's the problem. It might have something to do with truth, but.

33:13 Dusty: So, yeah, that's the worry. There are different ways of interpreting it. Some of the things he says suggest that ultimately he'll fall into the same kind of problems that Davidson complains about. At other moments, he seems to suggest that that won't be the case. So it's an ambiguous document in that respect. But what Carnap raises is the possibility that the question whether to accept a framework is not a question straightforwardly about what's real outside of the framework. It's not a cognitive question like that. It's a different kind of question. He's a bit vague in the way that he frames the nature of that question. Just as ambiguously practical. But, yeah. So roughly, the way I take it to speak directly to Davidson is that it suggests that perhaps that Davidson is being too narrow in his understanding of how we might approach the kind of choice between frameworks.

34:03 Mark: Well, and just to make an explicit connection, nobody says, and Carnap does not even just think it's obvious. Of course, you can't translate between different linguistic frameworks. Like, you wouldn't have a linguistic framework if you could just translate it. Right. So can you translate between the number framework and the physical object framework? No, not in any obvious way. And you shouldn't have to.

34:24 Dusty: Right. And ultimately, one interesting feature here is that Carnap is also always presupposing here that when you adopt a framework, that framework is not your entire language. Right. That framework is like one organ of a language that you're incorporating it into. And so he also presents what I find to be an interesting, at least, if not ultimately wholly persuasive picture of what it would mean to adopt a kind of a notion of conceptual scheme that doesn't presuppose that there's some position outside of language from which we're contrasting different conceptual Frameworks for Davidson.

35:05 Wes: Yeah, this appeal to the idea is that talking about these incommensurable conceptual schemes required appealing to some sort of neutral ground in order to even make a distinction between those conceptual schemes. And if that's the world, if it's featureless, if it's uninterpreted content, it doesn't really do the work of making those distinctions. Right. So we have to be able to say that there's a common ontology there even in order to start making these distinctions between conceptual schemes. So that undermines the sort of dualism of content and conceptual scheme or concept. And I'm just trying to relate it more closely to Carnap here.

35:51 Mark: Well, it just seems Carnap is trying to avoid the whole question of is there a single, you know, the one elephant that the different frameworks are about? Like. No, we come up with these different frameworks for different purposes. It's sort of external to.

36:05 Dylan: I mean, whether there is an elephant or not is an external question. That is done is a pseudo question of non importance, I guess.

36:15 Mark: I think that Wes was just complaining

36:17 Wes: about how well there is a thing world. Right. We posit a thing world. There is an empirical world.

36:22 Dusty: Well, yeah, but only we do, as a matter of fact, adopt the thing language and therefore there is a thing world. And he says that there's no moment at which we make that choice. Right. We're inculcated into a language in which people talk this way about middle sized objects. But he thinks that it still has this practical character.

36:41 Dylan: Yeah, it doesn't rise to the level of conceptual scheme. It doesn't seem to for Carnap. If that's all that Davidson would mean by conceptual scheme, then I guess they would agree. But this seems like a pretty thin conceptual scheme to just agree on a thing world.

36:57 Wes: Well, let me read, because I think what I was saying was misleading, actually. Just from page four. If someone decides to accept the thing language, there's no objection to against saying that he has accepted the world of things. But this must not be interpreted as if it meant his acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world. There's no such belief or assertion or assumption, because it is not a theoretical question. To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language. In other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing, accepting or rejecting them, which I'm glad you read

37:36 Mark: that because that sounds really weird.

37:39 Wes: I love the phrase thing world. Yeah, There should be a TV series called Thing World.

37:45 Dusty: So one point that's maybe interesting here is that so I know you all have talked about Carnap in the past, and early in his career, Carnap was very invested in the idea of a kind of phenomenalist foundation for knowledge, that we would ground all of our knowledge ultimately on perceptual data. So he was very straightforwardly one of these philosophers that someone like Davidson, also Sellars, would take issue with.

38:13 Mark: Well, are you sure about that? Because it seems like that the different levels in Carnap's Aufbau system, they are commensurable to each other. They're not incommensurable, they're different levels of abstraction. But it's really, you know, if everything breaks down into these sort of atomic, empirical perceptions or something, and then we are. We're building out of that space and time the thing, world and numbers and everything else, then, yeah, the fact that everything is translatable all the way down the line means that it is a single, explicitly a single conceptual scheme.

38:49 Dusty: I think that's fair. So the sense, though, in which I think that Davidson would take issue is that ultimately Carnap at that point is conceiving of our conceptual scheme as warranted by its relationship to some kind of sense datum outside of language. And Carnap's version of that is more sophisticated. And I don't want to speak to the finer points of his method in the Aufbau because he has a lot to say about it. But it's still this story on which we have a kind of language, external sensory input. And the legitimacy of our theory in some way directly owes to its hooking up with that sensory input, which is one of the points that Davidson criticizes in the paper.

39:32 Mark: I remember that Quine had said his ultimate conclusion in the on what there is, paper is whatever a quantifier can range over is what is in your ontology. And what Carnap is saying is in here is each of these linguistic frameworks is going to have a different domain of entities that quantifiers can range over. So if you're talking in the thing, language, then it reigns over things, and if you're talking about numbers, then it ranges over numbers, etc. Etc. And it even talks about the difference between are we going to admit just rational numbers or real numbers?

And, you know, it just becomes a matter of how you're constructing the system, the domain of things that the quantifier ranges over. And so there is no sense in which. I mean, you might say there's an ontology relative to that specific linguistic framework. And in that sense, just like Davidson was saying, wow, the different conceptual schemes can actually mean you're interpreting reality in a different way. You're claiming different things about reality. And so that maps on. Yeah, okay. Different linguistic frameworks, when you're talking within that framework, are making different claims about reality.

But Carnap is really trying to attack the whole idea of metaphysics, that there is no beyond outside of any given linguistic framework that you have set up or, you know, as outside of its own rules.

40:57 Wes: Yeah, to be real is to be part of the system, he says. So there's some question of reality external to the system.

41:04 Dylan: All those things called pseudo questions, those are all metaphysics. That's the whole category of metaphysics, is anything that amounts to a pseudo question.

41:13 Wes: So Quine's talking about the real things in the world, those which the quantifier ranges over. It's not a legitimate sort of statement. Like, it's just not. It's a meaningless way to occupy yourself, making those sorts of statements. It's not a legitimate concern, this ontological concern.

41:31 Dusty: So I think that's right, if it's all right, though. I think there's an important sense, though, in which Carnap does think these external questions, if understood correctly, you know, as practical questions, are very important. There's a quick thing. This is from a response by Carnap to an article by Charles Morris. It's just a few lines, really quick, but it's where he speaks directly to what he takes to be the importance of these kinds of questions. So he says, in earlier periods, I sometimes made attempts to give an explication of the term philosophy.

The domain of those problems, which I proposed to call philosophical, became, step by step, more comprehensive, as Morris indicates. Yet actually, none of my explications seemed fully satisfactory to me even when I proposed them, and I did not like the explications proposed by others any better. Finally, I gave up the search. I agree with Morris that it is unwise to attempt such an explication because each of them is more or less artificial. It seems better to leave the term philosophy without any sharp boundary lines and merely to propose the inclusion or the exclusion of certain kinds of problems.

In particular, many problems concerning conceptual frameworks seem to me to belong to the most important problems of philosophy. I am thinking here both of theoretical investigations and of practical deliberations and decisions with respect to an acceptance or a change of frameworks, especially of the most general frameworks containing categorical concepts, which are fundamental for the representation of all knowledge. This is page 862 in the Schilpp volume on the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. So here Carnap makes clear that the understood as practical deliberative problems, the external questions about which framework to accept are, he thinks, of central importance for philosophy.

43:14 Mark: So I think that was the issue was, even though we've said that there isn't a all encompassing domain, that the various linguistic frameworks, their quantifiers are all ranging over this common domain, the elephant, if you will, the world. Even though we're rejecting that, that doesn't mean that every linguistic framework is equally good. And so what are the criterion by which we decide which ones are legitimate, which ones are not? Carnap is saying what you just read, that that's a really important question. That's a fundamental philosophical question.

And when west was complaining about Carnap not being very forthcoming about what these practical considerations amount to, it does seem like maybe there is still a common reservoir that, you know, experience broadly construed, that these various linguistic proposals have to be weighed against. Right. So that becomes the common thing that Davidson was talking about.

44:07 Dusty: Right. I think it's, it's possible because the fact that he's so unclear about it probably suggests that he's aware there's a problem and so he's avoiding saying anything too concrete. But the good part of the story, what you can find there, is that he's recognized that in order for this to make sense at all, we have to conceive of these external questions as just being a different kind of question than a factual question.

44:32 Mark: Maybe just a few more quotes from the article.

44:36 Wes: Is it a legitimate question to ask whether Carnap was a robot? What was he like in person?

44:44 Dusty: I hear he was very sweet. He actually. So he taught here at Chicago from the 30s into the 50s. Davidson also taught here from in the late 70s. But you know, as far as I know, Carnap was. He was lovely. There's letters between he and Quine collected that are. He just. He just seemed like a very modest, very pleasant man, very workmanlike. He went to work doing philosophy in the way that you could imagine a technician going to work, right.

45:11 Mark: Just to get a little flavor. So section three. What does acceptance of a kind of entities mean? Let us now summarize the essential characteristics of situations involving the introduction of a new kind of entities. Characteristics which are common to the various examples outlined above. The acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms, forms of expression to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question, but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. So, in other words, you might have individual numbers, right? You might have people counting on their fingers. But until you actually get the concept of number itself, as opposed to just 1, 2, 3, many, then you haven't introduced the new number language.

45:56 Wes: Yeah, he's trying to argue for the legitimacy of talking about the framework and talking about numbers without the worry that it implies ontological commitments.

46:08 Mark: And then where does he say more? So we've gotten a hint there of how a new framework might arise. You know, you could picture the cave people. They were fine counting on their, you know, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, many or whatever their. Their notion was, but at some point they jumped up a level of abstraction and that became. Yeah, because then you can say there are indefinitely, you know, many. You can start making gradations and come up with rational numbers and real numbers, integers, fractions, rational numbers, real numbers, et cetera. And so where does that take us in terms of the next specific thing? Is there any next. Any more specific thing he says about why you would want to make that step in jumping up a level of abstraction, why you'd want to introduce a new frame?

46:54 Dusty: Ultimately, it's just going to be measured in terms of whether doing so, you know, maybe helps you solve certain kinds of problems. I take it that's something that's at work in this notion of if we're going to understand the practical criterion for whether it's appropriate to adopt a framework in terms that don't make Carnap fall prey to Davidson's criticisms. It's going to be in terms of something like solving problems. Right. So maybe introducing this more general notion of number allows us to solve problems that we weren't able to solve before.

47:23 Mark: When he says specifically, like jumping to real numbers from rational numbers, that allows us to do regular geometry. Right. In regular geometry, when you're using the Pythagorean theorem, you might need Square root of 2, and square root of 2 is not a rational number. So there you go. There's a justification right there for introducing real numbers, which are, you know, a strange bird.

47:45 Dusty: Right.

47:46 Mark: So what do you think about this, Dylan, Scientifically? I mean, does this capture pretty much exactly. Yeah, it helps in solving these problems to talk about atoms, to talk about quarks, whatever. So we do that, but we don't necessarily believe in any of this stuff. It's just. It's a way of Predicting.

48:02 Dylan: So I think that's one way of taking the fact that you end up being open to revision scientific, scientific concepts. I find it weird to say that, to sort of go full on nominalist and say, well, I don't really care at all about whether or not those things actually exist or not because it seems like we care about that for all kinds of things. Right. And so just because you have some uncertainty about it, so you can't see it in the normal way or whatever, or you. I guess I don't really buy it.

48:36 Mark: I think I'm just talking about the math. I'm hypostatizing out of the math. In other words. Yeah, I want the math to work and that's all that matters.

48:44 Dylan: I think that there are some people who can, they just can crank through the math and come up with an answer at the end. Inevitably you're going to have to have some correspondence with some kind of measurement in the world. And yeah, I suppose that there are people that don't make any analogies at all or don't see any correspondence. But it just seems in the end, if you're going to be talking about the world, you're going to have to take that equation on there and draw a line between, you know, some piece of that and the actual world. And you've got to mean something by that.

49:17 Mark: So what you're describing kind of sounds like Quine's position that we do. Yeah, we could be wrong. You know, these, these could be fictitious entities that we're positing when we talk about atoms and quarks and things. But it's not really any different than the way that we do it when we talk about chairs and tables. Like, yeah, we're in that case abstracting from. Yeah.

49:37 Dylan: And what I would say is, I would say, I don't know what you mean by saying that they're fictitious entities. Right. It means that I mean something by when I'm talking about quarks and chairs and tables. And to me the closest thing would be a functional whole that has certain kinds of boundaries. And if I want to object to that being. If you want to say, well, is that really a thing? Say, well, fine, if you want to say it's not a thing, then just say there aren't any things in the world at all. Right. We had a conversation going down this road a little bit with Stuart Umphrey on natural kinds.

Right. Where is there something that is really a genuine thing that's all by itself that isn't delineated conceptually? By us, even though it has overlap into the rest of the world? Well, there just aren't things like that. I mean, they just don't exist. I mean, so to me, it's a misunderstanding of what you mean by a thing. So I don't know. Tables and chairs are good for, as far as I'm concerned, even though, you know, we're the. Where the boundary is can be pretty fuzzy.

50:52 Mark: So it sounds like you're saying that all these linguistic frameworks ultimately have to connect together in some way, that they really are about a common world, even if they're talking about completely different phenomena within that world. And we come up with the different linguistic frameworks for very different purposes in terms of what phenomena we're trying to predict, but they're just not absolutely isolated. And so in that sense, they are translatable. Right. If there's a connection, then they're, in Davidson's sense, translatable. Yes, in the way.

So it might seem like Adam talk and chair and table talk are different linguistic frameworks. But no, really, if you take Adam seriously, then you're saying there's something that's like a chair and table, but really small, right? I mean, is that. That's the connection? Or maybe you're saying that I think a number is an abstraction, a number is a. There is a real fact of the matter, whether there is one table in front of me or two tables in front of me or three tables in front of me. And we can, like, as good empiricists, abstract from that and just talk about the abstraction and be nominalists about number.

And that may be that as a good empiricist, that's what you should do. And I've just said how the number language connects to the thing language. It's not that difficult. Right.

52:08 Dusty: I think this will also turn on Carnap's story, at least, you know, he's conceiving of these frameworks, say, of numbers, as, you know, as possible additions to just whatever language we happen to be using, which is just constituted by whatever rules it has. So once it's been incorporated, if we've accepted both numbers and things as part of our language, then they will be related. However, we can still, on Carnap's story, conceive of accepting wildly different languages than we do now. And that's ruled out on Davidson's story, how this speaks to the question of how much exactly we should take as real.

Again, you know, there. There are many answers to this, but I think one of the virtues of carnap's story, just to very quickly tie it back. The reason I mentioned the Aufbau earlier is just to say that. So maybe what's nice about this story that Carnap is telling is what he calls the principle of tolerance, or what at least commentators on him call the principle of tolerance here, which is that the very last line of the paper, he says, let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.

So the idea is that if you want to incorporate these wildly different frameworks into your language in order to solve problems, then Carnap thinks that's great, we shouldn't put prohibitions on that, and that this is why we should stop worrying about these metaphysical questions about reality or unreality is because they've stymied scientific progress at various moments because we've been too attached to telling a particular story about what's real.

53:40 Mark: So it's an interesting chapter in the to the Flames, a series of arguments by which I mean.

53:46 Unknown speaker: Right.

53:47 Mark: Wasn't it Hume said anything that's not about the experience world or about mathematics. To the flames with it, all the crappy old metaphysics. And so then the Vienna Circle guys come along that he. That Carnap explicitly, and we're just, you know, anything that there's not a potential way of empirically verifying it to the flame. I mean, really just kind of giving a more stringent version of Hume's principle here. And Carnap is using this to actually be tolerant of a lot of. A lot of ontological profligacy by saying, okay, we are throwing the particular question of the external question.

Is this actually real external to the particular system? We'll throw that to the flames. But that's not really that much of a loss because it allows you to actually still talk about all these things in quite a lot of detail and debate whether it's a wise action to add that set of additional terms to the overall language.

54:49 Dylan: Yeah, it amounts to the judgment that you should keep or not keep some set of concepts has nothing to do with the pseudo questions of their metaphysics. Has everything to do with whether those correspondences hold up. I mean, I have hardly read any Carnap. I've read only the Carnap that we read for the show. And I remember having a very poor reaction to Carnap the first time we read it. This article here, he's straight up revisionist, pragmatic about it.

55:23 Dusty: Right? This is the development that happened over the course of his career. There's people who Claim that even in the Aufbau he was more tolerant than he's given credit for. But I think it's clear that he moved from a much less tolerant position to a much more tolerant position.

55:38 Mark: Yeah, he's not spelling out really what linguistic forms he approves of. I mean, he's saying, yeah, you want to talk about propositions, talk about propositions. And I could imagine him like, we. One of the examples we've given was for Alexius Meinong saying, okay, if we're referring to an object that doesn't actually exist, I'm referring to unicorns or something, it must still in some sense exist. It doesn't exist in terms of. It's in the thing language. There is no unicorn in the world as a thing, but somehow the concept itself subsists. So this whole notion of subsistence, which then Russell immediately came in and said, no, this is bullshit.

We're not going to, we're not going to admit subsistence on top of existence. We need to reinterpret these sort of statements about negative existentials so that we don't have to talk about anything. The non existent thing actually still subsisting in some sense. That's just a bunch of garbage. You could take Meinong's language of subsistence and present it to Carnap. And Carnap would say, well, what problems does that solve? I'm not going to rule it out just because it's sounds junky.

56:44 Dylan: Or that might not be the only reason you would. I mean, I suspect that Carnap would admit all kinds of aesthetic types of distinctions.

56:52 Mark: Right. So he might still, I think, ultimately say we don't really want to use Meinong's terms of subsistence. And in the same way, the stuff that he was complaining about in the Aufbau, you know, he was taking the very hard, hard line, Vienna Circle thing of ethical responsibilities, for instance, as not being legitimate parts of the ontology. Can I reduce those in some fancy way to perceptions, atomic perceptions? No. Well, forget it. Forget all that kind of philosophy to the flames with it. And I'm not convinced that actually, even though he's saying he's being tolerant of, you know, whatever you need in your theory, that he ultimately thinks that ethics, for instance, is going to pass the test of usefulness.

57:36 Dusty: So again, reading from the same last paragraph to decree dogmatic prohibitions of certain linguistic forms instead, instead of testing them by their success or failure in practical use is worse than futile. It is positively harmful because it may obstruct scientific progress. The history of science shows examples of such prohibitions. Based on prejudices deriving from religious, mythological, metaphysical, or other irrational sources, which slowed up the developments for shorter or longer periods of time. Let us learn from the lessons of history. Let us grant to those who work in any special field of investigation the freedom to use any form of expression which seems useful to them. The work in the field will sooner or later lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful function.

58:16 Mark: That sounds like scientism. That sounds exactly like what scientism is.

58:20 Dusty: It's a deeply tolerant form of scientism.

58:23 Mark: I will entertain as much nonsense as you can bring me, but eventually we will judge each piece of nonsense on its own merits rather than dogmatically, categorically throwing it to the flames. We will judge each thing individually and then throw it to the flames, probably.

58:38 Dusty: Yeah. We won't do so dogmatically.

58:40 Mark: Closing thoughts, Any other connections, you know, final verdicts on Carnap or how this relates to the conceptual scheme stuff?

58:48 Dusty: What I take from Carnap is that this conception of practical deliberation that he has is not particularly worked out, and it may fall into kind of familiar empirical or empiricist errors. But by proposing that the question what scheme to adopt? Is not a directly cognitive question, it's not a question of which scheme fits the world or fits the evidence best, but a different kind of question, he perhaps broadens the horizons a bit from the view that we find in Davidson, which is that ultimately the question of decision between schemes doesn't make any sense because it's always measured up against a world that is already interpreted linguistically.

The bright side of Carnap seems to be that if we take the question of choice between schemes to be a radically different kind of question, there may be more room for exploring this kind of conceptual scheme relativism story without running into the troubles that Davidson raises for it.

59:44 Mark: Yeah, I think for there to be true relativism, there can be no standard by which you can judge between the two relative viewpoints.

59:52 Dusty: Right.

59:52 Mark: Isn't that kind of the point of relativism? Right. So it's not just perspectivism like I'm standing to the left of you, so we see things slightly differently. But I can explain to you that I'm standing to the left of you, and we can sort of translate our points of view in that way, you know, translate our coordinate systems. If there's just a radically different and we can't really explain, then we can't judge whether one is better than another. And then if every different culture has its own conceptual Scheme. Or maybe every different human being has their own point of view, which is just fundamentally indescribable.

Then that's where we get real relativism and a breakdown in the ability to say that you are fundamentally deluded and the rest of us are not. Maybe. Or the value judgments that are going on in this point of view. Your conceptual scheme. Yeah, I actually am in a position to judge those. There is something translatable about them. So that we're talking about a common world. We're talking about results within the world. We're talking about virtues that when you describe them, I can at least understand what you're talking about. And we can have a sensible argument about, you know, whatever the philosophical issue is.

And that's all we need for radical relativism to be false. Which is why we've never had a whole episode on it before, because it's kind of obvious.

1:01:06 Wes: Well, the Theaetetus we. Yes, it's kind of the big subject of that.

1:01:10 Mark: I guess you're right. I really didn't with my talk of scientism. Didn't suck you in at all to say anything, Wes?

1:01:18 Wes: No, I'm. I can tolerate it.

1:01:22 Dylan: You're not going to fan those flames, Mark.

1:01:24 Dusty: All right.

1:01:24 Mark: Any other thoughts, Dylan?

1:01:26 Dylan: Oh, I'm good.

1:01:27 Wes: Cool.

1:01:27 Mark: Thank you, Dusty. We would have been, I don't know, lost, but in a different scheme.

1:01:36 Dylan: Have you been holding on to that? All the podcast?

1:01:40 Mark: Pure improvisation, buddy.

1:01:43 Dusty: Well, yeah, thanks for having me. I enjoyed the discussion. It was good to have.

1:01:46 Wes: Yeah. Thanks for coming on.

1:01:48 Mark: Next time. We are talking about Allan Bloom's How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's students from 1987. We want to hear what you think about these topics about conceptual schemes. Is there some other paper, some other thinker that as a treatment of the topic we've not come close to covering and just looking at these two thinkers here. Yeah. Anything else?

1:02:10 Unknown speaker: You.

1:02:11 Mark: Any other thoughts you have on here, we'd be happy to hear them. You can post your comments on the blog at partiallyexaminedlife.com, on our Facebook group, or email us directly at pel@partiallyexaminedlife.com Today's closing song, fittingly enough, is called Shut up from the brand new album by Chandler Travis Three-O. The album is called Backward Crooked from the Sunset. You can hear my interview with Chandler Travis on Nakedly examined music number 46@nakedlyexaminedmusic.com thank you and good night.

1:02:40 Unknown speaker: Good night.

1:02:40 Wes: Good night.

1:03:11 Unknown speaker: Shut up. Shut up. Shut up. Stop thinking about everything you're thinking about, you little white lie. No one likes you or wants to hear from you at all. Shut up. Shut up. Shut up. Don't think. Don't move. Don't breathe, Stupid brain. Anyway, I'm ashamed that you're inside me, burrowing away. Shut up. Shut up.

1:04:09 Wes: Shut up.

1:04:15 Unknown speaker: So ridiculous, so puny, so ignorant. Just plain annoying. What chance do I have with you in charge? Shut up. Shut up.

1:04:40 Dylan: Shut up,

1:04:48 Dusty: Sam.

1:05:14 Unknown speaker: Shut up. Shut up. Shut up. Stop thinking about everything you're thinking about, you little white lie. No one likes you or wants to hear from you at all.

1:05:37 Dylan: Shut up, Sam.