What would it be like to be halfway between person and machine? If you think the machine can't have consciousness, then Chalmers thinks that there's no sensible way to describe such an experience, ergo the machine (if functionally equivalent to the person) must have consciousness after all.
Mark, Wes, and Seth continue trying to figure out whether this argument makes sense, whether it's actually a defense of the kind of functionalism Block is attacking, and whether the argument is stronger by considering instead of transition between consciousness and no consciousness, one between consciousness and different consciousness (e.g. my green = your yellow). Also, is there a way to describe the inputs and outputs of functionalism that isn't either chauvinistic (ruling out machines being conscious by definition) or too permissive (allowing, e.g. the economy of Bolivia to be counted as a mind)?
End song: "Machine" by Helen Money as interviewed on Nakedly Examined Music #101.
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