Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 45:05 — 41.3MB)
On Ian Hacking’s The Social Construction of What, ch 1 & 2 (1999); Peter Berger's “Religion and World Construction," i.e., the beginning of The Sacred Canopy (1967), and Ron Mallon's “Naturalistic Approaches to Social Construction” (2008, rev. 2019) from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Guest Coleman Hughes from the Dilemma podcast joins us to survey the ways and purposes for which people argue that various practices are socially constructed. These are roughly divided in popular discourse between the "culture wars" (e.g., race, gender) and the "science wars" (are scientific findings destined to be discovered because of the objectivity of truth or a matter of contingent social histories). In the former case, when people are given labels, these labels themselves have effects on the people involved, whereas in the latter case, the objects of natural science of course aren't aware of or affected by the labels we give them. A key lesson is that something can be both socially constructed and objective: Money is no doubt something given value only by human agreement, but when this agreement exists, the value is objectively there.
However, Hacking gives us a nice breakdown of the different steps in a possible social construction argument to show how these arguments differ. First, you argue that a practice that many take for granted as natural could have been different. You might stop there, the point being just to understand why we are the way we are. Or you might go on to argue that the practice is bad for us. But still, maybe now that we have it, there's not much we can do about it, so the point might be just to bemoan our fate. A full social construction argument will say further that the practice can and should be changed. And if you say it should be changed, you may in effect deny the reality of the practice—of course it's something people believe, and so in that sense a social reality, but not referring to anything real in the world—or you might acknowledge the social construct as an objective, social fact that you'd like to change to a different social fact.
Many of the social practices at issue involve a mix of nature and nurture that is difficult if not impossible to untangle. The fact that different societies have different practices certainly gives evidence that a practice is socially constructed, but one might instead interpret these differences as one case being the natural tendency coming to fruition, while in other cases something has gone wrong. Perhaps making an argument about social construction in fact isn't really trying to state facts at all, but instead to stake out a social position. We'll explore this idea more in our next episode (also with Coleman) on the social construction of race in particular.
Berger may well have invented this term in his book, The Social Construction of Reality (1966), and the chapter of his following book that we read sums up this work. He describes the nature of humanity as "incomplete," unlike animals. Animals get their whole world dictated to them by instinct, but people require socialization. He describes society as a dialectical process (i.e., back-and-forth interaction between individuals and social practices) determined in three steps: people act publicly and thus this action is externalized; these actions spread and get objectivated in customs, including group-held habits of perceiving the world and beliefs about it; and then internalization, where individuals through socialization acquire these customs. So when we think we're reporting our raw intuitions, we're really just spitting back what we've internalized.
Applying Hacking's division of types of social construction argument to Berger, I think Berger might be in the second category: We have these socially constructed practices, but it's human nature that these practices be constructed in some way or other, and these shared practices literally make up what it is to be human for us. If we deviate from them, if we throw off the veils that society has placed on us, we don't cut through to truth and reality, but instead find ourselves in a void of meaninglessness: we go crazy, lose any sense of purpose, and probably want to kill ourselves. This is, of course, existential terror, which the existentialists themselves tell us that we must learn to live with if we're honest with ourselves, but it's not clear from what we read that Berger thinks we can really take this further step. We can acknowledge that our beliefs and practices are socially conditioned but can't get rid of them (at least not very many of them; perhaps the plurality of society provides an opening for rebellious behavior through identification with other members of a minority group).
Buy Hacking's The Social Construction of What? or try this online version. Buy Berger's The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion
, or this PDF has most of what we read.
Read Mallon's Stanford article or check out his 2009 article "A Field Guide to Social Construction." For more about the "war on science" part of the argument, we had an optional article in Paul Boghossian's article "What Is Social Construction?" Another optional reading that contributed a key distinction Hacking used (between epistemic objectivity/subjectivity vs. metaphysical objectivity/subjectivity) was John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality (which, interestingly, Hacking insists does not describe a process of social construction, but rather the construction of the social itself).
Read some of Coleman's writing. Follow him on Twitter as @coldxman. Check out his new philosophy podcast, Dilemma.
Continues with part two; get the full, ad free Citizen Edition now. Please support PEL!
Image by Solomon Grundy.
Hacking is always worth reading, another good sociology of science book is physicist turned social theorist (his book is on Constructing Quarks is a classic for the hardcore STSers among us) Andy Pickering’s The Mangle of Practice, and if yer interested in a readable bit philo of social construction hard to beat the contingency sections of CIS
https://www.filosofiadeldebito.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Richard-Rorty-Contingency-irony-and-solidarity.pdf
What is the title of the Atlantic article on gender bathrooms? I think Wes mentioned it. Cheers
Russell,
“When the Culture War Comes for the Kids”
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/10/when-the-culture-war-comes-for-the-kids/596668/
In passing, Wes said that the Atlantic article by George Packer shows that “gender is real.” Maybe Wes simply misspoke, but I think what the bathroom controversy actually shows is that *sex*, that is, human biology, is real, whereas gender — that is, the stereotypes associated with being male or female — is a social construct. In other words, the problems in the school bathrooms arose because the administration tried to ignore an empirical reality — namely that boys and girls have different bodies and hence different experiences of bathrooms — in favor of a social construction which holds that biological differences can somehow be overruled or dodged or erased by a self-proclaimed metaphysical identity.
In any case, I think it could be worthwhile to record an episode about the philosophical issues associated with the concept of gender and how they relate to various recent controversies in public life.
they could do some Judith Butler along these lines:
http://seas3.elte.hu/coursematerial/TimarAndrea/17a.Butler,performative%5B1%5D.pdf
Yes. And then Martha Nussbaum’s critique of Butler:
https://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/theory/Nussbaum-Butler-Critique-NR-2-99.pdf
In part 2 of this episode, someone mentioned that the question of gender is a minefield. In fact, I think it’s safe to say that gender is currently the most contentious topic in philosophy, especially in the UK, where activists have tried to get several academics fired for even discussing the topic (https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/16/academics-are-being-harassed-over-their-research-into-transgender-issues)
Recent essays and interviews about the philosophy of gender that I have found interesting:
Rebecca Reilly Cooper
https://aeon.co/essays/the-idea-that-gender-is-a-spectrum-is-a-new-gender-prison
Kathleen Stock
https://philosophybites.com/2019/05/kathleen-stock-on-what-is-a-woman-.html
https://quillette.com/2019/04/11/ignoring-differences-between-men-and-women-is-the-wrong-way-to-address-gender-dysphoria/
Sarah Ditum
https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/10/the-old-vics-gender-neutral-toilets-leave-women-worse-off/
Mary Leng:
https://medium.com/@mary.leng/where-metaphysics-meets-politics-in-gender-critical-feminism-1fe565e2093a
Holly Lawford-Smith:
https://medium.com/@aytchellis/crossing-the-gender-picket-line-e765873d7a9f
https://medium.com/@aytchellis/a-philosophical-perspective-on-gender-identity-9fac2dccb6fb
“In fact, I think it’s safe to say that gender is currently the most contentious topic in philosophy, especially in the UK”
hmm well if one looks at conferences, classes, journals, most academic philosophy (which is the vast majority of philosophy being done) gives little to no thought about gender as a topic in philosophy so perhaps you are noticing instead how the culture wars are playing into the politics/funding of departments?
oh sure all kinds of infighting about various issues of identity and political orientation, hell fights about analytic vs continental philo still smolder like an old tire pile fire. That said most folks in philo are busy fighting about things like whether or not metaphysics is a live/central issue or not. The fact that the folks you are reading are posting online is a pretty good sign of how fringe most of this is outside of department politics about hires and the like, if you want to see what really spurs humanities folks in the UK look into the fights around workload requirements and all have been actual strikes along those lines in recent years.
cheers
I’m not sure what sort of philosophy department you’re imagining where people don’t “post online.” Is your ideal phil department one where single-minded devotion to metaphysical unity removes professors so fully from the hoi polloi that they never once feel the need to convey their findings to the unwashed masses?
I agree that gender is not a *major* topics in academic philosophy, but I have read quite a few papers on the subject in the past few years, so I wouldn’t say that little to no thought is given to it. Perhaps the difference is geographical? I read a lot of papers from the UK and that is where this controversy is fiercest.
In any case, the key word here is “contentious.”
Of course, the wider culture wars do play into it, but the controversy around defining gender is not only pitting activists and students against certain philosophy professors, it is also pitting philosophy professors against each other. I would say that a topic which prompts philosophers to call for the removal or no-platforming of other philosophers qualifies as a contentious issue within academic philosophy itself. Is there another topic that has recently caused this level of infighting?
“The looping effect of human kinds” is also known as the double hermeneutic. See Anthony Giddens.
Fascinating that almost no-one says “the world has been socially constructed and it’s pretty good”.