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Continuing from part one on Dostoevsky’s 1880 novel, we respond to some objections to the Christian arguments that the characters Alyosha and Zosima put forward (either explicitly or just through their behavior) to respond to Ivan’s “problem of evil”-type arguments previously revealed via the “Rebellion” and “Grand Inquisitor” arguments.
While the first objection comes from Seth, we then brought in our live audience to chime in: Is Dostoevsky’s solution simply irrational? Is he recommending some unobtainable, sage-like ethical goal (taking responsibility for everyone), or is it truly attainable? Does Dostoevsky have a good argument that there can be no morality without religion? Are we (and Dostoevsky) missing something about the Resurrection that would have helped his response to atheism and rebellion?
Is this sort of analysis where we already know Dostoevsky’s philosophical views (through his letters and other work) the best way to deal with a multi-faceted novel like this? Or is it better to just let the characters speak and not stack the deck against one view or another by attributing it to the author?
Next episode: We’re talking more about this book, as the live show was rather too short to cover this lengthy novel adequately. If you’d like to get ready for #318/319, start reading Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Read the Stanford summary.
Transcript
0:00 Wes: her over too, without even trying. He's going there to try and fall himself at that point.
0:07 Seth: So I want to raise what I consider to be a fatal issue with this position. So Zosima's characterization of what love is, ultimately the aspiration is for, as he says, all being accountable for all. It's not your ability to love one individual person unconditionally or love the world, but for you. And this is to get back to the existentialist point, if existentialism can be characterized in some way about radical responsibility, you're free in the sense that you have complete and total responsibility for your being, your existence. You have to take full responsibility for you and every decision you make and everything you do.
This form of existentialism that's characterized by Zosima is literally like full, total responsibility of every individual, for every other individual and the world and themselves. And that is a Christ like model of love, not a human like model of love. And I don't think that this answers the objection that you get from the Grand Inquisitor, because I really think if that's your characterization of what it takes to overcome suffering, to answer this suffering, not only is that not achievable, I would venture to guess that there's not one person in this room who carries around in them the capability for Christlike love and accountability for all.
But it's also not the point. Christ didn't come down to earth to redeem us all, to be Christ. Like the whole point is that we sin and that we need to be redeemed. And the idea that your model of love or your model of behavior as Christ is exactly the failing. And Zosima is tying this to. He's talking about these humble monks in the monasteries, you know, this ascetic kind of ideal of Christ like behavior. I think that kind of level of radical responsibility is just absolutely unattainable, unrealistic, and in no way shape or form answers the other argument.
But that's me.
2:18 Introducer: So I know talking we've been stressing the radical choice. And yes, all this stuff about responsibilities in there and is a very puzzling thing. But he also describes the mechanics, right? They give Zosima's backstory how his. His older brother was dying and he'd kind of been a churlish fellow throughout most of his life. But at some point he. He gains this sense of peace and it's sort of like he's gained an infection. He's even begging forgiveness. You know, he's said, I'm pretty much I'm one with everything because I'm taking responsibility for everything.
I'm accepting this on myself. He begs forgiveness of every. He begs forgiveness of the birds and says, it may be senseless to beg forgiveness of the birds, but birds would be happier at your side. A little happier anyway. And children and all animals, if you were nobler than you are now. It's all like an ocean, I tell you. Then you would pray to the birds too, consumed by an all embracing love in a sort of transport, and pray that they too will forgive your sin. Treasure this ecstasy, however senseless it may seem to men. So he infects Zosima.
Zosima is infecting Alyosha. Alyosha's going around and infecting all these other characters. That it's again, the social aspect which makes it sound. It's not just you and Grace or something like this. It is the things that we do to other people that enable them.
3:37 Wes: So I don't know that anybody with Smerdyakov. Right. That's the big example. Right. So the meaning of responsibility has changed. And Ivan doesn't physically kill the father, Fyodor, but it's his ideas influencing Smerdyakov that do that. There's another example where Zosima talks about a. You know, you ought to be careful about the way you act, the way you behave, but also just even what you project emotionally in front of children, because they might see that and be influenced. So this is about influence. And, you know, Alyosha really lives this out in the novel with children, and he gives a big speech at the end. We could read it or not, but Ilyusha's funeral.
4:18 Dylan: Yeah, the eulogy.
4:18 Wes: Yeah, yeah.
4:19 Dylan: Well, I just wanted to just comment on Seth's. So I think that that is a real tension, because I think you're pointing to the language of universalism that's in Zozima's argument, that almost everywhere else
4:36 Introducer: the
4:36 Dylan: argument seems to be pushing against that universalism, that universalism is a kind of fatal flaw, both of reason in terms of overarching, and that turns to nihilism. And the Grand Inquisitor's argument is a universalism that falls apart. It ends up being. They become like twin arguments that fatally don't recognize genuine mystery. And I find that that piece that you referred to is. Puzzlingly. Thank you.
5:15 Wes: Indefatigably
5:20 Dylan: dissonant. So I don't know why, I don't know why that's there. That's sort of. I want to tone it down to a disposition of open lovingness that isn't the same as accepting responsibility for everyone and everything. So it's more like that nature love that you get. That is a disposition of open lovingness in your acts, in the way you do things. That doesn't come with the universalist acceptance of responsibility for changing 100% with you
5:53 Wes: on that on the front end rather than the back end. Right. This isn't, you did something wrong, you're responsible for that, we're going to punish you. This is preemptive responsibility, which is love.
6:03 Introducer: Yeah. I think a common part of existentialist ethics is it's not directed at other people. It is a self improvement philosophy. It's how can you live with the fact that there's all this suffering in the world? Well, here is a life strategy for doing this. See the alternatives. See these other characters running around acting irrationally and defending their honor and getting too deep into lust and other things. And no, no, no, go the Zosima, Alyosha's ultimate destination route and you will be at peace. And that is the argument. And you can't then turn it around and say you are not Christlike enough. Like that is just not in the spirit of being Christ. Like.
6:44 Seth: Well, right. And if we were doing, and you know, if we were doing some kind of. If this was not a discussion about the philosophical themes and explicit philosophical arguments in the book and was a literary deconstruction of the characters and yada, yada, yada, you would say, oh, Alyosha is exactly manifesting these behaviors. And in the way that he manifests them, you actually see this is the mechanics of how love can actually make the world a better place. Right. The ripple effect. Right, honey? So I don't disagree with that. What I disagree with is having to have the giant 800 pound gorilla of orthodox religion on our backs while we have this conversation or why is that there?
7:33 Dylan: I think it's a good way to end actually with Alyosha's eulogy because the other key piece is memory. Right, Right.
7:44 Wes: Yeah. So it's not just doing loving acts, but the memory of that love can carry us forward in a way. So this is a eulogy for Ilyusha who sort of disproves Ivan's idea that children are just universally cute, bites Alyosha at a certain point in the finger to the bone, but is helped, like a bunch of other boys, tremendously by Alyosha's loving, accepting attitude. So this is what Alyosha says at the end. You must know that there is nothing higher and stronger and more wholesome and good for life in the future than some good memory, especially a memory of childhood, of home.
People talk to you a great deal about your education, but some good sacred memory preserved from childhood is perhaps the best education. If a man carries many such memories with him into life, he is safe to the end of his days. And if one has only one good memory left in one's heart, even that may sometime be the means of saving us. Perhaps we may even grow wicked later on, may be unable to refrain from a bad action, may laugh at men's tears and at those people who say, as Kolya did just now, I want to suffer for all men. And may even jeer spitefully at such people.
But however bad we may become, which, God forbid. Yet when we recall how we buried Ilusha, how we loved him in his last days, and how we have been talking like friends altogether at this stone, the cruelest and the most mocking of us, if we do become so, will not dare to laugh inwardly at having been kind and good at this moment. So these are memories that bolster us against cynicism, nihilism, the very last thing. Don't be afraid of life, how good life is when one does something good and just. So it's not about suffering in the sense of what you're passively receiving.
It's not the determinant of whether your life is good. It's about whether you're doing good.
9:47 Dylan: Yeah.
9:48 Introducer: So I think the time has come. We want to bring folks from the audience into the conversation. Is there something that you didn't understand? Is there something. Give us your take. Give us a question. Give us something. The mic is gonna be set up right over there. Someone is arising from a chair, walking towards stage right. Unless you're just leaving for the restroom, that's fine, too. Okay.
10:10 Dylan: All right.
10:11 Introducer: Oh, he is leaving. All right. Oh, wait, there's somebody at the. Say your name and ask your question.
10:16 Mark: Hi, guys. My name's Jesse.
10:18 Introducer: Hi, Jesse.
10:19 Mark: Thank you for doing this. I guess my question is, you're a philosophy podcast, right? So being rational matters, too. Alyosha's solution is just massively irrational. And how do you Deal with that.
10:32 Seth: How do you give up on the
10:33 Mark: rationality aspect to be a better person? And does it become more rational on the far side of it, after you've strived towards virtue or strive to be a good person? Just interested in your thoughts on that.
10:46 Introducer: I mean, it's instrumentally rational, right? It's. Look how. What is the smallest, smartest way to go about your life? Well, look what a mess these other people make. I guess rationally this is the best way. But no, it does not actually, as you say, solve the rational problem of evil. It does to me. It's just sort of distracting from. Don't think of things that way. You don't have to think of things like that. So it is in some ways just a denial of the importance.
11:14 Mark: I don't know.
11:15 Introducer: Do you guys have anything?
11:16 Wes: Or maybe what's irrational? Yeah, tell us what's irrational.
11:19 Mark: So I guess like I study philosophy, I'm a little bit of a Platonist, but like Plato has the idea of a noble lie, right? So Plato introduces this untruth into the foundation of philosophy. Alyosha basically says, you should live an untruth if you want to live a good life. Because you. Not untruth per se, but you act out in this way that if you tried to rationalize it to yourself like Ivan does, it doesn't really make sense, right? So how do we deal with the untrue nature of some of our actions or the fact that we can't justify them to ourselves?
11:48 Dylan: I don't think Alyosha would frame it that way. He wouldn't say that I'm telling myself a lie. In fact, he would frame it as, these acts of love are mysterious, but I'm convinced of them because they come from inside me and they come from inside those acts on the world. And so there is something inherently mysterious that ends up being preserved. So that part's unavoidable, that part that I'm interpreting what you mean by how you deal with irrationality. There's going to be that piece where you say, well, there's something that is left over in the rational account, the reasonable account that involves acts that have some mystery to them.
And the examples Ivan himself brings up. Or it's spring now, right? And that when you walk out and. And you say, I just love the blue sky and I love the birds, right? That act is one that is full of mystery from Alyosha's point of view. And that the extra thing is the cultivation of that kind of activity in your being with respect to the rest of the world. That's the antidote and the cultivation of sort of living with that mystery and accepting it as convincing.
13:08 Introducer: The next question. Please come to the mic.
13:11 Dylan: I'm curious about the idea that you brought up of that active love. Is this Christ like love that's unattainable in human nature. Right. That people can't truly be Christlike. And I'm wondering what you think about kind of the idea of striving towards an unattainable ideal, which saints like, where you end up with that, because I think that's very central to existentialism is like you will never be like a good person in some absolute way, but you should try anyway.
13:43 Wes: Yeah, I think we may. I don't know if we might have given the wrong impression, but I think the idea is that it's precisely not Christlike impossible love. It's just very small acts of kindness and decency. And this is something I think Dostoevsky explicitly thought about. Right. This is the theory that it's not this enormous. You know, in the same way that you're not going to appeal to some fancy theology. It's also not. It's not asceticism. Right. So Father Ferapont in the novel is kind of a foil people who are just straight out mystics and making these enormous demands on themselves and others.
That's not the way it's going to be. It's going to be smaller demands for. For decency. Even if you actually do. Right. Hate people with stupid faces. So you're aware of that. You don't act on that. You go to a therapist, you talk about it, blah, blah, blah. So I think that's the idea. Am I wrong about that?
14:38 Introducer: Well, yeah. One of the letters in this Norton Critical edition that we had that Dostoevsky had written is parenting advice. And he says parenting is actually pretty easy. You're going to make mistakes, but if you perform be a generally good example, perform some good actions, right. And then your kids are going to grow up and they're going to remember you for those things they're going to over. So he's not demanding perfection. I think what Seth was specifically referring to is the I take all responsibility for everyone. I don't understand that at all that.
But you know, when you see how this actually plays out in behavior, I feel like that the behavior then puts you in a mode that Dostoevsky thinks that you're just going to immediately assent to the theology to. I think maybe this I'm responsible for everyone is part of this extended theology. And I don't see why you have to make that additional leap. I think you could just take this in a secular way and say, yeah, how do we reconcile ourselves to suffering in the world? Well, one little good deed at a time.
15:41 Seth: To address the question you actually asked, I think you're pointing towards the idea of using an unattainable ideal as a guide or as a motivation perhaps for trying to act. And I think that's perfectly acceptable. There's a saying in Judaism that you can never perfect the world, but you're not permitted to cease from trying to do so. Right. And so I think that's fine. I think what I was raising around the issue of using Christ as a model is it's not just an unattainable idea, but that trying to attain or even using that as a model can lead to enormously destructive behaviors, both in the way you treat yourself and potentially the way you treat others. I feel the same way about many, many other ideas, if you will.
16:28 Mark: Yeah.
16:28 Introducer: Some of these things, like Ivan's hypermoralism, like he can't forgive himself, like that, that is part of. Even if you have this unattainable ideal, you don't use it as a thing to whip yourself every time you stray from it. Like, that's part of the ideal is being good to yourself. That's a small act of kindness towards yourself. Next up.
16:47 Wes: Yeah, I think my question is, does Dostoevsky establish that God is a necessary precondition for loving? Can the atheist not also adopt such an attitude? I think he kind of strawmans the atheist perspective on caring about other people and just what your thoughts on that are. We have a Rakitin advocate in the audience. So Rakitin makes right, precisely this argument. We don't need God to have a loving attitude towards others, to want social justice, to want to solve all these sorts of problems. I think that, you know, the position in here, it's explicitly expressed is that, or at least this seems to be Ivan's ideas, that there's no morality without God, which is a difficult.
An old philosophical question. And then there's this idea that, right, we can't truly love one another in the way that's required unless there is a God. Did anyone give some thought to this? And, you know, I didn't end up with a good argument for that. A defensive. I tried, but I.
17:55 Dylan: Well, my own thought is that Dostoevsky has to gloss this right. He ends up presenting the argument about love, but it's the way in which. Well, I Quoted from Zosima's reply to Madame Khokhlakova about faith. And even that response is one that you will be convinced. And that convincing, I think is utterly plain for Dostoyevsky that all that preservation of mystery and all of the argument that we make good in the world and the reply to suffering and evil are individual acts of kindness. That itself ends up being a convincing proof of God. But with Rakitin, I don't know that you. I mean, I'm not convinced of it, so. But I'm convinced of the other part.
18:48 Wes: I think part of the idea is that. So we tend to be egotistical and selfish, just naturally right. And we need some kind of counterbalance to that. And I think the idea is that that has to involve at least a belief in the immortality of the soul. So I think the larger idea is that for us to love one another, there has to be this larger framework in which we are not just animals, we are more than that, we are spirits. So that there's someone to actually love in the requisite way, a way that a soul would be loved as opposed to just an embodied animal. Not that that's entirely convincing, but.
19:25 Seth: Yeah, no, he doesn't. That's because it's not true.
19:31 Introducer: It's one of the puzzles of Dostoevsky, of why he seems to not want to debate these theological points that he says, maybe this is in a letter that, you know, belief in God and belief in immortality, it amounts to the same thing. Like those seem very different. You know, there are whole theologies that have one and not the other. But yet. So, you know, to give a generous reading of this, I think maybe what you could give sort of a multicultural pluralistic reading that whatever religious tradition you're in, let's say that if you have the requisite good feelings, you're going, maybe it's a New Age religious tradition, maybe it's something very non traditional.
But you're going to have something that I want to say points at the transcendent. But that's not right because it's not, you know, it's the ocean of love again. And there's just a way we have to articulate that somehow. I think he would be very, you know, if he had New Agers in his time, he would be very suspicious of their. If you have free floating things with no definition, then they're gonna sort of collapse on itself. That having this structure of here's what, you know, here's a creed or something, even if it's just as a behavioral aid to like, we have to go through the motions and kind of get in the habits of being a good religious person.
Like, he just sees that as an identity, a socially established. Again, one of our needs is to join with other people. So if everybody just, well, I have religion in my own way, that's gonna be a barrier. I think, according to him, in ultimately being consistently good, we're gonna inevitably be factionalist. So I guess his solution is that we should all be Russian Orthodox.
21:06 Wes: I wanna give one more. I just wanna say what Zosima says about this, even if it's unfortunately unconvincing. He says it's a spiritual psychological process. He's talking about brotherly love. To transform the world, to recreate it afresh, men must turn into another path psychologically. Until you have become really, in actual fact, a brother to everyone, brotherhood will not come to pass. No sort of scientific teaching, no kind of common interest will ever teach men to share property and privileges with equal consideration for all. Everyone will think his share too small. They will be always envying, complaining and attacking one another. You ask when it will come to pass. It will come to pass. It will come to pass. Brotherly love. But first we have to go through the period of isolation, convincing or not. That's the idea.
21:53 Seth: Yeah. Anybody who's interested in my opinion about transcendent ideas and how they. Whether they're necessary or not for moral action can find me at the bar afterwards. But. And that's. You can guess what my opinion is. But the issue with that is that the notion of brotherly love is tied to heaven here on earth. That's also rolled up in that same narrative. So it's not brotherly love. Like, you know, it's literally land of milk and honey. So you're still caught up in that Christian slash Greek Orthodox notion.
22:27 Wes: Zosima is rejecting that.
22:28 Seth: No, he's not.
22:29 Wes: Yeah, he is.
22:30 Seth: No, he's not.
22:31 Wes: No, he is. Because it takes a long time. It's a very incremental process of people doing small acts of kindness towards each other.
22:40 Seth: But the goal ultimately is heaven on earth, not brotherly love. It's literally heaven on earth.
22:47 Dylan: I think that you're attributing Ivan's point of view to Zosima there.
22:52 Introducer: Yeah, I think this whole, like, why we didn't even talk about later, Ivan is out of his mind. The devil appears to him in his dream and he says, hey, I'm the devil. I'm necessary. Without me, nothing would happen. It would just be constant hosannas all the time. So this is a very existentialist thing that, you know, the goal can't be for some static platonic goodness that we have established heaven on earth or whatever. It has to be an ongoing process. There actually has to be suffering. Does it have to be this bad suffering? But, you know, there has to be something for us to overcome because that's sort of our job as human. Human beings. That's like our. Psychologically. We would not work if we did not have those challenges and those evils to reconcile ourselves with.
23:29 Wes: All right, shall we move on to.
23:31 Introducer: Yes, sorry.
23:33 Mark: Thank you. Well, I'm glad you brought up the section about Ivan arguing with the devil, because it kind of factors in here. When you were talking about the devil sort of being able to reason you to death, I wondered. As I was listening to the conversation, you know, I became increasingly convinced, and I'm impressionable, but I became increasingly convinced that, like, yes, you know, pure rational argument is insufficient. There are these things that might be outside of the strictures of rationality. But I realized as I was coming to that I was being argued to, in a way, and I wonder not to condemn the podcast's effort here, if maybe. Maybe putting the novel under this degree of scrutiny and disentangling it in this way sort of murders it in a way. I'm not a huge advocate. I'm just.
24:27 Dylan: You're saying that we're squeezing the mystery out of it by over analyzing it, and therefore.
24:32 Mark: Yes, and that's. Ivan.
24:33 Dylan: We should be openingly loving it rather than.
24:38 Introducer: I'm sure there's a forum for you, a fetish forum for Dostoevsky you can find with uncritical love.
24:46 Seth: I would say that that question presupposes that there is a right or a wrong way to approach the text, or at least that there's a generous or an ungenerous way to approach the text. And, you know, maybe. Maybe there's a way in which taking a philosophical attitude or approach towards a literary text is in some way murdering, maybe the intent of, if you want to drive it, authorial intent or something like that.
25:16 Mark: If I can clarify just a second.
Sure.
Because I don't want to sound like some zealot. I guess my only point is if at the core of the novel is some sort of condemnation of rigorous argumentation, what does it mean if we are convinced through argumentation of that fact?
25:33 Seth: I mean, I think.
25:34 Wes: I. I don't think there's a condemnation, no rigorous argument. I mean, I. Yeah, but there's.
25:40 Introducer: There's a sense, like many theologians before him that we are in an epistemic position where we just don't have. There's a hubris about trying to make arguments about these major subjects that, you know, we're. We're just little, little tiny creatures and we're overwhelmed by suffering and emotion and all this stuff. And so how do you apply reason most effectively, given our profound state of ignorance? And I. That's why I interpret him as, this is a text about practical reason. And, you know, my original question that I was thinking for this whole episode is just sort of, which philosophy is the best coping method for dealing with the world?
Like, that's a little too general, but I mean, that's kind of what he's exploring here. You know, we have kind of cheated a little in that we have his letters. Like, we know that he wrote this as a programmatic thing. Like, we know what his view was, whereas when I read this just out of college, I didn't really know what his philosophy was. And so just reading it as a piece of literature where each character is a fleshed out philosophy or way of approaching the world is in some ways much more interesting and I think is a more fruitful way of getting at this.
But, yeah, word, of course, can't be satisfied with that.
26:50 Seth: No. And it's also the case he explicitly. I think it's Zosima section. I can't remember where he talks about the use of parables and stories so that you can. For peasants. You don't rationalize or reason with peasants. You tell them stories and they get it. They just get religion. They get God. Just in their intuitive nature, if you just present them with fables and stories and things like that. And if he thought of us that way, he would not have written this fat boy right here.
27:19 Wes: And if we thought you were peasants, we would have approached the show.
27:22 Seth: We would approach this very differently. Exactly.
27:24 Wes: All right, let's try to get in the final two questions first.
27:28 Audience: Thank you very much for coming to New York. It's been a pleasure to have you here.
27:31 Dylan: Thanks.
27:31 Seth: Thank you.
27:32 Audience: Okay, so I don't want to take too long with this. So you described the section following the bit about rebellion and the Grand Inquisitor as Dostoevsky's best effort as a response to what he considers to be a pretty much airtight challenge from atheism and secularism. So reading the book again, I was really impressed with that. Elder Zosima engaged in more social commentary than I remembered. Now, obviously, it was not the fundamental part of what he was saying. This sort of existentialist approach to Christianity and the way he practiced it was the more fundamental argument.
But the social commentary nonetheless was very visible and it was surprising. It almost clashed a little. So Dostoevsky himself, of course, was engaged in dissident activity when he was younger. And if this is to be understood as his final argument, and of course he passed shortly after the publication was complete, does his response include more of a. More of a social dimension, more of a political dimension than it's typically read, or even that it's presented? Does he engage in a sort of a synthesis with some of the radical political ideas of his time, just putting the Christian, the existentialist Christian love in the forefront?
He talks about the dangers, the resentment of the peasantry. He expresses his admiration for the serfs for not being servile after 200 years of serfdom. And he seems to regard the wealth of the rich as a curse from which they somehow need to be freed and that brotherhood will ultimately result in a relatively classless society.
28:54 Wes: He had a complicated relationship to all this. So he was, you know, he was basically arrested when he was younger for being in like a socialist reading group or a radical reading group. But even at the time, he took issue with those ideas, but he was engaged with them, right? So he could show up and argue about those ideas. And ironically, he almost got executed for that and then spent five years in a gulag. And as you can see from the way he has Ivan argue, he takes these ideas seriously and he gives them their full weight. Right? But I think we know from his letters and other work that he was very anti socialist. And we also know that unfortunately he was very much a nationalist about Russia and something of a chauvinist about religion and things like that. So that's the limit of my knowledge about that. I don't know if anyone else has anything to add about.
29:46 Introducer: Apparently before this book was written, he predicted a date for the end of the world, that he thought that it was the apocalypse and everything becoming a universal brotherhood was imminent. And it's just after that past, then we get this more developed view which, you know, Alyosha starts off as wanting everything just to become suddenly a universal brotherhood. And by the end, under Zosima's influence comes more of a step by step, not extreme.
30:17 Wes: Should we try to fit in this one last question? And.
30:20 Audience: Yeah, I'm not so sure it's a question. It's maybe an observation or something. I was just thinking early on when we were talking about the concept of God and good and Evil. And why is there suffering? And I was thinking, well, God doesn't really intervene in human history, most likely, right? So then we have that incarnation of Jesus, right? And Jesus does the whole suffering, but we forget that there was a resurrection, right? So in this kind of idea of Jesus and the whole God thing not intervening and then suddenly intervening is this idea of resurrection after suffering. Do you see this in this whole novel? Do you see that apparent anywhere?
31:04 Introducer: I mean, he tries to naturalize or existentialize all these, you know, is there literal resurrection? I mean he.
31:12 Wes: Not literal.
31:13 Introducer: One of the, one of the things that is pointed out is as miracles, right? People need miracles.
31:16 Audience: But they.
31:17 Introducer: That the kind of miracles they need is not the loaves and fishes thing. It is the, you know, that you were faced with temptation and you made the right choice. Isn't that a miracle? You know that your freedom, it's itself the miracle, Right?
31:29 Wes: Yeah. Zosima describes hell as not being able to love. Right, Sorry, did you want to add to that?
31:34 Audience: Oh, I was just going to say that with the incarnation does come that idea of freedom. And so that's therefore how we know there is such a thing, right, as freedom. And with this freedom comes the choice of good and evil. And then therefore, if we choose evil, what happens? You know what I mean?
31:53 Introducer: From what I understand the theology here, and this is sort of me channeling a secondary source, but you know, the traditional, the rebellion section, the traditional argument against evil is sort of an argument against God the Father and that new to him. This Grand Inquisitor was supposed to be an argument against Jesus, son. And so the ultimate solution is it's the Holy Ghost, right? This ocean of love thing. So there's a theological. I don't really understand. I'm not stupid as a orthodox.
32:23 Audience: Yeah, I was just trying to figure out the whole resurrection thing, you know, I mean, is there a redemption? Is there a.
32:30 Wes: That's a good thing to talk about over drinks. We gotta get off the stage.
32:33 Mark: Right.
32:33 Wes: At 8:30.
32:34 Introducer: Thanks to the caveat. Thanks to all of you for coming.
32:37 Dylan: Thank you so much.
32:41 Introducer: I want you to remember how good it was once here when we were all together, united by a good and kind feeling which made us perhaps better than we are.
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