Moral reasons are strong. That’s what you’d expect, at least. They’re weighty but not dull, alive but not hedonistic. It’s strange then that the term used time and again to describe the ultimate importance of moral reasoning is “objective,” a word so bloodless and clinical. Still, there’s something there that attempts to articulate the bottom-line concern. It’s understandable, but there are better terms available to get to the heart of the matter.
A term sometimes used in philosophical discussion is “categorical,” familiar in Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative, as opposed to a hypothetical imperative, applies regardless of one’s desires. Another word in this family resemblance is “overriding.” That is to say, a moral reason carries the authority to override any non-moral reason. You might not want to visit your grandmother, but it overrides your desire to stay home and play video games. People don’t always act on the stronger reason, but it’s a failure of some sort on their part.
The philosopher J.L. Mackie agreed that moral discourse comes packed with these strong expectations, but he didn’t buy into them. To Mackie, ultimately overriding reasons are metaphysically “queer.” From this objection error theory was born – now a major strand of moral anti-realism in meta-ethics. Error theory views moral statements as errors of some kind, in that they purport to invoke ultimately overriding considerations. Intrinsically overriding reasons have no home in our naturalistic world, says the error theorist.
The visceral character of morality was accounted for by an older version of moral anti-realism – emotivism (and more recently in its close companion found in expressivism). The larger family term for this kind of anti-realism is non-cognitivism, which asserts that moral statements are not about describing the world, but expressing some sort of taste or mere preference, analogized to tastes in food or art or to any sort of preferred outcome. Cognitivism, on the other hand, says that moral statements attempt to describe the world accurately, and to the moral realist, at least some of the time successfully (there are objectively overriding moral reasons).
Moral error theory sides with non-cognitivism on the anti-realist piece, but with cognitivism on what moral statements purport to do. So, cognitivism comes in realist and anti-realist versions. Volumes have been written in and around these categories, even in disputing them. Philosophical dispute occurs within a frame, but where the frame should be set is also often a matter of dispute.
For now, the task of getting down to the crux is enough. It’s helpful to contrast intrinsically overriding properties with the aforementioned hypothetical imperative. An example of the hypothetical imperative is IF you desire to become a champion chess player, THEN you should practice chess.
Note that the hypothetical imperative does not say that one should be means-end effective, as if enacting a means-end fit is somehow an overriding moral reason. Rather, it simply points out that actions can be taken to maximize effectiveness, given certain goals or conditions. On the other hand, the categorical imperative imposes moral ends regardless of desire or goal, as a universal obligation or good.
The even more technical term springing from this consideration is “categoricity,” which captures the inherent overriding power of the categorical imperative. This isn’t the only concern moral realists have to address. Issues only a philosopher could love include irreducibility, normative action-guidance in general, the prevalence of moral disagreement, and much more.
With all of this on the table, categoricity in particular can come into focus. Mackie thought of moral considerations as applying a kind of force on an agent, and since agents often flout moral considerations, it’s clear that this force isn’t real. This is probably too quick, but it’s a start.
Our discourse has a way of dealing with people who flout moral expectations. It’s to speak of them as if they’ve breached some previous contract or failed some sort of rational standard. We are not “live and let live” about this, even if we find that the offender cares nothing about considerations that we see ourselves as upholding. Aside from a few exceptions, for example early childhood or mental deficiency, there’s no way out of this moral community. That’s categoricity.
It’s not optional in moral discourse. If our best friend’s spouse slept with a trusted colleague who then disappeared with stolen retirement funds, it wouldn’t necessarily mean the criminal was means-end irrational or had breached some pre-mortal contract to be nice. Yet, it is expected that in conversations with our best friend we will refer to this scofflaw as faulty or at least in breach, and not just legally. It’s not just a favor we do to humor our friend. It would be worse than being a bad friend if we pointed out that the offender wasn’t necessarily irrational and simply lived by a different (obviously quite selfish) code. It would involve failing at friendship and misdescribing the moral situation, according to our moral discourse.
People have tried to characterize this universally binding character by saying that God will punish the wicked, or that karma will do its work, or to build these expectations into the requirements of rationality itself. This universal and overriding characteristic is objective, but it isn’t merely objective. Categoricity is objective necessarily, but the reverse isn’t true. That is, to observe that someone has a good moral character can be objectively true in the sense that it’s grounded in reality and adheres to normal rules of reference and meaning, but it wouldn’t necessarily make the consideration overriding.
Moral objectivity is often mentioned to contrast with moral subjectivity, which tends to mean according to taste, made up, personally arbitrary, or something along those lines. Non-cognitivism reconciles with moral subjectivity, but a person could still behave as a cognitivist while their moral point of view was based on personal whim. The error theorist can allow for passionate assertion, so long as the assertion purports to track truth. To the adherent of error theory who rejects categoricity as a real existing thing, moral realism should aim to fully accommodate the main characteristics of moral discourse.
But not everyone agrees either about what moral realism is required to explain or what moral discourse is committed to. Cornell Realism, for example, is a form of moral realism that gives up the idea that moral properties come with any motivational force. Similarly, “weak moral realism” is sometimes discussed as a possible direction for moral realists. This is the frame of the dispute, which is what moral realism requires as a view, and it’s another aspect to track aside from direct disagreement over content.
Ironically, the hard-core skeptics of error theory often agree with robust moral realists (often called non-naturalists or intuitionists) on how to frame the discussion, while those in the middle (like Cornell Realists) adjust the boundaries of the debate. Casting aside the responsibility of accounting for categoricity makes the realist’s job easier. The drawback is that it also opens up a possible criticism that the realist isn’t accommodating the fullness of moral discourse.
As the philosopher François Jaquet has explained, even after many of the objections to error theory are set aside, categoricity remains. Non cognitive forms of anti-realism don’t directly deny the truth of moral claims, per se. Rather, non-cognitivism says that moral statements express tastes or commitments, without even attempting to describe objective truth. Error theory, on the other hand, is a form of cognitivism and so is in more direct conversation with moral realism. It’s also now a major strand of moral anti-realism alongside non-cognitivist forms. Furthermore, no matter the varying objections that adherents to moral error theory focus on (irreducibility, rational action-guidance, etc.) they all tend to agree on categoricity as a key concern.
What categoricity consists in has predictably been up for grabs. Suffice it to say, it is a strong requirement in any case. There may be ways of weakening the stance of moral realism to avoid this burden, but the fact will remain that our moral discourse comes with categoricity. People are expected to do the right thing regardless of their desire and regardless of whether the law requires it. If they do not do the morally right thing, there is a judgement against them that is not descriptively neutral. It would be considered a mistake, and not just a social faux pas, to point out that those acting in blatantly immoral ways simply aren’t motivated by what we call morally good reasons. Live and let live is not an option in what we consider deeply important moral evaluations. We can grant a degree of objectivity. It’s categoricity that’s inescapable.
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