The Partially Examined Life (Citizens): (Protected Content)
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Mark and Wes discuss “On the Problem of Empathy,” ch. 4 “Empathy as the Comprehension of Mental Persons,” starting with section 2, “The Mental Subject” and into section 3, “The Constitution of the Person in Emotional Experiences.”
We’re trying to figure out what these early 20th century German phenomenologists think a “person” is as someone we’re able to empathize or sympathize with and which is morally worthy of respect. Stein does this by saying what the “I” (the self) is. It is the thing that “has” experiences, but also something that we understand in terms of a network of motivations, which are different than mere causes, in that they’re supposed to be rational. Our self gains definition, Stein says, when we have emotional experiences, which can of course be shallow and undirected (mere moods) or can be very deep and self-revelatory.
Read along with us, starting on p. 87 (PDF p. 107).
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