Finishing up on Hippias Minor and moving on to the Ion, where Socrates convinces a rhapsode (someone who does public, dramatic readings of Homer and is a Homer scholar) that his talent is a matter of inspiration and not knowledge. Ion is a Homer super-fan, but he gets instantly bored when someone talks about other poets like Hesiod. He's very good at channeling the emotions Continue Reading …
Citizen Feed Episodes: Paywalled and Ad-Free
Available only to PEL Citizens: All of our paywalled and ad-free regular episodes in a single feed. That includes paywalled full episodes from the back catalogue, Nightcap and (Starting in September 2020) Part 2 of all episodes. You can add this feed to the podcast app of your choice by following the instructions here. You can download them, listen to them here, or get them on the podcast app of your choice by following the instructions here. Not a Citizen? Join here.
Ep. 402: Plato Talks Homer: Hippias Minor and Ion (Part One for Supporters)
On two short (very early?) Platonic dialogues, written perhaps around a decade after Socrates' death in 399 BCE. Featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. This half of the discussion focuses on Hippias Minor, where Hippias is (like many of Socrates' interlocutors, e.g. Gorgias and Protagoras) a Sophist. In this case, this means that Hippias presents himself as an expert in all sorts of Continue Reading …
Ep. 401: Mind/Brain Identity Theory (J.J.C. Smart) (Part Three for Supporters)
Mark and Wes further explore J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959). Place had established that it's not the meanings of the words "brain" and "mind" that show their identity; they're metaphysically identical despite this difference in words. Start with part one. However, Smart claims that when referring to a mental state, a speaker is unknowingly still Continue Reading …
Ep. 401: Mind/Brain Identity Theory (U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart) (Part Two for Supporters)
Finishing up U.T. Place's "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" (1956) and starting on J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959). Start with part one. Place (presaging Dennett), argues against the "phenomenological fallacy," which involves recognizing people's descriptions of the appearances of things as descriptions of the actual state of the world in a Continue Reading …
Ep. 401: Mind/Brain Identity Theory (U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart) (Part One for Supporters)
On U.T. Place's "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" (1956) and J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959). Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Chris Heath. Is there some a priori reason for denying that the mind can actually be the brain? Obviously those two words don't mean the same thing, but can we think of them as a single thing under two descriptions (e.g. Continue Reading …
Ep. 400: Dennett Rejects Qualia (Part Three for Supporters)
Mark and Seth rejoin to complete our treatment of Consciousness Explained. We focus on Dennett's response to Frank Jackson's "Mary the Color Scientist" example: Is there really a difference between experiencing something and making a judgment about it? Dennett says that there's no information difference, just potentially a different mode of getting information, developed Continue Reading …
Ep. 400: Dennett Rejects Qualia (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one (and before that, ep. 399) on Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 12-14. We continue discussing Dennett's response in ch. 14 to Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" which gets us in a whole conversation about animal consciousness. What is it like to be any languageless creature? Dennett thinks we can say a lot of things about what it can't be like, Continue Reading …
Ep. 400: Dennett Rejects Qualia (Part One for Supporters)
Continuing from ep. 399 on Dan Dennett's Consciousness Explained (1991), now focusing on ch. 12-14, and again featuring Mark, Seth, Dylan, and Chris Heath. We've given the basic outline of Dennett's positive view of what consciousness is: By advocating the multiple drafts model, he's argued that consciousness is essentially a matter of information availability, and that it's Continue Reading …
Ep. 399: Dan Dennett’s Model of Mind (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Consciousness Explained, ch. 5, with some reference to ch. 12. Dennett seemed to be saying that the phi-phenomenon (where we see a dot as having moved and transformed into another dot, whereas it was really just two dots shown successively in different places) showed that there's no distinction between experiencing the dot as moving and judging Continue Reading …
Ep. 399: Dan Dennett’s Model of Mind (Part One for Supporters)
On Daniel C. Dennett's Consciousness Explained (Ch. 1, 5, and a bit of 12; ep. 400 will complete ch. 12 along with 13). Featuring Mark, Seth, Dylan, and Chris Heath. What is the mind? Dennett claims that we are intuitively Cartesians: It seems like sensory input gets fed into us, processed unconsciously, and then the conscious mind examines the result (this is our stream of Continue Reading …
PEL Sunami Nightcap August 2026
Recorded 8/18/26. Chris Sunami, the editor of the PEL book, joins Mark, Wes and Seth as part of the launch of his new book, Free Your Mind, which is a series of PEL-like conversations all coming out of Chris' brain, using the model of Plato's symposium to talk about race, AI, art, religion, and more. Chris then starts us talking about what we all might want to communicate to Continue Reading …
Ep. 398: Donald Davidson on Mind vs. Body (Part Two for Supporters)
We finish up "Mental Events" (1970) and move on to "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963), still with guest Chris Heath. Start with part one. Davidson gives us some more technical ways to think about the difference between the mental sphere and the physical. The failure of behaviorism to give us robust laws about the mental should be a lesson that mental explanation does not Continue Reading …
Ep. 398: Donald Davidson on Mind vs. Body (Part One for Supporters)
On "Mental Events" (1970) and "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963), featuring Mark, Wes, and returning guest Chris Heath. Davidson was roughly in the "ordinary language" camp of analytic philosophy, but (like Kripke) thought that he could draw certain metaphysical conclusions from his analyses of what we mean when we talk about "mental events" and "reasons for Continue Reading …
Ep. 397: Federalist Papers LIVE (Citizen Edition)
To celebrate our nation's 250th birthday, we gathered in front of a lovely audience near Madison WI to discuss Federalist Papers 70, 78, 39, 54, 10 by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison from 1787-1788, Anti-Federalist Papers 78-80 (aka Brutus 11 and 15), and Frederick Douglass' Fourth of July Speech (1852). Is the American experiment working out as planned? After musing Continue Reading …
Ep. 396: Peirce on Knowledge (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities." We start by looking more closely at the idea that all mental causation is a form of reasoning, i.e. inference. Peirce sees these as valid deductive (or inductive or abductive) arguments even if they are not sound, i.e. if the premises are false. Continue Reading …
Ep. 396: Peirce on Knowledge (Part One for Supporters)
On essays by Charles Sanders Peirce: "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," both from 1868. Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth and Dylan. Are there some instances of knowledge that are immediate and intuitive? These would be cognitions that are not caused by another cognition, but caused directly by the things that they Continue Reading …
Ep. 395: C.S. Lewis Argues for Christianity (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Mere Christianity (1952), starting with book 2, "What Christians Believe." Lewis argues that the problem of evil, far from showing that there is no good God, shows that we are endowed with that moral sense that judges the world to be evil, which was Lewis' proof for God. Many of Lewis' arguments are still common among Christian apologists today. Continue Reading …
Ep. 395: C.S. Lewis Argues for Christianity (Part One for Supporters)
On Mere Christianity, a 1952 book crafted from radio broadcasts delivered from 1941-1944. Featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan and Seth. Lewis tries to argue to a general audience that Christianity provides a unique and optimal response to the human condition. Specifically, he begins by arguing (like Kant) that we are all aware that we have moral standards that are not derived from Continue Reading …
PEL Summer of Fear Nightcap 2026
Recorded 6/9/26. Mark, Wes, and Dylan sign relief in being done with Hegel and talk phobias, metaphors vs. emotions, apperception of the ego, James Talarico (i.e. liberal Christianity), Survivor (Wes appears on the PMP episode, coming next week!), and situational/business ethics. The Donald Melzer book Wes mentions is The Claustrum. Here's a discussion Mark read about John Continue Reading …
Ep. 394: Hegel on Faith vs. The Enlightenment (Part Two for Supporters)
We conclude our treatment for the moment of the Spirit section of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (sec. 527-73). This directly continues part one, though we began on this tear back with ep. 386 in late Feb., so that's a five-month stretch on basically the same book, either reading it or reading other works discussing it and/or preparing us to understand it. The error that Continue Reading …
Ep. 394: Hegel on Faith vs. The Enlightenment (Part One for Supporters)
On Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), sec. 527-73, i.e. "Faith and Pure Insight" and "The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition." Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth and Dylan. We just read Hegel's earlier essay "Faith and Knowledge" to give us a clearer idea of the conclusion of this section of the Phenomenology: Faith, in this scientific age (i.e. our age as well has his Continue Reading …
Ep. 393: Kant vs. Hegel (Part Two for Supporters)
Concluding our treatment of Ch. 2 of Hegel's Faith and Knowledge (1802). Having spent part one discussing Kant, now we're back to more knowledgably deal with Hegel's critique of him. Hegel wants to connect Kant's idea in the Critique of Judgment of the "intuitive, archetypal intellect" that produces the objects given to its immediate consciousness, to the activity of the Continue Reading …
Ep. 393: Kant vs. Hegel (Part One for Supporters)
Continuing on Ch. 2 of Hegel's Faith and Knowledge (1802) about Kant, and throwing in some of the material being critiqued from Kant's Critique of Judgment (1790), chiefly sec. 76 and 77. Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth and Dylan. As discussed in our last episode, Hegel objected to Kant's doctrine that knowledge of theology is impossible. That's one of the main results of Kant's Continue Reading …
Ep. 392: Early Hegel Elevates Reason (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Faith and Knowledge (1802), Ch. 1 and 2. We start off by discussing how beauty might give us a window into things-in-themselves according to the Romantics, who were in part following Kant's lead. Also, what version of the ontological argument for the existence of God does Hegel believe, since he criticizes Kant for wrongly dismissing the Continue Reading …
Ep. 392: Early Hegel Elevates Reason (Part One for Supporters)
On Faith and Knowledge (1802), Ch. 1 and 2. Famously, Kant critiqued Reason to effectively forbid theology and metaphysics, and a young G.W.F. Hegel was not happy about that. In this self-published essay written five years before the Phenomenology of Spirit, he argues against the impoverishment of Reason to mere intellect (i.e. the Kantian Understanding), restricted to realm of Continue Reading …
Ep. 391: Habermas Defends Modernity (Part Three for Supporters)
Concluding our treatment of Habermas’ The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, lectures 1, 2, and 5, now without our guest. Start with part one. We review the overall critique that various figures have about modernity, try to figure out where Kant fits in with this (Habermas was a neo-Kantian, yet points to Hegel's critique of Kant as prefiguring Habermas' own constructive Continue Reading …
Ep. 391: Habermas Defends Modernity (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Ch. 1, 2, and 5 with guest John Ganz. We get further into the text itself, examining Habermas' characterizations of Hegel's characterizations of modernity and how Hegel's thought evolved. Habermas points at Hegel's early enthusiasm for the Greek polis and early Christian communities as anticipating his own Continue Reading …
Ep. 391: Habermas Defends Modernity (Part One for Supporters)
On Jürgen Habermas’ The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985), lectures 1, 2, and 5. Guest historian/pundit John Ganz joins Mark, Wes, Seth and Dylan to discuss Habermas' characterization of modernity, which is approximately what Hegel was criticizing as The Enlightenment. Habermas then uses Hegel (in lecture two) as an example of how to productively Enlightenment Continue Reading …
Ep. 390: Diderot Debates a Cynic (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Rameau's Nephew, getting further into Rameau's philosophy and practices and trying to figure out what this anti-hero can tell us about ethics, given that he displays the virtue of being candid about his own vices. Rameau bemoans the fact that he's not a greater villain: he is fascinated and apparently admiring of the greatness of certain Continue Reading …
Ep. 390: Diderot Debates a Cynic (Part One for Supporters)
On Denis Diderot's Rameau's Nephew, a dialogue written in the 1760s, published posthumously in 1805. Featuring Mark, Wes, and Dylan. Diderot was a key figure in the Enlightenment, and this dialogue was discovered right when philosophers like Hegel were criticizing the Enlightenment, pointing out that even though dispelling superstitious religion and the piety that went with Continue Reading …
Ep. 389: Hegel on Wealth and Power (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing form part one on the conclusion of "Culture and its Realm of Actuality," now largely covering sections 519-526 in Hegel's Phenomenology. The overall dynamic here makes it sound like nobles are just completely subjugating themselves to the monarch, but Hegel points out the psychological complexities here in ways that might remind us of Nietzsche: To give myself to Continue Reading …
Ep. 389: Hegel on Wealth and Power (Part One for Supporters)
Continuing on Hegel's Phenomenology, "Spirit" chapter, now up to sections 511-526, which finishes off the sub-section of "Self-Alienated Spirit" called "Culture and its Realm of Actuality." Featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. At the end of our last episode, we talked about how in putting on the robes of culture that make us into recognizable persons, we might identify as Continue Reading …
Ep. 388: Hegel on Culture (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on the "Spirit" chapter (more specifically. "Culture and its realm of actuality") in Hegel's Phenomenology, now covering sec. 490-510. How exactly does the process of acculturation work? In his uniquely abstract way, Hegel says there are three steps: First, there's an implicitly universal, self-identical spiritual being (an in-itself). Then this Continue Reading …
Ep. 388: Hegel on Culture (Part One for Supporters)
Continuing on Hegel's Phenomenology, "Spirit" chapter, now up to sections 484-510, which is the first part of "Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture." Featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. As we left things in our last discussion, law had ceased feeling like a natural outgrowth of moral sentiment, but at the same time, individual personhood had been established, both as a legal matter and Continue Reading …
PEL Dystopian Spring Nightcap 2026
Recorded on Feb. 24, featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan. Wes updates us about his many-part (sub)TEXT Julius Caesar treatment, Mark plugs thew new season/co-host of Philosophy vs. Improv (we just released one with recurring PEL guest Jenny Hansen), and we settle in for some afterthoughts on our Graham Haman engagement. That all wraps up before the 16-minute mark. Then Continue Reading …
Ep. 387: Hegel on Law (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on sec. 469-483 of Hegel's Phenomenology. Now that Hegel has told us the story of Antigone, he adds in a comparison to Oedipus to say why the conflict between human and divine law amounts to guilt and destiny. After all, Antigone herself doesn't feel guilty; she did what her conscience told her. But it's the Spirit (the society) as a group mind that Continue Reading …
Ep. 387: Hegel on Law (Part One for Supporters)
Continuing on Hegel's Phenomenology, "Spirit" chapter, now up to sections 464-483, which are under the sub-headings "Ethical Action. Human and Divine Knowledge. Guilt and Destiny" and "Legal Status." In our ep. 386, we introduced the idea of Spirit as sort of the mind of a society. In early societies, people didn't really question their customs, so there was some kind of Continue Reading …
Ep. 386: Hegel on Society (Part Three for Supporters)
On sec. 451-463 of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Start with part one. In this supporter-exclusive part, we get into more detail on these passages about the way the two types of law (human and divine) interact. These are part of the metabolism of society, and includes the death of individuals, which get absorbed into the action of the community through burial rituals. This Continue Reading …
Ep. 386: Hegel on Society (Part Two for Supporters)
We drill in further on The Phenomenology of Spirit, now starting at sec. 441 and largely covering "The True Spirit. The Ethical Order." We gave an overview of our assignment for this episode (438-463), in part one, and will be covering more of these selections in detail in a supporter-only part three, to be released next week. We're getting more detail about this historical Continue Reading …
Ep. 386: Hegel on Society (Part One for Supporters)
On. G.W.F. Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), sec. 438-463. What constitutes society? Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan. We're beginning a multi-episode arc here on the "Spirit" chapter of the book, and we learned that for Hegel, the society is actually the basic ontological unit, not the individual. Why? Because whenever you try to assert your individuality, Continue Reading …
Ep. 385: Guest Graham Harman on Object vs. Continuum (Part Two for Supporters)
In our continuing Q&A with Graham, we engage him about Kantian Things-In-Themselves, complex things (that if divided, must be cut at the joints) vs. mere heaps, fact ontology, natural kinds, fictional objects, why philosophy is not knowledge, and philosophical style. Start with part one, or go back to ep. 384 where our Harman reading journey began. Next Episode: We'll be Continue Reading …
Ep. 385: Guest Graham Harman on Object vs. Continuum (Part One for Supporters)
An interview with Graham in light of his new book, Waves and Stones: On the Ultimate Nature of Reality, which elaborates and adds to issues that the gang (Mark, Wes, Seth and Dylan) previously studied in Object-Oriented Ontology. We read chapters 1, 2, the conclusion of 9, and 10. What is the universe, fundamentally? We know that Graham is against reduction to fundamental Continue Reading …
Ep. 384: Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (Part Three for Supporters)
We take one more crack at Harman's Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything (2018), now focusing on ch. 2, "Aesthetics Is the Root of All Philosophy," which uses an essay by José Ortega y Gasset called "An Essay in Esthetics by Way of a Preface" (1914). Per our previous discussion (start with part one), real objects in the world are not accessible to perception, Continue Reading …
Ep. 384: Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything (2018), finishing up ch. 1 (his introduction to the theory) and moving to ch. 4, "Indirect Relations," which is about causality. To clarify Harman's objections to reductionism: He actually breaks this down into the idea of undermining, e.g. reducing everyday objects to their components, and a Continue Reading …
Ep. 384: Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (Part One for Supporters)
On Harman's Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything (2018), ch. 1, 2, and 4. Featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. What counts as an entity in the world? Harman's purpose in OOO is not, as it might seem by the name, to insist on the sole existence of physical objects, or even to rule out consideration of events as basic. He instead wants to broaden the concept Continue Reading …
Ep. 383: Freud on Love and the Primal Horde (Part Two for Supporters)
Finishing up Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, finally now turning to Freud's anthropological account of group membership. Freud attributes to Darwin the idea that the first societies were family units ruled despotically, and Freud in his earlier book Totem and Taboo had described how the alpha male in such a situation (as is the case now with certain primates) Continue Reading …
Ep. 383: Freud on Love and the Primal Horde (Part One for Supporters)
We discuss the second half of Sigmund Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), continuing from ep. 382 on the first half. We'd established that in group psychology, we take the leader (or leading idea) as a substitute for our super-ego, i.e. our conscience, so we let the group think for us. We talk about the dual origins of this for Freud, one of which is Continue Reading …
PEL 2026 Kickoff Nightcap
Subscribe to hear this ad-free and get tons of bonus content. It's another year, and Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan each came in with a short bucket list of philosophical works that we'd like to read before this podcast concludes, whenever that might be. I'm not going to bother to copy out all the titles here, but a few you might not be familiar with include Susan Haack's Continue Reading …
PEL 2026 Kickoff Nightcap (Citizen Edition)
It's another year, and Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan each came in with a short bucket list of philosophical works that we'd like to read before this podcast concludes, whenever that might be. I'm not going to bother to copy out all the titles here, but a few you might not be familiar with include Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry, Alex Honeth's The Struggle for Recognition, Continue Reading …
Ep. 382: Freud on Group Psychology (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on the first half of Sigmund Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, now getting really into Freud's own type of explanation. Is Freud actually giving us an illuminating explanation or just telling us more about his own theory and how it can be stretched to explain anything? The central explanatory term here is libido: a fundamental Continue Reading …