The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast
A Philosophy Podcast and Philosophy Blog
Continuing on Conditions, “The (Re)turn of Philosophy Itself.” What makes philosophy possible?
The four “conditions,” i.e. mathematics, politics, art, and love, generate the truths, and philosophy is the pincers that gather these together in thought. But how exactly?
On Conditions (1992), Ch. 1 “The (Re)turn of Philosophy Itself.”
Contra post-structuralists who deny Truth, Badiou argues that truths are generated by the truth conditions (politics, art, love, and science/math) which philosophy then thinks into a unified vision.
Continuing on Against Method. Given that according to F., epistemological conformity can’t proceed by an appeal to reason, how does it proceed? Through indoctrination, propaganda, and coercion, even when our goal is to encourage freedom and rationality.
On Against Method (1975). In dialogue with Lakatos, Feyerabend claimed that scientific progress can not be explained rationally, so how does it progress? Is F. just arguing against the possibility of any philosophy of science?
Continuing on “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” (1970).
We distinguish various kinds of falsificationism and give more details about Lakatos’ concept of a scientific research program.
On “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” (1970).
In what way is scientific progress rational? Lakatos splits the difference between Popper and Kuhn to argue that some scientific research programs are more progressive than others, meaning that they make dramatic, unexpected predictions.
Continuing on the Categories, considering artifacts, social construction in cutting up the world, different kinds of properties, and more.
On the Categories (ca. 350 BCE), which purports to describe all the types of entities that exist. We mostly talk about substances, as A’s presentation raises interesting questions about, e.g. the status of the species of substance, and the rest of the categories (e.g. quality, quantity, relative) rely on substances existing. So how exactly do these other categories relate to substances, and why does A. divide the world the way he does?
Continuing on Faces At the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism (1992), discussing “The Racial Preference Licensing Act” (ch. 3), “Divining a Racial Realism Theory” (ch. 5), and “The Rules of Racial Standing” (ch. 6). With guest Lawrence Ware.
On Faces At the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism (1992), a foundational text in critical race theory that presents thought experiments in the philosophy of law, including “The Space Traders.” With guest Lawrence Ware.
Seth, Wes and Dylan re-introduce this episode from ten years ago on G.F.W. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Ch. 4A “Self-Consciousness,” which features guest Tom McDonald.
We’ve removed the “review” section of the old episode (the first half), because it’s duplicative of our recent three-episode run on this book. The old discussion thus picks up in the book right where ep. 277 leaves off.
Continuing on The Phenomenology of Spirit ch. 3, “Force and the Understanding.”
We start off by considering the players in force: the thing exerting the force and the thing receiving. By arguing that these are not so different, Hegel moves to arguing that knowledge and the world are likewise not sharply distinguished.
On The Phenomenology of Spirit ch. 3, “Force and the Understanding.”
What is “force” as physics describes it? And scientific law? Do these terms denote objects in the world, or models for how we describe the world?
Focusing on The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), ch. 2 “Perception.”
Hegel’s critique of the adequacy of perceptual knowledge has metaphysical aspects: The relation of substance to properties, properties to each other, and things to other things and to the perceiver all create difficulties that call for more active participation by the mind.
On The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), ch. 1 “Sense Certainty” and ch. 2 “Perception.”
We walk through the first step in considering Hegel’s dialectical analysis of theories of knowledge. Sense-certainty claims that we have direct access to sensory particulars which can act as foundational. But can we really refer or point to a particular thing without bringing some universal concepts to bear, like “this” (which can refer to any number of things), as well as “here”, “now” and even “I”?
Continuing on the Introduction, we get into more detail on Hegel’s goal and his tricky terminology.
On G.W.F. Hegel’s 1807 opus: A series of treatments of various theories in epistemology (among other things), seeing how they’re internally incoherent, which then moves us to more sophisticated theories.
Concluding on Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), Parts 1 and 2.
What sort of self is created in the act of self-consciousness that according to Schelling grounds all knowledge? We further consider this primordial act.
On Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), Parts 1 and 2.
What is self-consciousness, and how did Schelling think that it grounds all of knowledge?
Continuing on the introduction of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800).
We talk psychologism, the harmony between mind and world, imputing intelligence to nature, natural law vs. teleology, and the aesthetic character of apprehending nature.
