Continuing from part one on The Problem of Christianity (1913), talking about how communities refer to time-processes, both in the history of the development of that community (so a community can be much more ancient and wizened than an individual), and in the mythical history and looked-for future, such that the community, for instance, of Christians is defined by the death of Continue Reading …
Ep. 380: Josiah Royce on Community (Part One for Supporters)
On sections of The Problem of Christianity (1913) which establish Royce's concept of a community of interpretation: individuals working together with a sense of shared history and expectation. He claims that such a grouping can be counted as a literal mind and that it solves the problem of human meaning. Which of our many social groupings and political affiliations share these Continue Reading …
Ep. 379: Egyptian Philosophy with Chike Jeffers (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on sources from ancient Egypt, finishing up the instructional literature: " "The Instruction of Ptahhotep," and "The Instruction Addressed to King Merikare," and then we move to the dialogues, ""The Eloquent Peasant," and "The Dispute Between a Man and His Ba." A theme that runs through the instructions is humility and hence silence: the virtue of Continue Reading …
Ep. 379: Egyptian Philosophy with Chike Jeffers (Part One for Supporters)
On some of the most famous surviving philosophical works from 2200-1400 BCE: "The Instruction of Ptahhotep," "The Instruction Addressed to King Merikare," "The Great Hymn to the Aten," "The Dispute Between a Man and His Ba," and "The Eloquent Peasant." Mark, Wes, and Seth are joined by the co-author of the Africana portion of the History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps Continue Reading …
Ep. 378: Aquinas on God and Mind (Part Four for Supporters)
We're completing our treatment for now of Thomas Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings, discussion sec. 15, "Feelings." This recording features Mark, Wes, and Seth. Listen to at least part three first, also about the mind. Passions are defined as passive ("passio" in Latin), and the puzzle again is how to fit the Aristotelian model of the soul (with its passive and active Continue Reading …
Ep. 378: Aquinas on God and Mind (Part Three for Supporters)
We're now moving on to the "mind" portion of our discussion, starting with how reason motivates us and hence how free will is possible. This is sections 16, 17, and eventually 12 in Thomas Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings. Listen to parts one and two first. As with the various causality-related arguments for the existence of God, we're wading into the complicated Continue Reading …
Ep. 378: Aquinas on God and Mind (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing on bits of Thomas Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings, completing our analysis of his arguments for the existence of God and then turning to eternity and the possibility of actually talking about God. One theme that runs through all these is the incommensurability between empirical things (which Aquinas says are the things we actually know; he's surprisingly Continue Reading …
Ep. 378: Aquinas on God and Mind (Part One for Supporters)
On selections from Thomas Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings, mostly taken from the Summa Theologica (1268). Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan. Given our flawed, finite human nature, how do we fit into the universe? In particular, how can we know and talk about things far beyond our experience such as God and eternity? Or maybe we just can't? Aquinas is writing Continue Reading …
Ep. 377: Emil Cioran’s Pessimism (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on "Directions for Decomposition" from A Short History of Decay (1949). What is it that humans are inevitably trying to avoid that seems so bad to us? It's our existential separation from others, our essential, incommunicable solitude. We further discuss why Cioran praises sloth and ennui. Most likely, post-WWII he was very skeptical of "great Continue Reading …
Ep. 377: Emil Cioran’s Pessimism (Part One for Supporters)
On A Short History of Decay (1949), a pessimist/existentialist text from the most famous Romanian philosopher consisting of short, multi-paragraph, relatively independent sections. It's aphoristic a la much of Nietzsche, but not of the one-liner variety. If you're a fan of Nietzsche, Cioran (pronounced "cho-RAHN") delivers similar scorching wit, but is harder to pin down in Continue Reading …
Ep. 376: Plato’s “Laws” (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on selections from this late Platonic dialogue. Starting in Book 4, Plato's characters are discussing how to create a new state ("Magnesia") from scratch. What sorts of laws should it have? We discuss the marriage laws and whether Plato's presentation of this topic actually fulfills his requirement that laws have a rationally argued prelude for the Continue Reading …
Ep. 376: Plato’s “Laws” (Part One for Supporters)
Everybody reads Plato's Republic, but is that dialogue really a political philosophy text (like the ideal type of government proposed there is what he really thinks we should and perhaps can have), or is he just using the political to illustrate something about the personal virtue of justice, as Socrates explicitly says in the dialogue? Well, in this later (and longer, and Continue Reading …
Ep. 375: Luce Irigaray’s Feminism (Part Two for Supporters)
On "Women on the Market" from The Sex Which Is Not One (1977) and other selections, continuing with guest Jenny Hansen from part one. "Women on the Market" is a study and application of Marx's theory of commodities from the first chapter of Das Kapital. Just as for Marx, a commodity's value is abstracted from how useful it is to a market value, for Irigaray, a woman's Continue Reading …
Ep. 375: Luce Irigaray’s Feminism (Part One for Supporters)
On selections (1977-1993) by Irigaray as presented in the French Feminism Reader (2000), ed. Kelly Oliver. Returning guest Jenny Hansen joins Mark, Seth, and Dylan to discuss the introduction she wrote in this book, plus parts of Irigaray's The Sex Which Is Not One (1977) and to a lesser degree An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1984), "Sexes and Genealogies: Each Sex Must Have Continue Reading …
Ep. 374: Discussing Liberalism (Lincoln, et al) with Walter Sterling (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one our discussion of the dangers to and weak points of liberal democracy, including consideration of Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed (2018) and Francis Fukuyama’s “Liberalism and Its Discontents” (his 2020 essay). We also read part of Steven Pinker’s Enlightenment Now (2018). Is liberal democracy founded on people's virtue (as Lincoln stated), Continue Reading …
Ep. 374: Discussing Liberalism (Lincoln, et al) with Walter Sterling (Part One for Supporters)
What's the crisis of liberal democracy? Dylan, Wes and Seth are joined by new St. John's College President J. Walter Sterling to discuss Abraham Lincoln's "On the Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions" (1838) plus the beginnings of Steven Pinker's Enlightenment Now (2018), Patrick Deneen's Why Liberalism Failed (2018), and Francis Fukuyama's "Liberalism and Its Continue Reading …
Ep. 373: Michael Walzer on Just Wars (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Just and Unjust Wars (1977), ch. 5-6. Ch. 5, "Anticipations" discusses times when it might be morally permissible to strike first, even when no immanent incoming attack is anticipated. These cases will be rare, and depending on what counts as a credible ongoing threat. If war is inevitable, and not attacking first would result in disaster, then Continue Reading …
Ep. 373: Michael Walzer on Just Wars (Part One for Supporters)
On Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Illustrations (1977, updated in 2006), ch. 4-6 on "jus ad bellum," which refers to moral justifications for going to war, as opposed to "jus in bello," which refers to how war is conducted. Featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. The short answer is that self-defense is OK, while aggression is not. But of course, this can be Continue Reading …
Ep. 372: Kant’s Ethics Lectures (Part Three for Supporters)
Concluding our treatment of these 1785 lectures, focusing now on "Of Duties Towards Other People," including some discussion of friendship, lying, distributive justice, and liberal/moral education. Start with part one. Thanks for supporting PEL! Transcript 0:00 Seth: Good night. 0:01 Dylan: Good night. 0:01 Wes: Night. 0:15 Mark: You are listening to the Partially Continue Reading …
Ep. 372: Kant’s Ethics Lectures (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on the 1785 course lecture notes by Georg Ludwig Collins, as collected in the Cambridge edition. We cover "Of Duties to Oneself," which are actually the primary ethical duties. This is not a matter of pursuing your desires, but recognizing your inherent dignity, and respecting that. When you do this, you'll have integrity, and will be in a good Continue Reading …
Ep. 372: Kant’s Ethics Lectures (Part One for Supporters)
On the 1784-1785 course lectures given in Konigsberg, via notes from Georg Ludwig Collins. We used the Cambridge edition (2013) picked what sections to read via a syllabus we found online. Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan. We originally discussed Kant's ethics via his Groundwork (also 1785) back in our ep. 10 and wanted to revisit the ideas given our recent work on Continue Reading …
Ep. 371: Christine Korsgaard on Normativity (Part Two for Supporters)
Concluding our treatment of The Sources of Normativity. Listen to part one first, or better yet, start with ep. 370. We start by conveying Korsgaard's interpretation of Kant, by which the categorical imperative (act such that your maxim can be a law) and the moral law (treat everyone as an end in themselves) aren't actually the same, since the former could conceivably have a Continue Reading …
Ep. 371: Christine Korsgaard on Normativity (Part One for Supporters)
On lectures 3 and 4 of The Sources of Normativity (1996), continuing our discussion of the book from ep. 370. Why is morality obligatory on us? According to Korsgaard, it's because we have a primary need for an identity (multiple identities, actually, or rather multiple roles that make up our identity), and this identity involves obligations. If I were to cross some ethical Continue Reading …
Ep. 370: Christine Korsgaard on the History of Ethics (Part Two for Supporters)
We dive further into the text of lectures 1 and 2 of The Sources of Normativity (1996). Start with part one. Her test for reflective endorsement, which is a method that starts with Hume, goes through Bernard Williams and to Korsgaard's ultimate view, asks us to explain the origins of our moral sentiments, and asks us, knowing the origins now of your own sentiments, do you Continue Reading …
Ep. 370: Christine Korsgaard on the History of Ethics (Part One for Supporters)
On The Sources of Normativity, lectures 1 and 2, which were delivered in 1992, published 1996. Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan. How are facts related to obligations? Korsgaard's own view is a tweaked view of Kantianism, and we'll be laying that out in ep. 371, but she presents this view as the result and synthesis of a progression of previous views starting with Thomas Continue Reading …
Ep. 369: Philippa Foot’s Naturalistic Ethics (Part Three for Supporters)
Mark and Seth return to talk through the last three chapters of Natural Goodness, examining Foot's alleged difference between animal and plant goods on the one hand and specifically human good on the other. She locates the latter in our rational will, in our ability to make choices, though at the same time she does not share Kant's insistence that the only way in which we are Continue Reading …
Ep. 369: Philippa Foot’s Naturalistic Ethics (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Natural Goodness, getting more into concrete cases of moral reasoning. How and why do we decide to keep promises, even in cases where violating them would produce more utility? How do we take into account different kinds of grounds in moral reasoning? We also refine Foot's account of specifically human goodness. To give one example: For most Continue Reading …
Ep. 369: Philippa Foot’s Naturalistic Ethics (Part One for Supporters)
On Natural Goodness (2001), Foot's only book (she died in 2010), which summed up her thoughts on ethics after publishing many influential papers in that area going back to 1959. Featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. Can we base ethics on the model of biology? Foot channels Aristotle in arguing that just as we understand what a healthy specimen of a plant or animal is that fulfills Continue Reading …
Ep. 368: Hume on Reason in Ethics (Part Two for Supporters)
We conclude our discussion of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739): Book III, "Of Morals," plus a bit more discussion of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Listen to part one first, or better yet, start with ep. 367. How do moral sentiments fit into Hume's overall philosophy of mind? Hume famously our conscious experience to be composed solely of impressions Continue Reading …
Ep. 368: Hume on Reason in Ethics (Part One for Supporters)
Continuing our treatment from ep. 367, we talk a bit more about David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), specifically on the conclusion and Appendix I, "Concerning Moral Sentiment," and add some parts of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739): sec. 3 "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" within the third part of Book II, "Of the Passions," and the first Continue Reading …
Ep. 367: Hume on the Foundations of Ethics (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). We dive into ch. 2 on justice: Hume says that the idea of property is not natural, but is an artificial construct created for utilitarian purposes. This means that property laws will be different in different societies based on what is scarce enough to require regulation and protection. Hume's Continue Reading …
Ep. 367: Hume on the Foundations of Ethics (Part One for Supporters)
On David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. What is morality, and how can we know it? We've been discussing the bases of morality of late: Are fundamental principles revealed to us by reason (perhaps "rational intuition"), or by sentiment (e.g. our feelings of empathy with others. Hume is a chief voice in the Continue Reading …
Ep. 366: Edith Stein on Empathy (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on The Problem of Empathy (1917). We start out by thinking more about what "primordiality" means, such that we have a non-primordial relation to those experiences of other people whom we're empathizing with as well as our remembered experiences and the not-immediately-visible but implied sides of the objects we encounter. Next, we map out her Continue Reading …
Ep. 366: Edith Stein on Empathy (Part One for Supporters)
On The Problem of Empathy (1917), featuring Mark, Seth, and Dylan. What is empathy, and what is its significance? Stein was Edmund Husserl's research assistant, and this book adapted her doctoral dissertation (so long before she became a Catholic saint and died in the Holocaust). It was very much in dialogue with Scheler's book on sympathy (among his other works), whose Continue Reading …
Ep. 365: Scheler on Love (Part Two for Supporters)
We conclude our treatment of Max Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy (1922). We briefly revisit Part I to connect sympathy to love: If you love someone, you can't help but have sympathy with them when they suffer. Feeling sympathy without love, i.e. mere pity, will actually injure the pride of your object. Listen to part one first, or better yet, start with ep. 364 where we start Continue Reading …
Ep. 365: Scheler on Love (Part One for Supporters)
On The Nature of Sympathy (1922), Part II: "Love and Hatred." The end of part I on fellow-feeling clarifies that we can only sympathize at the deepest level with someone if we love them, so what is love exactly, and how does it relate to ethics? For Brentano (Scheler's chief ethical influence), love was amoral in itself but is a component in our ethical intuitions: Something Continue Reading …
Ep. 364: Max Scheler on Sympathy (Part Three for Supporters)
Mark, Wes, and Dylan reconvened for one more hour on Part I, "Fellow Feeling" (ch. 3-4) in The Nature of Sympathy (1913/1922). Start with part one of the discussion. We continue to try to figure out the razor's edge of "fellow feeling proper" that does not rely on the sympathizer identifying in any way (including comparing himself to) to object of sympathy. Ch. 3 ("Genetic Continue Reading …
Ep. 364: Max Scheler on Sympathy (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on The Nature of Sympathy (1913/1922), Part I: "Fellow Feeling," Ch. 1-4. We look more closely at the text, getting further into how fellow feeling relates to ethics, and why the moral sentimentalists (like Hume) were wrong about this. We also get more into the types of fellow feeling, from "genuine fellow feeling" that takes the other person's Continue Reading …
Ep. 364: Max Scheler on Sympathy (Part One for Supporters)
On The Nature of Sympathy (1913, expanded 1922), Part I: "Fellow Feeling," Ch. 1-4, featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan. What is it to feel sympathy (or as Scheler repeatedly calls it "fellow feeling") for another person? Scheler was a phenomenologist highly influenced by Husserl and his teacher Brentano, who immediately before this work had written a lengthy ethical Continue Reading …
Ep. 363: Franz Brentano’s Moral Epistemology (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong" (1889), where starting on section 15, Brentano is getting into how we measure the comparative goodness of goods, actions, and purposes. We know that an action is appropriate if it fits and end we have, but how do we measure the values of ends? Like Aristotle, Brentano looks to what we actually will Continue Reading …
Ep. 363: Franz Brentano’s Moral Epistemology (Part One for Supporters)
On "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong" (1889), featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. Brentano was a descriptive psychologist best known for coming up with the idea that all mental states are "intentional"; they all point at something or other. You have a believe THAT [some proposition], or you perceive [some object or state of affairs], or feel an emotion about [some Continue Reading …
Ep. 362: Ecclesiastes: Biblical Existentialism? (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing on Ecclesiastes with guest Jesse Peterson, getting into some more close reading of particular sections. We make some connection from the author's observations to ancient Greek Skepticism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism. How is the world "absurd" according to this book; is this the same claim we get later from Camus? Qhoheleth considers the life of pleasure, great Continue Reading …
Ep. 362: Ecclesiastes: Biblical Existentialism? (Part One for Supporters)
Ecclesiastes is often cited as one of the most philosophical books of the Bible, so we approached it in that spirit with the help of Jesse M. Peterson from George Fox University, whose soon-to-be-published book is called Qoheleth and the Philosophy of Value. First, who is Qoheleth? It's the Hebrew word typically translated as teacher or preacher (liberally "gatherer" or Continue Reading …
Ep. 361: Marx on Machines (Part Two for Supporters)
To conclude our Marx treatment, we continue from part one, finally getting into his "Fragment on Machines" (1858). Shouldn't automating work free the workers? No! According to Marx, the (then-current) process of automation actually just makes labor conditions worse and certainly doesn't give people more free time, as the capitalist inevitably takes all the gains from greater Continue Reading …
Ep. 361: Marx on Machines (Part One for Supporters)
Yet more time spent on Karl Marx finishes up our treatment of Capital, Ch. 1, and throws in the mix "Fragment on Machines" (1858), which we'll discuss explicitly in part two of this. You should probably listen to our Marx series first, starting with ep. 359. In Capital, we finally get to the little bit that Marx says about actual communism, where there are no commodities Continue Reading …
Ep. 360: Karl Marx on Economic Value (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Capital, Ch. 1 on commodities. We go into detail on his account of how money gets derived from the continued comparison of various commodities, how use value comes back into play when we compare the economic value of one commodity as compared to another, and finally, the details of commodity fetishism. Next time: We're adding a reading we actually Continue Reading …
Ep. 360: Karl Marx on Economic Value (Part One for Supporters)
On Capital (1867), Ch. 1, "The Commodity." This continues our discussion in our last episode introducing Marx's economic project. So how does one begin to explain a holistic system? Marx chooses to start with wealth, i.e. the thing Adam Smith was trying to explain in The Wealth of Nations, and wealth, for Marx, is represented in the commodity: stuff that we buy and sell. So Continue Reading …
Ep. 359: Karl Marx’s Project (Part Two for Supporters)
We continue from part one on the introduction to the Grundrisse (1857), which is essentially a set of notes written in the composition of his major work, Capital, which we'll deal with explicitly in ep. 360. What exactly is universal and natural about our economic patterns, and what is a matter of historical epoch? Marx claims we can't just see the distribution of goods and Continue Reading …
Ep. 359: Karl Marx’s Project (Part One for Supporters)
On the introduction to Marx's Grundrisse, aka Foundations of a Critique of Political Economy (1857) with an appetizer of "Theses on Feuerbach" (1845). This is the first of three discussions we'll be having on Marx's "mature" work, and we were also assigned the first chapter (and introduction and 2nd edition afterward) of his Capital (1867), though we're not going to get around Continue Reading …
Ep. 358: Max Stirner’s Egoism (Part One for Supporters)
Continuing our trip through Marx and his influences, Wes, Dylan, and Seth read The Ego and its Own (1844), also translated as The Unique and its Property. Max Stirner was the pen name of Johann Kaspar Schmidt, and he went farther than Feuerbach in rejecting the status quo of a society driven by religion and traditional morality, prefiguring Nietzsche (though Nietzsche was aware Continue Reading …