On W.V.O. Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969), featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. What justifies scientific theory? The classical epistemological project found in figures like Descartes and Locke seeks to find basic, indubitable premises that serve to ground the rest of our theorizing. Quine begins by considering Hume's attempt to do this by claiming that all we ever Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Part Two)
On “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). Building on our first half, which covered Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973), we now look to some of Lewis's ideas about language. In his "Scorekeeping in a Language Game" essay, Mark, Wes, Dylan, and guest Matt Teichman consider conversational dynamics, which in part involves thinking about Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Part One)
On Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973) and the essays “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). What makes counter-factual statements true? If you think "I might have grown up in Cleveland" is true, then what thing about the world makes that "might" statement true? Or by contrast, "I might have been a round square" is not only obviously Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Citizen Edition)
On Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973) and the essays “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). What makes counter-factual statements true? If you think "I might have grown up in Cleveland" is true, then what thing about the world makes that "might" statement true? Or by contrast, "I might have been a round square" is not only obviously Continue Reading …
Episode 195: Truth-The Austin/Strawson Debate (Part Two)
Continuing on "Truth" by J.L. Austin and "Truth" by P.F. Strawson, both from 1950. We proceed to the Strawson article, which critiques the notion of a "fact" as explaining why a sentence might be true. A "fact" is not a thing in the world! So what do we add when we change "The cat is on the mat" to "'The cat is on the mat' is true"? Addendum: We discovered after posting Continue Reading …
Episode 195: Truth-The Austin/Strawson Debate (Part One)
On two articles in the "ordinary language" tradition of philosophy called "Truth" from 1950 by J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. You may remember John Langshaw Austin as the performatives guy, but it's actually Peter Frederick Strawson (whom we covered in the context of free will) who (shortly before either of these papers) came up with what has become known as the performative Continue Reading …
Ep. 195: Truth-The Austin/Strawson Debate (Citizen Edition)
On two articles in the "ordinary language" tradition of philosophy called "Truth" from 1950 by J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. You may remember John Langshaw Austin as the performatives guy, but it's actually Peter Frederick Strawson (whom we covered in the context of free will) who (shortly before either of these papers) came up with what has become known as the performative Continue Reading …
Episode 194: Alfred Tarski on Truth (Part Two)
Continuing on Tarski's “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” (1944), Hartry Field's “Tarski's Theory of Truth” (1972), and Donald Davidson's “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” (1977). What was Tarski really doing? What are the implications of his project? Does it even make sense to define "truth," and what should a definition look Continue Reading …
Episode 194: Alfred Tarski on Truth (Part One)
On Tarski's “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” (1944), Hartry Field's “Tarski's Theory of Truth” (1972), and Donald Davidson's“The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” (1977). What is truth? Tarski gives a technical, metaphysically neutral definition for truth within a particular, well-defined language. In short, a sentence is true if it is Continue Reading …
Ep. 194: Alfred Tarski on Truth (Citizen Edition)
On Tarski's “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” (1944), Hartry Field's “Tarski's Theory of Truth” (1972), and Donald Davidson's “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” (1977). What is truth? Tarski gives a technical, metaphysically neutral definition for truth within a particular, well-defined language. In short, a sentence is true if it is Continue Reading …
Episode 155: Richard Rorty Against Epistemology
On Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Part II: "Mirroring" (Ch. 3–4). Is a "theory of knowledge" possible? Rorty says that while of course psychology has interesting things to say, any specifically philosophical effort is doomed. Why? Because there is no fixed point outside of the "knowledge language game" that provides an ultimate grounding. Rorty draws on Continue Reading …
Ep. 155: Richard Rorty Against Epistemology (Citizen Edition)
On Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Part II: "Mirroring" (Ch. 3–4). Is a "theory of knowledge" possible? Rorty says that while of course psychology has interesting things to say, any specifically philosophical effort is doomed. Why? Because there is no fixed point outside of the "knowledge language game" that provides an ultimate grounding. Rorty draws on Continue Reading …
Episode 154: Wilfrid Sellars on the Myth of the Given
On "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). Is knowledge based on a "foundation," as Descartes, Locke, et al. thought? Sellars says no. Sixteenth-century empiricists thought that we have some indubitable perceptions: Even though I may not be absolutely sure that there's a red object in front of me, I can be sure that there seems to be such an object. The "red Continue Reading …
Ep. 154: Wilfrid Sellars on the Myth of the Given (Citizen Edition)
On "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). Is knowledge based on a "foundation," as Descartes, Locke, et al. thought? Sellars says no. Sixteenth-century empiricists thought that we have some indubitable perceptions: Even though I may not be absolutely sure that there's a red object in front of me, I can be sure that there seems to be such an object. The "red Continue Reading …
Episode 126: Saul Kripke on Possibilities, Language & Science
On Naming and Necessity (1980). What's the relationship between language and the world? Specifically, what makes a name or a class term (like "tiger") pick out the person or things that it does? Saul Kripke wanted to correct the dominant view of his time (which involved speakers having some description in mind, and it's that description that hooks the word to the thing), and Continue Reading …
Episode 126: Saul Kripke on Possibilities, Language & Science (Citizen Edition)
On Naming and Necessity (1980). What's the relationship between language and the world? Specifically, what makes a name or a class term (like "tiger") pick out the person or things that it does? Saul Kripke wanted to correct the dominant view of his time (which involved speakers having some description in mind, and it's that description that hooks the word to the thing), and Continue Reading …
PREVIEW-Ep. 68: Guest David Chalmers on the Scrutability of the World
This is a short preview of the full episode. Buy Now Purchase this episode for $2.99. Or become a PEL Citizen for $5 a month, and get access to this and all other paywalled episodes, including 68 back catalogue episodes; exclusive Part 2's for episodes published after September, 2020; and our after-show Nightcap, where the guys respond to listener email and chat more Continue Reading …
Episode 68: David Chalmers Interview on the Scrutability of the World (Citizens Only)
On his book Constructing the World (2012). How are all the various truths about the world related to each other? David Chalmers, famous for advocating a scientifically respectable form of brain-consciousness dualism, advocates a framework of scrutability: if one knew some set of base truths, then the rest would be knowable from them. What sort of base? Well, there may be Continue Reading …
Topic for #68: Interviewing David Chalmers on Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysics
On 12/4 we spoke with David Chalmers about his new book, Constructing the World. Listen to the episode. The book explores a series of related positions that attempt to generalize and improve upon Carnap's project of logical construction in the Aufbau, the subject of our episode 67 (which will be posted soon). Carnap's project was problematic mainly because first, it was Continue Reading …