Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this ad-free, plus a supporter-exclusive part three. Listen to a preview.. Continuing from part one on "Meaning" (1957), "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions" (1969), and "Logic and Conversation" (1975) with guest Steve Gimbell. We tie Grice's initial project about meaning into this apparently new project in "Logic and Conversation": What Continue Reading …
Ep. 325: Paul Grice on Meaning and Conversation (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on "Meaning" (1957), "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions" (1969), and "Logic and Conversation" (1975) with guest Steve Gimbell. We tie Grice's initial project about meaning into this apparently new project in "Logic and Conversation": What are the rules that people tend to follow in conversation to actually be engaged in the cooperative enterprise of Continue Reading …
Ep. 325: Paul Grice on Meaning and Conversation (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. On "Meaning" (1957), "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions" (1969), and "Logic and Conversation" (1975), featuring Mark, Seth, Dylan, and guest prof. Steve Gimbell of Gettysburg College. Sponsors: Get a $1/month e-commerce trial at shopify.com/pel. Check out Drilled, a true-crime podcast about Continue Reading …
Ep. 325: Paul Grice on Meaning and Conversation (Part One for Supporters)
On "Meaning" (1957), "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions" (1969), and "Logic and Conversation" (1975), featuring Mark, Seth, Dylan, and guest prof. Steve Gimbell of Gettysburg College. Someone who utters something typically means something in particular, but is that meaning determined just by the definitions of the words uttered? Clearly not, as words can be used in Continue Reading …
Ep. 307: G.E. Moore Defends Common Sense (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on "A Defense of Common Sense" (1925), now down to Mark, Wes, and Dylan. We get into the nitty gritty of Moore's argument: Against idealism, Moore argues that physical facts are in now way dependent on mental facts; for instance, the existence and position of the moon don't depend on anyone's beliefs about the moon. Reality is mind Continue Reading …
Ep. 307: G.E. Moore Defends Common Sense (Part One for Supporters)
On "A Defense of Common Sense" (1925), featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan. Various philosophers will tell you that the only thing you experience is your own ideas, and hence the world outside of your mind is something wholly unknowable, or if it is knowable, it must be because those supposedly physical objects are actually somehow ideas as well. Moore defends our Continue Reading …
Ep. 294: Quine on Science vs. Epistemology (Part One for Supporters)
On W.V.O. Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969), featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. What justifies scientific theory? The classical epistemological project found in figures like Descartes and Locke seeks to find basic, indubitable premises that serve to ground the rest of our theorizing. Quine begins by considering Hume's attempt to do this by claiming that all we ever Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Part Two)
On “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). Building on our first half, which covered Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973), we now look to some of Lewis's ideas about language. In his "Scorekeeping in a Language Game" essay, Mark, Wes, Dylan, and guest Matt Teichman consider conversational dynamics, which in part involves thinking about Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Part One)
On Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973) and the essays “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). What makes counter-factual statements true? If you think "I might have grown up in Cleveland" is true, then what thing about the world makes that "might" statement true? Or by contrast, "I might have been a round square" is not only obviously Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Citizen Edition)
On Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973) and the essays “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). What makes counter-factual statements true? If you think "I might have grown up in Cleveland" is true, then what thing about the world makes that "might" statement true? Or by contrast, "I might have been a round square" is not only obviously Continue Reading …
Episode 195: Truth-The Austin/Strawson Debate (Part Two)
Continuing on "Truth" by J.L. Austin and "Truth" by P.F. Strawson, both from 1950. We proceed to the Strawson article, which critiques the notion of a "fact" as explaining why a sentence might be true. A "fact" is not a thing in the world! So what do we add when we change "The cat is on the mat" to "'The cat is on the mat' is true"? Addendum: We discovered after posting Continue Reading …
Episode 195: Truth-The Austin/Strawson Debate (Part One)
On two articles in the "ordinary language" tradition of philosophy called "Truth" from 1950 by J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. You may remember John Langshaw Austin as the performatives guy, but it's actually Peter Frederick Strawson (whom we covered in the context of free will) who (shortly before either of these papers) came up with what has become known as the performative Continue Reading …
Ep. 195: Truth-The Austin/Strawson Debate (Citizen Edition)
On two articles in the "ordinary language" tradition of philosophy called "Truth" from 1950 by J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. You may remember John Langshaw Austin as the performatives guy, but it's actually Peter Frederick Strawson (whom we covered in the context of free will) who (shortly before either of these papers) came up with what has become known as the performative Continue Reading …
Episode 194: Alfred Tarski on Truth (Part Two)
Continuing on Tarski's “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” (1944), Hartry Field's “Tarski's Theory of Truth” (1972), and Donald Davidson's “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” (1977). What was Tarski really doing? What are the implications of his project? Does it even make sense to define "truth," and what should a definition look Continue Reading …
Episode 194: Alfred Tarski on Truth (Part One)
On Tarski's “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” (1944), Hartry Field's “Tarski's Theory of Truth” (1972), and Donald Davidson's“The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” (1977). What is truth? Tarski gives a technical, metaphysically neutral definition for truth within a particular, well-defined language. In short, a sentence is true if it is Continue Reading …
Ep. 194: Alfred Tarski on Truth (Citizen Edition)
On Tarski's “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” (1944), Hartry Field's “Tarski's Theory of Truth” (1972), and Donald Davidson's “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” (1977). What is truth? Tarski gives a technical, metaphysically neutral definition for truth within a particular, well-defined language. In short, a sentence is true if it is Continue Reading …
Episode 155: Richard Rorty Against Epistemology
On Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Part II: "Mirroring" (Ch. 3–4). Is a "theory of knowledge" possible? Rorty says that while of course psychology has interesting things to say, any specifically philosophical effort is doomed. Why? Because there is no fixed point outside of the "knowledge language game" that provides an ultimate grounding. Rorty draws on Continue Reading …
Ep. 155: Richard Rorty Against Epistemology (Citizen Edition)
On Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Part II: "Mirroring" (Ch. 3–4). Is a "theory of knowledge" possible? Rorty says that while of course psychology has interesting things to say, any specifically philosophical effort is doomed. Why? Because there is no fixed point outside of the "knowledge language game" that provides an ultimate grounding. Rorty draws on Continue Reading …
Episode 154: Wilfrid Sellars on the Myth of the Given
On "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). Is knowledge based on a "foundation," as Descartes, Locke, et al. thought? Sellars says no. Sixteenth-century empiricists thought that we have some indubitable perceptions: Even though I may not be absolutely sure that there's a red object in front of me, I can be sure that there seems to be such an object. The "red Continue Reading …
Ep. 154: Wilfrid Sellars on the Myth of the Given (Citizen Edition)
On "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). Is knowledge based on a "foundation," as Descartes, Locke, et al. thought? Sellars says no. Sixteenth-century empiricists thought that we have some indubitable perceptions: Even though I may not be absolutely sure that there's a red object in front of me, I can be sure that there seems to be such an object. The "red Continue Reading …