Mark and Wes go into more textual detail re. Lucretius’s take on atomism and the metaphysical and epistemological problems it entails. Listen to the full episode discussion first. Lucretius believes in something like entropy: all conjoined atoms eventually break apart, but his account of the mechanism by which they join is less spelled out: When you get two heat atoms Continue Reading …
Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Part One)
On Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). What does it mean to say that we grasp the world through a conceptual scheme? Are schemes different between cultures or even individuals, such that we can't really understand each other? Davidson thinks that this doesn't make sense: For schemes to be Continue Reading …
Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Citizen Edition)
On Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). What does it mean to say that we grasp the world through a conceptual scheme? Are schemes different between cultures or even individuals, such that we can't really understand each other? Davidson thinks that this doesn't make sense: For schemes to be Continue Reading …
REISSUE-Ep. 24: Spinoza on God and Metaphysics
On Baruch Spinoza's Ethics (1677), books 1 and 2. Time warp to 2010 when Mark, Seth, and Wes recorded this lo-fi burst of energy, made available to you now to kick of our June Spinoza-fest, with two full discussions coming out over the next four weeks on Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Dylan and Mark have recorded a new introduction connecting the two works. Our Continue Reading …
Episode 155: Richard Rorty Against Epistemology
On Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Part II: "Mirroring" (Ch. 3–4). Is a "theory of knowledge" possible? Rorty says that while of course psychology has interesting things to say, any specifically philosophical effort is doomed. Why? Because there is no fixed point outside of the "knowledge language game" that provides an ultimate grounding. Rorty draws on Continue Reading …
Ep. 155: Richard Rorty Against Epistemology (Citizen Edition)
On Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Part II: "Mirroring" (Ch. 3–4). Is a "theory of knowledge" possible? Rorty says that while of course psychology has interesting things to say, any specifically philosophical effort is doomed. Why? Because there is no fixed point outside of the "knowledge language game" that provides an ultimate grounding. Rorty draws on Continue Reading …
Episode 154: Wilfrid Sellars on the Myth of the Given
On "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). Is knowledge based on a "foundation," as Descartes, Locke, et al. thought? Sellars says no. Sixteenth-century empiricists thought that we have some indubitable perceptions: Even though I may not be absolutely sure that there's a red object in front of me, I can be sure that there seems to be such an object. The "red Continue Reading …
Ep. 154: Wilfrid Sellars on the Myth of the Given (Citizen Edition)
On "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). Is knowledge based on a "foundation," as Descartes, Locke, et al. thought? Sellars says no. Sixteenth-century empiricists thought that we have some indubitable perceptions: Even though I may not be absolutely sure that there's a red object in front of me, I can be sure that there seems to be such an object. The "red Continue Reading …
Episode 153: Richard Rorty: There Is No Mind-Body Problem
On Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Part I: "Our Glassy Essence" (mostly Ch. 1). "The mind" seems to be an unavoidable part of our basic conceptual vocabulary, but Rorty thinks not, and he wants to use the history of philosophy as a kind of therapy to show that many of our seemingly insoluble problems like the relation between mind and body are a result of Continue Reading …
Ep. 153: Richard Rorty: There Is No Mind-Body Problem (Citizen Edition)
On Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Part I: "Our Glassy Essence" (mostly Ch. 1). "The mind" seems to be an unavoidable part of our basic conceptual vocabulary, but Rorty thinks not, and he wants to use the history of philosophy as a kind of therapy to show that many of our seemingly insoluble problems like the relation between mind and body are a result of Continue Reading …
Episode 138: Guest John Searle on Perception
We interview John about Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception (2015). What is perception? Searle says that it's not a matter of seeing a representation, which is then somehow related to things in the real world. We see the actual objects, with no mediation. But then how can there be illusions? Well, we see things under an aspect: a presentation of the thing. And Continue Reading …
Ep. 138: John Searle Interview on Perception (Citizen Edition)
We interview John about Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception (2015). What is perception? Searle says that it's not a matter of seeing a representation that is then somehow related to things in the real world. We see the actual objects, with no mediation. But then how can there be illusions? Well, we see things under an aspect: a presentation of the thing. And Continue Reading …
Intro Readings in Philosophy Series Starting Now(ish)!!!!
You're fired up, you are ready. To read some philosophy, and OHYEAH!, talk about it. Well, you're ready for the Intro Readings in Philosophy Not School Group. Led by Brian Wilson (me, a St. John's College Graduate Institute alum who's been doing this same gig for veterans and active duty since 2013 through my Combat & Classics program), you'll dig into a monthly Continue Reading …
Episode 134: Hegel on Thought & World (or “Logic”)
On G.F.W. Hegel's The Science of Logic (1812–1816), §1–§129 (i.e., the two prefaces and the introduction), plus The Encyclopaedia Logic (1817) §1–§25, which is supposed to dumb it down more so we can understand what's going on. "Logic" for Hegel isn't about symbolic logic; it's about how thought interacts with the world. In short, our thoughts about fundamental metaphysical Continue Reading …
Ep. 134: Hegel on Thought & World (or “Logic”) (Citizen Edition)
On G.F.W. Hegel's The Science of Logic (1812–1816), §1–§129 (i.e., the two prefaces and the introduction), plus The Encyclopaedia Logic (1817) §1–§25, which is supposed to dumb it down more so we can understand what's going on. "Logic" for Hegel isn't about symbolic logic; it's about how thought interacts with the world. In short, our thoughts about fundamental metaphysical Continue Reading …
Episode 131: Aristotle’s “De Anima”: What Is the Mind?
Our second discussion of De Anima or On the Soul (350 BCE), this time on book 3. What is the intellect? In ep. 130, we talked about Aristotle's idea of the soul as the form of the body and about two of its functions or parts: the nutritive and the sensitive. Here we talk more about how sensation is supposed to work according to Aristotle, and how the sense organs interact Continue Reading …
Episode 131: Aristotle’s “De Anima”: What Is the Mind? (Citizen Edition)
Our second discussion of De Anima or On the Soul (350 BCE), this time on book 3. What is the intellect? In ep. 130, we talked about Aristotle's idea of the soul as the form of the body and about two of its functions or parts: the nutritive and the sensitive. Here we talk more about how sensation is supposed to work, according to Aristotle, and how the sense organs interact Continue Reading …
Episode 127: John Dewey on Experience and the World
On Experience and Nature (1925), through ch. 4. What's the relationship between our experience and the world that science investigates? Dewey thinks that these are one and the same, and philosophies that call some part of it (like atoms or Platonic forms) the real part while the experienced world is a distortion are unjustified. We need to remove the unjustified split Continue Reading …
Episode 127: John Dewey on Experience and the World (Citizen Edition)
On Experience and Nature (1925), through ch. 4. What's the relationship between our experience and the world that science investigates? Dewey thinks that these are one and the same, and philosophies that call some part of it (like atoms or Platonic forms) the real part while the experienced world is a distortion are unjustified. We need to remove the unjustified split Continue Reading …
Topic for #127: John Dewey on Experience and Nature
John Dewey is primarily known for two things: being one of the big names in pragmatism, and for his highly influential claims about education, specifically pointing out the active nature of learning such that simply sitting students down and telling them things is not very effective. Mark, Wes, and Dylan met on 10/25/15 to discuss the first four chapters of his 1925 book, Continue Reading …