On Hilary Putnam’s "The Nature of Mental States" (1973) and David M. Armstrong’s "The Causal Theory of the Mind" (1981). What is the mind? Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth consider a theory of mind that defines things not by what they're made of, but what they do. What does this mean? Well, what makes something a mousetrap, for instance, is that it catches mice. It could be made Continue Reading …
Ep. 221: Functionalist Theories of Mind (Putnam, Armstrong) (Citizen Edition)
On Hilary Putnam’s "The Nature of Mental States" (1973) and David M. Armstrong’s "The Causal Theory of the Mind" (1981). What is the mind? Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth consider a theory of mind that defines things not by what they're made of, but what they do. What does this mean? Well, what makes something a mousetrap, for instance, is that it catches mice. It could be made Continue Reading …
Episode 128: Hilary Putnam on Linguistic Meaning
On "The Meaning of Meaning" (1975). So if per Kripke (we're following the thread from #126), meaning is NOT a matter of having a description in your head, then what is it? Hilary Putnam reformulates Kripke's insight in terms of Twin Earths: If Earth-water is H2O, and on Twin Earth, they have something that looks just like water but is a different compound, then we wouldn't Continue Reading …
Episode 128: Hilary Putnam on Linguistic Meaning (Citizen Edition)
On "The Meaning of Meaning" (1975). So if per Kripke (we're following the thread from #126), meaning is NOT a matter of having a description in your head, then what is it? Hilary Putnam reformulates Kripke's insight in terms of Twin Earths: If Earth-water is H2O, and on Twin Earth, they have something that looks just like water but is a different compound, then we wouldn't Continue Reading …
Topic for #128: Hilary Putnam on Linguistic Meaning
On 11/8/15, Mark, Wes, and Dylan were rejoined by Matt Teichman to continue the thread of our ep. #126 on Saul Kripke. Our primary text was his 1975 article "The Meaning of Meaning," with secondary emphasis on his earlier, preparatory essays, "It Ain't Necessarily So" (1962) and "Is Semantics Possible?" (1970). If Kripke was concerned primarily with debunking the Continue Reading …