Mark and Wes further explore J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959). Place had established that it's not the meanings of the words "brain" and "mind" that show their identity; they're metaphysically identical despite this difference in words. Start with part one. However, Smart claims that when referring to a mental state, a speaker is unknowingly still Continue Reading …
Ep. 401: Mind/Brain Identity Theory (U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart) (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. On U.T. Place's "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" (1956) and J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959). Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Chris Heath. Is there some a priori reason for denying that the mind can actually be the brain? Obviously those two words don't mean the same Continue Reading …
Ep. 401: Mind/Brain Identity Theory (U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart) (Part Two for Supporters)
Finishing up U.T. Place's "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" (1956) and starting on J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959). Start with part one. Place (presaging Dennett), argues against the "phenomenological fallacy," which involves recognizing people's descriptions of the appearances of things as descriptions of the actual state of the world in a Continue Reading …
Ep. 401: Mind/Brain Identity Theory (U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart) (Part One for Supporters)
On U.T. Place's "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" (1956) and J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959). Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Chris Heath. Is there some a priori reason for denying that the mind can actually be the brain? Obviously those two words don't mean the same thing, but can we think of them as a single thing under two descriptions (e.g. Continue Reading …