Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free. On G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and "Certainty" (1941), featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. Similar to the essay we covered in our last episode, Moore is defending common sense realism against idealists who claim that the external world is not mind-independent but is instead made up of ideas, Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one, we quickly complete our treatment of G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and move on to consider "Certainty" (1941). In the latter paper, Moore considers various "obvious" statements about his current situation (in my case now: I am writing this, I am sitting down, I have fingers, I am in my house on earth, etc.). These are all Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part One for Supporters)
On G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and "Certainty" (1941), featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. Similar to the essay we covered in our last episode, Moore is defending common sense realism against idealists who claim that the external world is not mind-independent but is instead made up of ideas, and also skeptics who claim that we can't know (or know with Continue Reading …
Can We Be Philosophical Realists?
The analytic philosophy of logical positivism or logical empiricism, which dominated 20th-century Anglo-American scientific thinking, leaves philosophy with a complex and problematic legacy that must be addressed and overcome if we are to have any hope of a renewed, meaningful, philosophically rational realism. On the one hand, the positivist view of philosophy is Continue Reading …