On the new book God and the World’s Arrangement: Readings from Vedanta and Nyaya Philosophy of Religion, which presents two takes on the argument that God must exist because the world is a "product." The first is excerpted from the Brahma-sūtra (a.k.a. the Vedānta-sutra, compiled ca. the 2nd century C.E.) verses 2.2.1-2.2.10 with commentary from Śaṅkara (710 C.E.) and Vācaspati Continue Reading …
PREVIEW-Ep. 267: Avicenna on God and Soul w/ Peter Adamson (Part Two)
Subscribe to get Part 2 of this episode in its entirety. Citizens can get the second part here. Continuing from part one on Avicenna's argument for the existence of God and on the "flying man" argument for the soul's immateriality. This preview gets into some of the metaphysical and epistemological views that lurk behind these two arguments. We start by drilling more Continue Reading …
Ep. 267: Avicenna on God and Soul w/ Peter Adamson (Part One for Supporters)
On selections and commentary about Avicenna's argument from around 1020 C.E. for the existence of God (including arguments to prove that God has the person-like properties that Islam imputes to him) and his "flying man" argument for the soul's essential independence from matter. Featuring Mark, Dylan, and our guest Peter Adamson from the History of Philosophy Continue Reading …
PREVIEW-Ep. 264: Plato’s “Timaeus” on Cosmology (Part Two)
Subscribe to get Part 2 of this episode in its entirety. Citizens can get the second part here. Continuing from part one on the Timaeus. In this preview, we return to look closely at the beginning of the dialogue where Plato argues for differences between the perceived, created, impermanent world and its perfect model. In the full discussion, we get into time, space, and Continue Reading …
Ep. 264: Plato’s “Timaeus” on Cosmology (Part One)
Subscribe to get Part 2 of this episode. Listen to a preview. On the later Platonic dialogue from around 360 BCE, with Mark, Wes, and Dylan. How is nature put together? Plato, speaking this time through the fictional character instead of Socrates (who is present, but only Timaeus talks after the first part of the dialogue), paints a picture of the creation of the cosmos and Continue Reading …
Ep. 264: Plato’s “Timaeus” on Cosmology (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on the Timaeus. In this second part, we go more or less back to the beginning of the dialogue and talk through some quotes and details. For instance, we have arguments concerning the realms of Being and Becoming, the former being the model which the Craftsman used to create the latter. Could the model itself have been created? No, anything in that Continue Reading …
Ep. 264: Plato’s “Timaeus” on Cosmology (Part One for Supporters)
On the later Platonic dialogue from around 360 BCE, with Mark, Wes, and Dylan. How is nature put together? Plato, speaking this time through the fictional character instead of Socrates (who is present, but only Timaeus talks after the first part of the dialogue), paints a picture of the creation of the cosmos and our place in it. The overall principle is the same as it was Continue Reading …
Ep. 261: Derek Parfit on Personal Identity (Part One)
Subscribe to get Part 2 of this episode, or listen to a preview. Citizens can get the entire second part here. On Reasons and Persons (1984), ch. 10-13, featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan and Seth. What makes a person the same over time? Parfit used Locke as a starting point: It's a matter of continuity of memory: I am the same person as my younger self because there are Continue Reading …
Ep. 259: Locke Clarifies Misleading Complex Ideas (Part Two)
More on Book II (ch. 22-33) of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), discussed by Mark, Wes, and Dylan. On relations, then personal identity, with more on substances (spiritual and material), the various ways in which ideas can go wrong, and how mental association can entrench irrationality that disrupts clear thinking. Listen to part one first, or get Continue Reading …
Ep. 259: Locke Clarifies Misleading Complex Ideas (Part One)
On Book II (ch. 22-33) of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), discussed by Mark, Wes, and Dylan. Simple ideas (as discussed in ep. 258) get complex rather quickly, perhaps as soon as you put them into words, and certainly as soon as you put them into a system. If I perceive the color blue, or a passing thought in my mind, a simple idea of this appears Continue Reading …
Ep. 259: Locke Clarifies Misleading Complex Ideas (Citizen Edition)
On Book II (ch. 22-33) of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), discussed by Mark, Wes, and Dylan. Simple ideas (as discussed in ep. 258) get complex rather quickly, perhaps as soon as you put them into words, and certainly as soon as you put them into a system. If I perceive the color blue, or a passing thought in my mind, a simple idea of this appears Continue Reading …
Ep. 253: Leibniz on the Problem of Evil (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing on Gottfried Leibniz’s Theodicy (1710). We get further into the weeds: What is the metaphysical necessity for evil? Leibniz says God doesn't actually cause evil; it's just that his optimal creation will necessarily have some evil in it. Just the fact that he's necessary and infinite, and his creation is contingent and finite means that creatures involve some lack, Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Part One)
On Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973) and the essays “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). What makes counter-factual statements true? If you think "I might have grown up in Cleveland" is true, then what thing about the world makes that "might" statement true? Or by contrast, "I might have been a round square" is not only obviously Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Citizen Edition)
On Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973) and the essays “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). What makes counter-factual statements true? If you think "I might have grown up in Cleveland" is true, then what thing about the world makes that "might" statement true? Or by contrast, "I might have been a round square" is not only obviously Continue Reading …
PREVIEW-Ep 206 Lucretius’s Epicurean Physics (Part Three)
Mark and Wes go into more textual detail re. Lucretius’s take on atomism and the metaphysical and epistemological problems it entails. Start with Part one. This is a preview; become a PEL Citizen or $5 Patreon supporter to get the full, 50 minute conversation. Lucretius believes in something like entropy: all conjoined atoms eventually break apart, but his account of the Continue Reading …
Ep. 206 Follow-Up Lucretius’s Epicurean Physics (Citizens Only)
Mark and Wes go into more textual detail re. Lucretius’s take on atomism and the metaphysical and epistemological problems it entails. Listen to the full episode discussion first. Lucretius believes in something like entropy: all conjoined atoms eventually break apart, but his account of the mechanism by which they join is less spelled out: When you get two heat atoms Continue Reading …
Episode 198 Follow-Up: More on Plato’s “Parmenides” (Citizens Only)
Mark and Seth continue our conversation from ep. 198 by going through the arguments in the second half of the dialogue. This puzzling section is largely a monologue by the character Parmenides, with the stated aim of showing the implications from first, the assumption that the One exists, and then that the One does not exist. But is this really the One that Parmenides speaks Continue Reading …
Episode 198: Plato’s Forms in the “Parmenides” (Part Two)
We get down to the specific questions considered in this perplexing Platonic dialogue: Are there Forms for all adjectives? Does the Form of a property itself have that property? (Is the Form Large itself large?) How do Forms connect with particulars? How can we mortals have any connection to heavenly Forms anyway? Why even think there are Forms outside of particulars? Listen Continue Reading …
Episode 198: Plato’s Forms in the “Parmenides” (Part One)
On the most peculiar Platonic dialogue, from ca. 350 BCE. Are properties real things in the world, or just in the mind? Plato famously thought that for a property like "large," there's a Form that causes all the large things to be large, and which enables us to recognize those things as large. These Forms are not material things, and hence aren't the objects of ordinary Continue Reading …
Episode 198: Plato’s Forms in the “Parmenides” (Citizen Edition)
On the most peculiar Platonic dialogue, from ca. 350 BCE. Are properties real things in the world, or just in the mind? Plato famously thought that for a property like "large," there's a Form that causes all the large things to be large, and which enables us to recognize those things as large. These Forms are not material things, and hence aren't the objects of ordinary Continue Reading …