On the most peculiar Platonic dialogue, from ca. 350 BCE. Are properties real things in the world, or just in the mind? Plato famously thought that for a property like "large," there's a Form that causes all the large things to be large, and which enables us to recognize those things as large. These Forms are not material things, and hence aren't the objects of ordinary Continue Reading …
Episode 197: Parmenides on What There Is (Part Two)
Continuing with guest Peter Adamson with "On Nature" (475 BCE). We finally get to the great "fragment 8," which describes why Being must be singular and eternal, given that the notion of Non-Being is nonsense. So does it make any sense to talk of this eternal, uniform Being as a finite sphere? Would this absolute unity of Being make it impossible for us to even be Continue Reading …
Episode 197: Parmenides on What There Is (Part One)
On the fragments referred to as "On Nature" from ca. 475 BCE, featuring guest Peter Adamson from the History of Philosophy without Any Gaps podcast. One of the most influential Presocratic philosophers, Parmenides gives "the Way of Truth," which is that there is only Being, and talking of Non-Being is nonsense. And guess what? Any talk of difference implies non-being, so Continue Reading …
Episode 143: Plato’s “Sophist” on Lies, Categorization, and Non-Being
On the later Platonic dialogue (ca. 360 BC). What is a sophist? Historically, these were foreign teachers in Ancient Greece who taught young people the tools of philosophy and rhetoric, among other things, and espeically they claimed to teach virtue. In this dialogue, "the Eleatic Stranger" (i.e., not Socrates, who is present but wholly silent after the first couple of Continue Reading …
Ep. 143: Plato’s “Sophist” on Lies, Categorization, and Non-Being (Citizen Edition)
On the later Platonic dialogue (ca. 360 BC). What is a sophist? Historically, these were foreign teachers in Ancient Greece who taught young people the tools of philosophy and rhetoric, among other things, and especially they claimed to teach virtue. In this dialogue, "the Eleatic Stranger" (i.e., not Socrates, who is present but wholly silent after the first couple of Continue Reading …