Continuing on Jürgen Habermas's “Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld" (1998), with guest John Foster. We get into the details about the validity claims that are inherent in speech: When I make an assertion, I'm not just uttering a fact without context, but am (ordinarily, like not if I'm saying this in the context of playing a part Continue Reading …
Ep. 252: Habermas on Communication as Sociality (Part One)
Subscribe to get Part 2 of this episode, or listen to a preview. Citizens can get the entire second part here. On Jürgen Habermas' "Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld" (1998), with guest John Foster. What's the relation between individuals and society? Habermas says it's language. But don't picture this as fully formed but isolated Continue Reading …
Ep. 252: Habermas on Communication as Sociality (Part One for Supporters)
On Jürgen Habermas' “Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld" (1998), with guest John Foster. What's the relation between individuals and society? Habermas says it's language. But don't picture this as fully formed but isolated animal individuals that then acquire language and thereby come together to form a society. Rather, what Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Part Two)
On “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). Building on our first half, which covered Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973), we now look to some of Lewis's ideas about language. In his "Scorekeeping in a Language Game" essay, Mark, Wes, Dylan, and guest Matt Teichman consider conversational dynamics, which in part involves thinking about Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Citizen Edition)
On Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973) and the essays “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). What makes counter-factual statements true? If you think "I might have grown up in Cleveland" is true, then what thing about the world makes that "might" statement true? Or by contrast, "I might have been a round square" is not only obviously Continue Reading …
Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Part Two)
Finishing Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and moving on to Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). Carnap's paper comes 22 years after his Aufbau project that we covered in ep. 67, and is really a response to Quine's 1948 paper "On What There Is," which we covered in ep. 66. His point is that when we use a certain vocabulary, Continue Reading …
Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Part One)
On Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). What does it mean to say that we grasp the world through a conceptual scheme? Are schemes different between cultures or even individuals, such that we can't really understand each other? Davidson thinks that this doesn't make sense: For schemes to be Continue Reading …
Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Citizen Edition)
On Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). What does it mean to say that we grasp the world through a conceptual scheme? Are schemes different between cultures or even individuals, such that we can't really understand each other? Davidson thinks that this doesn't make sense: For schemes to be Continue Reading …
Ep. 189 Follow-Up: Authorial Intent (Citizens Only)
Thanks to you, our supporters, who by contributing your hard-earned cash have enabled us to record extra discussions like this one. Enough folks expressed appreciation for our free-speech follow-up that we thought we'd do another one. You'll want to listen to ep 189 before this. Our new text for this follow-up discussion is from the Stanford Encyclopedia on theories of Continue Reading …
Ep. 186: J.L. Austin on Doing Things with Words (Part Two)
Continuing on How to Do Things with Words (lectures from 1955), covering lectures 5–9. Austin tries and fails to come up with a way to grammatically distinguish performatives from other utterances, and so turns to his more complicated system of aspects of a single act: locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary. In doing so, he perlocutionarily blows our minds. Buy the Continue Reading …
Ep. 186: J.L. Austin on Doing Things with Words (Part One)
On How to Do Things with Words, a lecture series delivered in 1955. What's the relationship between language and the world? According to Austin, philosophers have generally taken language as providing descriptions: A sentence is true if it correctly describes some state of affairs. But what about sentences like "I promise…"? Austin says that when you say that, you're not Continue Reading …
Ep. 186: J.L. Austin on Doing Things with Words (Citizen Edition)
On How to Do Things with Words, a lecture series delivered in 1955. What's the relationship between language and the world? According to Austin, philosophers have generally taken language as providing descriptions: A sentence is true if it correctly describes some state of affairs. But what about sentences like "I promise…"? Austin says that when you say that, you're not Continue Reading …
The Accuracy of Slurs (Philosophical Issues Related to the #thatasshole Campaign, Part 2)
Continuing from part 1, but you needn't read part 1 to get this; just look at the original post. In the tradition of things like the Marvel Universe that continue to build on an immature piece of fluff (in their case, comics where every sentence ends with an exclamation point), here are some more thoughts on philosophical issues involved in my silly and offensive-to-many Continue Reading …
Episode 160: Orwell on Totalitarianism and Language (Part Two)
Continuing with 1984. How does the book relate to today's politics, or to the politics of his time? Does Orwell present something that we should actually be afraid our society will turn into? Are people really motivated by power for power's sake as Orwell depicts? Was he predicting history based on current trends, or was it satire, or what? We discuss the relationship Continue Reading …
Episode 160: Orwell on Totalitarianism and Language (Part One)
On the novel 1984 (1949) and the essays “Politics and the English Language” (1946) and “Notes on Nationalism” (1945). What's the relation between language and totalitarianism? In 1984, Orwell presents us with a society where the ruling powers have mastered the art of retaining power, and one element of this involves "Newspeak," where the vocabulary is purposely limited to Continue Reading …
Ep. 160: Orwell on Totalitarianism and Language (Citizen Edition)
On the novel 1984 (1949) and the essays “Politics and the English Language” (1946) and “Notes on Nationalism” (1945). What's the relation between language and totalitarianism? In 1984, Orwell presents us with a society where the ruling powers have mastered the art of retaining power, and one element of this involves "Newspeak," where the vocabulary is purposely limited to Continue Reading …
In Dreams
There’s safety in delusion. People sometimes say it takes special courage to face the world as it is, even more to face ourselves, and we know the truth doesn’t always feel good. It can be painful. Perhaps, then, a moderate amount of delusion can be, well, healthy. Ta-Nehisi Coates has something else in mind. “To awaken the Dreamers, to rouse them to the facts,” is the greatest Continue Reading …
Episode 128: Hilary Putnam on Linguistic Meaning
On "The Meaning of Meaning" (1975). So if per Kripke (we're following the thread from #126), meaning is NOT a matter of having a description in your head, then what is it? Hilary Putnam reformulates Kripke's insight in terms of Twin Earths: If Earth-water is H2O, and on Twin Earth, they have something that looks just like water but is a different compound, then we wouldn't Continue Reading …
Episode 128: Hilary Putnam on Linguistic Meaning (Citizen Edition)
On "The Meaning of Meaning" (1975). So if per Kripke (we're following the thread from #126), meaning is NOT a matter of having a description in your head, then what is it? Hilary Putnam reformulates Kripke's insight in terms of Twin Earths: If Earth-water is H2O, and on Twin Earth, they have something that looks just like water but is a different compound, then we wouldn't Continue Reading …
Topic for #128: Hilary Putnam on Linguistic Meaning
On 11/8/15, Mark, Wes, and Dylan were rejoined by Matt Teichman to continue the thread of our ep. #126 on Saul Kripke. Our primary text was his 1975 article "The Meaning of Meaning," with secondary emphasis on his earlier, preparatory essays, "It Ain't Necessarily So" (1962) and "Is Semantics Possible?" (1970). If Kripke was concerned primarily with debunking the Continue Reading …