Someone, somewhere coined the powerful phrase "meaning is use," but the expression as we know it is from Ludwig Wittgenstein. Among other things, it causes a great deal of headache, which includes figuring out what in the world it means. Regardless of whether it's right or even what it means exactly, we can still say something about what it does not mean. This becomes important Continue Reading …
Philosophy Has Entered the Chat: Meaning in Large Language Models
If an LLM could talk, would we understand it? This is a rhetorical question making its way into the public discourse on AI and the generative text technology found in large language models (LLMs), specifically in ChatGPT, Claude, and the like. You could have missed it because the questions currently taking the stage revolve around whether LLMs are conscious, or at least whether Continue Reading …
Ep. 327: Harry Frankfurt on Bullshit and Authenticity (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth discuss the celebrated 1986 essay "On Bullshit." (In part two, we'll cover by contrast his 1982 essay "The Importance of What We Care About.") What is bullshit, or "humbug" as a previous essay by Max Black calls it? Frankfurt starts with Black's definition Continue Reading …
Ep. 327: Harry Frankfurt on Bullshit and Authenticity (Part One for Supporters)
Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth discuss the celebrated 1986 essay "On Bullshit." (In part two, we'll cover by contrast his 1982 essay "The Importance of What We Care About.") What is bullshit, or "humbug" as a previous essay by Max Black calls it? Frankfurt starts with Black's definition ("deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of Continue Reading …
Ep. 326: Michael Tomasello on the Evolution of Agency (Part Two)
Subscribe to get this ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. Wes, Dylan, and guest Chris Heath continue to discuss The Evolution of Agency (2022) in light of our interview with the author in part one. We relate examples from the book of animals of various levels of complexity making deliberative decisions, exhibiting rationality, experiencing causality, or otherwise Continue Reading …
Ep. 326: Guest Michael Tomasello on the Evolution of Agency (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. The psycho-linguist prof. from Duke University joins Wes, Dylan, Seth, and Chris Heath to discuss his 2022 book, The Evolution of Agency: Behavioral Organization from Lizards to Humans. What is human agency? How would we determine whether an animal is a legitimate agent, as opposed to just Continue Reading …
Ep. 326: Michael Tomasello on the Evolution of Agency (Part Two for Supporters)
Wes, Dylan, and guest Chris Heath continue to discuss The Evolution of Agency (2022) in light of our interview with the author in part one. We relate examples from the book of animals of various levels of complexity making deliberative decisions, exhibiting rationality, experiencing causality, or otherwise engaging in agentive or proto-agentive behaviors. One particularly Continue Reading …
Ep. 326: Guest Michael Tomasello on the Evolution of Agency (Part One for Supporters)
The psycho-linguist prof. from Duke University joins Wes, Dylan, Seth, and Chris Heath to discuss his 2022 book, The Evolution of Agency: Behavioral Organization from Lizards to Humans. What is human agency? How would we determine whether an animal is a legitimate agent, as opposed to just acting automatically? Tomasello investigates this by thinking about what capabilities Continue Reading …
Ep. 325: Paul Grice on Meaning and Conversation (Part Two)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this ad-free, plus a supporter-exclusive part three. Listen to a preview.. Continuing from part one on "Meaning" (1957), "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions" (1969), and "Logic and Conversation" (1975) with guest Steve Gimbell. We tie Grice's initial project about meaning into this apparently new project in "Logic and Conversation": What Continue Reading …
Ep. 325: Paul Grice on Meaning and Conversation (Part Three for Supporters/Closereads Part One)
Mark and Wes Closeread through the 1975 ordinary language philosophy paper. What are the assumptions behind everyday conversation? When someone violates a conversational norm by, e.g., giving too much information or stating something literally untrue, what are the strategies by which we try to make sense of what they're saying as still a sensible contribution to the Continue Reading …
Ep. 325: Paul Grice on Meaning and Conversation (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on "Meaning" (1957), "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions" (1969), and "Logic and Conversation" (1975) with guest Steve Gimbell. We tie Grice's initial project about meaning into this apparently new project in "Logic and Conversation": What are the rules that people tend to follow in conversation to actually be engaged in the cooperative enterprise of Continue Reading …
Ep. 325: Paul Grice on Meaning and Conversation (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. On "Meaning" (1957), "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions" (1969), and "Logic and Conversation" (1975), featuring Mark, Seth, Dylan, and guest prof. Steve Gimbell of Gettysburg College. Someone who utters something typically means something in particular, but is that meaning determined just by Continue Reading …
Ep. 325: Paul Grice on Meaning and Conversation (Part One for Supporters)
On "Meaning" (1957), "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions" (1969), and "Logic and Conversation" (1975), featuring Mark, Seth, Dylan, and guest prof. Steve Gimbell of Gettysburg College. Someone who utters something typically means something in particular, but is that meaning determined just by the definitions of the words uttered? Clearly not, as words can be used in Continue Reading …
Ep. 324: Plato’s “Cratylus” on Language (Part Two)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this ad-free, plus a supporter-exclusive part three. Listen to a preview.. Continuing from part one on Plato's mid-period dialogue about language. Is attaching a word to a thing, i.e. naming it, like other activities such as carpentry or sewing that can go wrong? Can we put the "form" of a thing into letters and syllabus of its name? Continue Reading …
Ep. 324: Plato’s “Cratylus” on Language (Part Three/Closereads)
Mark and Wes do a Closeread on the latter part of the dialogue, where Socrates argues to Cratylus that even if names (words) were devised to somehow depict the things they stand for, that wouldn't guarantee that they ACCURATELY describe the world. You can't look at the definitions of words to learn about the world; you have to actually investigate the world directly. Follow Continue Reading …
Ep. 324: Plato’s “Cratylus” on Language (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content including a supporter-exclusive part three to this discussion coming out next week. On Plato's mid-period dialogue from around 388 BCE. How do words relate to the things they represent? Featuring Mark, Wes, and Dylan. We're all familiar with the feeling when we see someone really hot but Continue Reading …
Ep. 324: Plato’s “Cratylus” on Language (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Plato's mid-period dialogue about language. Is attaching a word to a thing, i.e. naming it, like other activities such as carpentry or sewing that can go wrong? Can we put the "form" of a thing into letters and syllabus of its name? Socrates argues (at least through most of the dialogue) that we can, that some names can be more appropriate than Continue Reading …
Ep. 324: Plato’s “Cratylus” on Language (Part One for Supporters)
On Plato's mid-period dialogue from around 388 BCE. How do words relate to the things they represent? Featuring Mark, Wes, and Dylan. We're all familiar with the feeling when we see someone really hot but with a very dweeby name that something seems to have gone wrong. We also know Native names like "Running Eagle" that may or may not seem to really fit the person with that Continue Reading …
Ep. 323: Acquiring Language: Tomasello vs. Chomsky (Part Two)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this ad-free, plus a supporter-exclusive Nightcap discussion about cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and more. Continuing from part one on Michael Tomasello's "Language Is Not an Instinct" (1995) and Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition (2003), as contrasted with Chomsky universal grammar (the Continue Reading …
Ep. 323: Acquiring Language: Tomasello vs. Chomsky (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. On Michael Tomasello's "Language Is Not an Instinct" (1995) and ch. 1, 2, 8 and 9 of Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition (2003), plus the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article Innateness and Language by Fiona Cowie (posted 2008, updated 2017). Featuring Continue Reading …
Ep. 323: Acquiring Language: Tomasello vs. Chomsky (Part One for Supporters)
On Michael Tomasello's "Language Is Not an Instinct" (1995) and ch. 1, 2, 8 and 9 of Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition (2003), plus the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article Innateness and Language by Fiona Cowie (posted 2008, updated 2017). Featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, Dylan, and guest Christopher Heath. Clearly we are not born Continue Reading …
Ep. 311: Understanding the Dao De Jing (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one with guest Theodore Brooks on the central Daoist text attributed to Laozi. We start with more discussion of practical vs. metaphysical interpretations of the first chapter. In either case, Laozi recommends not being too self-conscious; you want to be fully present in your activities, open to the subtle cues of your environment, without too much Continue Reading …
Ep. 309: Wittgenstein On Certainty (Part Two)
Subscribe to get both parts of this episode ad free, plus a supporter exclusive PEL Nightcap discussion. Continuing our discussion from part one of On Certainty (1951), we do some close reading of the text. How does he actually respond to Moore's argument about his hand? How does he extend his account to talk about mathematical and scientific statements? Is Wittgenstein a Continue Reading …
Ep. 309: Wittgenstein On Certainty (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free. Discussing the notes Ludwig Wittgenstein made at the end of his life in 1951 that were published as On Certainty in 1969, featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. These were in direct response to the essays by G.E. Moore that we discussed in episodes 307 and 308, so we talk about the status of so-called "Moorean Continue Reading …
Ep. 309: Wittgenstein On Certainty (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing our discussion from part one of On Certainty (1951), we do some close reading of the text. How does he actually respond to Moore's argument about his hand? How does he extend his account to talk about mathematical and scientific statements? Is Wittgenstein a pragmatist? You may want to review our episode on William James' pragmatist definition of truth. We Continue Reading …
Ep. 309: Wittgenstein On Certainty (Part One for Supporters)
Discussing the notes Ludwig Wittgenstein made at the end of his life in 1951 that were published as On Certainty in 1969, featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. These were in direct response to the essays by G.E. Moore that we discussed in episodes 307 and 308, so we talk about the status of so-called "Moorean propositions" like "physical objects exist," "the world is more Continue Reading …
Ep. 294: Quine on Science vs. Epistemology (Part Two)
Subscribe to get Parts 1 and 2 ad-free, plus a supporter exclusive Part 3, which you can preview. Continuing from part one on "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969), we work further through the text, getting into what this new psychology-rooted epistemology might look like. Quine remains an empiricist in that he agrees that whatever evidence there is for science must be Continue Reading …
Ep. 294: Quine on Science vs. Epistemology (Part Three for Supporters)
Concluding on W.V.O. Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969), featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. Start with part one. We take one more stab at making sense of the indeterminacy of translation that is part of Quine's holism about linguistic meaning. Then we turn to more implications about Quine's attempt to turn epistemology into psychology. Is Quine a behaviorist? (Was Continue Reading …
Ep. 294: Quine on Science vs. Epistemology (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus a supporter-only part 3. On W.V.O. Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969), featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. What justifies scientific theory? The classical epistemological project found in figures like Descartes and Locke seeks to find basic, indubitable premises that serve to ground the rest of our theorizing. Continue Reading …
Ep. 294: Quine on Science vs. Epistemology (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969), we work further through the text, getting into what this new psychology-rooted epistemology might look like. Quine remains an empiricist in that he agrees that whatever evidence there is for science must be sensory, and that we learn language through the medium of our senses (i.e. no innate knowledge). However, this Continue Reading …
Ep. 294: Quine on Science vs. Epistemology (Part One for Supporters)
On W.V.O. Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969), featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. What justifies scientific theory? The classical epistemological project found in figures like Descartes and Locke seeks to find basic, indubitable premises that serve to ground the rest of our theorizing. Quine begins by considering Hume's attempt to do this by claiming that all we ever Continue Reading …
Ep. 290: Susanne Langer on Our Symbol-Making Nature (Part One)
Subscribe to get Part 2 of this episode. Listen to a preview. Hear this part ad-free. On Philosophy in a New Key (1942), ch. 1-5, plus as background most of us looked at Langer's main influence Ernst Cassirer via his An Essay on Man (1944), ch. 1-5. Featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. What is human nature, and why does natural science have such trouble studying it? Continue Reading …
Ep. 290: Susanne Langer on Our Symbol-Making Nature (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on Philosophy in a New Key (1942), ch. 1-5. We start off by considering whether the hardware-software distinction with regard to our minds can help make sense of what Langer has proposed in saying that symbol-making is basic to us. Is she saying that we're more flexible (software-driven) than evolutionary biology would suggest, or does her claim that Continue Reading …
Ep. 290: Susanne Langer on Our Symbol-Making Nature (Part One for Supporters)
On Philosophy in a New Key (1942), ch. 1-5, plus as background most of us looked at Langer's main influence Ernst Cassirer via his An Essay on Man (1944), ch. 1-5. Featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. What is human nature, and why does natural science have such trouble studying it? Cassirer's massive, three-volume Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-1929) provides the Continue Reading …
Ep. 252: Habermas on Communication as Sociality (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing on Jürgen Habermas's “Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld" (1998), with guest John Foster. We get into the details about the validity claims that are inherent in speech: When I make an assertion, I'm not just uttering a fact without context, but am (ordinarily, like not if I'm saying this in the context of playing a part Continue Reading …
Ep. 252: Habermas on Communication as Sociality (Part One)
Subscribe to get Part 2 of this episode, or listen to a preview. Citizens can get the entire second part here. On Jürgen Habermas' "Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld" (1998), with guest John Foster. What's the relation between individuals and society? Habermas says it's language. But don't picture this as fully formed but isolated Continue Reading …
Ep. 252: Habermas on Communication as Sociality (Part One for Supporters)
On Jürgen Habermas' “Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld" (1998), with guest John Foster. What's the relation between individuals and society? Habermas says it's language. But don't picture this as fully formed but isolated animal individuals that then acquire language and thereby come together to form a society. Rather, what Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Part Two)
On “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). Building on our first half, which covered Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973), we now look to some of Lewis's ideas about language. In his "Scorekeeping in a Language Game" essay, Mark, Wes, Dylan, and guest Matt Teichman consider conversational dynamics, which in part involves thinking about Continue Reading …
Ep. 240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Citizen Edition)
On Ch. 4 of Lewis's book Counterfactuals (1973) and the essays “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979) and “Truth in Fiction” (1978). What makes counter-factual statements true? If you think "I might have grown up in Cleveland" is true, then what thing about the world makes that "might" statement true? Or by contrast, "I might have been a round square" is not only obviously Continue Reading …
Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Part Two)
Finishing Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and moving on to Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). Carnap's paper comes 22 years after his Aufbau project that we covered in ep. 67, and is really a response to Quine's 1948 paper "On What There Is," which we covered in ep. 66. His point is that when we use a certain vocabulary, Continue Reading …
Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Part One)
On Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). What does it mean to say that we grasp the world through a conceptual scheme? Are schemes different between cultures or even individuals, such that we can't really understand each other? Davidson thinks that this doesn't make sense: For schemes to be Continue Reading …
Ep. 191: Conceptual Schemes: Donald Davidson & Rudolf Carnap (Citizen Edition)
On Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). What does it mean to say that we grasp the world through a conceptual scheme? Are schemes different between cultures or even individuals, such that we can't really understand each other? Davidson thinks that this doesn't make sense: For schemes to be Continue Reading …
Ep. 189 Follow-Up: Authorial Intent (Citizens Only)
Thanks to you, our supporters, who by contributing your hard-earned cash have enabled us to record extra discussions like this one. Enough folks expressed appreciation for our free-speech follow-up that we thought we'd do another one. You'll want to listen to ep 189 before this. Our new text for this follow-up discussion is from the Stanford Encyclopedia on theories of Continue Reading …
Ep. 186: J.L. Austin on Doing Things with Words (Part Two)
Continuing on How to Do Things with Words (lectures from 1955), covering lectures 5–9. Austin tries and fails to come up with a way to grammatically distinguish performatives from other utterances, and so turns to his more complicated system of aspects of a single act: locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary. In doing so, he perlocutionarily blows our minds. Buy the Continue Reading …
Ep. 186: J.L. Austin on Doing Things with Words (Part One)
On How to Do Things with Words, a lecture series delivered in 1955. What's the relationship between language and the world? According to Austin, philosophers have generally taken language as providing descriptions: A sentence is true if it correctly describes some state of affairs. But what about sentences like "I promise…"? Austin says that when you say that, you're not Continue Reading …
Ep. 186: J.L. Austin on Doing Things with Words (Citizen Edition)
On How to Do Things with Words, a lecture series delivered in 1955. What's the relationship between language and the world? According to Austin, philosophers have generally taken language as providing descriptions: A sentence is true if it correctly describes some state of affairs. But what about sentences like "I promise…"? Austin says that when you say that, you're not Continue Reading …
The Accuracy of Slurs (Philosophical Issues Related to the #thatasshole Campaign, Part 2)
Continuing from part 1, but you needn't read part 1 to get this; just look at the original post. In the tradition of things like the Marvel Universe that continue to build on an immature piece of fluff (in their case, comics where every sentence ends with an exclamation point), here are some more thoughts on philosophical issues involved in my silly and offensive-to-many Continue Reading …
Episode 160: Orwell on Totalitarianism and Language (Part Two)
Continuing with 1984. How does the book relate to today's politics, or to the politics of his time? Does Orwell present something that we should actually be afraid our society will turn into? Are people really motivated by power for power's sake as Orwell depicts? Was he predicting history based on current trends, or was it satire, or what? We discuss the relationship Continue Reading …
Episode 160: Orwell on Totalitarianism and Language (Part One)
On the novel 1984 (1949) and the essays “Politics and the English Language” (1946) and “Notes on Nationalism” (1945). What's the relation between language and totalitarianism? In 1984, Orwell presents us with a society where the ruling powers have mastered the art of retaining power, and one element of this involves "Newspeak," where the vocabulary is purposely limited to Continue Reading …
Ep. 160: Orwell on Totalitarianism and Language (Citizen Edition)
On the novel 1984 (1949) and the essays “Politics and the English Language” (1946) and “Notes on Nationalism” (1945). What's the relation between language and totalitarianism? In 1984, Orwell presents us with a society where the ruling powers have mastered the art of retaining power, and one element of this involves "Newspeak," where the vocabulary is purposely limited to Continue Reading …