of spirit.[127] There is nothing on ethics in Descartes, and what concerns cognitive knowing or the intelligent spirit is to be found in the first part, dealing with the principles of human knowledge.[128] These are the main aspects of Cartesian philosophy.

We must refer to a few other particular forms that are usually dealt with in metaphysics (by Wolff as well[129]), such as the relation of the soul to the body. We find many systematic views on this topic in metaphysics.[130] One is that of the *influxus physicus,* [the notion] that spirit functions in corporeal fashion, that external things have a mechanical relation to the soul in the way that one thing affects another by pressure or collision. This is a very crude notion, one that Descartes rejects.[131] He established the spiritual or intellectual sphere as free on its own account. "In his *cogito* I am at first only certain of myself, since I can abstract from everything."[132] On this

127. [*Ed.*] On Spinoza's ethics, see below, p. 000. Here Hegel appears to disregard Spinoza's discussion of evil both in his correspondence (however, see below, p. 000), and also in the *Theologico-political Treatise* and the *Political Treatise.*

128. [*Ed.*] Part 1 of the *Principles of Philosophy* deals not only with questions of metaphysics—as mentioned previously by Hegel—but also with such principles of human knowledge as pertain to the philosophy of subjective spirit, according to Hegel's own system outline: doubt, error, free will, imagination, sensible nature, and so forth.

129. [*Ed.*] Hegel is probably referring particularly to Wolff's rational psychology. See Christian Wolff, *Psychologia rationalis methodo scientifica pertractata,* new rev. ed. (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig, 1740), section III (reprinted in *Gesammelte Werke,* division II, 6:451–587), which deals with the interaction between mind and body.

130. [*Ed.*] Further on in these lectures Hegel distinguishes three such systems (see pp. 000 and 000 below; cf. *W* 15:456–457). But see also Hegel's criticism of the "thoughtless" representation of the soul-body relation in Epicurus (*W* 14:499–500).

131. [*Ed.*] Descartes does not reject the idea of a mechanical relationship between external things and the soul in quite the explicit fashion Hegel's wording suggests. But such rejection is implied by what Descartes says about the real difference between thinking substance and extended substance, which is probably what Hegel has in mind; see in particular *Principles of Philosophy,* pt. 1, § 60 (*Writings* 1:213; *Œuvres* 8, pt. 1:29) or, with direct reference to the relation between soul and body, the Sixth Meditation (*Writings* 2:52–53; *Œuvres* 7:76). The conjunction (*compositio, unio, permixtio*) of soul and body affirmed a few pages later in the Sixth Meditation (*Writings* 2:59–62; *Œuvres* 7:85–90) also precludes a purely mechanical relationship between them; see also n. 123, p. 000 above.

132. *Thus Gr; An reads:* I am conscious of myself and of my freedom, without anything external.

basis Descartes founds the subsistence of spirit on its own account. But then the middle term or the link between the abstract universal and the particular external [body] has to be identified. Descartes identifies it by saying that God is the intermediary, the middle term. This is what is called | the system of assistance, namely, that God 102
is the metaphysical ground of the reciprocal changes. Changes occur in the soul as well as in the body. Bodily changes correspond to those in the soul. This correspondence is effected by God—this is the *systema assistentiae.*[133] Here we see the need for a mediating element between the two opposites. The unity of the idea, or of the concept, and what is real, is in God alone. In its further moments this point receives particular emphasis in Spinoza's system.

3. Benedict Spinoza

Spinozism is related to Cartesianism simply as a consistent carrying out or execution of Descartes's principle.

First, however, we must examine the circumstances of Spinoza's life.[134] He was born in Amsterdam in 1632, of a Portuguese-Jewish family. His given name was Baruch, but he changed it to Benedict. "At an early age he got into conflict with the rabbis in the synagogue,"[135] and he stopped attending the synagogue. He was offered a great deal of money to return to the synagogue, and when the

133. [*Ed.*] The adoption of a *systema assistentiae* in its developed form is, owing to its agreement with Occasionalism, to be attributed to Malebranche rather than to Descartes, as Hegel himself confirms elsewhere (*W* 15:367). The passages in Descartes that go furthest in this direction occur in his *Treatise on Man* (1629–1633), which was to exert such a decisive influence on Malebranche (see p. 000 below). Hegel does not mention this treatise, although Rixner does (*Handbuch* 3:44–49).

134. [*Ed.*] Hegel's account of Spinoza's life and works is derived from the *Collectanea de vita B. de Spinoza,* appended to vol. 2 of H. E. G. Paulus's edition, *Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quae supersunt omnia,* 2 vols. (Jena, 1802–1803). Hegel had a small part in the work on this edition; see the editorial report by M. Baum and K.-R. Meist in *GW* 5. From the *Collectanea* Hegel relied mainly on the Spinoza biography by Johannes Colerus, a Lutheran clergyman in The Hague, with the additions of the Spinozist, Count Boulainvilliers. One departure is that this source does not expressly make the Jews responsible for the assassination attempt on Spinoza; in *W* 15:368 Hegel assigns responsibility to the rabbis.

135. *Thus An with Pn, similar in Lw, Sv; Gr reads:* In his youth he received instruction from the rabbis,

Jews sought to rid themselves of him by assassination, he narrowly escaped with his life. He then left the Jewish community, without, however, formally going over to the Christian church. He now applied himself particularly to the study of Latin. He studied Descartes's philosophy and published an exposition of it according to the geometrical method (subsequently included in his works). Later he achieved fame through his *Theologico-political Treatise,* which contains the doctrine of inspiration, an assessment of the Mosaic
103 scriptures particularly from the | standpoint that the Mosaic laws apply only to the Jews---a critical treatment of the Mosaic books. Most of what later Christian theologians have written in a critical spirit on inspiration and the limitation of the Mosaic Law to the Jewish nation, usually purporting to show that these books were not compiled until a later time—a principal topic for Protestant theologians—they found already in Spinoza.[136] In 1664 Spinoza went to Rijnsburg near Leiden, and from 1665 on he lived ˜in a village near The Hague, and in The Hague itself,˜[137] where he supported himself by grinding optical lenses, after declining several donations from his friends. The elector Palatine, Carl Ludwig, offered him a chair of philosophy at Heidelberg with freedom to teach and to write, because this prince believed that Spinoza "would not abuse this freedom by disturbing the public religion." Spinoza declined the offer because "he did not know within what limits philosophical freedom must be confined in order not to disturb the

136. [*Ed.*] For this discussion see the preface and chapters 5, 8–11 of Spinoza's *Theologico-political Treatise* (1670) in *Chief Works,* trans. R. H. M. Elwes, 2 vols. (London, 1883; reprint, New York, 1951), 1:8, 69, 114; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:148–149, 219, 270–271; *Spinoza: Opera,* ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg, 1926), 3:9–10, 69, 112–113. We do not know the extent of Hegel's acquaintance with the development of the historical criticism of the Bible. For instance, it is improbable that he knew the work of the Deist Johann Lorenz Schmidt (1702–1749) and not confirmed that he knew that of the "neologist" Johann Salomo Semler (1725–1791); undoubtedly he did know Lessing's 1777 publication of the "Fragments" of Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), taken from the latter's *Apology for Rational Worshipers of God.* But whereas Spinoza's influence on the later views of Lessing and Herder concerning the relation of Scripture and history is evident, his impact on the initial historical-critical study of the Bible is not as clear as Hegel here suggests.

137. *Thus An, Lw; Pn reads:* in a village near The Hague, *Gr reads:* in The Hague or in Vorburg near The Hague,

public religion."[138] He remained in Holland with no ties of any kind, and died of consumption on 22 February 1677. Only after his death was his *Ethics* published, by his closest friend, the physician Ludwig Meyer. ˜The great hatred Spinoza aroused among the Jews was equaled by the hatred the Protestant clergy had for him.˜[139]

His principal work is his *Ethics.* It consists of five parts. The first deals with God, and the second with the nature and origin of the mind [*Geist*]; so he does not deal with nature but passes straight over from God to mind. The third book | deals with [the nature 104
and origin of] our emotional states and passions, and the fourth with the forces of the emotions or, as its title puts it, with human bondage. Finally, the fifth book deals with the power of the understanding, of thinking, or with human freedom.[140]

Spinoza's system itself is on the whole very simple. The difficulty of grasping it is due partly to the method, the closely woven method by which he presents his thoughts, and [partly] to his restricted viewpoint, which leaves one dissatisfied about [some of its] major aspects and lines of inquiry.

˜Spinoza's simple reality [*das Einfache*]˜[141] is absolute substance; only absolute substance truly is, it alone is actual or is actuality. ˜It is˜[142] the unity of thinking and being, or that whose

138. [*Ed.*] These two approximate quotations come from an exchange of letters between J. L. Fabricius (on behalf of the elector Palatine) and Spinoza. See Spinoza's Letters 53 and 54 (*Chief Works* 2:373–375; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:639–640; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 4:235–236 = Letters 47 and 48).

139. *Thus Gr; Pn reads:* The Jews and the Protestants hated him greatly. *An reads:* By his writings he incurred great hatred from the Jews and the Protestants. *Lw reads:* Hostility to Spinoza was even greater among the Christians than among the Jews.

[*Ed.*] Hegel knew about the circumstances of the publication of Spinoza's *Ethics* from Ludwig Meyer's preface to it in the *Opera* edited by Paulus (2:3 ff.), and about the hostility of the Protestant clergy from the Colerus biography in Paulus, which cites an attack on Spinoza by Johann Musaeus, a theology professor at Jena (2:650). Musaeus called him an impostor who, under the devil's influence, perverted human and divine laws.

140. [*Ed.*] Here Hegel gives the titles of the five parts of the *Ethics,* using *Geist* where Spinoza has "mind" (*mens*).

141. *Thus Gr; Lw reads:* The principal idea

142. *Thus Pn, Lw; An reads:* This substance is *Gr reads:* It is, as for Descartes,

[*Ed.*] This sentence refers to the definition of *causa sui*; see n. 149 below.

concept contains its existence within itself. We have before us two determinations, the universal or what has being in and for itself, and secondly the determination of the particular and singular, that is, individuality. Now it is not hard to demonstrate that the particular or the singular is something altogether limited, that its concept altogether depends upon an other, that it is dependent, does not truly exist for itself, and so is not truly actual. With regard to the determinate, Spinoza established this thesis: *omnis determinatio*[143] *est negatio* [all determination is negation]. Hence only the nonparticularized or the universal *is*. It alone is what is substantial and therefore truly actual. As a singular thing, the soul or the mind is something limited. It is by negation that ˜a singular thing is.˜[144] Therefore ˜it [the singular thing]˜[145] does not have genuine actuality. This on the whole is Spinoza's idea.

The general point to notice here is that thinking, or the spirit, has to place itself at the standpoint of Spinozism. This idea of Spinoza's must be acknowledged to be true and well-grounded. There is an absolute substance, and it is what is true. But it is not
105 yet | the whole truth, for substance must also be thought of as inwardly active and alive, and in that way must determine itself as spirit. Spinoza's substance is the universal, and consequently the abstract, determination. We can call it the absolute foundation of spirit, not, however, as its absolutely fixed underlying ground, but as the abstract unity that spirit is within itself.

If thinking stops with this substance, there is then no develop-

143. *Thus Gr, Pn, Lw, Sv; An adds:* (particularization)
[*Ed.*] For this axiom, see Spinoza's Letter 50, to Jarig Jelles (*Chief Works* 2:369–370; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:634; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 4:240). There Spinoza states that, as perceived, figure or body is determined not in terms of its being (what it is) but in terms of its nonbeing (what it is not): "As therefore figure is none other than determination and determination is negation (*non aliud, quam determinatio et determinatio negatio est*), it can, as we have said, be none other than negation." Hegel's formulation shows, however, that his citation is probably not directly from Spinoza but from Jacobi: *Determinatio est negatio* (Jacobi, *Spinoza-Briefe,* pp. 31n, 182; *Werke* 4, pt. 1:62, 182). The first edition of Hegel's *Science of Logic* also quotes this axiom in Jacobi's version (GW 11:76). The generalized form with *omnis* first occurs in Hegel's 1817 review of vol. 3 of Jacobi's *Werke,* in the *Heidelbergische Jahrbücher der Litteratur* 1:6 (cf. W 17:8).
144. *Thus Pn; Gr reads:* it [mind] is a singular thing.
145. *Thus Lw, Pn; Gr, Sv read:* it [the mind]

ment, no life, no spirituality or activity. So we can say that with Spinozism everything goes into the abyss but nothing emerges from it. In Spinoza the particular is adopted from representation without being justified. For it to be justified he would have to deduce or derive it from his substance, but this is not what happens. What differentiates and forms the particular is said to be just a modification of the absolute substance and nothing actual in its own self.[146] The operation upon it is just the stripping away of its determination or particularity, so that it can be thrown back into the one absolute substance. This is what is unsatisfying in Spinoza. Leibniz takes individuality, the opposite mode, as his principle, and in that way outwardly integrates Spinoza's system.[147] The great merit of the Spinozist way of thinking in philosophy is its renunciation of everything determinate and particular, and its orientation solely to the One—heeding and honoring only the One, acknowledging it alone. This view [*Ansicht*] must be the foundation of every authentic view. But it [the One] is ˜something utterly fixed and immobile.˜[148] It is the universal.

We still have to mention a few characteristics of a more specific sort. To render his philosophy mathematically conclusive and consistent, Spinoza presented it according to a geometrical method, but one that is only appropriate for the finite sciences of the understanding. Hence he begins | with definitions. These definitions in- 106
volve universal determinations, and they are adopted directly or presupposed, they are not deduced, for Spinoza does not know how he arrives at them. He says, "By that which is its own cause, *causa sui,* I understand that whose essence includes existence within itself, and which cannot be thought of otherwise than as existent."[149] This

146. [*Ed.*] See Spinoza's *Ethics* I, prop. 25, corol., in *The Collected Works of Spinoza,* ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, vol. 1 (Princeton, 1985), p. 431; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:59; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:68. Curley's second volume, to contain some of the other works by Spinoza discussed here, has not yet been published.
147. [*Ed.*] See the discussion of Leibniz below, pp. 000–000.
148. *Thus Pn, An; Gr reads:* an utterly fixed immobility, whose sole activity is to plunge everything into the abyss of substance. *Lw reads:* something utterly immobile; everything is plunged into the abyss of substance.
149. [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* I, def. 1 (*Collected Works* 1:408; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:35; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:45). The first six definitions and the explication of the sixth are quoted in German—as transmitted by Hegel himself—in W 15:379–382.

is a wholly speculative concept. A cause produces an effect that is something other than the cause. A cause of itself is a cause that produces an effect, but in this case the distinction is sublated, for a cause of itself produces only itself. This is a fundamental concept in all speculation—return into self within the other.

The second definition is that of the finite. "Finite" means what is bounded by something else of the same kind. In this other it finds an end in which *it* is not, for what is there is an other, and indeed an other of its own kind. For things that are said to limit one another must be of the same kind, they must stand in community and have a common soil. Thus a thought is limited by another thought, a body by another body, but not a body by a thought or vice versa.[150]

The third definition is that of substance. "Substance" is what is conceived within itself and through itself, that is, something the concept of which does not require for its conception the concept of any other thing, what has no need of an other[151]—else it would be finite, accidental. The second [moment] of substance is the attribute, which (according to definition 4) is what the understanding grasps of substance as constituting its essence. But ˜where the substance passes over to the attribute˜[152] is not stated. The third [moment] is the mode, namely, the affection of substance or that, in an other, through which it is conceived.

107 God is the absolutely infinite being. The infinite is the | affirmation of itself.[153] The infinite of thought is distinct from the infinite of imagination. The latter is the bad infinite, namely, the infinitude

150. [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* I, def. 2 (*Collected Works* 1:408; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:35; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:45).

151. [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* I, def. 3, where Spinoza actually says "what is in itself and is conceived through itself," not, as Hegel has it, "what is conceived within itself and through itself." In Hegel's subsequent text, "the second moment" cites def. 4 and "the third moment" cites def. 5. See *Collected Works* 1:408–409; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:35; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:45.

152. *Thus Gr; Lw reads:* how the determinations ensue, whence the understanding comes,

153. [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* I, prop. 8, schol. 1 (*Collected Works* 1:412; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:39; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:49).

of space or time, or the infinite series of mathematics, of numbers.[154] Yet this is the infinity we usually have in view when we speak of infinity. Philosophical infinity is the affirmation of itself. Here too Spinoza employs geometrical examples to illustrate his concept of the infinite. He takes two circles that are not concentric but do not touch, although one of them lies wholly within the other. The space between the two circles is a present, complete space. It is *actu,* actual, not an [infinite] "beyond," yet the determination of this space cannot be given precisely in numerical terms. The determining does not exhaust the space, and yet the space is actual.[155] [Similarly] it can be said of any line that is limited [that is, a line segment] that it consists of infinitely many points and yet the line is extant, is present, is determinate. The infinite should be represented as actu-

154. [*Ed.*] In his Letter 29 (12 in Gebhardt), to Ludwig Meyer, Spinoza sets forth the different senses of infinity (*Chief Works* 2:317–321; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:526–530; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 4:53–58). He distinguishes: (1) what is infinite by its nature or definition, from what is infinite owing to its cause; (2) what is infinite because unlimited, from what is finite in magnitude although its parts cannot be expressed by number; (3) what is understandable but not imaginable, from what is imaginable as well. The key to this issue lies in the distinction between the existence of indivisible substance and the existence of the modes, which are divisible. Quantity, duration, and number apply only to the modes, not to substance itself. Each of these three can in turn be either viewed superficially, by the imagination, as finite and divisible, or understood as infinite and indivisible. See *Ethics* I, prop. 15, schol. (*Collected Works* 1:420–424; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:47–51; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:57–60). Spinoza's example (cf. Hegel's bad infinite), similar to the "Achilles and the Tortoise" paradox of Zeno, is that of an hour of time viewed as infinitely divisible and therefore unable to be traversed. A similar procedure would generate the infinite series: 1, ½, ¼, ⅛, 1/16, and so on, yielding an infinite that is not actual (*actu*). Unlike Spinoza, however, Hegel accepts that numerical relations express a genuine—quantitative—infinite, for instance, the fraction 1/1–a as distinct from the series $1 + a + a^2 + a^3 \ldots$, or the fraction 2/7 as distinct from the decimal expression 0.285714. . . . See *GW* 11:159 and 21:242–244 (cf. *Science of Logic,* pp. 250–252), as well as *W* 15:382.

155. [*Ed.*] It is not clear whether Spinoza's example of the circles in Letter 29 is in terms of plane geometry or solid geometry. The reference to the space between the two circles, and matter in motion within this space, suggests solid geometry. But reference to infinitely many different straight-line distances between the two circles suggests a two-dimensional figure such as Spinoza introduces elsewhere concerning the study of fluids. Hegel's mention of the line segment example in the next sentence probably refers to an earlier passage in the same letter. See *Chief Works* 2:319, 321; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:528, 530–531; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 4:56, 59–60.

ally present. The genuine infinite consists in the cause producing itself (*causa sui*).[156] As soon as the cause has over against it an other, the effect, then finitude is present. In the case of the genuine infinite, however, this other that sought to limit it is at once sublated, and the infinite is itself again. God, therefore, is the absolutely infinite being or the substance that consists of infinite attributes, each of which ˜expresses its˜[157] eternal and infinite essence. ˜These determinations, however, are universal and thus completely formal.˜[158]

The main thing is that Spinoza says that substance consists of infinite attributes. This seems to mean that there should be infinitely
108 many attributes. But Spinoza only speaks of two | attributes, so that "infinite" must refer to their character. He does not indicate how these two[159] proceed from the one substance, however, nor say why he speaks only of two. As with Descartes, the two of them are thought and extension,[160] each by itself being the entire totality in such a way that both have the same content, except that it is posited in one case in the form of thinking and in the other case in the form of extension. The understanding grasps these attributes, it grasps them as totalities. They express the same being, God, but in a form that the understanding, so to speak, brings with it, a form that pertains to the understanding. Both are the same totality, or, as he puts it, the order or system of extended things is the same as the order of thinking things,[161] it is one and the same system. Recently

156. [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* I, prop. 7, and prop. 8, schol. 1 (*Collected Works* 1:412; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:38–39; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:49).

157. *Thus Pn, Lw; Gr reads:* constitutes its *An reads:* constitutes an [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* I, def. 6 and expl. (*Collected Works* 1:409; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:35–36; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:45–46).

158. *Thus Gr; Pn reads:* Now this is very formal, with the eternal, infinite essence expressed by each attribute.

159. *Thus Gr, Pn, An; Lw adds:* nor why only they

160. [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* II, props. 1 and 2 (*Collected Works* 1:448–449; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:78–79; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:86). Although Hegel rejects the view that by "infinite attributes" Spinoza means "infinitely many attributes," the passage cited in the following note suggests that Spinoza thought there are more than two attributes, since it speaks of extension and "the other attributes." For Descartes's view that there are only two kinds of things, thinking things and extended things, see n. 116, p. 000 above.

161. [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* II, prop. 7 and schol. (*Collected Works* 1:451–452; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:82–83; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:89–90).

this idea has been served up to us again in the following terms, namely, that the thinking world is implicitly the same as the extended world, and [the two just are] in distinct forms.[162] But the question here is: ˜Whence comes it that the understanding applies˜[163] these two forms to the absolute substance, and whence come these two forms? Here the unity of being (extension) and thinking is therefore posited in such a way that ˜thinking is in itself the totality, and likewise what is extended˜[164] is the same totality. So we have two totalities. In themselves they are the same, and the distinctions are only attributes or determinations of the understanding, which is an added factor. This is the general view, that the attributes ˜are just nothing in themselves, they are no distinctions in themselves.˜[165]

The third [moment] consists of the modes or *affectiones.*[166] In extension these are rest and motion, in thinking they are *intellectus*
and | *voluntas,* cognition and will; they are mere modifications. 109
Whatever relates to this distinction and is in particular posited by it is nothing in itself. These, then, are Spinoza's general forms.

Several other forms that are more determinate remain to be men-

162. [*Ed.*] Hegel's criticism is directed against Schelling's Identity-philosophy (see below, pp. 000–000).

163. *Thus An, Lw; Gr, Pn read:* How does the understanding come (*Pn:* now come) to apply

164. *Thus Pn; Sv reads:* thinking is in itself totality, *Gr reads:* the thinking universe is in itself the whole absolute, divine totality, and the corporeal universe

165. *Thus Gr; Pn reads:* are just not the [being] in itself of what is differentiated. *An reads:* are just not in themselves.

166. [*Ed.*] See the definition of mode as given on p. 000 above. Hegel's justification for designating mode as "the third moment" is that from his standpoint he identifies substance, attribute, and mode with universal, particular, and singular respectively. The analogy between singular and mode becomes particularly clear in *W* 15:391: "The singular as such pertains to these modes [namely, rest and motion, or understanding and will]; it is through them that what is called singular distinguishes itself." As evidence in favor of Hegel's interpretation we may cite, for instance, *Ethics* I, prop. 25, corol.: "Particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, *or* modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way" (*Collected Works* 1:431; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:59; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:68). Hegel's subsequent statement about cognition and will is based on *Ethics* I, prop. 32, dem. and corol. 2 (*Collected Works* 1:435; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:63; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:72–73). Spinoza's text implies that motion and rest are to be considered as modes too.

tioned. Spinoza has this to say about evil:[167] "It is alleged that God is even the author of evil because God is the author of everything; it is alleged that what is evil is God himself. I affirm that God is the absolute author of everything that is positive reality or essence (Letter 36). Now if you can prove to me that error, depravity, or evil, is something that expresses an essence, I will freely grant you that God is the author of evil. But I have abundantly demonstrated that the form of evil is not in something that [expresses] an essence, ˜that it is nothing in itself genuinely real,˜[168] and therefore it cannot be said that God is the author of evil. Nero's matricide, for instance, so far as it has a positive, volitional content, is another matter. His vice was just disobedience, ruthlessness, and ingratitude. But that is no essence, so God is not the cause of the evil in his action. Inasmuch as God does not consider the case abstractly ˜and no more reality pertains to things than˜[169] God imparts to them, it follows that such privation holds only with regard to our understanding and not with regard to God. Evil and the like is only privation; God is what is utterly real."[170]

It is all very well to say this, but it does not satisfy us. Our view of the freedom of the subject protests vehemently against the

167. [*Ed.*] Although it is shown as a single quoted passage, the remainder of this paragraph, except for the last sentence, is in fact a conflation of points from Spinoza's Letters: 31, from Willem van Blyenbergh; 32 and 36, Spinoza's replies (*Chief Works* 2:329, 333, 347; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:538–539, 543, 581–582; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 4:82–84, 91–92, 147 = Letters 18, 19, 23). Cf. *W* 15:406–407 (Ms?). In replying, Spinoza compares the matricide of Nero and that of Orestes. The two acts are alike in essence, that is, in intention and deed, in which respect both were caused by God. Nero is blameworthy in a way that Orestes is not, however, because Nero's attitude was vicious; it did not express essence and so was not caused by God.

168. *Thus Gr; Sv reads:* and so it [evil] also could not be taken as something positive,

169. *Gr reads:* and things do not have true reality other than what

170. [*Ed.*] For Spinoza's concept of privation, see his Letter 34, to van Blyenbergh (*Chief Works* 2:339; *Opera,* ed Paulus, 1:566–567; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 4:128–129 = Letter 21). Spinoza says that privation, as the attribution of a deficiency (for instance, to a blind person who cannot see) is merely a product of our reason or imagination, not the result of God's causing something to be taken away (from that person). When certain qualities do not fall within the scope of something's nature, as determined by God's will and understanding, then that circumstance is properly called negation, not privation.

Spinozistic substance, since the fact that I exist as subject, as individual spirituality and the like, is, according to Spinoza, nothing but a modification or transient form. This is what is shocking in the inner content of Spinoza's system and what gives rise to the animosity toward it. For we have the self-consciousness of freedom and [are aware] | that spirit is in and for itself essentially the negative of the corporeal, and that it is only in positing an antithesis to the corporeal that one is what one truly is. Both in theology and in sound common sense people have held fast to this negative element. This form of the antithesis is first of all that what is free is actual, that evil exists. It is no explanation if I call it all mere modification; the moment of the negative is what is lacking and deficient in this one, rigid, motionless substantiality. The pattern of the antithesis is that, in distinguishing itself explicitly from the corporeal, spirit is substantial and actual, that *spirit is,* and is no mere privation or negation. In the same way *freedom is,* and is no mere privation. This actuality is set against the Spinozistic system, which is correct in formal thought. The actuality rests, for one thing, upon feeling. But beyond that there is the fact that in and for itself the idea contains within itself the principle of movement or of vitality, the principle of freedom and hence the principle of spirituality. Spinoza did not grasp that. On the one hand the defect of the Spinozistic system is that it does not correspond to actuality. On the other hand, however, the defect has to be grasped in a higher way—to be precise, in such a way that the Spinozistic substance is [seen to be] the idea only as wholly abstract and not in its vitality. 110

There are many other particular propositions from Spinoza to which I could refer, but they are very formal in character and constantly repeat one and the same thing. In this vein he says that the actual being of the *mens humana* [human mind] is the idea of a singular, existing thing.[171] It certainly does include this characteristic, but that is only ˜one mode, one affection.˜[172] What is lacking

171. [*Ed.*] See *Ethics* II, prop. 11 (*Collected Works* 1:456; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:86; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:94); cf. *W* 15:395 (Ms?).

172. *Thus Lw; Gr reads:* one *modus affectionis. Pn reads:* one mode. *Sv reads:* one modification.

[*Ed.*] See *Ethics* II, prop. 9, and prop. 10, corol. (*Collected Works* 1:453–454; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:84–85; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:91–93).

is the infinite form, which we can call knowing, freedom, spirituality. [173]To set up a system of form and | to grasp how the One 111
is organized within itself as Bruno did—that is a task Spinoza renounced.

Spinozism is said to be atheism.[174] This is correct in one respect at any rate, since Spinoza does not distinguish God from the world or from nature. He says that God is all actuality, but all actuality insofar as the idea of God explicates itself in particular fashion, for instance, in the existence of the human spirit. So it can be said that this is atheism, and that is said insofar as Spinoza does not distinguish God from the finite, from the world, from nature. We have already noted ˜that in any case the Spinozistic substance does not fulfill the concept of God,˜[175] since God has to be grasped as spirit. But if one wants to call Spinozism atheism for the sole reason that it does not distinguish God from the world, this is a misuse of the term; it could better be called acosmism, because all natural things are only modifications. Spinoza himself maintains that there is no such thing as what is called a world, that it is only a ˜form of God and is nothing in and for itself, that the world has no genuine actuality.˜[176] [But today] what continually intrudes is the mistaken view

173. *Thus An; precedes in Gr:* I have already indicated that Lull and Bruno attempted

[*Ed.*] On Bruno, see p. 000 with n. 169 above. In *W* 15:408 Hegel also refers in this connection to Raymon Lull; see also p. 000 above.

174. [*Ed.*] This assertion is found, for instance, in Christian Wolff's *Theologia naturalis,* pars posterior, § 716. Hegel knew the assertion principally through Jacobi, who in both his *Spinoza-Briefe,* p. 223 (*Werke* 4, pt. 1:216 and note) and his preface to the *Werke* (pp. xxxvi–xxxvii) stated categorically that Spinozism is atheism. In the explanation that follows directly in our text, Hegel is probably not referring to a specific passage but reproducing the sense of arguments advanced at various places in the *Ethics.* See in particular I, prop. 14 with corol. 1, and II, prop. 11, corol. (*Collected Works* 1:420, 456; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:46, 87; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:56, 94–95).

175. *Thus Gr; Pn reads:* that surely the Spinozistic substance does not involve cognitive knowledge of the concept of God,

176. *Thus Gr; An reads:* transient phenomenon.

[*Ed.*] Use of the term "acosmism" for Spinoza's philosophy and in opposition to the charge of atheism may be traced back to Salomon Maimon's autobiography, *Lebensgeschichte,* ed. K. P. Moritz, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1792). The philosopher Salomon Maimon (d. 1800) affirms that Spinozism and atheism are diametrically opposed, the latter denying the existence of God while the former denies the existence of the

that singular things are genuine actualities just as they are in their finitude. The reproach that Spinoza does not distinguish God from the finite is therefore of no account, since Spinoza casts all this [finite being] into the abyss of the One Identity. According to him, finite actuality (the cosmos) has no truth; what is, is God and God alone. Thus Spinozism is far removed from being atheism in the ordinary sense, although his system could well be termed atheism in the sense that God is not grasped as spirit. ˜But there are many others, even theologians, who say God is the unknown, and speak of God only as the almighty | and highest being, and the like.˜[177] 112
They are worse atheists than Spinoza, for they accord the status of what is true to the finite as such.

We still have to speak about Spinoza's system of morals. His principal work is the *Ethics.* Its main principle is simply that the finite spirit has its truth in the moral sphere, and is therefore moral, when it directs its knowing and willing toward God—to the extent that it has true ideas. This alone is the knowledge of God. So we can say that there is no more sublime morality than this, since it

world, and that therefore Spinozism should be called the "acosmic" system (1:154). Alternatively, Hegel may have encountered this interpretation of Spinozism in Christoph Theophil de Murr's *Adnotationes* on the *Theologico-political Treatise* (The Hague, 1802), which Hegel studied during his collaboration, in summer 1802, on the Paulus edition of Spinoza's *Opera* (cf. the editorial report to *GW* 5). In adopting the concept of acosmism here—as well as in *W* 15:404, 408, in the *Philosophy of Religion* (1:377), and in the 1827 and 1830 editions of the *Encyclopedia* (§§ 50 and 573, notes)—Hegel is at odds with Jacobi, who contended (in 1818–1819) that the distinction between atheism and acosmism is "basically only a play on words" (Jacobi, *Werke* 4, pt. 1:xxxiv–xxxv). The assertion that the world is only a form of God and has no genuine actuality is not found in Spinoza. Hegel is rather educing what seems to him to follow from Spinoza's basic viewpoint, in light of the commentators' discussion of acosmism.

177. *Thus Gr with An; Pn reads:* But then matters are no different [with] many philosophies and modes of theology, where God is not grasped as spirit.

[*Ed.*] Hegel's general criticism is directed against (1) Enlightenment—and especially eighteenth-century French—philosophy (see *W* 15:521 on Robinet's talk of "an unknown God"); (2) deism and "natural theology" (such as that of Herbert of Cherbury), which affirms the knowability of God but conceives God only as "necessary being" or "most perfect being"; (3) the critique of the knowability of God, by Kant, Jacobi, and their philosophical and theological disciples. Designation of God as "highest being" (*Wesen*) is also found, inter alia, in Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* (Berlin, 1821), §§ 9–10.

requires only the having of a clear idea of God. The works of the righteous, that is, of those who have a clear idea of God, are, he says, that they direct all their thoughts and actions to the God whom they know. The wicked are those who do not have this idea and are directed solely to earthly things, who act according to singular and personal interests and opinions. Everything that is proceeds necessarily from God's eternal laws and counsels, and the truth, which is genuine cognitive knowledge, consists in considering everything *sub specie aeterni* [in its eternal aspect].[178] The necessity of things is the eternal will of God. The affections are what constitute human slavery, because in them human beings only have something determinate as end. Spirit has the ability to refer all corporeal affects and all representations of corporeal things back to God, for whatever is, is in God, and nothing is apart from God. In this way human beings gain power over their affects.[179] This is the return of spirit to God, and that is genuine human freedom.[180]

178. [*Ed.*] Most of the content of the three preceding sentences is not in fact taken from the *Ethics* but from Spinoza's Letter 36, to van Blyenbergh (*Chief Works* 2:347–348; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 1:582; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 4:148–149 = Letter 23). The reference to *sub specie aeterni,* however, comes from *Ethics* II, prop. 44, corol. 2; see also IV, prop. 62, and V, prop. 29 (*Collected Works* 1:481, 581, 609–610; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:118, 250, 288–289; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:126, 257, 298–299). For the following remark, on the necessity of things, see *Ethics* I, prop. 33, schol. 2 (*Collected Works* 1:436–437; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:65–66; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:74–75).

179. [*Ed.*] Spinoza's *Ethics* IV deals with human bondage to the affects, with the inability to moderate and restrain them. (Our text uses both "affects" [*Affekte*] and "affections" [*Affektionen*].) On the connection of the affects with the desiring of individual finite things, see *Ethics* III, prop. 56, dem. (*Collected Works* 1:527; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:178; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:185), as well as the preceding note. On referring corporeal affections back to God, see *Ethics* V, prop. 14 (*Collected Works* 1:603; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:280; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:290); cf. *W* 15:404 (Ms?). On the being in God of whatever is, see *Ethics* I, prop. 15 (*Collected Works* 1:420; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:46; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:56). On power over one's affects, see *Ethics* V, prop. 6 (*Collected Works* 1:599; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:275; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:284); cf. *W* 15:404 (Ms?).

180. [*Ed.*] In this connection Spinoza does not refer explicitly to a "return to God." However, see *Ethics* IV, prop. 66, schol., which calls those who are guided solely by affect "slaves" and those who are guided by reason "free" (*Collected Works* 1:584; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:254; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:260).

These ideas are true insofar as they are related to God.[181] From this cognition, from knowledge of the One, of what is true, springs the intellectual love of God—a joyfulness that at the same time includes the representation of its cause, and this cause is God. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love, for God can have only himself as end and cause, | and the vocation of the subjective spirit 113
is to direct itself to God.[182] This then is the highest and greatest morality; but [it] remains still [caught up] in this [abstract] universality.

4. Nicolas Malebranche

We have to mention another form that can be set alongside Spinozism. It too is a development of Cartesian philosophy—the form in which Malebranche presented this philosophy. Because [unlike Spinoza] he presented it in theological form, Malebranche was not reproached with atheism.

Malebranche was born in Paris in 1638.[183] He was sickly and deformed in body, ˜and was therefore brought up with very delicate care. He was˜[184] shy and loved solitude. In his twenty-second year he was accepted into the Congrégation de l'Oratoire, a kind of spiritual order, and devoted himself to the sciences. He happened to see in a bookseller's shop a work by Descartes that so interested him that his heart beat faster and he was seized by a compelling

181. *Gr adds:* This then is not philosophical cognition.

[*Ed.*] See *Ethics* II, prop. 32 (*Collected Works* 1:472; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:107; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:116); cf. *W* 15:404 (Ms?).

182. [*Ed.*] On the intellectual love of God, see *Ethics* V, prop. 32, corol. (*Collected Works* 1:611; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:291; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:300); cf. *W* 15:405 (Ms?). On God's self-love, see *Ethics* V, prop. 35 (*Collected Works* 1:612; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:292; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:302), although Spinoza does not say here that God can have only himself as end. On the subjective spirit's vocation, see *Ethics* V, prop. 36, schol., and IV, prop. 28 (*Collected Works* 1:612, 559; *Opera,* ed. Paulus, 2:293, 221; *Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, 2:303, 228), as well as n. 178 just above.

183. [*Ed.*] Hegel's account of Malebranche's life in this paragraph is taken from Buhle (*Geschichte* 3, pt. 2:430–431), although it omits the derogatory undertones ("a well-nigh exaggerated piety") found there. The work by Descartes that so affected Malebranche was the *Treatise on Man.*

184. *Thus W; An reads:* delicate,