Not Episode 69: PEL Players Full Cast Audiobook of Plato’s “Gorgias” (part 1)

0:07 Mark: Hey, what's that funny music? This is not the Partially Examined Life. Rather, it's not our regular podcast. If you look adjacent to this entry on the Partially Examined Life podcast feed, in your itunes, web browser or other device, you will find one of our typical discussions of Plato's dialogue, the Gorgias. What you're listening to now is a supplement to that episode, which. Which is the Gorgias itself. Or rather, in this file, you'll only hear the first half of it. The second half we've reserved for those of you who sign up for a Partially Examined Life citizen membership.

In fact, this entire Gorgias recording was created to provide content for members, but it was so fun and came out so well that we really wanted to share quite a good chunk of it with the larger populace. You can become a PEL member for a mere $5 a month. There's no minimum subscription length, and of course, we also accept donations. The copyright for the translations obtained by the publisher. Now, I want you to sit back and imagine. Imagine yourself present on a Skype call with some Partially Examined Life podcasters and listeners reading the Gorgias.

Right. This is a Partially Examined Life players presentation. This is Mark. I'm going to play Socrates.

1:16 Dylan: This is Dylan. I'll be playing Calicles.

1:19 Unknown speaker: I'm Eileen playing Chaerephon.

This is Evan. I'll be playing Polas.

1:24 Seth: This is Seth, and I'm playing Gorgias.

1:26 Mark: Okay.

1:27 Dylan: And we're doing the Cooper. The one that's in the Cooper. It's not by Cooper.

1:31 Unknown speaker: Right?

1:31 Dylan: It's Donald J.

1:34 Unknown speaker: Zeal Ziel.

1:35 Mark: There's D Y L Zyl, or Zeal Zyl from 1959.

1:41 Dylan: And we're not reading the names, we're just speaking our parts, right?

1:44 Mark: Yes, go ahead.

1:46 Dylan: This, they say, is how you're supposed to do your part in a war or battle. Socrates.

1:51 Mark: Oh, did we arrive when the feast was over, as the saying goes? Are we late?

1:55 Dylan: Yes, and a very urbane one it was. Gorgias gave us an admirable, varied presentation just a short while ago.

2:03 Mark: But that's Chaerephon's fault, Callicles. He kept us loitering about in the marketplace.

2:07 Unknown speaker: That's no problem, Socrates. I'll make up for it too. Gorgias is a friend of mine, so he'll give us a presentation now, if you see fit. Or else some other time, if you like.

2:18 Dylan: What's this, Chaerephon? Is Socrates eager to hear Gorgias?

2:22 Unknown speaker: Yes, that's the very thing we're here for.

2:24 Dylan: Well, then, come to my House any time you like. Gorgias is staying with me and will give you a presentation there.

2:31 Mark: Very good, Callicles. But would he be willing to have a discussion with us? I'd like to find out from the man what his craft can accomplish and what it is that he both makes claims about and teaches. As for the other thing, the presentation, let him put that on another time. As you suggest.

2:45 Dylan: There's nothing like asking him, Socrates. This was in fact one part of his presentation. Just now he invited those inside to ask him any question they liked, and he said that he'd answer them all.

2:56 Mark: An excellent idea. Ask him, Chaerephon.

2:58 Unknown speaker: Ask him what?

2:59 Mark: What he is.

3:00 Unknown speaker: What do you mean?

3:01 Mark: Well, if you're a maker of shoes, he'd answer that he was a cobbler, wouldn't he? Or don't you see what I mean?

3:06 Unknown speaker: I do. I'll ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles, right in saying that you make claims about answering any question anyone might put to you?

3:15 Seth: He is, Chaerephon. In fact, I just now made that very claim, and I say that no one has asked me anything new in many a year.

3:22 Unknown speaker: In that case, I'm sure you'll answer this one quite easily, Gorgias.

3:25 Seth: Here's your chance to try me, Chaerephon.

3:28 Unknown speaker: By Zeus, Chaerephon. Try me if you like. I think Gorgias is quite worn out. He's only just now finished a long discourse.

Really, Polus, do you think you'd give more admirable answers than Gorgias?

What does it matter, as long as they're good enough for you?

Nothing at all. You answer us then, since that's what you want.

Ask your questions.

I will suppose that Gorgias were knowledgeable in his brother Herodicus Craft. What would be the right name for us to call him by then? Isn't it the same one as his brothers?

Yes, it is.

So we'd be right in saying that he's a doctor.

Yes.

And if he were experienced in the craft of Aristophan, the son of Aglophon or his brother, what would be the correct thing to call him?

A painter, obviously.

Now then, since he's knowledgeable in a craft, what is it, and what would be the correct thing to call him?

Many among men are the crafts experientially devised by experience, Chaerephon. Yes. It is experience that causes our times to march along the way of craft, whereas inexperience causes them to march along the way of chance. Of these various crafts, various men partake in various ways. The Best men partaking of the best of them. Our Gorgias is indeed in this group. He partakes of the most admirable of the crafts.

4:42 Mark: Polus certainly appears to have prepared himself admirably for giving speeches, Gorgias. But he's not doing what he promised Chaerephon.

4:48 Seth: How exactly is he, Socrates?

4:51 Mark: He hardly seems to be answering the question.

4:53 Seth: Why don't you question him then, if you like?

4:56 Mark: No, I won't. Not as long as you yourself may want to answer. I'd much rather ask you. It's clear to me, especially from what he has said, that Polus has devoted himself more to what is called oratory than to discussion.

5:06 Unknown speaker: Why do you say that, Socrates?

5:08 Mark: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asks you what craft Gorgias is knowledgeable in, you sing its praises as though someone were discrediting it, but you haven't answered what it is.

5:17 Unknown speaker: Didn't I answer that it was the most admirable one?

5:20 Mark: Very much so. No one, however, asked you what Gorgias craft is like, but what craft it is. And one ought to call Gorgias. So, just as when Chaerephon put his earlier questions to you, and you answered him in such an admirably brief way, tell us now, in that way too, what his craft is and what we're supposed to call Gorgias, or rather, Gorgias, why don't you tell us yourself what the craft you're knowledgeable in is, and hence what we're supposed to call you.

5:43 Seth: It's oratory, Socrates.

5:45 Mark: So we're supposed to call you an orator?

5:47 Seth: Yes, and a good one, Socrates, if you really want to call me what I boast myself to be, as Homer puts it.

5:54 Mark: Of course I do.

5:55 Seth: Call me that then.

5:57 Mark: Aren't we supposed to say that you're capable of making others orators too?

6:00 Seth: That's exactly the claim I make, not only here, but elsewhere too.

6:05 Mark: Well now, Gorgias, would you be willing to complete the discussion in the way we're having it right now, that of alternately asking questions and answering them, and to put aside for another time this long style of speech making, like the one Polus began with? Please don't go back on your promise, but be willing to give a brief answer to what you're asked.

6:21 Seth: There are some answers, Socrates, that must be given by way of long speeches. Even so, I will try to be as brief as possible. This too, in fact, is one of my claims. There's no one who can say the same things more briefly than I.

6:34 Mark: That's what we need Gorgias, do give me a presentation of this very thing, the short style of speech, and leave the long style for some other time.

6:42 Seth: Very well, I'll do that. You'll say you've never heard anyone make shorter speeches.

6:47 Mark: Come then, you can't claim to be knowledgeable in the craft of oratory and to be able to make someone else an orator too. With which of the things there are is oratory concerned? Weaving, for example, is concerned with the production of clothes, isn't it?

6:59 Seth: Yes.

7:00 Mark: And so too music is concerned with the composition of tunes. Yes, by Hera Gorgias, I do like your answers. They couldn't be shorter.

7:07 Seth: Yes, Socrates, I dare say I'm doing it quite nicely.

7:11 Mark: And so you are. Come and answer me then, that way, about oratory too, about which of the things there are is it knowledge about speeches? What sort of speeches, Gorgias? Those that explain how sick people should be treated to get well?

7:23 Seth: No.

7:23 Mark: So oratory isn't concerned with all speeches?

7:26 Seth: Oh no.

7:27 Mark: But it does make people capable of speaking?

7:29 Seth: Yes.

7:30 Mark: And also to be wise in what they're speaking about?

7:32 Seth: Of course.

7:34 Mark: Now, does the medical craft, the one we were talking about just now, make people able both to have wisdom about and.

7:39 Seth: And to speak about the sick necessarily.

7:42 Mark: This craft then is evidently concerned with speeches too. Yes, speeches about diseases, that is exactly. Isn't physical training also concerned with speeches? Speeches about good and bad physical condition?

7:54 Seth: Yes, it is.

7:55 Mark: In fact, Gorgias, the same is true of all other crafts too. Each of them is concerned with those speeches that are about the object of

8:00 Seth: the particular craft, apparently.

8:03 Mark: Then why don't you call the other crafts oratory, since you call any craft whatever that's concerned with speeches Oratory. They're concerned with speeches too.

8:10 Seth: The reason, Socrates, is that in the case of other crafts, the knowledge consists almost completely in working with your hands and activities of that sort. In the case of oratory, on the other hand, there isn't any such manual work. Its activity and influence depend entirely on speeches. That's the reason I consider the craft of oratory to be concerned with speeches, and I say that I'm right about this.

8:35 Mark: Not sure I understand what sort of craft you want to call it. I'll soon know more clearly. There are crafts for us to practice, aren't there? Yes, of all the crafts there are, I take it that there are those that consist for the most part of making things and that call for little speech, and some that call for none at all, ones whose task could be done even silently. Take painting for instance, or sculpture, or many others. When you say that oratory has nothing to do with other crafts, it's crafts of this sort that I think you're referring to. Or aren't you?

9:01 Seth: Yes, Socrates, you take my meaning very well.

9:04 Mark: And then there are other crafts, the ones that perform their whole task by means of speeches that call for practically no physical work besides, or very little of it. Take arithmetic or computation or geometry, even checkers, and many other crafts. Some of these involve speeches to just about the same degree as they do activity, while many involve speeches more. All their activity and influence depend entirely on speeches. I think that you mean that oratory is a craft of this sort of. True, but you certainly don't want to call any of these crafts oratory, do you? Even though, as you phrase it, oratory is the craft that exercises influence through speech. Somebody might take you up if you wanted to make a fuss in an argument and say, so you're saying that arithmetic is oratory, are you, Gorgias? I'm sure, however, that you're not saying that either arithmetic or geometry is oratory.

9:45 Seth: Yes, you're quite correct, Socrates. You take my meaning rightly.

9:49 Mark: Come on, then, please complete your answer in the terms of my question. Since, since oratory is one of those crafts which mostly uses speech, and since there are also others of that sort, try to say what it is that oratory which exercises its influence through speeches is about. Imagine someone asking me about any of the crafts I mentioned just now. Socrates, what is the craft of arithmetic? I tell him, just as you told me, that it's one of those that exercise their influence by means of speech. And if he continued, what are they crafts about?

I'd say that they're about even and odd, however many of each there might be. If he then asked, what is the craft you call computation? I'd say that this one too is one of those that exercise their influence entirely by speech. And if he then continued, what is it about? I'd answer in the style of those who draw motions in the assembly, that in other respects computation is like arithmetic, for it's about the same thing even and odd, yet it differs from arithmetic insofar as computation examines the quantity of odd and even, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.

If someone asked about astronomy, and I replied that it too exercises its influence by means of speech, then if he asked, what are the speeches of astronomy about, Socrates? I'd say they're about the motions of the stars, the sun and the moon, and their relative velocities and you'd be

10:56 Seth: quite right in saying so, Socrates.

10:59 Mark: Come Gorgias, you take your turn for oratory is in fact one of those crafts that carry out and exercise their influence entirely by speech, isn't it?

11:06 Seth: That's right.

11:07 Mark: Tell us then, what are they crafts about? Of the things there are which is the one that these speeches use? By oratory concerned with the greatest of

11:15 Seth: human concerns, Socrates, and the best.

11:18 Mark: But that statement too is debatable, Gorgias. It isn't at all clear yet either I'm sure you've heard people at drinking parties singing that song in which they count out as they sing that to enjoy good health is the best thing Second is to have turned out good looking and third, so the writer of the song puts it, is to be honestly rich.

11:34 Seth: Yes, I've heard it. Why do you mention it?

11:37 Mark: Suppose the producer of the things the songwriter praised, we're here with you right now a doctor, a physical trainer and a financial expert. Suppose at first the doctor said, socrates, Gorgias is telling you a lie it isn't his craft that is concerned with the greatest good for humankind but mine. If I then asked him, what are you to say that I suppose he'd say that he's a doctor what's this you're saying? Is the product of your craft really the greatest good? Of course, Socrates, I suppose he'd say, seeing that its product is health, what greater good for humankind is there than health?

And suppose that next in his turn, the trainer said, I too would be amazed, Socrates, if Gorgias could present you with a greater good derived from his craft than the one I would provide from mine. I'd ask this man too, what are you, sir, and what's your product? I'm a physical trainer, he'd say, and my product is making people physically good looking and strong and following the trainer, the financial expert would say, I'm sure with an air of considerable scorn for all. Do consider, Socrates, whether you know of any good, Gorgias's or anyone else's that's a greater good than wealth?

We'd say to him really? Is that what you produce? He'd say yes as what? As a financial expert? Well, we'd say is wealth in your judgment the greatest good for humankind? Of course he'll say ah, but Gorgias here disputes that he claims that his craft is the source of a good that's greater than yours? We'd say it's obvious what questions he'd ask next and what is this Good. Please let Gorgias answer me that. So, come on, Gorgias, consider yourself questioned by both of these men and myself, and give us your answer. What is this thing that you claim is the greatest good for humankind?

A thing that you claim to be a producer of?

13:06 Seth: The thing that is in actual fact the greatest good, Socrates, it is the source of freedom for humankind itself, and at the same time, it is for each person the source of rule over others in one's own city.

13:18 Mark: And what is this thing you are referring to?

13:20 Seth: I'm referring to the ability to persuade by speeches, judges in a law court, counselors in a council meeting, an assemblyman in an assembly, or in any other political gathering that might take place. In point of fact, with this ability you'll have the doctor for your slave and the physical trainer too. As for this financial expert of yours, he'll turn out to be making more money for somebody else instead of himself for you. In fact, if you've got the ability to speak and persuade the crowds.

13:49 Mark: Now, I think you've come closest to making clear what craft you take oratory to be. Gorgias, if I follow you at all, you're saying that oratory is a producer of persuasion. Its whole business comes to that, and that's the long and short of it. Or can you mention anything else oratory can do besides instilling persuasion in the souls of an audience?

14:06 Seth: Not at all, Socrates. I think you're defying it quite adequately. That is indeed the long and the short of it.

14:13 Mark: Listen there, Gorgias, you should know that I'm convinced that I'm one of the people who, in a discussion with someone else, really want to have knowledge of the subject the discussion's about. And I consider you one of them too.

14:23 Seth: Well, what's the point?

14:24 Mark: Socrates, let me tell you now, you can know for sure that I don't know what this persuasion derived from oratory that you're talking about is, or what subjects it's persuasion about. Even though I do have my suspicions about which persuasion I think you mean and what it's about, I'll still ask you just the same what you say this persuasion produced by oratory is and what it's about. And why, when I have my suspicions, do I ask you and refrain from expressing them myself? It's not you I'm after, it's our discussion. To have it proceed in such a way as to make the thing we're talking about most clear to us. Consider then, whether you think I'm being fair in resuming my questions to you, suppose I were to ask you which of the painters Zeuxis is? If you told me that he's the one who paints pictures, wouldn't it be fair for me to ask of what sorts of pictures is he the painter and wear?

15:06 Seth: Yes, it would.

15:07 Mark: And isn't the reason for this fact that there are other painters too who paint many other pictures? Yes, but if no one besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer would have been a good one?

15:17 Seth: Of course.

15:18 Mark: Come then and tell me about oratory. Do you think that oratory alone instils persuasion, or do other crafts do so too? This is the sort of thing I mean, Does a person who teaches some subject or other persuade people about what he's teaching or not?

15:31 Seth: He certainly does, Socrates. He persuades most of all.

15:35 Mark: Let's talk once more about the same crafts we were talking about just now. Doesn't arithmetic or the arithmetician teach us everything that pertains to number?

15:42 Seth: Yes, he does.

15:43 Mark: And he also persuades.

15:45 Seth: Yes.

15:46 Mark: So arithmetic is also a producer of persuasion?

15:50 Seth: Apparently.

15:51 Mark: Now if someone asks us what sort of persuasion it produces and what it's persuasion about, I suppose we'd answer him that it's the persuasion through teaching about the extent of even an odd, we'll be able to show that all the other crafts we are just now talking about are producers of persuasion as well as what the persuasion is and what it's about. Isn't that right?

16:08 Seth: Yes.

16:09 Mark: So oratory isn't the only producer of persuasion.

16:12 Seth: That's true.

16:13 Mark: In that case, since it's not the only one to produce this product, but other crafts do it too. We do write to repeat to our speaker the question we put next in the case of the painter of what sort of persuasion is oratory a craft, and what is its persuasion about? Or don't you think that is right to repeat that question?

16:29 Seth: Yes, I do.

16:31 Mark: Well then, Gorgias, since you think so too, please answer.

16:34 Seth: The persuasion, I mean, Socrates, is the kind that takes place in law courts and in those other large gatherings at as I was saying a moment ago, and it's concerned with those matters that are just and unjust.

16:48 Mark: Yes, Gorgias, I suspected that this was the persuasion you meant, that these are the matters it's persuasion about. But so you won't be surprised if in a moment I ask you again another question like this about what seems to be clear. And yet I go on with my questioning. As I say, I'm asking questions so that we can conduct an orderly discussion. It's not you I'm after. It's prevent our getting in the habit of second guessing and snatching each other's statements away ahead of time is to allow you to work out your assumption in any way you want to.

17:14 Seth: Yes, I think you're quite right to do this, Socrates.

17:17 Mark: Come then, and let's examine this point. Is there something you call to have learned?

17:21 Seth: There is.

17:22 Mark: Very well. And also something you call to be convinced?

17:26 Seth: Yes, there is.

17:28 Mark: Now, do you think that to have learned and learning are the same as to be convinced and conviction or different?

17:33 Seth: I certainly suppose that they're different, Socrates.

17:36 Mark: You suppose rightly. This is how you can tell if someone asked you, is there such a thing as true and false conviction? Gorgias, you'd say yes, I'm sure.

17:43 Seth: Yes.

17:44 Mark: Well, now, is there such a thing as true and false knowledge?

17:47 Seth: Not at all.

17:49 Mark: So it's clear that they're not the same.

17:50 Seth: That's true.

17:52 Mark: But surely both those who have learned and those who are convinced have come to be persuaded.

17:56 Seth: That's right.

17:58 Mark: Would you like us then to posit two types of persuasion? One providing conviction without knowledge, the other providing knowledge?

18:04 Seth: Yes, I would.

18:05 Mark: Now, which type of persuasion does oratory produce in law courts and other gatherings concerning things that are just and unjust? The one that results in being convinced without knowing, or the one that results in knowing?

18:15 Seth: It's obvious surely that it's the one that results in conviction.

18:20 Mark: So evidently oratory produces the persuasion that comes from being convinced and not the persuasion that comes from teaching concerning what's just and unjust. Yes, and so an orator is not a teacher of law courts and other gatherings about things that are just and unjust either, but merely a persuader. For I don't suppose that he could teach such a large gathering about matters so important in such a short time.

18:40 Seth: No, he certainly couldn't.

18:42 Mark: Well, now let's see what we're really saying about oratory. For mind you, even I myself can't get clear yet about what I'm saying. When the city holds a meeting to appoint doctors or shipbuilders or some other variety of craftsmen, that's surely not the time when the orator will give advice, is it? For obviously it's the most accomplished craftsman who should be appointed in each case. Nor will the orator be the one to give advice at a meeting that concerns the building of walls or the equipping of harbors or dockyards. But the master builders will be ones.

And when there is a deliberation about the appointment of generals or an arrangement of troops against the enemy or an occupation of territory? It is not the orators, but the generals who give advice. Then what do you say about such cases, Gorgias? Since you yourself claim both to be an orator and to make others orators, will do well to find out from you the characteristics of your craft. You must think of me now as eager to serve your interests too. Perhaps there is actually someone inside me who wants to become your pupil. I notice some, in fact, a good many, and they may well be embarrassed to question you.

So while you are being questioned by me, consider yourself being questioned by them as well. What will we get if we associate with you, Gorgias? What will we be able to advise the city on? Only about what's just and unjust, or about the things Socrates was mentioning just now? Try to answer them.

19:48 Seth: Well, Socrates, I'll try to reveal to you clearly everything oratory can accomplish. You yourself led the way nicely, for you do know, don't you, that these dockyards and walls of the Athenians and the equipping of the harbor came about through the advice of Themistoc, and in some cases through that of Pericles, but not through that of craftsmen.

20:09 Mark: That's what they say about Themistocles, Gorgias. I myself heard Pericles when he advised us on the middle wall.

20:15 Seth: And whenever those craftsmen you were just now speaking of are appointed, Socrates, you see that the orators are the ones who give advice and whose views on the matters prevail.

20:24 Mark: Yes, Gorgias, My amazement at that led me long ago to ask what it is that oratory can accomplish. For as I look at it, it seems to me to be something supernatural in scope.

20:33 Seth: Oh yes, Socrates, if only you knew all of it, that it encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be accomplished. And I'll give you ample proof. Many a time I've gone with my brother or with other doctors to call on some sick person who refuses to take his medicine or allow the doctor to perform surgery or cauterization on him. And when the doctor failed to persuade him, I succeeded by means of no other craft than oratory. And I maintain too, that if an orator and a doctor came to any city, anywhere you like, and had to compete in speaking in the assembly or in some other gathering over which of them should be appointed doctor, the doctor wouldn't make any showing at all, but the one who had the ability to speak would be appointed if he so wished.

And if he were to compete with any other craftsman whatever the orator more than anyone else would persuade them that they should appoint him. For there isn't anything that the orator couldn't speak more persuasively about to a gathering than than could any other craftsman whatever. That's how great the accomplishment of this craft is, and the sort of accomplishment it is. One should, however, use oratory like any other competitive skill. Socrates in other cases too, one ought not to use a competitive skill against any and everybody just because he has learned boxing, or boxing and wrestling combined, or fighting in armor, so as to make himself be superior to his friends as well as his enemies.

There's no reason to strike, stab, or kill one's own friends. Imagine someone who, after attending wrestling school, getting his body into good shape and becoming a boxer, went on to strike his father and mother or any other family member or friend. By Zeus, that's no reason to hate physical trainers and people who teach fighting in armor, and to exile them from their cities. For while these people imparted their skills to be used justly against enemies and wrongdoers, and in defense, not aggression, their pupils pervert their strength and skill and misuse them.

So it's not their teachers who are wicked, nor does that make the craft guilty or wicked. Those who misuse it surely are the wicked ones. And the same is true for oratory as well. The orator has the ability to speak against everyone on every subject, so as in gatherings, to be more persuasive, in short, about anything he likes. But the fact that he has the ability to rob doctors or other craftsmen of their reputations doesn't give him any more of a reason to do it. He should use oratory justly, as he would any competitive skill. And I suppose that if a person who has become an orator goes on with this ability and this craft to commit wrongdoing, we shouldn't hate his teacher and exile him from our cities.

For while the teacher imparted it to be used justly, the pupil is making the opposite use of it. So it's the misuser whom it's just to hate and exile are put to death, not the teacher.

23:22 Mark: Gorgias, I take it that you, like me, have experienced many discussions and that you've observed this sort of thing about them. It's not easy for the participants to define jointly what they're undertaking to discuss, and so, having learned from and taught each other to conclude their session. Instead, if they're disputing some point and one maintains that the other isn't right or isn't clear, they get irritated each Thinking the other is speaking out of spite, they become eager to win, instead of investigating the subject under discussion. In fact, in the end, some have a most shameful parting of the ways, abuse heaped upon them, having given and gotten to hear such things that make even the bystanders upset with themselves for having thought it worth while to come and listen to such people.

What's my point in saying this? It's that I think you're now saying things that aren't very consistent or compatible with what you were first saying about oratory. So I'm afraid to pursue my examination with you for fear that you should take me to be speaking with eagerness to win against you, rather than to have our subject become clear. For my part, I would be pleased to continue questioning you if you are the same kind of man I am, otherwise I would drop it. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I say anything untrue.

And who would be pleased to refute anyone who says anything untrue. One who, however, wouldn't be any less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I count being refuted a greater good, in so far as it is a greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is than to deliver someone else from it. I don't suppose that there's anything quite so bad for a person as having false beliefs about the things we're discussing right now. So if you say that you're this kind of man too, let's continue the discussion. But if you think we should drop it, let's be done with it and break it off.

24:50 Seth: Oh, yes, Socrates, I say that I myself too am the sort of person you describe. Still, perhaps we should keep in mind the people who are present here too, for quite a while ago now, even before you came, I gave them a long presentation, and perhaps will stretch things out too long if we continue the discussion. We should think about them too, so as not to keep any of them who want to do something else.

25:13 Unknown speaker: You yourselves hear the commotion these men are making, Gorgias and Socrates. They want to hear anything you have to say. And as for myself, I hope I'll never be so busy that I'd forgo discussions such as this conducted in the way this one is, because I find it more practical to do something else.

25:31 Dylan: By the gods, Corophon. As a matter of fact, I too, though I've been present in many a discussion before now, don't know if I've ever been so pleased as I am at the moment. So if you're willing to discuss, even if it's all day long, you'll be gratifying me.

25:46 Mark: For my part, there's nothing stopping me. Callicles, as long as Gorgias is willing,

25:51 Seth: it'll be to my shame ever after. Socrates, if I weren't willing, when I myself have made the claim that anyone may ask me anything he wants. Alright, if it suits these people, carry on with the discussion and ask what you want.

26:05 Mark: Well then, Gorgias, let me tell you what surprises me in the things you've said. It may be that what you've said was correct and that I'm not taking your meaning correctly. You say that you're able to make an orator out of anyone who wants to study with you.

26:17 Seth: Yes.

26:18 Mark: So that he'll be persuasive in a gathering about all subjects, not by teaching, but by persuading.

26:23 Seth: Yes, that's right.

26:25 Mark: You were saying just now, mind you, that the orator will be more persuasive even about health than a doctor is.

26:30 Seth: Yes, I was more persuasive in a gathering anyhow.

26:34 Mark: And doesn't in a gathering just mean among those who don't have knowledge? For among those who do have it, I don't suppose that he'll be more persuasive than the doctor.

26:42 Seth: That's true.

26:43 Mark: Now, if he'll be more persuasive than a doctor, doesn't he prove to be more persuasive than the one who has knowledge?

26:48 Seth: Yes, that's right.

26:50 Mark: Even though he's not a doctor, right?

26:51 Seth: Yes.

26:53 Mark: And a non doctor, I take it, isn't knowledgeable in the thing in which a doctor is knowledgeable?

26:57 Seth: That's obvious.

26:58 Mark: So when an orator is more persuasive than a doctor, a non knower will be more persuasive than a knower among non knowers, isn't this exactly what follows?

27:06 Seth: Yes, it is. At least in this case.

27:09 Mark: The same is true about the orator and oratory relative to the other crafts too. Then oratory doesn't need to have any knowledge of the state of their subject matters. It only needs to have discovered some device to produce persuasion in order to make itself appear to those who don't have knowledge, but that it knows more than those who actually do have it.

27:25 Seth: Well, Socrates, aren't things made very easy when you come off no worse than the craftsman, even though you haven't learned any other craft but this one?

27:32 Mark: Whether the orator does or does not come off worse than the others, because of this being so, we'll examine in a moment if it has any bearing on our argument. For now, let's consider this point. Is it the case that the orator is in the same position with respect to what's just and unjust, what's shameful and admirable, what's good and bad as he is, about what's healthy and about the subjects of the other crafts? Does he lack knowledge, that is, of what these are, of what is good or what is bad, of what is admirable, or what is shameful or just and unjust?

Does he employ devices to produce persuasion about them so that even though he doesn't know, he seems, among those who don't know either, to know more than someone who actually does know? Or is it necessary for him to know? And must the prospective student of oratory already be knowledgeable in these things before coming to you? And if he doesn't, will you, the oratory teacher, not teach him any of these things when he comes to you? For that's not your job? And will you make him seem, among most people, to have knowledge of such things when in fact he doesn't have it, and to seem good when in fact he isn't?

Or won't you be able to teach him oratory at all unless he knows the truth about these things to begin with? How do such matters as these stand? Gorgias? Yes, by Zeus, do give us your revelation and tell us what oratory can accomplish, just as you just now said you would.

28:42 Seth: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if he really doesn't have this knowledge, he'll learn these things from me as well.

28:48 Mark: Hold it there. You're right to say so. If you make someone an orator, it's necessary for him to know what's just and what's unjust, either beforehand or by learning from you afterwards.

28:58 Seth: Yes, it is.

28:59 Mark: Well, a man who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, isn't he?

29:02 Seth: Yes.

29:03 Mark: And a man who has learned music, a musician.

29:06 Seth: Yes.

29:07 Mark: And a man who has learned medicine a doctor. Isn't this so too? By the same reasoning with the other crafts, Isn't a man who has learned a particular subject the sort of man his knowledge makes him?

29:16 Seth: Yes, he is.

29:18 Mark: By this line of reasoning. Isn't a man who has learned what's just a just man too?

29:22 Seth: Yes, absolutely.

29:24 Mark: And a just man does just things, I take it?

29:26 Seth: Yes.

29:27 Mark: Now, isn't an orator necessarily just? Doesn't a just man necessarily want to do just things?

29:32 Seth: Apparently so.

29:34 Mark: Therefore an orator will never want to do what's unjust?

29:37 Seth: No, apparently not.

29:39 Mark: You remember saying a little earlier that we shouldn't complain against physical trainers or exile them from our cities if the boxer uses his boxing skill to do what's unjust, and that similarly, if an orator uses his oratorical skill unjustly, we shouldn't complain against his teacher or banish him from the city, but do so to the one who does what's unjust, the one who doesn't use his oratorical skill properly. Was that said or not?

30:00 Seth: Yes, it was.

30:01 Mark: But now it appears that this very man, the orator, would never have done what's unjust, doesn't it?

30:06 Seth: Yes, it does.

30:07 Mark: At the beginning of our discussion, Gorgias, it was said that oratory would be concerned with speeches, not those about even and odd, but those about what's just and unjust, right?

30:16 Seth: Yes.

30:16 Mark: Well, at the time you said that, I took it that oratory would never be an unjust thing, since it always makes its speeches about justice. But when a little later, you were saying that an orator could also use oratory unjustly, I was surprised and thought that your statements weren't consistent. And so I made that speech in which I said that if you, like me, think that being refuted is a profitable thing, it would be worth while to continue this discussion, but if you don't, to let it drop. But now, as you subsequently examine the question, you see for yourself too, that it's agreed that, quite to the contrary, the orator is incapable of using oratory unjustly and of being willing to do what's unjust by the dog, Gorgias, it'll take more than a short session to go through an adequate examination of how these matters stand.

30:55 Unknown speaker: Really, Socrates, Is what you're now saying about oratory what you actually think of it? Or do you really think, just because Gorgias was too ashamed not to concede your further claim that the orator also knows what's just, what's admirable and what's good, and that if he came to him without already having this knowledge to begin with, he said that he would teach him himself. And then from this admission, maybe some inconsistency crept into his statements, just the thing that gives you delight. You're the one who leads him on to face such questions. Who do you think would deny that he himself knows what's just and would teach others to lead your arguments to such an outcome is a sign of great rudeness.

31:32 Mark: Most admirable, Polis. It's not for nothing that we get ourselves companions and sons. It's so that when we ourselves have grown older and stumble, you younger men might be on hand to straighten our lives up again, both in what we do and what we say. And if Gorgias and I are stumbling now in what we say, well, you're on hand. Straighten us up again. That's only right. And if you think we were wrong to agree on it, I'm certainly willing to retract any of our agreements you like, provided that you're careful about just one thing.

31:57 Unknown speaker: What do you mean?

31:57 Mark: That you curb your long style of speech, Polus. The style you tried using at first.

32:01 Unknown speaker: Really? Won't I be free to say as much as I like?

32:05 Mark: You'd certainly be in a terrible way, my good friend, if upon coming to Athens, where there's more freedom of speech than anywhere else in Greece, you alone should miss out on it here. But look at it the other way. If you spoke at length and were unwilling to answer what you're asked, wouldn't I be in a terrible way if I'm not to have the freedom to stop listening to you and leave? But if you care at all about the discussion we've had and want to straighten it up, please retract whatever you think best. As I was saying just now, take your turn in asking and being asked questions the way Gorgias and I did, and subject me and yourself to refutation. You say, I take it that you know the same craft Gorgias knows, or don't you?

32:36 Unknown speaker: Yes, I do.

32:37 Mark: And don't you also invite people to ask you each time whatever they like because you believe you'll answer as one who has knowledge?

32:42 Unknown speaker: Certainly.

32:43 Mark: So now please do whichever of those you like, either ask questions or answer them.

32:47 Unknown speaker: Very well, I shall. Tell me, Socrates, since you think Gorgias is confused about oratory, what do you say it is?

32:54 Mark: Are you asking me what craft I say it is?

32:56 Unknown speaker: Yes, I am.

32:57 Mark: To tell you the truth, Polus, I don't think it's a craft at all.

33:00 Unknown speaker: Well, then, what do you think oratory is?

33:03 Mark: In the treatise that I read recently, it's the thing that you say has produced craft.

33:07 Unknown speaker: What do you mean?

33:08 Mark: I mean a knack.

33:09 Unknown speaker: So you think oratory is a knack?

33:11 Mark: Yes, I do. Unless you say it something else.

33:13 Unknown speaker: A knack for what?

33:15 Mark: For producing a certain gratification and pleasure.

33:18 Unknown speaker: Don't you think that oratory is an admirable thing then, to be able to give gratification to people?

33:23 Mark: Really, Polus, have you already discovered for me what I say it is so that you go on to ask me next whether I don't think it's admirable.

33:30 Unknown speaker: Haven't I discovered that? You say it's a knack.

33:33 Mark: Since you value gratification, would you like to gratify me on a small matter?

33:37 Unknown speaker: Certainly.

33:38 Mark: Ask me now what craft I think pastry baking is.

33:41 Unknown speaker: All right, I will. What craft is pastry baking?

33:44 Mark: It isn't one at all, Polus. Now say, what is it then? All right, it's a knack, say. A knack for what? Alright, for producing gratification and pleasure, Polus.

33:54 Unknown speaker: So oratory is the same thing as pastry baking?

33:57 Mark: Oh no, not at all. Although it is part of the same practice.

34:01 Unknown speaker: What practice do you mean?

34:03 Mark: I'm afraid it may be rather crude to speak the truth. I hesitate to do so for Gorgias sake, for fear that he may think I'm satirizing what he practices. I don't know whether this is the kind of oratory that Gorgias practices. In fact, in our discussion a while ago we didn't get it all clear on just what he thinks it is. But what I call oratory is part of some business that isn't admirable at all.

34:23 Seth: Which one's that, Socrates? Say it and don't spare my feelings.

34:27 Mark: Well then, Gorgias, I think there's a practice that's not craft like, but one that a mind given to making hunches takes to. A mind that's bold and naturally clever at dealing with people. I call it flattery. Basically, I think that the practice has many other parts as well, and pastry baking too is one of them. This part seems to be a craft, but in my account of it it isn't craft but a knack and a routine. I call oratory a part of this too, along with cosmetics and sophistry. These are four parts and they're directed to four objects. So if Politz wants to discover them, let him do so.

He hasn't discovered yet what sort of part of flattery I say oratory is. Instead, it's escaped him that I haven't answered the question yet. So he goes on to ask whether I don't consider it to be admirable. And I won't answer him whether I think it's admirable or shameful till I first tell what it is. That wouldn't be right, Polus. If, however, you want to discover this, ask me what sort of part of flattery I say oratory is, I shall

35:20 Unknown speaker: tell me what sort of part it is.

35:22 Mark: Would you understand my answer? By my reasoning, oratory is an image of a part of politics.

35:27 Unknown speaker: Well, are you saying that it's something admirable or shameful?

35:30 Mark: I'm saying that it's a shameful thing. I call bad things shameful. Since I must answer you as though you already know what I mean.

35:36 Seth: By Zeus, Socrates, I myself don't understand what you mean either.

35:40 Mark: Reasonably enough, Gorgias. I'm not saying anything clear yet. The cult here is youthful and impulsive.

35:46 Seth: Never mind him. Please tell me what you mean by saying that oratory is an image of a part of politics.

35:52 Mark: All right, I'll try to describe my view of oratory. This isn't what it actually is. Polus here will refute me. There is, I take it, something you call body and something you call soul.

36:02 Seth: Yes, of course.

36:03 Mark: And do you also think there's a state of fitness for each of these?

36:06 Seth: Yes, I do.

36:08 Mark: Alright. Is there also an apparent state of fitness, one that isn't real? The sort of thing I mean is this. There are many people who appear to be physically fit, and unless one is a doctor or one of the fitness experts, one wouldn't readily notice that they're not fit.

36:20 Seth: That's true.

36:22 Mark: I'm saying that this sort of thing exists in the case of both the body and the soul. A thing that makes the body and the soul seem fit, when in fact they aren't any the more so.

36:30 Seth: That's so.

36:31 Mark: Come then, and I'll show you more clearly what I'm saying, if I can. I'm saying that of this pair of subjects there are two crafts. The one for the soul I call politics, the one for the body, though it is one. I can't give you a name for offhand, but while the care of the body is a single craft, I'm saying that it has two gymnastics and medicine. And in politics the counterpart of gymnastics is legislation. The part that corresponds to medicine is justice. Each member of these pairs has features in common with the other. Medicine with gymnastics and justice with legislation, because they're concerned with the same thing.

They do, however, differ in some way from each other. These then are the four parts, and they always provide care in the one case for the body, in the other for the soul, with a view to what's best. Now, flattery takes notice of them, and I won't say by knowing, but only by guessing, divides itself into four masks itself with each of the parts, and then pretends to be the characters of the masks. It takes no thought at all of Whatever is best with the lure. At what's most pleasant at the moment, it sniffs out folly and hoodwinks it, so that it gives the impression of being the most deserving.

Pastry baking has put on the mask of medicine and pretends to know the foods that are best for the body, so that if a pastry baker and a doctor had to compete in front of children, or in front of men just as foolish as children, to determine which of the two, the doctor or the pastry baker had expert knowledge of good food and bad, the doctor would die of starvation. I call this flattery. And I say that such a thing is shameful. Polus, it's you I'm saying this to, because it guesses at what's pleasant with no consideration for what's best. And I say that it isn't a craft but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it's unable to state the cause of each thing.

And I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a craft. If you have any quarrel with these claims, I'm willing to submit them for discussion. So pastry baking, as I say, is the flattery that wears the mask of medicine. Cosmetics is the one that wears that of gymnastics. In the same way a mischievous, deceptive, disgraceful and ill bred thing, one that perpetuates deception by means of shaping and colouring, smoothing out and dressing up so as to make people assume an alien beauty and neglect their own, which comes through gymnastics.

For that I won't make a long style speech. I'm willing to put it to you the way that geometers do, for perhaps you follow me now that what cosmetics is the gymnastics, pastry baking is to medicine, or rather like this, what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and what pastry baking is to medicine, oratory is to justice. However, as I was just saying, although these activities are naturally distinct in this way, yet because they are so close, sophists and orators tend to be mixed together as people who work in the same area and concern themselves with the same things, they don't know what to do with themselves and other people don't know what to do with them.

In fact, if the soul didn't govern the body, but the body governed itself, and if pastry baking and medicine weren't kept under observation and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself made judgments about them, making its estimates by reference to the gratification it receives, then the world according to Anaxagoras would prevail Polus, my friend, you are familiar with these views. All things would be mixed together in the same place. And there would be no distinction between matters of medicine and health and matters of pastry baking. You've now heard what I say oratory is.

It's the counterpart in the soul to pastry baking. It's the counterpart in the body. Perhaps I've done an absurd thing. I wouldn't let you make long speeches, and here I've just completed a lengthy one myself. I deserve to be forgiven, though, for when I made my statements short, you didn't understand and didn't know how to deal with the answers I gave you. But you needed a narration. So if I don't know how to deal with your answers either, you must spin out a speech too. But if I do, just let me deal with them. That's only fair. And if you now know how to deal with my answers, please deal with it.

40:01 Unknown speaker: What is it you're saying then? You think oratory is flattery?

40:04 Mark: I said that it was part of flattery. Don't you remember? Polus, young as you are, what's to become of you?

40:09 Unknown speaker: So you think that good orators are held in low regard in their cities as flatterers?

40:14 Mark: Is this a question you're asking or some speech you're beginning?

40:17 Unknown speaker: I'm asking a question.

40:19 Mark: I don't think they're held in any regard at all.

40:21 Unknown speaker: What do you mean they're not held in any regard? Don't they have the greatest power in their cities?

40:26 Mark: No, if by having power you mean something that's good for the one who has the power.

40:31 Unknown speaker: That's just what I do mean.

40:32 Mark: In that case, I think orators have the least power of any in the city.

40:36 Unknown speaker: Really? Don't they like tyrants put to death anyone they want and confiscate the property and banish from their cities anyone they

40:43 Mark: see fit by the dog. Polus, I can't make out one way or the other with each thing you're saying. Whether you're saying these things for yourself and revealing your own view, or whether you're questioning me.

40:52 Unknown speaker: I'm questioning you.

40:54 Mark: Very well, my friend. In that case, are you asking me two questions at once?

40:57 Unknown speaker: What do you mean, two?

40:59 Mark: Weren't you just now saying something like, don't orators like tyrants put to death anyone they want? Don't they confiscate the property of anyone they see fit? And don't they banish them from their cities?

41:07 Unknown speaker: Yes, I was.

41:09 Mark: In that case, I say there are two questions, and I'LL answer you both of them. I say, Polus, that both orators and tyrants have the least power in their cities, as I was saying just now, for they do just about nothing they want to, though they certainly do whatever they see most fit to do.

41:22 Unknown speaker: Well, isn't this having great power?

41:25 Mark: No. At least Pola says it isn't.

41:27 Unknown speaker: I say it isn't. I certainly say it is.

41:30 Mark: You certainly don't, since you say that having great power is good for the one who has it.

41:34 Unknown speaker: Yes, I do say that.

41:36 Mark: You think it's good, then, if a person does whatever he sees most fit to do when he lacks intelligence. Do you call this having great power too?

41:43 Unknown speaker: No, I do not.

41:45 Mark: Will you refute me, then, and prove that orators do have intelligence, or that oratory is a craft and not flattery? If you leave me unrefuted, then the orators who do what they see fit in their cities, and tyrants too, won't have gained any good by this. Power is a good thing, you say, but you agree with me that doing what one sees fit without intelligence is bad, or don't you?

42:04 Unknown speaker: Yes, I do.

42:05 Mark: How then? Could it be that orators or tyrants have great power in their cities so long as Socrates is not refuted by polis to show that they do what they want? This fellow denies they do what they want. Go ahead and refute me.

42:16 Unknown speaker: Didn't you just now agree that they do what they see fit?

42:19 Mark: Yes, and I still do.

42:21 Unknown speaker: Don't they do what they want, then?

42:23 Mark: I say they don't, even though they

42:26 Unknown speaker: do what they see fit?

42:28 Mark: That's what I say.

42:29 Unknown speaker: What an outrageous thing to say, Socrates. Perfectly monstrous.

42:33 Mark: Don't attack me, my peerless polis, to address you in your own style. Instead, question me if you can, and prove that I'm wrong. Otherwise you must answer me.

42:40 Unknown speaker: All right, I'm willing to answer. To get some idea of what you're saying.

42:44 Mark: Do you think that when people do something, they want the thing they're doing at the time, or the thing for the sake of which they do what they're doing? You think that people who take medicine prescribed by their doctors, for instance, want what they're doing? The act of taking the medicine with all its discomfort? Or do they want to be healthy, the thing for the sake of which they're taking it?

43:01 Unknown speaker: Obviously they want their being healthy with

43:04 Mark: seafarers too, and those who make money in other ways. The thing they're doing at the time is not the thing they want. For who wants to make dangerous and troublesome sea voyages. What they want is their being wealthy, the thing for the sake of which, I suppose, they make their voyages, if for the sake of wealth they make them.

43:19 Unknown speaker: Yes, that's right.

43:20 Mark: Isn't it just the same in all cases? In fact, if a person does anything for the sake of something, he doesn't want this thing that he's doing, but the thing for the sake of which he's doing it, yes. Now, is there anything that isn't either good or bad, or what is between these neither good nor bad?

43:35 Unknown speaker: There can't be.

43:36 Mark: Socrates, you say that wisdom, health, wealth and the like are good and their opposites bad.

43:41 Unknown speaker: Yes, I do.

43:43 Mark: And by things which are neither good nor bad, you mean things which sometimes partake of what's good, sometimes of what's bad, and sometimes of neither, such as sitting or walking, running or making sea voyages, or stones and sticks and the like. Aren't these the ones that you mean, or are there others that you call things neither good nor bad?

43:59 Unknown speaker: No, these are the ones.

44:00 Mark: Now, whenever people do things, do they do these intermediate things for the sake of good ones, or the good things for the sake of the intermediate ones?

44:07 Unknown speaker: The intermediate things for the sake of the good ones, surely.

44:10 Mark: So it's because we pursue what's good that we walk. Whenever we walk, we suppose that it's better to walk, and conversely, whenever we stand still, we stand still for the sake of the same thing, what's good. Isn't that so?

44:21 Unknown speaker: Yes.

44:22 Mark: And don't we also put a person to death if we do or banish him and confiscate his property, because we suppose that doing these things is better for us than not doing them?

44:30 Unknown speaker: That's right.

44:31 Mark: Hence, it's for the sake of what's good that those who do all these things do them.

44:35 Unknown speaker: I agree.

44:36 Mark: Now, didn't we agree that we want not those things which we do for the sake of something, but that thing for the sake of which we do them?

44:43 Unknown speaker: Yes, very much so.

44:45 Mark: Hence, we don't simply want to slaughter people or exile them from their cities and confiscate their properties as such. We want to do these things if they are beneficial, but if they're harmful, we don't. For we want the things that are good, as you agree, and we don't want those things that are neither good nor bad. Nor those that are bad, Right? Do you think that what I'm saying is true, Polus, or don't you? Why don't you answer?

45:05 Unknown speaker: I think it's true.

45:06 Mark: Since we're in agreement about that then? If a person who's a tyrant or an orator puts somebody to death, or exiles him, or confiscates his property because he supposes that doing so is better for himself, when actually it's worse. This person, I take it, is doing what he sees fit, isn't he?

45:20 Unknown speaker: Yes.

45:21 Mark: And is he also doing what he wants if these things are actually bad? Why don't you answer?

45:26 Unknown speaker: Alright, I don't think he's doing what he wants.

45:28 Mark: Can such a man possibly have great power in that city? If in fact having great power is, as you agree, something good?

45:34 Unknown speaker: He cannot.

45:36 Mark: So what I was saying is true when I said that it is possible for a man who does in his city what he sees fit not to have great power, nor to be doing what he wants.

45:44 Unknown speaker: Really, Socrates? As if you wouldn't welcome being in a position to do what you see fit in the city, rather than not. As if you wouldn't be envious whenever you see anyone putting to death some person he saw fit, or confiscating his property, or tying him up justly, you mean, or unjustly, Whichever way he does it, isn't he to be envied either way?

46:03 Mark: Hush, Pallas.

46:05 Unknown speaker: What for?

46:06 Mark: Because you're not supposed to envy the unenviable or the miserable, you're supposed to pity them.

46:10 Unknown speaker: Really? Is this how you think it is with the people I'm talking about?

46:14 Mark: Of course.

46:15 Unknown speaker: So you think that a person who puts to death anyone he sees fit and does so justly is miserable and to be pitied?

46:21 Mark: No, I don't. But I don't think he's to be envied either.

46:25 Unknown speaker: Weren't you just now saying that he's miserable?

46:27 Mark: Yes. The one that'd put someone to death unjustly is. My friend needs to be pitied besides. But the one who does so justly isn't to be envied, surely?

46:35 Unknown speaker: The one who's put to death unjustly is the one who's both to be pitied and miserable.

46:39 Mark: Less so than the one putting him to death, Paulus, and less than the one who's justly put to death?

46:44 Unknown speaker: How can that be, Socrates?

46:46 Mark: It's because doing what's unjust is actually the worst thing there is.

46:49 Unknown speaker: Really? Is that the worst? Isn't suffering what's unjust still worse?

46:54 Mark: No, not in the least.

46:56 Unknown speaker: So you'd rather want to suffer what's unjust than do it?

46:59 Mark: For my part, I wouldn't want either. But if one had to be one or the other I would choose suffering over doing what's unjust.

47:05 Unknown speaker: You wouldn't welcome being a tyrant, then?

47:07 Mark: No. If by being a tyrant you mean what I do.

47:09 Unknown speaker: I mean just what I said a while ago. To be in a position to do whatever you see fit in the city, whether it's putting people to death or exiling them, or doing any and everything just as you see fit.

47:19 Mark: Well, my wonderful fellow, I'll put you a case and you criticize it. Imagine me in a crowded marketplace with a dagger up my sleeve, saying to you, paulus, I've just got myself some marvelous tyrannical power. So if I see fit to have any one of these people you see here put to death right on the spot to death he'll be put. If I see fit to have one of them have his head bashed in. Bashed in it will be right away. If I see fit to have his coat ripped apart. Ripped it will be. That's how great my power in the city is. Suppose you didn't believe me and I showed you the dagger.

On seeing it you'd be likely to say, but, Socrates, everybody could have great power that way. For this way any house you see fit might be burned down. And so might the dockyard and the triremes of the Athenians and all their ships, both public and private. But then, that's not what having great power is, doing what one sees fit. Or do you think it is?

48:04 Unknown speaker: No. At least not like that.

48:06 Mark: Can you then tell me what your reason is for objecting to this sort of power?

48:09 Unknown speaker: Yes, I can.

48:10 Mark: What is it? Tell me.

48:12 Unknown speaker: It's that the person who acts this way is necessarily punished.

48:16 Mark: And isn't being punished a bad thing?

48:18 Unknown speaker: Yes, it really is.

48:20 Mark: Well, then, my surprising fellow, here again you take the view that as long as acting as one sees fit coincides with acting beneficially, it is good. And this evidently is having great power. Otherwise it is a bad thing, and it is having little power. Let's consider this point. Do we agree that sometimes it's better to do those things we were just now talking about? Putting people to death and banishing them and confiscating their property? And at other times it isn't?

48:42 Unknown speaker: Yes, we do.

48:43 Mark: This point is evidently agreed upon by you and me both.

48:46 Unknown speaker: Yes.

48:47 Mark: When do you say that it's better to do these things? Then tell me where you draw the line.

48:51 Unknown speaker: Why don't you answer that question yourself, Socrates?

48:54 Mark: Well then, Pallas, if you find it more pleasing to listen to me, I say that when one does these things justly, it's better but when one does them unjustly, it's worse.

49:02 Unknown speaker: How hard it is to refute you, Socrates. Why, even a child could refute you and show that what you're saying isn't

49:08 Mark: true in that case I'll be very grateful to the child and just as grateful to you. Now, if you refute me and rid me of this nonsense please don't falter now in doing a friend a good turn. Refute me?

49:18 Unknown speaker: Surely, Socrates, we don't need to refer to ancient history to refute you why, current events quite suffice to do that and to prove that many people who behave unjustly are happy what sorts of events are these? You can picture this man Archelaus, the son of Perdikas ruling Macedonia, I take it?

49:36 Mark: Well, if I can't picture him, I do hear things about him do you

49:39 Unknown speaker: think he's happy or miserable?

49:41 Mark: I don't know, Pallas, I haven't met the man yet.

49:43 Unknown speaker: Really? You'd know this if you had met him, but without that you don't know straight off that he's happy.

49:49 Mark: No, I certainly don't. By Zeus.

49:51 Unknown speaker: It's obvious, Socrates, that you wouldn't even claim to know that the great king

49:54 Mark: is happy yes, and that would be true, for I don't know how he stands in regard to education and justice.

50:00 Unknown speaker: Really? Is happiness determined entirely by that?

50:04 Mark: Yes, Pallas, so I say anyway. I say that the admirable and good person, man or woman, is happy, but that the one who's unjust and wicked is miserable.

50:12 Unknown speaker: So, on your reasoning, this man Archelaus is miserable?

50:16 Mark: Yes, my friend, if he is in fact unjust.

50:18 Unknown speaker: Why of course he's unjust. The sovereignty which he now holds doesn't belong to him at all given the fact that his mother was a slave of Alcatas Perdiccas brother, by rights he was a slave of Alcatoss and if he wanted to do what's just, he'd still be a slave to Alcatoss and on your reasoning would be happy as it is, how marvelously miserable he's turned out to be now that he's committed the most heinous crimes. First he sends out for this man his very own master and uncle, on the pretext of restoring to him the sovereignty that Perdiccas had taken from him, he entertains him, gets him drunk, both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin and a boy about his own age he then throws them into a wagon, drives it away at night and slaughters and disposes of them both and Although he's committed these crimes, he remains unaware of how miserable he's become and feels no remorse either.

He refuses to become happy, and by justly bringing up his brother and conferring the sovereignty upon him, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven, to whom the sovereignty was by rights due to come. Instead, not long afterwards, he throws him into a well and drowns him, telling the boy's mother, Cleopatra, that he fell into the well chasing a goose and lost his life for this very reason. Now, because he's committed the most terrible of crimes of any in Macedonia, he's the most miserable of all Macedonians, instead of the happiest.

And no doubt there are some in Athens, beginning with yourself, who'd prefer being any other Macedonian at all to being Archelaus.

51:42 Mark: Alright. At the start of our discussions, Paulus, I praised you because I thought you were well educated in oratory, but I also thought that you'd neglected the practice of discussion. And now is this all there is to the argument by which even a child could refute me? Do you suppose that when I say that a person who acts unjustly is not happy, I now stand refuted by you by means of this argument? Where did you get that idea, my good man? As a matter of fact, I disagree with every single thing you say.

52:04 Unknown speaker: You're just unwilling to admit it. You really do think it's the way I say it is.

52:08 Mark: My wonderful man, you're trying to refute me in oratorical style, the way people in law courts do when they think they're refuting some claim. There too. One side thinks it's refuting the others when it produces many reputable witnesses on behalf of the arguments it presents, while the person who asserts the opposite produces only one witness, or none at all. This refutation is worthless insofar as truth is concerned, for it might happen that sometimes an individual is brought down by the false testimony of many reputable people. Now too, nearly every Athenian and alien will take your side on the things you're saying.

If it's witnesses you want to produce against me, to show that what I say isn't true. Nicias the son of Nicaratas will testify for you if you like, his brothers along with him, one whose tripods are standing in a row in the precinct of Dionysus Aristocracies, the son of Scellias will too, if you like, the one to whom the hands of votive offering and the precinct of Pythian Apollo belongs, and so will the whole house of Pericles if you like, or any other local family you care to choose. Nevertheless, though I'm only one person, I don't agree with you.

You don't compel me. Instead you produce many false witnesses against me and try to banish me from my property. The truth, for my part, if I don't produce you as a single witness to agree with what I'm saying, then I suppose I've achieved nothing worth mentioning concerning the things we've been discussing. And I suppose you haven't either. If I don't testify on your side, though I'm just one person, you disregard all these other people. There is then this style of refutation, one you and many others accept. There's also another one that I accept.

Lets compare the one with the other and see if they'll differ in any way. It's true, after all, that the matters in dispute between us are not at all insignificant ones, but pretty nearly those it's most admirable to have knowledge about. Most shameful not to. For the heart of the matter is that of recognizing or failing to recognize who is happy and who is not. To take first the immediate question our present discussion is about you believe that it's possible for a man who behaves unjustly and who is unjust to be happy. Since you believe Archelaus to be both unjust and happy, are we to understand that this is precisely your view?

That's right, and I say that that's impossible. This is one point of dispute between us. Fair enough, although he acts unjustly, he'll be happy, that is, if he gets his due punishment.

53:58 Unknown speaker: Oh no, certainly not. That's how he'd be the most miserable.

54:01 Mark: But if a man who acts unjustly doesn't get his due, then on your reasoning, he'll be happy.

54:05 Unknown speaker: That's what I say.

54:06 Mark: On my view of it, Pallas, A man who acts unjustly. A man who is unjust is thoroughly miserable, the more so if he doesn't get his due punishment for the wrongdoing he commits, the less so if he pays and receives what is due at the hands of both gods and men.

54:17 Unknown speaker: What an absurd position you're trying to maintain, Socrates.

54:20 Mark: Yes, and I'll try to get you to take the same position too, my good man, for I consider you a friend. For now. These are the points we differ on. Please look at them with me. I said earlier, didn't I, that doing what's unjust is worse than suffering it?

54:31 Unknown speaker: Yes, you did.

54:32 Mark: And you said that suffering it is worse. Yes, And I said those who do what's unjust are miserable. And was refuted by you.

54:39 Unknown speaker: You certainly were, by Zeus.

54:41 Mark: So you think, Polus?

54:42 Unknown speaker: So I truly think.

54:44 Mark: Perhaps. And again, you think that those who do what's unjust are happy so long as they don't pay what is due?

54:48 Unknown speaker: I certainly do.

54:49 Mark: Whereas I say that they're the most miserable, while those who pay their due are less so. Would you like to refute this too?

54:54 Unknown speaker: Why, that's even more difficult to refute than the other claims, Socrates.

54:58 Mark: Not difficult, surely, Paulus? It's impossible. What's true is never refuted.

55:02 Unknown speaker: What do you mean? Take a man who's caught doing something unjust, say, plotting to set himself up as a tyrant. Suppose that he's caught, put on the rack, castrated, and his eyes burned out. Suppose that he's subject to a host of other abuses of all sorts, and then made to witness his wife and children undergo the same. In the end he's impaled or tarred. Will he be happier than if he hadn't got caught, had set himself up as a tyrant and lived out his life ruling in his city and doing whatever he liked? A person envied and counted happy by fellow citizens and aliens alike? Is this what you say is impossible to refute?

55:32 Mark: This time you're spooking me, Paulus. Instead of refuting me just before, you were arguing by testimony, still refresh my memory on a small point. If the man plots to set himself up as a tyrant unjustly, you said.

55:43 Unknown speaker: Yes, I did.

55:44 Mark: In that case, neither of them will ever be the happier one. Neither the one who gains tyrannical power unjustly, nor the one who pays what is due. For of two miserable people, one could not be happier than the other. But the one who avoids getting caught and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable one. What's this, Paulus? You're laughing. Is this now some further style of refutation? To laugh when somebody makes a point instead of refuting him?

56:02 Unknown speaker: Don't you think you've been refuted already, Socrates? When you're saying things the lights of which no human being would maintain? Just ask any one of these people.

56:10 Mark: Hollis, I'm not one of the politicians. Last year I was elected to the council by lot. And when our tribe was presiding and I had to call for a vote, I came in for a laugh. I didn't know how to do it. So please don't tell me to call for a vote from the people present here. You have no better refutations than These Toph, or do as I suggested just now. Let me have my turn and you try the kind of refutation I think is called for. I do know how to produce one witness to whatever I'm saying, and that's the man I'm having a discussion with. The majority I disregard.

And I do know how to call for a vote from one man. But I don't even discuss things with the majority. See if you'll be willing to give me a reputation then, by answering the questions you're asked for. I do believe that you and I and everybody else consider doing what's unjust. Worse than suffering it and not paying what is due. Worse than paying it.

56:48 Unknown speaker: And I do believe that I don't, and that no other person does either. So you'd take suffering what's unjust over doing it, would you?

56:54 Mark: Yes. And so would you and everyone else.

56:57 Unknown speaker: Far from it. I wouldn't. You wouldn't and nobody else would either.

57:00 Mark: Won't you answer then?

57:01 Unknown speaker: I certainly will. I'm eager to know what you'll say

57:04 Mark: in fact, so that you'll know. Answer me as though this were my first questioning to you. Which do you think is worse, Pallas? Doing what's unjust or suffering it?

57:12 Unknown speaker: I think suffering it is.

57:14 Mark: You do? Which do you think is more shameful? Doing what's unjust or suffering it? Tell me. Doing it now. If doing it is in fact more shameful, isn't it also worse?

57:24 Unknown speaker: No, not in the least.

57:26 Mark: I see. Evidently you don't believe that admirable and good are the same, or that bad and shameful are.

57:32 Unknown speaker: No, I certainly don't.

57:33 Mark: Well, what about this? When you call all admirable things admirable bodies, for example, or colors or shapes or sounds or practices, is with nothing in view that you do so each time. Take admirable bodies first. Don't you call them admirable either in virtue of their usefulness relative to whatever it is that each is useful for, or else in virtue of some pleasure if it makes the people who look at them get enjoyment from looking at them? In the case of the admirability of a body, can you mention anything other than these?

57:59 Unknown speaker: No, I can't.

58:00 Mark: Does the same hold for all the other things? Don't you call shapes and colors admirable on account of either some pleasure or benefit or both?

58:07 Unknown speaker: Yes, I do.

58:08 Mark: Doesn't this also hold for sounds and all things musical?

58:11 Unknown speaker: Yes.

58:12 Mark: And certainly things that pertain to laws and practices, the admirable ones, that is, don't fall outside the Limits of being either pleasant or beneficial, or both, I take it.

58:20 Unknown speaker: No, I don't think they do.

58:21 Mark: Doesn't the same hold for the admirability of the fields of learning, too?

58:25 Unknown speaker: Yes, indeed, yes, Socrates, your present definition of the admirable in terms of pleasure and good is an admirable one, and

58:31 Mark: so is my definition of the shameful in terms of the opposite pain and bad.

58:35 Unknown speaker: Isn't it necessarily so?

58:37 Mark: Therefore, whenever one of two admirable things is more admirable than the other, it is so because it surpasses the other either in one of these pleasure or benefit, or in both.

58:45 Unknown speaker: Yes, that's right.

58:46 Mark: And whenever one of two shameful things is more shameful than the other, it will be because it surpasses the other, either in pain or in badness. Isn't that necessarily so?

58:54 Unknown speaker: Yes.

58:54 Mark: Well, now, what were you saying a moment ago about doing what's unjust and suffering it? Weren't you saying that suffering it is worse, but doing it is more shameful?

59:01 Unknown speaker: I was.

59:02 Mark: Now, if doing what's unjust is in fact more shameful than suffering it, wouldn't it be so, either because it is more painful and surpasses the other in pain, or because it surpasses it in badness, or both? Isn't that necessarily so too?

59:14 Unknown speaker: Of course it is.

59:16 Mark: Let's look at this first. Does doing what's unjust surpass suffering it in pain? And do people who do it hurt more than people who suffer it?

59:24 Unknown speaker: No, Socrates, that's not the case at all.

59:26 Mark: So it doesn't surpass it in pain anyhow?

59:28 Unknown speaker: Certainly not.

59:29 Mark: So if it doesn't surpass it in pain, it couldn't at this point surpass it in both.

59:33 Unknown speaker: Apparently not.

59:35 Mark: That leaves it surpassing it in only the other thing.

59:37 Unknown speaker: Yes, in badness, evidently.

59:40 Mark: So, because it surpasses it in badness, doing what's unjust would be worse than suffering it. That's clear now, didn't the majority of mankind and you earlier agree with us that doing what's unjust is more shameful than suffering it?

59:53 Unknown speaker: Yes.

59:53 Mark: And now, at least, it's turned out to be worse.

59:56 Unknown speaker: Evidently.

59:57 Mark: Would you then welcome what's worse and more shameful over what is less so? Don't shrink back from answering, Pallas. You won't get hurt in any way. Submit yourself nobly to the argument as you would to a doctor, and answer me. Say yes or no to what I ask you.

1:00:09 Unknown speaker: No, I wouldn't, Socrates.

1:00:11 Mark: And would any other person?

1:00:13 Unknown speaker: No, I don't think so. Not on this Reasoning.

1:00:15 Mark: Anyhow, I was right then when I said that neither you nor I nor any other person would take doing what's unjust over suffering it, for it really is something worse.

1:00:24 Unknown speaker: So it appears.

1:00:25 Mark: So you see, Pallas, that when the one refutation is compared with the other, there's no resemblance at all. Whereas everyone but me agrees with you, you're all I need, although you're just a party of one, for your agreement and testimony, it's you alone whom I call on for a vote. The others I disregard. Let this be our verdict on this matter. Then let's next consider the second point in dispute between us. That is, whether a wrongdoer's paying what is due is the worst thing there is, as you were supposing, or whether his not paying it is even worse, as I was. Let's look at it this way. Are you saying that paying what is due and being justly disciplined for wrongdoing are the same thing?

1:00:57 Unknown speaker: Yes, I do.

1:00:59 Mark: Can you say then that all just things aren't admirable insofar as they are? Just think carefully and tell me.

1:01:04 Unknown speaker: Yes, I think they are.

1:01:06 Mark: Consider this point. If somebody acts upon something, there also has to be something that has something done to it by the one acting upon it.

1:01:13 Unknown speaker: Yes, I think so.

1:01:14 Mark: And that it has done to it what the thing acting upon it does, and in the sort of way the thing acting upon it does it. I mean, for example, that if somebody hits, there has to be something that's being hit.

1:01:23 Unknown speaker: There has to be.

1:01:24 Mark: And if the hitter hits hard or quickly, the thing being hit is hit that way too.

1:01:28 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:01:29 Mark: So the thing being hit gets acted upon in whatever way the hitting thing acts upon it.

1:01:33 Unknown speaker: Yes, that's right.

1:01:34 Mark: So too, if somebody performs surgical burning, then there has to be something that's being burned.

1:01:39 Unknown speaker: Of course.

1:01:39 Mark: And if he's burned severely or painfully, the thing that's being burned is burned in whatever way the burning thing burns it.

1:01:45 Unknown speaker: That's right.

1:01:46 Mark: Doesn't the same account also hold if a person makes a surgical cut for something is being cut?

1:01:51 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:01:51 Mark: And if the cut is large or deep or painful, the thing being cut is cut in whatever way the cutting thing cuts it.

1:01:57 Unknown speaker: So it appears.

1:01:58 Mark: Summing it up, see if you agree with what I was saying just now, that in all cases, in whatever way the thing acting upon something acts upon it, the thing acted upon is acted upon in just that way.

1:02:09 Unknown speaker: Yes, I do agree.

1:02:10 Mark: Taking this as agreed, is paying what is due a case of being acted upon or acting upon something?

1:02:16 Unknown speaker: It must be A case of being acted upon, Socrates, by someone who acts? Of course, by the one administering discipline.

1:02:24 Mark: Now, the one who administers discipline correctly disciplines justly.

1:02:28 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:02:28 Mark: Thereby acting justly or not?

1:02:31 Unknown speaker: Yes, justly.

1:02:32 Mark: So the one being disciplined is being acted upon justly when he pays what is due?

1:02:36 Unknown speaker: Apparently.

1:02:37 Mark: And it was agreed, I take it, that just things are admirable?

1:02:41 Unknown speaker: That's right.

1:02:42 Mark: So one of these men does admirable things, and the other, the one being disciplined, has admirable things done to him.

1:02:48 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:02:49 Mark: If they're admirable, then aren't they good, for they're either pleasant or beneficial.

1:02:53 Unknown speaker: Necessarily so.

1:02:54 Mark: Hence, the one paying what is due has good things being done to him?

1:02:58 Unknown speaker: Evidently.

1:02:59 Mark: Hence he's being benefited.

1:03:00 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:03:01 Mark: Is his benefit the one I take it to be, does his soul undergo improvement if he's justly disciplined?

1:03:06 Unknown speaker: Yes, that's likely.

1:03:07 Mark: Hence, one who pays what is due gets rid of something bad in his soul?

1:03:11 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:03:12 Mark: Now, is the bad thing he gets rid of the most serious one. Consider it this. In the matter of a person's financial condition, do you detect anything bad other than poverty?

1:03:20 Unknown speaker: No, just poverty.

1:03:21 Mark: What about that of a person's physical condition? Would you say that what is bad here consists of weakness, disease, ugliness and the like?

1:03:28 Unknown speaker: Yes, I would.

1:03:29 Mark: Do you believe there's also some corrupt condition of the soul?

1:03:32 Unknown speaker: Of course.

1:03:33 Mark: And don't you call this condition injustice, ignorance, cowardice and the like?

1:03:37 Unknown speaker: Yes, certainly.

1:03:38 Mark: Of these three things, one's finances, one's body and one's soul. You said there are three states of corruption, namely poverty, disease and injustice.

1:03:46 Dylan: Yes.

1:03:46 Mark: Which of these states of corruption is most shameful? Isn't it injustice and corruption of one's soul in general?

1:03:52 Unknown speaker: Very much so.

1:03:53 Mark: And if it's the most shameful, it's also the worst.

1:03:55 Unknown speaker: What do you mean, Socrates?

1:03:57 Mark: I mean this. What we agreed upon earlier implies that what's most shameful is so always because it's the source either of the greatest pain, or of harm, or of both.

1:04:05 Unknown speaker: Very much so.

1:04:07 Mark: Now we've agreed that injustice and corruption of the soul as a whole is the most shameful thing.

1:04:11 Unknown speaker: So we have.

1:04:13 Mark: So either it's most painful and is most shameful because it surpasses the others in pain, or else in harm, or in both.

1:04:19 Unknown speaker: Necessarily so.

1:04:20 Mark: Now, is being unjust, undisciplined, cowardly and ignorant more painful than being poor or sick?

1:04:26 Unknown speaker: No, I don't think so, Socrates, given what we've said anyhow.

1:04:29 Mark: So the reason that corruption of one soul is the most shameful of them all is that it surpasses the others by some monstrously great harm of astounding badness, since it doesn't surpass them in pain, according to your reasoning.

1:04:41 Unknown speaker: So it appears.

1:04:42 Mark: But what is surpassing in greatest harm, would, I take it, certainly be the worst thing there is?

1:04:46 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:04:47 Mark: Injustice then, lack of discipline and all other forms of corruption of the soul are the worst thing there is?

1:04:52 Unknown speaker: Apparently so.

1:04:53 Mark: Now, what is the craft that gets rid of poverty? Isn't it that of financial management?

1:04:58 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:04:58 Mark: What's the one that gets rid of disease? Isn't it that of medicine? Necessarily, what's the one that gets rid of corruption and injustice? If you're stuck, look at it this where and to whom do we take people who are physically sick?

1:05:10 Unknown speaker: To doctors, Socrates, where do we take

1:05:13 Mark: people who behave unjustly and without discipline?

1:05:15 Unknown speaker: To judges, you mean?

1:05:17 Mark: Isn't it so they'll pay what's due?

1:05:19 Unknown speaker: Yes, I agree.

1:05:20 Mark: Now, don't those who administer discipline correctly employ a kind of justice in doing so?

1:05:25 Unknown speaker: That's clear.

1:05:25 Mark: It's financial management, then, that gets rid of poverty, medicine that gets rid of disease, and justice that gets rid of injustice and indiscipline?

1:05:33 Unknown speaker: Apparently.

1:05:34 Mark: Which of these now is the most admirable?

1:05:36 Unknown speaker: Of which do you mean?

1:05:37 Mark: Of financial management and medicine and justice?

1:05:40 Unknown speaker: Justice is by far.

1:05:41 Mark: Socrates, doesn't it in that case provide either the most pleasure or benefit, or both? If it is really the most admirable, yes. Now, is getting medical treatment something pleasant? Do people who get it enjoy getting it?

1:05:52 Unknown speaker: No, I don't think so.

1:05:53 Mark: But it is beneficial, isn't it? Yes, because they're getting rid of something very bad so that it's worth their while to endure the pain and so get well?

1:06:01 Unknown speaker: Of course.

1:06:02 Mark: Now, would a man be happiest as far as his body goes, if he's under treatment, or if he weren't even sick to begin with?

1:06:08 Unknown speaker: If he weren't even sick, Obviously.

1:06:10 Mark: Because happiness evidently isn't a matter of getting rid of something bad, it's rather a matter of not even contracting it to begin with. That's so very well. Of two people, each of whom has something bad in either body or soul, which is the more miserable one? The one who is treated and gets rid of the bad thing, or the one who doesn't but keeps it?

1:06:27 Unknown speaker: The one who isn't treated, it seems

1:06:28 Mark: to me, now, wasn't paying what's due Getting rid of the worst thing there is? Corruption. It was, yes, because such justice makes people self controlled, I take it, and more Just it proves to be a treatment against corruption.

1:06:41 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:06:41 Mark: The happiest man, then, is the one who doesn't have any badness in his soul, now that this has been shown to be the most serious kind of badness.

1:06:48 Unknown speaker: That's clear.

1:06:49 Mark: And second, I suppose, is the man who gets rid of it. Evidently, this is the man who gets lectured and lashed. The one who pays what is due.

1:06:56 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:06:57 Mark: The man who keeps it, then, and who doesn't get rid of it is the one whose life is the worst, apparently. Isn't this actually the man who, although he commits the most serious crimes and uses methods that are most unjust, succeeds in avoiding being lectured and disciplined and paying his due, as Archelaus, according to you and the other tyrants, orators and potentates have put themselves in a position to do? Evidently, yes, my good man, I take it that these people have managed to accomplish pretty much the same thing as a person who has contracted very serious illnesses, but by avoiding treatment, manages to avoid paying what's due to the doctors for his bodily faults, fearing, as would a child, cauterization or surgery, because they're painful. Don't you think so too?

1:07:34 Unknown speaker: Yes, I do.

1:07:35 Mark: It's because he evidently doesn't know what health and bodily excellence are like. For on the basis of what we're now agreed on, it looks as though those who avoid paying what is due also do the same sort of singing polis. They focus on its painfulness, but are blind to its benefit and are ignorant of how much more miserable it is to live with an unhealthy soul than with an unhealthy body, a soul that's rotten with injustice and with impiety. This is also the reason they go to any length to avoid paying what is due and getting rid of the worst thing there is. They find themselves funds and friends and ways to speak as persuasively as possible. Now, if what we're agreed on is true, Paulus, are you aware of what things follow from our argument? Or would you like us to set them out?

1:08:12 Unknown speaker: Yes, if you think we should.

1:08:13 Mark: Anyhow, does it follow that injustice and doing what is unjust are the worst thing there is?

1:08:19 Unknown speaker: Yes, apparently.

1:08:20 Mark: And it has indeed been shown that paying what is due is what gets rid of this bad thing.

1:08:24 Unknown speaker: So it seems.

1:08:25 Mark: And that if it isn't paid, the bad thing is retained?

1:08:28 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:08:29 Mark: So doing what's unjust is the second worst thing. Not paying what's due when one has done what's unjust is by its very nature the first worst thing. The Very worst of all, evidently. Now, wasn't this the point in dispute between us? My friend, you considered Archelaus happy, a man who's committed the gravest crimes without paying what is due. Whereas I took the opposite view, that whoever avoids paying his due for his wrongdoing, whether he is Archelaus or any other man, is and deserves to be miserable beyond all other men, and that one who does what's unjust is always more miserable than the one who suffers it, and the one who avoids paying what's due always more miserable than the one who does pay it. Weren't these the things I said?

1:09:05 Unknown speaker: Yes.

1:09:06 Mark: Hasn't it been proved that what was said is true?

1:09:08 Unknown speaker: Apparently.

1:09:09 Mark: Fair enough. If these things are true, then, Paulus, what is the great use of oratory? For on the basis of what we're agreed on now, what a man should guard himself against most of all is doing what's unjust, knowing that he will have trouble enough if he does. Isn't that so?

1:09:23 Unknown speaker: Yes, that's right.

1:09:24 Mark: And if he or anyone else he cares about acts unjustly, he should voluntarily go to the place where he'll pay his due as soon as possible he should go to the judge as though he were going to a doctor, anxious that the disease of injustice shouldn't be protracted and cause his soul to fester incurably. What else can we say, Polus? If our previous agreements really stand, aren't these statements necessarily consistent with our earlier ones in only this way?

1:09:46 Unknown speaker: Well, yes, Socrates, what else are we to say?

1:09:49 Mark: So if oratory is used to defend injustice, Polus, one's own, or that of one's relatives, companions or children, or that of one's country, when it acts unjustly, it is of no use to us at all, unless one takes it to be useful for the opposite purpose, that he should accuse himself first and foremost, and then too his family and anyone else dear to him who happens to behave unjustly at any time, that he should not keep his wrongdoing hidden, but bring it out into the open, so that he may pay his due and get well, and compel himself and the others not to play the coward, but to grit his teeth and present himself with grace and courage as to a doctor for cauterisation and surgery, pursuing what's good and admirable without taking any account of the pain.

And if his unjust behaviour merits flogging, he should present himself to be whipped. And if it merits imprisonment, to be imprisoned, if a fine to pay it, if exile, to be exiled and if execution to be executed, he should be his own chief accuser, and the accuser of other members of his family, and use his oratory for the purpose of getting rid of the worst thing there is, injustice. As the unjust acts are being exposed, are we to affirm or deny this, Polus?

1:10:52 Unknown speaker: I think these statements are absurd, Socrates, though no doubt you think they agree with those expressed earlier, and either we

1:10:59 Mark: should abandon those, or else these necessarily follow.

1:11:01 Unknown speaker: Yes, that's how it is.

1:11:03 Mark: And on the other hand, to reverse the case, suppose a man had to harm someone, an enemy, or anybody at all, provided that he didn't suffer anything unjust from this enemy himself, for this is something to be on guard against. If the enemy did something unjust against another person, then our man should see to it in every way, both in what he does and what he says, that his enemy does not go to the judge and pay his due. And if he does go, he should scheme to get his enemy off without paying what's due. If he has stolen a lot of gold, he should scheme to get him not to return it, but to keep it and spend it in an unjust and godless way, both on himself and his people.

And if his crimes merit the death penalty, he should scheme to keep him from being executed, preferably never to die at all, but to live forever in corruption, but failing that, to have him live as long as possible in that condition. Yes, this is the sort of thing I think oratory is useful for Pallas, since for the person who has no intention of behaving unjustly, it doesn't seem to me to have much use, if in fact it has any use at all, since its usefulness hasn't in any way become apparent so far.

1:11:57 Dylan: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates earnest about this, or is he just joking?

1:12:01 Unknown speaker: I think he's in dead earnest about this Callicles. There's nothing like asking him, though, by

1:12:06 Dylan: the gods, just the thing I'm eager to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to take you as being in earnest now, or joking? For if you are in earnest, and these things you're saying are really true, won't this human life of ours be turned upside down? And won't everything we do evidently be the opposite of what we should do?

1:12:23 Mark: Well, Callicles, if human beings didn't share common experiences, some sharing one, others sharing another, but one of us had some unique experience not shared by others, it wouldn't be easy for him to communicate what he experienced to the other. I say this because I realize that you and I are both now actually sharing a common experience. Each of the two of us is a lover of two objects. I of Alcibiades, Clinias, son and of philosophy, and you of the Deimos, I.e. people of Athens, and the Deimos is the son of Pyrilampes. I notice that in each case you are unable to contradict your beloved, clever though you are, no matter what he says or what he claims is so, you keep shifting back and forth.

If you say anything in the assembly and the Athenian Deimos denies it, you shift your ground and say what it wants to hear. Other things like this happen to you when you are with that good looking young man, the son of Pyrilampes, you are unable to oppose what your beloveds say or propose, so that if somebody heard what you say, what you do on their account, and was amazed at how absurd that is, you'd probably say, if you were minded to tell him the truth, that unless somebody stops your beloved from saying what they say, you'll never stop saying these things either.

In that case you must believe that you're bound to hear me say things like that too. And instead of being surprised at my saying them, you must stop my beloved philosophy from saying them. For she always says what you now hear me say, my dear friend, and she's by far less fickle than my other beloved. As for that son of Clinias, what he says differs from one time to the next, but what philosophy says always stays the same. And she's saying things that now astound you, though you were present when they were said. So either refute her and show that doing what's unjust without paying what's due is not the ultimate of all bad things, as I just now was saying it is.

Or else if you leave this unrefuted, then by the dog, the God of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be dissonant with you all your life long. Yet, for my part, my good man, I think it's better to have my lyre or a chorus that might lead out of tune and dissonant, and have the vast majority of men disagree with me and contradict me, than to be out of harmony with myself, to contradict myself, though I'm only one person.

1:14:17 Dylan: Socrates, I think you're grandstanding in these speeches, acting like a true crowd pleaser. Here you are playing to the crowd now that Polus has had the same thing happen to him, and he accused Gorgias of letting you do to him, for he Said, didn't he, that when Gorgias was asked by you whether you would teach anyone who came to him, wanting to learn oratory, but without expertise in what's just, Gorgias was ashamed and out of deference to human custom, since people would take it ill if a person refused, said that he'd teach him. And because Gorgias agreed on this point, he said he was forced to contradict himself.

Just the thing you like. He ridiculed you at the time, and rightly so, as I think anyhow. And now the very same thing has happened to him. And for the same reason I don't approve of Polus. He agreed with you that doing what's unjust is more shameful than suffering it. As a result of this admission, he was bound and gagged by you in the discussion, too ashamed to say what he thought. Although you claim to be pursuing the truth, you're in fact bringing the discussion around to the sort of crowd pleasing vulgarities that are admirable only by law and not by nature.

And these nature and law are for the most part opposed to each other. So if a person is ashamed and doesn't dare say what he thinks, he's forced to contradict himself. This is in fact the clever trick you've thought of with which you work mischief in your discussions. If a person makes a statement in terms of law, you. You slyly question him in terms of nature. If he makes it in terms of nature, you question him in terms of law. That's just what happened here. On the question of doing what's unjust versus suffering it. While Polus meant that doing it was more shameful by law, you pursued the argument as though he meant by nature.

For by nature all that is worse is also more shameful. Like suffering what's unjust. Whereas by law doing it is more shameful. No, no man would put up with suffering what's unjust. Only a slave would do so. One who is better dead than alive, who, when he's treated unjustly and abused, can't protect himself or anyone else he cares about. I believe that the people who institute our laws are the weak and the many. So they institute laws and assign praise and blame with themselves and their own advantage in mind, as a way of frightening the more powerful among men, the ones who are capable of having a greater share of out of getting a greater share than they.

They say that getting more than one share is shameful and unjust. And that doing what's unjust is nothing but trying to get more than One share. I think they like getting an equal share, since they are inferior. These are the reasons why trying to get a greater share than most is said to be unjust and shameful by law. Why they call it doing what's unjust. But I believe that nature itself reveals that it's a just thing for the better man and the more capable man to have a greater share than the worse man and the less capable. Nature shows that this is so in many places, both among the other animals and in whole cities and races of men.

It shows that this is where justice has been decided to be, that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than they. For what sort of justice did Xerxes go by when he campaigned against Greece? Or his father when he campaigned against Scythia? Countless other such examples could be mentioned. I believe that these men do these things in accordance with the nature of what's just. Yes, by Zeus, in accordance with the law of nature and. And presumably not with the one we institute. We mold the best and the most powerful among us, taking them when they are still young, like lion cubs.

And with the charms and incantations we subdue them into slavery, telling them that one is supposed to get no more than his fair share and that that's what's admirable and just. But surely if a man whose nature is equal to it arises, he will shake off, tear apart, and escape all this. He will trample under foot our documents, our tricks and charms and. And all our laws that violate nature. He the slave, will rise up and be revealed as our master. And here the justice of nature will shine forth. I think Pindar, too refers to what I'm saying in that song in which he says that law, the king of all of mortals and the immortal gods.

This, he says, bring on and renders just what is most violent with towering hand. I take as proof of this the deeds of Heracles. For he unbought his words are something like that. I don't know the song well. He says that Heracles drove off Giron's cattle, even though he hadn't paid for them and Giron hadn't given them to him on the ground that this is just by nature, and that the cattle and all other possessions of those who are worse and inferior belong to the one who is better and superior. This is the truth of the matter, as you will acknowledge if you abandon philosophy and move on to more important things.

Philosophy is no doubt a delightful thing, Socrates, as long as one is exposed to it in moderation, at the appropriate time of life. But if one spends more time on it than he should, it's a man's undoing. For even if one is naturally well favoured but engages in philosophy far beyond that appropriate time of life, he can't help but turn out to be inexperienced in everything a man who is to be admirable and good and well thought of is supposed to be experienced in. Such people turn out to be inexperienced in the laws of their city or in the kind of speech one must use to deal with people on matters of business, whether in public or private, inexperienced also in human pleasures and appetites, and in short, inexperienced in the ways of human beings altogether.

So when they venture into some private or political activity, they become a laughing stock, as I suppose men in politics do, when they venture into your pursuits and your consciousness kind of speech. What results is Euripides saying, where he says that each man shines in this and presses on to this, allotting the greatest part of the day to this, where he finds himself at his best, and whatever a man's inferior in, he avoids and rails against, while he praises the other thing, thinking well of himself and supposing that in this way he's praising himself.

I believe, however, that it is more appropriate to have a share of both. To partake of as much philosophy as your education requires is an admirable thing, and it's not shameful to practice philosophy while you're a boy, but when you still do it, when you're grown older and become a man, the thing gets to be ridiculous. Socrates My own reaction to men who philosophize is very much like that to men who speak haltingly and play like children. When I see a child for whom it's still quite proper to make conversation this way, halting in its speech and playing like a child, I'm delighted.

I find it a delightful thing, a sign of good breeding and appropriate for the child's age. When I hear a small child speaking clearly, I think it's a harsh thing, it hurts my ears. I think of it something fit for a slave. But when one hears a man speaking haltingly, or sees him playing like a child, it strikes me as ridiculous and unmanly, deserving of a flogging. Now I react in the same way to men who engage in philosophy too. When I see philosophy in a young boy, I approve of it, I think it's appropriate and consider such a person well bred.

Whereas I consider one who doesn't engage in philosophy ill bred, one who will never count himself deserving of an admirable or a noble thing. But when I see an older man still engaging in philosophy and not giving it up, I think such a man by this time needs a flogging. For as I was just saying now, it's typical that such a man, even if he's naturally very well favored, becomes unmanly and avoids the center of his city in the marketplaces in which, according to the poet, the men attain preeminence, and instead lives the rest of his life in hiding, whispering in the corner with three or four boys, never uttering anything well bred, important or apt.

Socrates, I do have a rather warm regard for you. I find myself feeling the way Xuthes, whose words I recalled just now felt towards Amiphon in Euripides play. In fact, the sorts of things he said to his brother come to my mind to say to you're neglecting the things you should devote yourself to, Socrates, and though your spirit's nature is so noble, you, you show yourself to the world in the shape of a boy. You couldn't put a speech together correctly before councils of justice, or utter any plausible or persuasive sound, nor could you make any bold proposal on behalf of anyone else.

And so then, my dear Socrates, please don't be upset with me, for it's with good will toward you that I say all this. Don't you think it shameful to be the way I take you to be, and others who ever press too far in philosophy as it is? If something got hold of you or anyone else like you, and took you off to prison on the charge that you're doing something unjust, when in fact you aren't, be assured that you wouldn't have any use for yourself. You'd get dizzy, your mouth would hang open, and you wouldn't know what to say. You'd come up for trial and face some no good wretch of an accuser and be put to death, if death is what he'd want to condemn you to.

And yet, Socrates, how can this be a wise thing? The craft which took a well favored man and made him worse, able neither to protect himself nor to rescue himself or anyone else from the gravest dangers, to be robbed of all his property by his enemies, and to live a life with absolutely no rights in his city. Such a man one could knock on the jaw without paying what's due for it, to put it rather crudely. Listen to me, my good man, and stop this refuting. Practice the sweet music of an active life, and do it where you'll get a reputation for being intelligent and leave these subtleties to others, whether we should call them just silly or outright nonsense which will cause you to live in empty houses and envy not those men who refute such trivia, but those who have life and renown and many other good things as well.

1:23:45 Mark: And that's it for part one, folks. Go to partiallyexaminedlife.com and sign up to be a pel citizen to get the audio file for part two, where Callicles and Socrates duke it out. Good night and thanks as always for your support.