Oughts and Thoughts: Scepticism and the Normativity of Meaning
Note that this is not global skepticism about the objective facts that science is supposed to study. This is the fairly typical contemporary view that if language requires interpretation, then its meaning-content is 'merely subjective' or even 'merely intersubjective'. This is skepticism about whether in language the semantics or meanings expressed, e.g., conceptual contents like "the distinction of the 18th-century powdered wig" or "comedy" or "the zombie in cinema", are themselves 'a matter of fact'.
If Heidegger inquires about the meaning of being, we could say that Hattiangadi inquires about the being of meaning. Here is her essential argument:
If the skeptic reaches the conclusion that there is no fact of meaning in language use, then he must rely on the thesis that linguistic meaning is normative, i.e., it contains inferential rules for interpreting in a particular way, and also hold that the normativity of linguistic meaning essentially fails, i.e., it does not 'really' contain inferential rules for interpreting in a particular way. Thus skepticism about meaning and its notion of being 'merely subjective' or 'merely intersubjective' is incoherent. Hattiangadi therefore concludes that the meanings in our language must be in the realm of fact.
This might seem to be merely a version of a coherence type of argument against skepticism, but I'd suggest that there are implications here regarding the being of meaning a la Heidegger, and about the normativity of language itself.
You can read a full review of Oughts and Thoughts: Scepticism and the Normativity of Meaning here at The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews site includes a full review of Hattiangadi's book.
- Tom McDonald
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