Continuing from part one, we finish up "Knowledge First Epistemology" (2011), and delve further into "Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios" (2015), and "Morally Loaded Cases in Philosophy" (2019). How does Williamson's approach compare to Goldman's reliabilism? (Note that Goldman just passed away.) Williamson distinguishes between actually following a norm and Continue Reading …
Ep. 348: Tim Williamson’s Knowledge-First Epistemology (Part One for Supporters)
On "Knowledge First Epistemology" (2011), "Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios" (2015), and "Morally Loaded Cases in Philosophy" (2019). Does it really make sense to try to define knowledge in terms of belief and justification, as we did in ep. 344, or should we instead take Williamson's advice and consider knowledge as basic: something to be examined, sure, but Continue Reading …
Ep. 347: Nyaya Sutra Against Buddhist Skeptics (Part Two)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content, including a supporter-exclusive, part three to this episode. Listen to a preview.. Mark, Seth, and Dylan now turn to ch. 4 of Dasti/Phillips' Nyaya Sutra: Selections with Early Commentaries about the self. Buddhism famously claims that there is no self. Sponsor: Give online therapy a try at Continue Reading …
Ep. 347: Nyaya Sutra Against Buddhist Skeptics (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. We're continuing to explore Nyaya epistemology, in this part focusing on ch. 3, "In Defense of the Real," in Nyaya Sutra: Selections with Early Commentaries (2017). Featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. Sponsors: Apply for convenient term life insurance from Fabric by Gerber Life at Continue Reading …
Ep. 347: Nyaya Sutra Against Buddhist Skeptics (Part Two for Supporters)
Mark, Seth, and Dylan now turn to ch. 4 of Dasti/Phillips' Nyaya Sutra: Selections with Early Commentaries about the self. Buddhism famously claims that there is no self. Metaphysically, we can take the pro-self position (atman) as involving something like a soul that exists over time. As we'll get into further in part three of this discussion, this is morally problematic in Continue Reading …
Ep. 347: Nyaya Sutra Against Buddhist Skeptics (Part One for Supporters)
We're continuing to explore Nyaya epistemology, in this part focusing on ch. 3, "In Defense of the Real," in Nyaya Sutra: Selections with Early Commentaries (2017). Featuring Mark, Wes, and Seth. In our last episode, we laid out the "knowledge sources" (perception, inference, testimony) and established that each of these is defined as successful contact with the world. If Continue Reading …
Ep. 346: Nyaya Sutra on Knowledge (Part Two)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. Continuing from part one on ch. 1, "Knowledge Sources," of the Matthew Dasti/Stephen Phillips presentation of the Nyaya-Sutra: Selections with Early Commentaries. We continue discussing modalities of perception (why no love for a smell-based philosophy?) and further consider the Sutra's Continue Reading …
Ep. 346: Nyaya Sutra on Knowledge (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. On the Nyaya Sutra: Selections with Early Commentaries. While the original Sutra, reputed to be by someone named Akṣapāda (which means "looking at his feet") Gautama was written somewhere around 150 CE, this 2017 edition by Matthew Dasti and our previous guest Stephen Phillips features many Continue Reading …
Ep. 346: Nyaya Sutra on Knowledge (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on ch. 1, "Knowledge Sources," of the Matthew Dasti/Stephen Phillips presentation of the Nyaya-Sutra: Selections with Early Commentaries. We continue discussing modalities of perception (why no love for a smell-based philosophy?) and further consider the Sutra's dictum that perception must be inerrant and how this dovetails with the overall Nyaya Continue Reading …
Ep. 346: Nyaya Sutra on Knowledge (Part One for Supporters)
On the Nyaya Sutra: Selections with Early Commentaries. While the original Sutra, reputed to be by someone named Akṣapāda (which means "looking at his feet") Gautama was written somewhere around 150 CE, this 2017 edition by Matthew Dasti and our previous guest Stephen Phillips features many more words by the commentators Vatsyayana (450 CE), Uddyotakara (550), and Continue Reading …
Ep. 344: Gettier and Goldman on Justified True Belief (Part Two)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. On "What Is Justified Belief?" (1979) by Alvin Goldman, where he tries to come up with a "function" for justification: If a belief has such-and-such non-epistemic properties, then it counts as justified. This discussion continues from part one, where we discussed the Gettier problems that (in Continue Reading …
Ep. 344: Gettier and Goldman on Justified True Belief (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free, plus tons of bonus content. On “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (1963) by Edmund Gettier, “What Is Justified Belief?” (1979) by Alvin Goldman, and “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems” (1994) by Linda Zagzebski. What is knowledge? A formulation going back to Plato distinguishes between opinion and knowledge. Continue Reading …
Ep. 344: Gettier and Goldman on Justified True Belief (Part Two for Supporters)
On "What Is Justified Belief?" (1979) by Alvin Goldman, where he tries to come up with a "function" for justification: If a belief has such-and-such non-epistemic properties, then it counts as justified. This discussion continues from part one, where we discussed the Gettier problems that (in part) motivate Goldman's account. What makes a property "epistemic" in this sense Continue Reading …
Ep. 344: Gettier and Goldman on Justified True Belief (Part One for Supporters)
On “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (1963) by Edmund Gettier, “What Is Justified Belief?” (1979) by Alvin Goldman, and “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems” (1994) by Linda Zagzebski. What is knowledge? A formulation going back to Plato distinguishes between opinion and knowledge. Even if one's opinion is true, it's not knowledge if it lacks justification. In his Continue Reading …
Closereads: Reason in Hobbes’ “Leviathan” (Part One)
Sign up for Closereads at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy to get parts 2 and 3 of this reading, as well as our previous and future installments of this new podcast. We've covered a lot of rationalists (I'm including the Romantics in this, strangely enough) and wanted to turn back to one of the original Enlightenment empiricists, Thomas Hobbes. His Leviathan (1651) is best Continue Reading …
Ep. 309: Wittgenstein On Certainty (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing our discussion from part one of On Certainty (1951), we do some close reading of the text. How does he actually respond to Moore's argument about his hand? How does he extend his account to talk about mathematical and scientific statements? Is Wittgenstein a pragmatist? You may want to review our episode on William James' pragmatist definition of truth. We Continue Reading …
Ep. 309: Wittgenstein On Certainty (Part One for Supporters)
Discussing the notes Ludwig Wittgenstein made at the end of his life in 1951 that were published as On Certainty in 1969, featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. These were in direct response to the essays by G.E. Moore that we discussed in episodes 307 and 308, so we talk about the status of so-called "Moorean propositions" like "physical objects exist," "the world is more Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part Two)
Subscribe to get both parts of this episode ad free and tons of bonus content. Continuing from part one, we quickly complete our treatment of G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and move on to consider "Certainty" (1941). In the latter paper, Moore considers various "obvious" statements about his current situation (in my case now: I am writing this, I am Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free. On G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and "Certainty" (1941), featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. Similar to the essay we covered in our last episode, Moore is defending common sense realism against idealists who claim that the external world is not mind-independent but is instead made up of ideas, Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one, we quickly complete our treatment of G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and move on to consider "Certainty" (1941). In the latter paper, Moore considers various "obvious" statements about his current situation (in my case now: I am writing this, I am sitting down, I have fingers, I am in my house on earth, etc.). These are all Continue Reading …