Discussing the notes Ludwig Wittgenstein made at the end of his life in 1951 that were published as On Certainty in 1969, featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. These were in direct response to the essays by G.E. Moore that we discussed in episodes 307 and 308, so we talk about the status of so-called "Moorean propositions" like "physical objects exist," "the world is more Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part Two)
Subscribe to get both parts of this episode ad free along with tons of bonus content including first crack on tickets to PEL Live April 15 in Manhattan. Continuing from part one, we quickly complete our treatment of G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and move on to consider "Certainty" (1941). Sponsors: Check out the Weird Studies podcast at Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part One)
Subscribe to get parts 1 and 2 of this now, ad-free. On G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and "Certainty" (1941), featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. Similar to the essay we covered in our last episode, Moore is defending common sense realism against idealists who claim that the external world is not mind-independent but is instead made up of ideas, Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one, we quickly complete our treatment of G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and move on to consider "Certainty" (1941). In the latter paper, Moore considers various "obvious" statements about his current situation (in my case now: I am writing this, I am sitting down, I have fingers, I am in my house on earth, etc.). These are all Continue Reading …
Ep. 308: Moore’s Proof of Mind-Independent Reality (Part One for Supporters)
On G.E. Moore’s "Proof of the External World" (1939) and "Certainty" (1941), featuring Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth. Similar to the essay we covered in our last episode, Moore is defending common sense realism against idealists who claim that the external world is not mind-independent but is instead made up of ideas, and also skeptics who claim that we can't know (or know with Continue Reading …
Ep. 307: G.E. Moore Defends Common Sense (Part Two)
Subscribe to get both parts of this episode ad free, plus a supporter exclusive PEL Nightcap discussion. Continuing from part one on "A Defense of Common Sense" (1925), now down to Mark, Wes, and Dylan. We get into the nitty gritty of Moore's argument: Against idealism, Moore argues that physical facts are in now way dependent on mental facts; for instance, the Continue Reading …
Ep. 307: G.E. Moore Defends Common Sense (Part Two for Supporters)
Continuing from part one on "A Defense of Common Sense" (1925), now down to Mark, Wes, and Dylan. We get into the nitty gritty of Moore's argument: Against idealism, Moore argues that physical facts are in now way dependent on mental facts; for instance, the existence and position of the moon don't depend on anyone's beliefs about the moon. Reality is mind Continue Reading …
Ep. 307: G.E. Moore Defends Common Sense (Part One for Supporters)
On "A Defense of Common Sense" (1925), featuring Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan. Various philosophers will tell you that the only thing you experience is your own ideas, and hence the world outside of your mind is something wholly unknowable, or if it is knowable, it must be because those supposedly physical objects are actually somehow ideas as well. Moore defends our Continue Reading …
Moore on Theodicy
In the episode, I brought up Moore's use of the non-mathematical character of the good (in that one good plus another good doesn't necessarily make a whole with the good equal to the sum of the parts) by bringing up theodicy, i.e. the defense of the existence of evil in a perfectly good world by saying that that evil is necessary, because it allows us to be virtuous in response Continue Reading …
The Good as Simple Idea
At some point during the episode, Dylan and Wes were arguing about Moore and referred to the good as a 'term'. I corrected them that Moore actually calls it a 'concept' as if something hung on that distinction. I guess it is incumbent upon me to explain. First off, Moore never uses the word "concept" in the chapter - my bad. He uses "idea" and "notion". But my point is Continue Reading …
Episode 58: What Grounds Ethical Claims? (Moore, Stevenson, MacIntyre) (Citizens Only)
On G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica, ch. 1 (1903); Charles Leslie Stevenson's "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" (1937), and Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, ch. 1-2. Is there such a thing as moral intuition? Is "good" a simple property that we all recognize but can't explain like yellow? G.E. Moore thinks that any attempt to define good in terms of properties like Continue Reading …
PREVIEW-Episode 58: What Grounds Ethical Claims? (Moore, Stevenson, MacIntyre)
This is a short preview of the full episode. Buy Now Purchase this episode for $2.99. Or become a PEL Citizen for $5 a month, and get access to this and all other paywalled episodes, including 68 back catalogue episodes; exclusive Part 2's for episodes published after September, 2020; and our after-show Nightcap, where the guys respond to listener email and chat more Continue Reading …
Topic for #58/#59: Is vs. Ought (G.E. Moore, C.L. Stevenson, Alasdair MacIntyre)
These two episodes cover some related approaches in 20th century ethics: First, we read Chapter 1 of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica(1903), which argues against utilitarianism and other ethical philosophies by exposing the "naturalistic fallacy," which equates "good" with some natural property like pleasure or people's actual desires. This error, says Moore, also extends to Continue Reading …