In the episode, I brought up Moore’s use of the non-mathematical character of the good (in that one good plus another good doesn’t necessarily make a whole with the good equal to the sum of the parts) by bringing up theodicy, i.e. the defense of the existence of evil in a perfectly good world by saying that that evil is Continue Reading …
The Good as Simple Idea
At some point during the episode, Dylan and Wes were arguing about Moore and referred to the good as a ‘term’. I corrected them that Moore actually calls it a ‘concept’ as if something hung on that distinction. I guess it is incumbent upon me to explain. First off, Moore never uses the word “concept” in the chapter – my Continue Reading …
Episode 58: What Grounds Ethical Claims? (Moore, Stevenson, MacIntyre) (Citizens Only)
On G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, ch. 1 (1903); Charles Leslie Stevenson’s “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms” (1937), and Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, ch. 1-2. Is there such a thing as moral intuition? Is “good” a simple property that we all recognize but can’t explain like yellow? Or are moral terms just tools we use to convince other people to like things that we like? Learn more.
End song: “When I Was Yours,” by Mark Lint, 1997.
PREVIEW-Episode 58: What Grounds Ethical Claims? (Moore, Stevenson, MacIntyre)
On G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, ch. 1 (1903); Charles Leslie Stevenson’s “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms” (1937), and Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, ch. 1-2. Is there such a thing as moral intuition? Is “good” a simple property that we all recognize but can’t explain like yellow? Or are moral terms just tools we use to convince other people to like things that we like?
Topic for #58/#59: Is vs. Ought (G.E. Moore, C.L. Stevenson, Alasdair MacIntyre)
These two episodes cover some related approaches in 20th century ethics: First, we read Chapter 1 of G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica(1903), which argues against utilitarianism and other ethical philosophies by exposing the “naturalistic fallacy,” which equates “good” with some natural property like pleasure or people’s actual desires. This error, says Moore, also extends to equating good with what God wants Continue Reading …