Scientific realists are known to have a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best scientific theories and models. The exact interpretation of this philosophical tenet can, however, differ dramatically between each of its proponents. Some of these base their idea of the truthfulness of scientific realism upon the seeming success of the reference of its theoretical terms to the things in the world. Others refer to the scientific method of inquiry as making science an adequate system for capturing reality. Here, I'll interpret scientific realism not so much in terms of the truthfulness of its terms or a method of inquiry, but in terms of the faith one puts in the ontology of scientific theories. ...Or, as the objective interpretation of scientific realism goes, in scientific theories as giving an adequate representation of a mind-independent world. However, isn't there something fundamentally wrong with this representation of a "mind-independent" world? To see this, we first of all have to understand what science and its purpose within our society is.
Science is involved in the production of knowledge. It does this by gathering large lumps of data and extracting what are the seemingly underlying structures responsible for the phenomena being detected. Usually, on an "objective" interpretation of science, we think of science discovering the way the world works. Science is involved in writing down whatever kinds of regularities are being detected in the world. However, is this truly the manner in which knowledge is being created?
I believe that one crucial element is being left out of this picture, and it is this element that is responsible for the progression and the advancement in science as we experience it on a daily basis, and the seemingly never-ending accumulation of facts in which it results. I am talking, of course, about the element of inference. The notion of inference has been well discussed by philosophers ever since Hume pointed out the incomprehensible problems associated with it. However, apart from Hume's ideas about the indeterminacy of scientific theories and the problems it causes, in what way does the inferential relationship - which is present in every logical system consisting of premises and conclusions - manifest itself in the daily life of a scientist? And what is its role with regard to the production of facts?
Let's take a look at an example. Imagine a scientist who has made the following observation: (A) human skin gets agitated when it gets in touch with a deadly nightshade (which - apparently - is a type of plant). Furthermore, the scientist believes to know that (B) a poisonous plant makes one's skin agitated. Therefore - and let’s assume that this was unknown up till that point in time - the scientist claims that (C) deadly nightshade must be poisonous. Or, to put it more formally, (A^B) --> C. Given that the scientist has enough data to back up this claim, he or she has just created what we consider to be a fact.
But what would have happened if the scientist would have went home after making the observation responsible for premise A? Then no fact, and thus no new knowledge, would have been produced. That is, the scientist would have remained stuck at the level of observation, a level that can be reached by each and every one of us and therefore would not create any scientific value, a.k.a. knowledge. It is only because of the scientist being a person who has studied botany for years, who has confidence in her or her own capabilities and who has a basic sense of logic, that the step from mere observation to fact can be made. And it is by making this step, the step represented by the "-->" symbol in the logical formulation, that the scientist adds value to the "knowledge-producing factory" called science.
Two noteworthy implications follow from this observation. The first is that facts about the world around us are, whether we like it or not, constructed on a very fundamental level. There is always a human being needed in order to take the last step and create the knowledge: to take the observation and the knowledge at hand, and make an inference leading to the creation of new facts. And it is because of this inference, which is an activity that has to be performed by us human beings with our minds and our souls, that objectivism, with its proclaimed access to mind-independent knowledge, is untenable.
But watch it: It is explicitly not being said that the observed regularities in the world did not occur before the scientist came along and used the data about these regularities in producing our so-called facts. No claims are being made about any causal relationship between the domain of knowing (epistemology) and the domain of beings (ontology). What is being said is that what happens within the domain of beings is completely irrelevant to us human beings, since we will never be able to access the domain of beings - from a mind-independent point of view - in order to know what would be happening there. All that we know is that, after the scientist has finished its research, the fact is there.
A second implication of this plea for constructivism is that, on the most fundamental level, science does not seem to differ from religion - or from any other system of beliefs for that matter - in any fundamental manner. Both of these domains are dominated by people who believe in the truths of the ideas brought forth within these domains. None of the ideas produced within these domains will be true - at least not in a sense of being true independently on the human mind - unless they are believed to be true. And it is this believing that is an inherently human, and thus mind-dependent, ability which provides us access to the only realm of truth we will ever know: the realm of beliefs.
So the question is: is knowledge being constructed by scientists as an outcome of a fact-seeking process? Or are facts existing somewhere out there in the world, true whether they are discovered or not? And, if so, true in what sense?
-Rob Graumans (author of www.theyoungsocrates.com)
The question at the end seems like a definitional question. If you take a fact as meaning a true statement or a true claim then the truth of a fact is independent of humans in the sense that humans doesn’t determine the fact.
Take as an example “the letter a is the first letter in the book so and so”, of course the fact of what a “letter a” is taken to be and so forth is determined by humans, just as the words making up the claim are made up by humans, (just as claims are made up by humans)however the fact of “the letter a is the first letter in the book so and so” is totally independent of humans.
Now I’m curious about this constructivism, how would it view claims such as:
“some very large number N is a prime”(where its impossible for humans or others to calculate if N is or is not a prime)
Can such a statement be either true or false? can it be a fact? (a fact being a true claim)
I consider the notion of a fact to be nothing more than a human artifact and the reason for this is as follows: if one wants to come to know whether a certain claim is true or not, one first of all needs to have an absolute answer – that is, a mind-independent answer – to the question of what it is that is true. Given that we are unable to ever come to know whether our beliefs about the world around us are absolutely true or false, we cannot claim that facts as we use them in our language are a true resemblance of the world out there nor – and I will come back to this point – of fully conceptualistic – that is, mental – issues like mathematics. We simply do not know whether we have reached the bottom for therefore we would have to know what the bottom is. And if we would know what the bottom was, we wouldn’t have to look any further.
Now, let’s zoom in on the “N is a prime” example. First of all, I would say that the whole idea of something being a true claim – in the sense of some statement corresponding to a state in the world out there as a consequence of which a statement will be either true or not – is an artificial distinction because of the fact that we are fundamentally unable to ever cross the gap between our beliefs and the outside world. So in this sense of the notion of truth, I consider it to be impossible to provide definitive answers about the alleged truth of statements.
However, for the statement “the very large number N is a prime”, one could – at first sight – argue that a prime is not an external state of affairs – as in a state nature like a tree or an organization – which one could discover by doing empirical research. Therefore is seems that absolute answers are possible. However, even in this case I would say that it is impossible to state whether something is definitely true or not and the reason for this is as follows: mathematics is a conceptual discipline. That means that it is all about ideas. However, whose ideas about mathematics are true? What if – like Fermat’s theorem – people always considered it is impossible to crack it and suddenly a guy came along who cracked it? From this it follows that even mathematical trues are impossible because of our human beings flawed capacity to get to know the truth.
Actually, yesterday I have written an article about this conception of the truth as can be read here: http://theyoungsocrates.com/2013/02/15/a-defence-of-relativism/ . I think that it might give you a deeper perspective into this notion of truth I consider being appropriate.
Thank you for your reply. I read thru the text again together with the linked text you provided and your answer to form a better picture of what you are saying.
I tried to condense it in a few lines below, to understand it better, maybe this is close to, or som variation of, your argument. (hopefully)
1.For a human to know the truth of a claim (if there is such a thing) he needs to know it absolutely.
2.To know the truth of a claim absolutely he needs to know it independent of his own mind.
3.Since 2 is impossible he cannot know the truth of a claim.
(or short there is no such thing as mind-independent knowledge)
Now why is 2 true? Well for claims about trees and cars etc its clear since they reside in the real world, but what about other claims like “I like ice-cream”?
As i understand it the answer about mathematics as you suggested is as follows: “mathematical trues are impossible because of our human beings flawed capacity to get to know the truth.”
This seems like a much weaker argument, is this not simply just saying that since humans not always know the truth of a claim, they never know the thruth of a claim?
Is 2 really impossible? What is mind-independent taken to mean? Is it to be taken as meaning that knowledge is dependent on the mind in that it is exists in the mind?
But what if knowledge was written down on a paper would it then be independent of the mind?
It seems like there must be something stronger than this since otherwise you can start making arguments like:
The true claim of Fermat’s last theorem is quite mind-independent, i have it in this book right here.
Thank you for reading my text and thank you for commenting on it. Let’s – first of all – take a look at the conditions you posed:
I agree with the first of the conditions: if one knows the truth of a claim, one needs to know it absolutely. Since, if one wouldn’t know it absolutely, one could not know it would be the truth. Therefore, talking in terms of the truth – as being an absolute entity – is nonsense or at least unattainable for humans.
With regard to the second condition, I would say that this not necessarily has to be true. A difference should be made between objectivism and absolutism. I have been making claims about objectivism – as being the claim that some claim could be true independent of the mind. I interpret absolutism as being the counterpart of relativism. So, absolutism does not necessarily make claims about points of view being true irrespective of the human mind. What I have said is that, whether it is via our own mind or via the mind of others, knowledge is always dependent on the human mind and therefore no objective knowledge – which is a contradiction in terms –can be obtained.
And sure: you can have the belief that you like ice-cream. And I am not saying that you are wrong in believing that. I only say that it is not objectively true. And sure: you can stretch the argument even further to say that all of your own beliefs like “I like ice-cream” do not necessarily have to be true, expect for the fact that you believe you like ice-cream. However, this would imply a Cartesian-like skeptical position – which I do not dismiss right away by the way – because of which it would become difficult to speak of any truth except for how things seem to you. My point, however, was about objectivism and the impossibility of claiming something to be true independent of the human mind.
And that’s also where my remark about mathematics comes in. Mathematics is a fundamentally mental activity because of which one cannot state the objective truth of it in any sense. However that is what – from the perspective of objectivism – would seems to be a logical consequence
What I meant by mind-independent – to answer your question – is not that knowledge is dependent on the mind as that is exists in the mind but more that everything we claim to be knowledge always has to be obtained through the mind since knowledge is an entity that can only exist because of the existence of the mind. So knowledge cannot be written down on a paper in order to make it independent of the mind. Since then it would no longer be knowledge.
“What if – like Fermat’s theorem – people always considered it is impossible to crack it and suddenly a guy came along who cracked it? From this it follows that even mathematical trues are impossible because of our human beings flawed capacity to get to know the truth.”
To begin with people didn’t always consider that Fermat’s Theorem would be impossible to crack. Regardless, it wouldn’t follow anyway that mathematical truths are impossible because Andrew Wiles solved something that some people considered impossible to crack. So you’ve failed Logic 101 there hot on the heels of setting up your Straw Man.
Thanks for the article, Rob.
Personally, I much enjoyed Nietzsche’s shorter introduction to epistemology:
Daybreak 243,
The two Courses When we endeavour to examine the mirror in itself we discover in the end that we can detect nothing there but the things which it reflects. If we wish to grasp the things reflected we touch nothing in the end but the mirror. This is the general history of knowledge.
That’s indeed a beautiful description. However, I can’t help but wondering whether Nietzsche is – with his usage of the word “mirror” – referring to (1) the world out there – that is, nature and everything else beyond our own mind providing us with images about what might be out there – or (2) to our minds as being the mirror we inevitably end up in when reflecting upon the things as they might be out there? In case Nietzsche is using the second interpretation of the mirror as it lying inside of us because of which it would be possible for us to reflect upon, I agree wholeheartedly with him. However, in case Nietzsche is using the first interpretation, I am not so sure whether it would ever be possible for him to “touch in the end nothing but the mirror”. After all, how could one know when one has reached that mirror?
What interpretation do you think Nietzsche is referring to?
Hi Rob,
Reasonably sure that, in this instance at least, Nietzsche is going with something closer to you version (2).
“our minds as being the mirror we inevitably end up in when reflecting upon the things as they might be out there?”
The problem is that we never even end up in it. We can’t seem to get behind it, on it, or in it. We don’t see ourselves in the mirror, “we” are as much that play on the surface as everything else.
The mind is the “mirror,” that which impressions – or so it seems – fall upon. We try to come to grips with what the mirror/mind “is” but we end up discussing not the mirror, but the images at play on the surface. When we turn to those things, all we can say about them is that which we already new – they are there at play on the surface of the mirror.
Nietzsche, as per usual, doesn’t bother with trying to find a way out. He ends with his little shrug of the shoulder and moves on.
Thank you for your clarification. Now I believe I understand what Nietzsche meant to say. What I find interesting is that – although Nietzsche proclaims that we will never be able to investigate the mirror itself – he nonetheless presumes the existence of some kind of mirror which – to me – seems like he presumes the existence – although we might not be able to capture it – of some kind of stable entity upon which changing impressions might be imprinted. That is, he does not confine himself to saying that the impressions are all we have. Doesn’t that seem to contradict his own point of view?
“…he nonetheless presumes the existence of some kind of mirror which – to me – seems like he presumes the existence – although we might not be able to capture it – of some kind of stable entity upon which changing impressions might be imprinted.”
I think that Nietzsche, in the main, adopts the folk position “of course there is something and it is absurd to even question it.”
So, yes I do not think it would be unfair to say he presumes such a thing.
However, I don’t believe it contradicts his position as I don’t think he adopts a position here. To my mind, rather than advocating an epistemology, he seems to be more interested in poking fun at the two main historical positions. Nietzsche at this stage is still keen on science, and still primarily interested in critique and observation.
Daybreak, sits between Human all to Human and Gay Science. It seems to me that this Nietzsche is in the process of establishing what he is against, not what he is for. The mirror analogy speaks to the philosophical “singularities” where our accounts breakdown. I don’t think Nietzsche is really concerned to find a solution.
Thank you for the clarification. That interpretation of Nietzsche would – indeed – make more sense.
I fail to see how this approach to science benefits any form of inquiry, reflection, or observation. I also would like to point out that a true scientist, or even simply a student or admirer (if you will) of science would hardly find these supposed insights as worth investigating. If someone is concerned with what there “is” in the world and we have a seamless method of determining that, calling the conclusions or what they “mean” into question is little more than a thought exercise, on par with doing a dollar store Sudoku book: entertaining and time-consuming.
The way in which the author depicts “science” in this essay is only a small part of the picture, reductionist to make a rather simple and disposable point. The cause and effect scenario (exposure to a nightshade) was, for the majority of human existence, just a basic tenet of being alive, and their use-value never called into question or the object of consideration. Pre-scientific societies, particularly pre-literate societies, simply took these “observations” as a given, and wasted nary a second on their investigation; the plants with the leaves shaped as such are avoided.
In other words, the conclusions in the essay are only the conclusions made by a far removed observer, not someone immersed in the world of experience. Any conclusions made from such a removed vantage point are irrelevant to the world of experience While the supposed philosopher may question the method, conclusions, or value of either, the “scientist” is determining the cause of disease and its prevention and cure (among countless other highly valuable “inferences.”) Again, it must be stressed that this activity has been going on for all of human existence, and has only been labeled as science recently.
“Given that we are unable to ever come to know whether our beliefs about the world around us are absolutely true or false, we cannot claim that facts as we use them in our language are a true resemblance of the world out there nor – and I will come back to this point – of fully conceptualistic – that is, mental – issues like mathematics. We simply do not know whether we have reached the bottom for therefore we would have to know what the bottom is”
Yet another egregious mischaracterization of science. Only religion makes these grandiose truth claims. Furthermore – and this is so simple I am in awed disbelief that it’s discussed with even a minor degree of sincerity – people don’l “believe” in science. They understand why it works. We don’t “believe” evolution exists, we observe it.
Thank you, Dominic, for reading my article and for taking the time to comment on it. I indeed agree with you that the conclusions I reach are those of “a far removed observer, not someone immersed in the world of experience”. And that was exactly what I tried to point out. I tried to pay attention to the process through which knowledge is created. My intention was not to disregard scientific knowledge as being wrong in any way but just to show that the scientific enterprise is not just concerned with mind-less representations of nature but that we human beings play an indispensable role – with the creative power we have – to come to inferences about the way the world works. And that it is in this capability of ours – to be creative and to connect the dots – in which our contribution – next to nature’s contribution – to the creation of knowledge lays.
What I tried to point out by stressing the act of believing – and the resemblances between the realms of religion and science in this regard – is that trueness is not a property that is imposed upon us but that it is always dependent upon human beings – and the creative powers and ideas they possess – whether or not so-called facts are being created and that is dependent upon one’s beliefs about the accuracy of the manner in which these facts are created whether or not one, the outside observer, consents to the truth of the claims produced.
I am sorry, truly I am, but I have to ask: are you aware of Aristotles contribution to the scientific method of observation? Or simply the “scientific method?” If so, can you please relate your above response to said method and expound upon their comparability, or incompatibility, as you see it?
I am sorry, I truly am, but I have to ask: do really think that being such a snarky tosser is really necessary?
Thank you Geoff. To Dominic: I believe I have not read Aristotle’s contribution regarding the scientific method of observation per se but I will definitely take a look at it. Thank you very much for the suggestion.
Well said. No, totally unnecessary. Consider me chastised. Rob, thank you so much for contributing to the PEL philosophy discussion and I look forward to more. I went ahead and read the Stanford Philosophy encyclopedia link you provided and appreciated it and learned from it. I wont waste everyones time with snarkyness here, however I stand by the views I expressed, just not the spirit in which I expressed them.
Hi Dominic.
I agree with your comments and would hardly characterise what you said as snarky. Nor would I have called you a tosser for simply voicing an opposing view.
People who wrap themselves in God, claim that we can never really know anything and go out of their way to maintain the mystery are the first to take offence and the first to be critical of opinions unlike their own.
Poor old Daniel Dennett, as a case in point, has copped a hiding on this podcast for no reason other than that he has a different world view than someone else.
Vive la Science.
“I … would hardly characterise what you said as snarky.”
I did.
“Nor would I have called you a tosser for simply voicing an opposing view.”
Neither would I.
“People who wrap themselves in God…”
You need to seperate philsophical analysis of science and its epistemic justification from some of the more simplistic criticisms of science that come from a small segment of religion.
If you would like to know more about Philosophy of science, the Stanford Encyclopedia has a range of articles you can read. As well as articles on Hume, Locke, Popper and many, many others who have made significant contributions to the subject there entries dealing with more specific issues in science.
Her is the contents page for entrys under “science”
http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html#s
Based on your comments below, you might want to start here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
“Vive la Science”
Indeed. ‘Science’ and its methods of knowledge aquisistion is a powerful tool. However, if you are at all interetsed in participating in this type of conversation, then it is not a bad idea to know what the conversation is actually about.
Thanks Geoff.
“Nor would I have called you a tosser for simply voicing an opposing view.”
“Neither would I.”
I’m assuming by this you mean that you didn’t call him a tosser simply because he voiced an opposing view. Fair enough, so why did you call him a tosser? I think you could do with improving your bedside manner somewhat.
“Her is the contents page for entrys under “science””
“http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html#s”
Thanks for those references. I certainly don’t profess to know much about this and I will look at the references you suggest. I have to say that I’m not sure how seriously I’ll be able to take some of this stuff based on some of the things I’ve heard on the podcast. Take for example Descartes’ argument for the existence of God. That, to me, is verging on childish and ridiculous and, if not summarily dismissable on its face, can certainly be dismissed without much consideration. To contend that it is a strong argument, as Wes has done on the podcast, is nuts in my view. On the basis of Descartes’ logic I could make up any nonsense I like and, so long as it is clear and distinct, have it be justified. For example, I have a clear and distinct idea that there are invisible meerkats who kick-started the universe and intervene from time to time. Therefore there are invisible meerkats ….. voila. QED. Crazy stuff.
“However, if you are at all interetsed in participating in this type of conversation, then it is not a bad idea to know what the conversation is actually about.”
There is that bedside manner again.
Russel,
“so why did you call him a tosser? I think you could do with improving your bedside manner somewhat.”
– I felt he was acting like one and I wanted him to stop. Dominic’s response indicates that he is clearly not a tosser, and that he understood my objection. By re-purposing his turn of phrase I was hoping to imply a certain degree of irony. This is not my normal bedside manner. I didn’t enjoy pressing submit on that comment.
“…I’m not sure how seriously I’ll be able to take some of this stuff…”
You don’t have to take it seriously in the end. There is a lot that I find ludicrous. I often have visceral reactions to texts. But I recommend following the advice often given on the Podcast. Be generous, make the effort to engage with the text. You never know where you might end up.
"There is that bedside manner again"
– Sorry if it sounded sarcastic as that wasn't the tone I was going for. Nonetheless, I still think it is reasonable advice.
Geoff,
“But I recommend following the advice often given on the Podcast. Be generous, make the effort to engage with the text. You never know where you might end up.”
I agree with this advice completely and I make an effort to entertain opposing views, even though I struggle from time to time with nonsense like Descartes’ argument for the existence of God.
I only wish that some of the podcasters themselves would take their own advice and practice what they preach. I have heard Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Peter Singer and others derided on the podcast with little if any justification. I don’t think there was much effort to engage with the text in those situations. I think I remember someone saying, and I may be paraphrasing, “oh well, if it’s not Dennett then it’s someone else I hate for thinking that.” This doesn’t sound much like a well founded critical attitude towards Dennett.
I do love the podcast in general but it should also be open to criticism on matters like these occasional blips of obvious bias.
“I have heard Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Peter Singer and others derided on the podcast with little if any justification.”
Probably reasonable to remember that the guys were Phil Majors who were at one time intent on blah blah blah…
While it is true that may provide little justification on the podcast, I am confident they have their reasons. Harris not so, but the other two have been known, read and discussed in philosophical circles for a while. Singer’s Animal Liberation came out in 1975. Dennet has been publishing since the 60’s.
Philosophy predates Skeptic’s Guide to the Universe.
“oh well, if it’s not Dennett then it’s someone else I hate for thinking that.”
I found that perfectly hilarious. There is plenty of this kind of banter. Given the regular mocking of many people of all philosophical flavours, it is hard to see this as bias.
“oh well, if it’s not Dennett then it’s someone else I hate for thinking that.”
“I found that perfectly hilarious. There is plenty of this kind of banter. Given the regular mocking of many people of all philosophical flavours, it is hard to see this as bias.”
The fact that you find this particular comment hilarious, or whether there is a general banter of this kind on the show, has nothing to do with whether or not there is an underlying bias against Dennett in particular.
You can’t see a bias from a particular member of the podcast against Dennett and I think it is as plain as the nose on your face.
You saw Dominic as a tosser handing out a snarky reply and I did not.
You see Descartes’ argument for the existence of God as reasonable and I think it’s ridiculous.
Perhaps we should take a leap of faith and agree to disagree.
“You can’t see a bias from a particular member of the podcast against Dennett and I think it is as plain as the nose on your face.”
Okay. I probably should say, that Wes is not a fan of Dennett. You believe it is for no reason. I believe he has his reasons. i.e., I don’t think it is “just because” Dennett holds a certain worldview.
“You see Descartes’ argument for the existence of God as reasonable and I think it’s ridiculous.”
I haven’t addressed Descarte’s argument for the existence of God here, nor stated that I find it reasonable, so I am not sure what you are getting at here. I didn’t pay a great deal of attention to that episode.
“Okay. I probably should say, that Wes is not a fan of Dennett. You believe it is for no reason. I believe he has his reasons. i.e., I don’t think it is “just because” Dennett holds a certain worldview. ”
I’m sure he has his reasons. I just doubt the objectivity of them. I’d love to listen to a PEL podcast with Dennett on it, although I strongly suspect Wes would be absent.
“I haven’t addressed Descarte’s argument for the existence of God here, nor stated that I find it reasonable, so I am not sure what you are getting at here. I didn’t pay a great deal of attention to that episode.”
Sorry, I must have got my wires crossed. That said, there is not much attention you need to pay. In short here is the argument: “I have a clear and distinct idea of God, therefore God exists.” What do you think of that logic?
“I have a clear and distinct idea of God, therefore God exists.” What do you think of that logic?
That’s not the argument.
A summary of it looks sort of like this according to the Stanford:
There is nothing wrong with the logic of the argument. The conclusion follows from the premises. But whether an arguments is logically valid a is separate issue to whether it’s conclusion is true. A valid argument only requires that the conclusion follows from the premises.
The premises are where you would criticise it. It obviously relies on Descarte’s principle of Clear and Distinct Perception. So unless you buy into that the argument is not actually going to be persuasive.
If you are interested, the Stanford article has the various objections and criticisms.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/#3
The argument, as an argument, is not absurd.
However, I don’t buy the premises, so I don’t buy the conclusion.
Hi Geoff,
Thank you for the effort that must have taken. Note to self: Go to the Stanford!
I understand what you are saying about the conclusion following from the premises but I could invent any nonsense I like and structure it in the same logically valid way.I’m looking beyond the validity (in the technical sense) and seeing the thing as a whole as completely ridiculous. Like you, I don’t buy the premises or the conclusion.
Here is my version of the argument:
1) Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
2) I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
existence is contained in the idea of an invisible meerkat in my backyard.
3) Therefore, there is an invisible meerkat in my backyard.
Is this argument not as valid (in the technical sense) as Descartes’ in your opinion?
I think it’s slightly more compelling actually as there is very strong evidence that meerkats exist and that I have a backyard.
Also, can you not just perform the following little tweak?
1) Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
2) I clearly and distinctly perceive that non-existence is contained in the idea of God.
3) Therefore, God doesn’t exist.
Ok – I had some serious cutting and pasting issues above. This is the revised version …
Hi Geoff,
Thank you for the effort that must have taken. Note to self: Go to the Stanford!
I understand what you are saying about the conclusion following from the premises but I could invent any nonsense I like and structure it in the same logically valid way.I’m looking beyond the validity (in the technical sense) and seeing the thing as a whole as completely ridiculous. Like you, I don’t buy the premises or the conclusion.
Here is my version of the argument:
1) Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
2) I clearly and distinctly perceive that existence is contained in the idea of an invisible meerkat in my backyard.
3) Therefore, there is an invisible meerkat in my backyard.
Is this argument not as valid (in the technical sense) as Descartes’ in your opinion?
I think it’s slightly more compelling actually as there is very strong evidence that meerkats exist and that I have a backyard.
Also, can you not just perform the following little tweak?
1) Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
2) I clearly and distinctly perceive that non-existence is contained in the idea of God.
3) Therefore, God doesn’t exist.
How can a thing have non-existance as a property? A thing is by definition something that exists, if it’s non existance then it is no thing (nothing) and then it cannot have any properties, including non-existance.
Making the claim “there exists an invisible meerkat in my backyard” is the same as saying “there is such a thing such as an invisible meerkat in my backyard”, but no-one would take this as an argument proving there to be such a thing. But why not? Surley they would agree that existance is a property
of a possible invisible meerkat in your backyard if it did exist, but that is what you are trying to prove to begin with, you are just begging the question.
Now if you could convince someone that a property of a invisible meerkat in your backyard is necessary existence, you would on the other hand prove that it exists trivially.
The real problem for this kind of argument is that convincing someone that something has the property of necessary existence seems much harder than convincing someone that something exists.
Thats why some cheap-shoots use improved versions of this arguing , “well is there not a possibility of a thing with a property of necessary existence?”,
and then trying to be nice and agreeing with them out of kindness, bam! god exists. Underhanded tricks I tell you.
Russell,
“Is this argument not as valid (in the technical sense) as Descartes’ in your opinion?”
I would have included “necessary existence” instead of just “existence” at 2). I am not sure what perfections that Meerkats have, but the modal axiom “□A→A”
If it is necessary that A, then A seems to be important in getting you Meerkat into the world.
Did you check out the parodies of the ontological argument at Stanford?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#ParOntArg
Hi Geoff,
“I would have included “necessary existence” instead of just “existence” at 2).”
It was meant to be “necessary existence”, since it should have been a straight copy of what you presented to me. Sadly I had some copying and pasting issues.
“Did you check out the parodies of the ontological argument at Stanford?”
Thanks for the link. I’ll be having a look at those at my leisure.
One other thing occurred to me that is odd about the Descartes argument:
Let’s say that …
(1) I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God.
(2) You don’t.
Then (1) implies God exists but (2) doesn’t.
There are so many issues with this argument. As Mark put it in epsiode 2, “it’s lame”.
Must this be either/or? I would say that knowledge is constructed by scientists (or observers) as a part of a rigorous fact seeking process which is independently verifiable by multiple observers. This lends credence to the the facts which are discovered as true knowledge and not just belief ( thereby attaining a more reliable status than mere religious belief based on independent observation or testimony). Or if you feel uncomfortable with those terms, couldn’t you say (and I have only a base understanding of epistemology) that scientists have justified belief which is grounded in some form of perception or induction, whereas the religious belief is at best tenuously in testimony and not independently verifiable in those that claim it.
This knowledge however is always based on the limits of our observation at this point, and maybe that’s the missing qualifier – knowledge “based on the limits of our understanding at its current point.” As new observations are made, beliefs are formed and then can be justified – and our realm of knowledge is expanded. So yes, maybe knowledge is always being constructed but these “facts” exist in the world whether we have discovered them or not. They are true in the sense that they represent a more expansive or accurate version of what exists in the world then our current representation can comprehend.
Now will we ever come to have absolute knowledge of the world in itself, that is an interesting question. My hope is that like the convergent series approaches its limit we will eventually either be close to true knowledge that the difference between it and our representation is infinestmal, however it is much more likely that we will reach a threshold of the limits our biology is capable of understanding.
I’m only an amateur so please feel free to correct my ignorance – I did enjoy the article very much.
Thank you very much for you valuable contribution Aaron and I personally do not believe there is any difference between an amateur and a professional; one should be judged on the basis of the value of their ideas.
I agree with you that on a purely empirical level – that is, the level at which sense information enters each of our bodies – science seems much more defendable than religion (given that we assume that empiricism is the dominant philosophical tenet of the day). However – and that was what I was trying to underpin – one cannot escape the act of faith in coming to whatever generalization imaginable. And that is – as I tried to say – where the realms of religion and science coincide. Because it is the last step – the decision to consider a belief to be true – in which reason cannot support us but in which only faith can lead the way. And of course: you can debate about the extent in which religion and science differ in the usage of faith in the development of their “true” beliefs. But at the core lies the act of faith as being the omnipresent and indispensable link for holding any belief whatsoever.
Maybe – as I believe you also proclaim – we should make a difference between knowledge – as being the beliefs about the world that we consider to be right – and facts – the manners in which our external world seems to presents itself to us. When viewed in that manner, one could righteously pose that all knowledge is constructed even though the facts – as they might or might not exist out there – can be assumed to stay same.
What you say about reaching the thresholds of our human understanding might indeed very well be true. That would explain why we human beings are incapable of conceptualizing philosophical issues like what might be the connecting part between our bodies and minds and other questions the philosophical community seems to struggle with for centuries.
“Because it is the last step – the decision to consider a belief to be true – in which reason cannot support us but in which only faith can lead the way”.
That is such nonsense. When I drop a pen 100,000 times and it hits the ground every time there is no faith involved in my acceptance of the theory of gravity. As others have said before me “faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don’t have any good evidence”.
So far as facts go they are not necessarily evident at given points in time but they are nevertheless facts. The Earth has always been round and has always revolved around the sun. This has always been a fact regardless of what people believed at certain points.
Despite your attempts to equate them science and religion will always remain are poles apart.
Thank you for reading my article Russell and taking the time to comment on it. I believe we seem to disagree about the role the element of faith plays within the realm of scientific thought.
First of all, let me say that I am not trying to drag science down to religion. Because that (1) would mean that science would in some sense be higher than religion and (2) that I would be dragging something down. I am in no way claiming to esteem religion and science on the level. I am only trying to draw attention to the element of faith that is present in science, just like it is present in all of our beliefs in daily life.
Secondly, you are right in saying that: “there is no faith involved in my acceptance of the theory of gravity”. However, I never claimed there was. I said – and I quote – “Because it is the last step – the decision to consider a belief to be true (emphasize added) – in which reason cannot support us but in which only faith can lead the way”. I am pointing to the subtle difference between accepting a theory – as you mention – and considering a belief to be true – as I did. That is, considering a belief to be true in an objective manner is an endeavor requiring a certain degree of faith – where faith should in no sense be interpreted in a religious manner – while accepting a theory might not require any faith at all.
Thanks Rob.
We certainly disagree about faith. I don’t see any need at all for faith, as used in the religious sense. Faith is the bridge from A to B when there is no path via reason. I don’t see faith as being present in the scientific method at all unless you want to play a semantic game with what faith means in relation to science. The bridge from A to B in science is the Bridge of Reason. You can’t cross that bridge with blind faith. You need an evidence ticket before you’re allowed onto the bridge.
“That is, considering a belief to be true in an objective manner is an endeavor requiring a certain degree of faith – where faith should in no sense be interpreted in a religious manner – while accepting a theory might not require any faith at all.”
There it is! So you need faith to be interpreted in some different sense to get you over the line. To me, without this obfuscation, there is no degree of faith required to make a scientific claim. If you are making such a claim on the basis of faith (in the same sense as it is used in relation to religion for the sake of a level playing field) then you are not doing science. Science is about discovery and follows where the evidence leads. Faith is about getting to an already prescribed position regardless of the evidence, or lack thereof.
If people want to believe in God that’s fine but they shouldn’t pretend that their position is equally justified just because the existence of God can’t be proved or disproved. That doesn’t make it a heads or tails proposition.
Russel,
“There it is! So you need faith to be interpreted in some different sense to get you over the line.”
Yes, Rob is using faith in a sense you are unfamiliar with, but it is not an illegitimate one.
Faith has usages beyond the religious sense. It derives etymologically from the Latin fido, fidere which means to basically ‘to trust’, as opposed to the currently common usage of belief in the absence of evidence.
You see it in words like confide.
con- + fide which taking another step back is cum + fide
Literally: with trust
The sense is retained in confidence. In statistics, which play a major role in science, you have confidence measures.
Con-fide-nce – the level or degree of trust you have in something.
The main idea that Rob is getting at is the logical gap that most epistemic accounts suffer from when attempting to establish what we can justly claim to know. If you are someone practicing science today, chances are that you may not be familiar with these discussions.
They aren’t really necessary to practice, but most of the methods used in science are premised on these considerations.
Ideas like falsifiability in science come about from discussion on the problem of logical induction. In very short form, a conclusion is never logically justified in no matter how many times you run an experiment. Even if you have run a test a million times and got the same result, one case is sufficient to break the rule. Hence, falsifiability as a methodological principle in science.
It is of course entirely reasonable to assume that the rule is strong after a million cases, but this is not a logical proof .
Geoff,
Maybe I didn’t explain myself well enough.
I have no objection to a word having multiple meanings but generally when someone says something like “religion and science both require faith” they do not point that fact out and most people would naturally take faith to be meant in the same sense on each count. This is generally, but not always, an attempt to make the point by obfuscation. Once called on it they will say that “oh, I mean faith in this sense not in that sense”, but they don’t say that unless called.
“Even if you have run a test a million times and got the same result, one case is sufficient to break the rule.”
Of course. If, on my 100,001st release of the pen, it hovers in mid air and doesn’t fall, Gravity is dead. That’s all good and no scientist worth his salt would dispute this point. In fact science is all about provisional findings, revision and falsifiability. Religion, on the other hand, needs to be dragged kicking and screaming, generally over hundreds of years, to change any of its dogma.
“… generally when someone says something like “religion and science both require faith” they do not point that fact out and most people would naturally take faith to be meant in the same sense on each count.”
Yes. However, I don’t think Rob is guilty of equivocation here. In my opinion he is using faith in a consistent manner.
You need to be reading it from the get-go taking into account the epistemic issue, the relationship between a subject and their objects. Rob is clearly writing from a point of view that takes issue with the term mind-independent.
To my mind, in this context the phrase Faith is the bridge from A to B when there is no path via reason argues that at some stage we must move past the epistemic/logical problems and assent to a proposition. If we accept the philosophical problems as genuine problems, then we admit that we can never get there by “reason alone” and must at some stage must leap across this gap.
You need to think about it in terms of where “faith” fits in with the wider argument. You shouldn’t view it in isolation from the other premises.
“That’s all good and no scientist worth his salt would dispute this point. In fact science is all about provisional findings, revision and falsifiability.”
Yes, and the reasons for this are historically philosophical, not scientific.
Plenty of good scientists are unaware of the philosophical reasons for the adoption of such principles. The empirical sciences as we know them emerge from philosophical disputes about how we can justly claim “to know” something.
I think that knowledge of this history, while not strictly necessary, is still very useful. The difference is in knowing why I am doing something, not just how to do it.
Thank you Geoff for pointing out the meaning of the notion of confidence in science and the implications one could derive from this.
My aim in writing this article was primarily to point out to the inherent necessity of the human contribution being present in the formation – and interpretation – of scientific facts. I believe you capture this belief quite well by referring to the difference between deduction and induction, although I believe both of these methods depend on human creativity in some sense, whether this is in making the inferences or in the formation of the elements being present in one’s theories.
“I believe both of these methods depend on human creativity in some sense”
“making” the connection, as it were.
That’s indeed a major part where creativity comes in.