We discussed Nietzsche's conception of truth as presented in his essay "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," written in 1873 but unpublished until after his death with guest Jessica Berry of Georgia State University, who published Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition
This Nietzsche essay has been extremely influential for postmodernists, and argues that truth is:
A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.
More radical on the face of it that the pragmatist conception of truth, by which "the true" is in some way defined as what is useful for human endeavor, it sounds like Nietzsche is denying that truth exists at all. But why should we take Nietzsche's claim seriously if it's not itself true?
Jessica had pretty much no tolerance for this whole line of interpreting Nietzsche. Based on close reading of the text and familiarity with Nietzsche's other work, it's far more reasonable to see him as a believer in truth but a skeptic about the dogmatic claims of metaphysicians. His concern is not to give a theory of truth at all, but to analyze where this "will to truth" that philosophers value so highly might come from. In keeping with his later analysis of this will to truth in the Genealogy of Morals, he sees the philosopher's monomainia regarding truth as a form of asceticism, of life-hating self-denial. First off, illusions are not always bad for us, and may in fact be necessary for the continued well-functioning of society. More importantly, the urge towards truth when taken to extremes (or maybe even to just its natural end point given the way we normally use the term) becomes a will towards acquiring something that due to our knowledge capabilities simply impossible: we want pure facts, unmediated by our own faculties. In this, Nietzsche's epistemology is the same as Schopenhauer's and Kant's: there's a distinction between the thing-in-itself and the world of appearance, and the latter, which is all we can know, inevitably bears the traces of our own psychology, our own interests. (For more discussion of the pragmatic conception of truth, listen to our episodes on William James: part 1 and part 2.)
As an optional source to help sort through the various scholarly interpretations of Nietzsche, you might want to look at Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy
Buy a book with a good translation of Nietzsche's essay in it
Nietzsche’s proto-deconstruction of ‘truth’ in this essay is exemplary of his claim from The Will to Power that “the highest values devalue themselves.” He does *not* say “we devalue society’s highest values form our view from nowhere,” but rather, essentially, that the values themselves (the rules of the game, so to speak), if self-reflected, disintegrate.
I don’t think that Nietzsche wants to ground his criticisms in ‘Truth’ (i.e. in some deeper truth from which we could attack conventional ‘truth’), but rather to self-consciously use the tools of our anthropocentric truth-game against themselves. For him, as you quote above, “truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions” – but the point of his attempt to remind us of this is not to escape the illusions (which would be impossible for human beings), but rather to be conscious of their illusory nature, thus opening up the possibility of the creation of new values.
So my response to the criticism that the Nietzschean deconstruction of truth is akin to one sawing off a tree branch upon which one is sitting would be: yeah, that’s exactly right – except that the tree never had any roots to begin with, and we were in free-fall all along.
“But why should we take Nietzsche’s claim seriously if it’s not itself true?”
And
“So my response to the criticism that the Nietzschean deconstruction of truth is akin to one sawing off a tree branch upon which one is sitting would be: yeah, that’s exactly right – except that the tree never had any roots to begin with, and we were in free-fall all along.” (That’s really good.)
This seems to me a classic statement of the philosophically suicidal nature of radical skepticism. I used to dismiss this as a quibble — an artifact reflecting that language can tie itself in knots, something to win dorm room arguments with — but now I’m very curious to know if anyone’s addressed this who has not resorted to metaphysics.
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/d/dickstein-pragmatism.html
“Berthelot was probably the first to call Nietzsche “a German pragmatist,” and the first to emphasize the resemblance between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the pragmatist theory of truth. This resemblance–frequently noted since, notably in a seminal chapter of Arthur Danto’s book on Nietzsche–is most evident in the The Gay Science. There Nietzsche says “We do not even have any organ at all for knowing, for `truth’; we `know’ … just as much as may be useful in the interest of the human herd.” This Darwinian view lies behind James’ claim that “thinking is for the sake of behavior” and his identification of truth as “the good in the way of belief.”
That identification amounts to accepting Nietzsche’s claim that human beings should be viewed, for epistemological purposes, as what Nietzsche called “clever animals.” Beliefs are to be judged solely by their utility in fulfilling these animals’ varied needs. James and Nietzsche did for the word “true” what John Stuart Mill had done for the word “right.” Just as Mill says that there is no ethical motive apart from the desire for the happiness of human beings, so James and Nietzsche say that there is no will to truth distinct from the will to happiness. All three philosophers think that the terms “true” and “right” gain their meaning from their use in evaluating the relative success of efforts to achieve happiness. “
I’d love to hear you guys incorporate some discussion of book three of the genealogy of morals, especially its thoughts on the nature of the will to truth. I think it has a lot to say about what Nietzsche has in mind when he suggests that truth is self undermining. Its also one of my favorite works of his, so there’s that too.
It’d be Very interesting to at some point hear discussion of contemporary Nietzsche commentators and how their interpretations contrast.. -particularly Brian Leiter and Alexander Nehamas…
But also then also going back a bit to Heidegger, latter on Rorty and of course all those 20th century Frenchmen.
I would also suggest another essay on this topic entitled, “Perspectivism and Truth in Nietzsche’s Philosophy: A Critical Look at the Apparent Contradiction as a brief supplement.
Yet another essay for you consideration, “Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil: ‘Why insist on the truth?’.